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Introduction 
 
 
All stable societies have to find some agreed process and procedure by which moral 
conflicts can be adjudicated and managed, if not resolved. Within world politics, the 
challenge is still more daunting given the diversity and divisiveness of sentiments, 
attachments, languages, cultures, ways-of-living, combined with the massive 
inequalities of power, wealth and capacity. A global moral community in which claims 
about justice can both secure authority and be genuinely accessible to a broad swathe 
of humanity will be one that is built around some minimal notion of just process, that 
prioritizes institutions that embed procedural fairness, and that cultivates the shares 
political culture and the habits of argumentation and deliberation on which such 
institutions necessarily depend.1 
 
─ Andrew Hurrell, The State of International Society 
 
1. A DILEMMA IN MONTEVIDEO 
 
In 2004 I worked as a researcher at the Mercosur Secretariat in Montevideo. I was part of an 
informal group of young scholars who periodically gathered to explore the possibility of 
creating an integrated foreign policy for Mercosur, the common market of the Southern 
Cone. At the time, Mercosur consisted of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay2; and 
from the South American point of view, its internal power asymmetries posed a dilemma. 
The essence of the problem was that Brazil dwarfed the other member states. Would 
Mercosur become a launching pad for Brazil’s bid to become a global power? Or a mutually 
beneficial, EU-like political structure capable of containing its largest member? 
This dilemma pointed to a larger question. Would a rising Brazil align itself with the 
‘West’? Or would it pursue a more independent strategy, and confront the system established 
by the rich Western nations? Events in 2004, during my time at the Secretariat, proved 
inconclusive. On the one hand, Brazil pursued a strategy of alignment by leading the UN 
peacekeeping mission in Haiti. On the other hand, President Lula positioned himself as a 
champion of the poor, adopted what Paulo Roberto de Almeida calls an “evident anti-
hegemonic leaning”3, and used a confrontational rhetoric which allied Brazil with the Third 
World.4 In short, Brazil seemed to employ a mix of both integration and confrontation.  
                                                 
1 Hurell, Andrew (2006). The State of International Society. In: Richard Little and John 
Williams (eds.) The Anarchical Society in a Globalized World. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006. 
191-215 
2 See, for example: Hirst, Mônica (2005). The United States and Brazil. A Long Road of Unmet 
Expectations. New York: Routledge, 2005. Venezuela joined Mercosur in 2006; the Paraguayan Senate 
has yet to approve Venezuela’s entry.  
3 Gregory, Denise and Paulo Roberto de Almeida (2008). Brazil and the G8 Heiligendamm Process, in 
Cooper, Andrew F. and Agata Antkiewicz (2008). Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons 
from the Heiligendamm Process, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008 
4 Juan de Onis notes that “historically, politically and culturally, Brazil is part of the West (…) but in 
the era of globalization, it has shifted to a more independent position”. de Onis, Juan (2008). Brazil’s 
Big Moment. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, Issue 6, pp. 110-122, Nov/Dec 2008 
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I left Montevideo for Harvard in 2005. At the Kennedy School of Government, I 
studied rising powers for two years, focusing on the countries at the fringes of the 
international institutions - countries like Brazil and India, where I spent several months in 
2006 and 2007 to conduct research. Since then, my research has focused increasingly on the 
question of whether India and Brazil would choose a course of confrontation, or if they 
would align with the West.5  
Brazil’s and India’s behavior during and immediately after the Cold War has been the 
subject of numerous insightful studies.6 But in more recent years, both countries have 
undergone such fundamental transformations that we know relatively little about their 
newfound positions. In 2003, Raja Mohan wrote that “[India] has begun to move towards a 
new set of assumptions about the nature of its interaction with the world.”7 Despite their 
growing importance, relatively little has been written about Brazil’s and India’s place in the 
twenty-first century, since many studies focus on China.8 In addition, there are still 
surprisingly few international relations specialists from Brazil.9 Studying Brazil’s and India’s 
more recent past is therefore of particular interest, especially because both countries’ strategic 
actions could have important consequences for the system as a whole. 
So how do rising powers on the periphery of both international institutions and the 
global distribution of power - countries which seek to change their position in the present 
context of the internationalization of authority - behave, react and construct a discourse?10 
When trying to resolve this dilemma, liberal institutionalist theorists argue that the rising 
powers’ domestic political system matters. They predict that democracies are more likely to 
engage in international institutions than non-democratic regimes.11 They expect 
democratically organized rising powers to become “responsible stakeholders”12, adapt to the 
                                                 
5 Put differently, Naazneen Barma, Ely Ratner and Steven Weber asked in 2007: “What will be the 
relationship between these rising powers and an international system still governed by “Western” 
conceptions of order and based on the primacy of post–World War II U.S.-sponsored rules, drawn 
from liberal models of capitalism and democracy?” (Barma, Naazneen, Ely Ratner and Steven Weber 
(2007). A World Without the West, The National Interest, Number 90, Jul./Aug. 2007)  
Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Relations in Brasília, categorizes 
countries into “normal” and “confrontational” and identifies Brazil as one of the latter. (Desafios 
brasileiros na era dos gigantes. Rio de Janeiro: Contraponto, 2006) 
6 See, for example: Spektor, Matias (2009). Kissinger e o Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Livraria da Travessa, 
2009 
7 Mohan, C. Raja (2004). Crossing the Rubicon. The Shaping of India’s New Foreign Policy. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004 
8 Messner, Dirk and John Humphrey (2006). China and India in the Global Governance Arena. 
Conference Paper. Seventh Annual Global Development Conference: At the Nexus of Global Chance. 
Pre-Conference Workshop on Asian and Other Drivers of Global Chance. January 18-19, 2006 
9 Da Cruz, José A. (2005). Review: Brazil's International Relations at the Dawn of the Twenty-First 
Century. Latin American Politics and Society, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Spring, 2005), pp. 115-122. Baldev Raj 
Nayar and T.V. Paul argue that the search for major power status and significant role in the 
international system dominates India’s foreign policy making. In: Nayar, Baldev Raj and T.V. Paul. 
(2003). India in the World Order. Searching for Major-Power Status. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003 
10 Herz, Mônica (2007). New Directions in Brazilian Foreign Relations. Brazil Institute, Woodrow 
Wilson International Center for Scholars, September 28, 2007 
11 Doyle, Michael (1997). Ways of War and Peace. Realism, Liberalism and Socialism. New York: 
W.W. Norton and Company, 1997 
12 Stephens, Philip (2010). Rising Powers do not want to play by the west’s rules. Financial Times, May 
20, 2010 
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existing norms and align with the status quo, the Western-dominated system of liberal 
internationalism. Specifically, liberals argue that establishing trust between liberal 
democracies is easier, and that they tend to seek international collaboration to create a more 
transparent, predictable and stable system, thus maximizing the gains of international 
collaboration.13  
Furthermore, there is a systemic liberal institutionalist argument about why rising 
powers are likely to integrate: They face a Western-centered system that is, as Ikenberry 
stresses, “open […] and rule-based, with wide and deep political foundations,14 a force that 
will enmesh and entrap even the most powerful.”15 The Western order, which Roosevelt had 
conceived to “ensure the end of beginning of wars”16, is “hard to overturn and easy to join.”17 
Emerging actors encounter an environment in which they will be able to rise—a characteristic 
we shall call ‘intra-institutional mobility’. By seeking to limit other states’ influence in 
international institutions (“soft balancing”), both liberal and non-liberal states have the 
luxury of avoiding traditional power balancing, which involves increasing military strength.18 
Finally, due to unprecedented economic interdependence through trade, investment and 
commercial flows with others, non-established rising powers will seek to strengthen global 
governance to maintain economic stability.19  
Those in the realist camp, on the other hand, understand the system according to the 
distribution of power20 and predict that the rising powers will not “play by the West’s 
rules.”21 They generally expect rising powers to use their "newfound status to pursue 
alternative visions of world order"22 and challenge the status quo, for example by joining 
hands with other rising powers and mounting a counter-hegemonic coalition.23 Rising powers 
                                                 
13 Ikenberry, G. John (2008). The Rise of China and the Future of the West. Foreign Affairs; 
Jan/Feb2008, Vol. 87 Issue 1, pp. 23-37. In addition, Nolte argues that middle powers (such as Brazil 
and India) favor a multilateral and cooperative approach, articulating a preference for international 
institutions to assert their interests in the region and the global level. In: Detlef Nolte (2007). How to 
Compare Regional Powers: Analytical Concepts and Research Topics, Paper prepared for delivery at 
the ECPR Joint Session of Workshops, Helsinki 7 - 12 May 2007 
14 Ikenberry, G. John (2008). The Rise of China and the Future of the West. Foreign Affairs; 
Jan/Feb2008, Vol. 87 Issue 1, p23-37, 
15 Hurrell, Andrew (2006). Hegemony, liberalism and global order: what space for would-be great 
powers? International Affairs, Volume 82, Number 1, January 2006 , pp. 1-19(19) 
16 Rubenfeld, Jed (2003). The Two World Orders, The Wilson Quarterly (1976-), Vol. 27, No. 4 
(Autumn, 2003), pp. 22-36 
17 Ikenberry, G. John (2008). The Rise of China and the Future of the West. Foreign Affairs; 
Jan/Feb2008, Vol. 87 Issue 1, p23-37 
18 Ikenberry, G. John (1999). Liberal Hegemony and the Future of American Postwar Order. In Paul, 
T.V. and John A. Hall (eds.) International Order and the Future of World Politics. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999 
19 Friedman, Thomas L (2000). The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization. New 
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2000 
20 Modern scholars measure “critical mass” (population and territory), economic capability (GNP), 
and military capability as objective determinants of power, to which they sometimes add force 
postures, “strategic purpose”, and “national will”, which are less objective. (Doyle, Michael (1997). 
Ways of War and Peace. Realism, Liberalism and Socialism. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 
1997) 
21 Stephens, Philip (2010). Rising Powers do not want to play by the west’s rules. Financial Times, May 
20, 2010  
22 Narlikar, Amrita (2006). Bargaining for a Rise. Internationale Politik, 2006 
23 Sikri, Rajiv (2007). India’s Foreign Policy Priorities over the Coming Decade. Opinion Asia, 2007  
Guimarães distinguishes between “normal” and “confrontational” states, categorizing Brazil as one of 
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could create a parallel system with, as Weber puts it, “its own distinctive set of rules, 
institutions, and currencies of power, rejecting key tenets of liberal internationalism and 
particularly any notion of global civil society justifying political or military intervention.”24 In 
the same way, Krasner expects that once the balance of power moves against the West, 
emerging powers will create different principles25, for example by introducing countervailing 
power against the U.S.-led Bretton Woods institutions.26 
In sum, liberals’ and realists’ arguments dominate how to think about rising powers’ 
options. Yet, India and Brazil seem to defy theoretical pigeon-holing. Both countries have 
made integrative moves. For example, they have both turned into IMF lenders, overcoming 
strong domestic anti-Western sentiment.27 But there has been plenty of evidence over the past 
decade that Brazil and India are by no means keen on aligning with all of today’s principal 
institutions. India, for instance, was the only liberal democracy in the world that 
fundamentally stood apart from (and often against) the West during the Cold War.28 India 
refuses to sign the NPT, Brazil rejects any additional inspection provisions, and Brazil and 
India are among the WTO members who most frequently file complaints at the WTO.29 India 
has, Nayar and Paul write, “serious disagreements with several international-order norms 
promoted by the status quo powers.”30 Yet the two major theories fail to explain the dilemma 
in a satisfactory manner. The debate is limited because the terms are not defined, but more 
importantly, because we struggle to understand and categorize the world properly. Only once 
we have gained a better understanding of the international system, created a meaningful 
category for the actors in question, and clarified their options, can we determine to what 
extent the rising nations located on the fringes of today's global institutions will confront or 
align with the West. This is the goal of my dissertation.  
 
2. SEARCHING FOR A CATEGORY  
 
In this context, many scholars seek to find a categorical way of understanding the rising 
nations and the system in which they operate; so far, no one has succeeded in doing so 
                                                                                                                                               
the latter. (Guimarães, Samuel Pinheiro (2006). Desafios brasileiros na era dos gigantes. Rio de 
Janeiro: Contraponto, 2006) 
24 Barma, Nazneen, Ely Ratner and Steve Weber (2007). A World Without the West. National Interest, 
2007. The authors identify a “third way” between alignment and confrontation, yet their scenario 
contains many elements of confrontation, as it is hardly possible to simply “ignore” the Western-
dominated system without causing considerable friction.  
25 Krasner, Stephen D. (1985). Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985 
26 Messner, Dirk and John Humphrey (2006). China and India in the Global Governance Arena. 
Conference Paper. Seventh Annual Global Development Conference: At the Nexus of Global Chance. 
Pre-Conference Workshop on Asian and Other Drivers of Global Chance. January 18-19, 2006 
27 Weinlich, Silke (2010). Die Reform der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit der Vereinten Nationen: Eine 
Analyse des Verhaltens und der Positionierung wichtiger Staaten gegenüber Reformoptionen. 
Discussion Paper, German Development Institute (GDI), 2010  
28 Mohan, C. Raja (2004). Crossing the Rubicon. The Shaping of India’s New Foreign Policy. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004 
29 Narlikar, Amrita (2006). Peculiar Chauvinism or Strategic Calculation: Explaining the Negotiation 
Strategy of a Rising India, International Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 1, January 2006, pp. 77-94. 
30 Nayar, Baldev Raj and T.V. Paul (2003). India in the World Order. Searching for Major-Power 
Status. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003 
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conclusively. This challenge is not unprecedented. At fairly regular intervals, scholars and 
policy makers attempt to distinguish between countries according to categories, blocs and 
groups organized along different variables. In 1946, Winston Churchill successfully 
established such a new concept when he introduced the idea of an ‘Iron Curtain’, using 
ideology as the organizing principle. Six years later, Alfred Sauvy, building on the two worlds 
Churchill had devised, coined the term ‘Third World’ and established a concept that helped 
human beings across the world understand and analyze the international system.31 
 Today these models are no longer meaningful, and so naturally there have been many 
proposals since the turn of the century about how to reconceptualize geopolitical reality.  
Around the turn of the century, many scholars of international politics began to focus on the 
impact China’s rise would have on the global order. John Ikenberry theorized about what 
China’s rise would mean for the West32, John Mearsheimer predicted “China’s unpeaceful 
rise”33, and Martin Jacques foresaw “the rise of the Middle Kingdom and the end of the 
Western World.”34 Parag Khanna and Paul Kennedy argued that it is not only the three 
dominant powers that will shape the global order in the coming decades, but also the so-
called “Second World”, composed of the rising “pivotal” actors located on the fringes of the 
global institutions - such as South Africa, Turkey, Mexico, India and Brazil.35 In the same 
context, Fareed Zakaria and Kishore Mahbubani predict the “Post-American World”36 and 
the “rise of the rest”37, expecting that the rise of new actors will have systemic 
consequences.38 
In 2001, Jim O’Neill, head of global economic research at Goldman Sachs, sought to 
create a category for the large, fast-growing developing countries that he thought could 
symbolize the current global economic transformation. 
 An economist by training, O’Neill did not take any political aspects into account, and 
devised the group purely based on economic indicators. After initially selecting Brazil, India, 
China, Russia, Mexico and South Korea, he eventually excluded the latter two because they 
were no longer developing countries.  The resulting group, Brazil, Russia, India and China, or 
                                                 
31 Sanders, Doug (2010). Brazil and Turkey rush to the middle. The Globe and Mail. May 22, 2010  
32 Ikenberry, G. John (2008). The Rise of China and the Future of the West, Foreign Affairs; 
Jan/Feb2008, Vol. 87 Issue 1, p23-37 
33 Mearsheimer, John J. (2006). China’s Unpeaceful Rise. Current History; Apr 2006; 105, 690. For 
different theoretical approaches towards China’s rise, see: Walt, Stephen (1998). One world, many 
theories. Foreign Policy, Iss. 110; pg. 29, 1998 
34 Jacques, Martin (2009). When China rules the World. London: Penguin Group, 2009  
35 Chase, Robert, Emily Hill and Paul Kennedy (1999). The pivotal states: a new framework for US 
foreign policy in the developing world, 1999. See also: Khanna, Parag (2008). The Second World: 
Empires and Influence in the new global order. New York: Random House, 2008.  
36 Mahbubani, Kishore (2008). The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to 
the East. New York: Public Affairs, 2008. See also: Zakaria, Fareed. The Post-American World. New 
York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2008 
37 Zakaria, Fareed (2008). The Post-American World. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2008 
38 This search is by no means confined to academics alone. John McCain, US Presidential candidate in 
2008, sought to create a ‘League of Democracies’, and Charles Kupchan, member of the first Clinton 
administration, proposed the ‘Atlantic Union’ by fusing the EU and NATO, both of which would have 
redrawn the way we think of the world. (Kupchan, Charles A. Reviving the West. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 
75, No. 3 (May - Jun., 1996), pp. 92-104) 
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BRIC was, as a consequence, very heterogeneous.39 Some examples make this clear. While 
Brazil and India are democracies, Russia and China are non-democratic regimes. Russia and 
Brazil are raw material exporters, India and China import them. Brazil is non-nuclear, while 
the other three possess nuclear weapons, and India is a non-signatory of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Furthermore, China and Russia are permanent members of the 
UN Security Council, while India and Brazil are still outside.  
  Initially, BRIC’s impact was limited to the financial world in the same manner as the 
‘Asian tigers’ label that had been popular in the 1990s. Banks offered ‘BRIC investment 
models’ to the customers who were willing to invest in emerging markets. In 2003, however, 
Goldman Sachs published the report ‘Dreaming with the BRICs: The Path to 2050’. It 
predicted that by 2050, the BRIC economies would be larger in U.S. dollar terms than the G-
6, which consists of the U.S., Germany, Japan, the U.K., France and Italy.40 Not only was the 
impact immediate, but it also surpassed the limits of the financial world and became a 
buzzword in international politics.41 The French Prime Minister Védrine’s characterization of 
the United States as a “hyper power”, made in the run-up to the Iraq War, suddenly seemed 
anachronistic. The United States had invaded Iraq but its struggle there exposed the limits of 
its power, proving Joseph Nye’s point that America “can’t go it alone”.42  
  Overnight, the BRICs turned into a household name among international policy 
makers, analysts and academics. In 2010 political and economic observers pointed out that, 
while the West had plunged into the worst economic recession since the 1930s, the BRICs had 
in fact “decoupled” from the West economically43, and contributed 36.6% of global growth 
(purchasing power parity) during the first decade of the century,44 calling it the ‘BRIC 
Decade’. Investing in BRIC countries was suddenly considered safer than in some formerly 
established countries in the European Union. Brazilian, Russian and Indian officials admitted 
that Goldman Sachs had done them an invaluable marketing favor, and put them at a great 
advantage relative to other emerging economies such as Indonesia or Turkey.  
  The newly found category had political implications, too. Brazil’s, India’s, Russia’s 
and China’s heads of state and government had begun to refer to themselves as “BRIC 
members” and agreed that they needed to strengthen “intra-BRIC” ties.45 President Lula and 
Dimitry Medvedev referred to the BRICs as if it were some kind of strategic alliance. This 
development culminated in 2008, when Russia invited Brazil’s, India’s and China’s foreign 
ministers to talks, where they formalized the BRIC summit to strengthen their international 
                                                 
39 Hurrell, Andrew (2006). Hegemony, liberalism and global power: What space for would-be great 
powers?, International Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 1. January 24, 2006 
40 Wilson, Dominic. Purushothaman, Roota (2003). Dreaming with BRICs: The path to 2050. Goldman 
Sachs, 2003 
41 Cheng, Hui Fang, Margarida Gutierrez, Arvind Mahajan, Yochanan Shachmurove, Manuchehr 
Shahrokhi (2007). A future global economy to be built by BRICs. Global Finance Journal 18, 2007, 
143-157 
42 Nye, Joseph (2002). The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go 
It Alone. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002 
43 The Economist Correspondent (2009). Not just straw men. The biggest emerging economies are 
rebounding, even without recovery in the West. June 18, 2009  
44 Wilson, Dominic, Alex L. Kelston, Swarnali Ahmed (2010). Is this the BRICs decade? Issue No 10 /3, 
Goldman Sachs, May 20, 2010 
45 da Silva, Luiz Inácio (2008). Building on the B in BRIC, The Economist, November 19, 2008  
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weight.46 In 2009 Brazil’s President Lula, Russia’s President Dimitry Medvedev, India’s Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh and China’s President Hu Jintao met for a BRIC summit in St. 
Petersburg. A second BRIC summit followed in April 2010 in Brasília. 
  How was it possible that this group had developed seemingly strong ties, a group 
which had never before considered forming a club? And, did the creation of the BRIC 
category facilitate our understanding of global politics, or did it complicate things?  
  The unprecedented reaction to his category in the global media and academia showed 
that scholars and investors are not the only ones who search for a category that can capture 
reality. Heads of state longed for a meaningful way to understand the world as well. They 
had essentially met in St. Petersburg to “try out” the category O’Neill had devised for them. 
Rather than pointing to their enthusiasm for summitry, their behavior indicated their strong 
desire to comprehend which category they themselves belonged to. The strong reaction also 
showed that O’Neill had identified a group of countries whose significance others had 
understood, yet failed to frame and delineate properly. At the conference in Brasília in April 
2010, I debated this phenomenon with other scholars from the BRIC countries. We agreed 
that there was more that tied the BRIC countries together than merely low per capita income, 
economic growth, and a large population. In fact, what seemed to become obvious during the 
summit was that what most unified its members was a common interest in changing the way 
the world was run.47 
  After initial optimism during negotiations and grand announcements about a ‘new 
world order’, the BRIC members realized that their positions were too far apart to agree on 
any specific measures48 and that the BRIC summit would probably never turn into a unified 
institution. The BRICs’ discontent with the system and claim for a greater say, their 
revisionist and confrontational rhetoric, the vagueness about what should be changed and 
their eventually reluctant acknowledgement that the system is fundamentally sound showed 
that reality is more complicated than fiction, and that O’Neill’s category was too broad to be 
meaningful. The same applies to other groupings such as the ‘Big Ten’49, G20, L20, P21 
(proposed by Klaus Schwab),50, BRICSAM (BRICs, South Africa and Mexico), BASIC 
(Brazil, South Africa, India, China), ‘E-7’ (BRICs, Indonesia, Mexico and Turkey), and ‘G2’ 
(United States and China).51 
 
                                                 
46 Sweeney, Conor (2008). BRIC to form official club. St. Petersburg Times, May 20, 2008; 
http://www.sptimesrussia.com/index.php?story_id=26029&action_id=2 (accessed October 15, 2009) 
47 Reuters Correspondent (2010). Emerging BRIC powers and the new world order. July 7, 2010; 
http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-49935720100707 (accessed August 10, 2010). Russia and China 
are both permanent members of the UNSC, arguably the most important international institution. But 
Russia is not part of the WTO, China is not part of the G8, and Brazil and India are not part of the 
UNSC, the G8 and India is not part of the NPT. None of the four is part of the OECD or NATO. 
48 Aside from strengthening trade and engaging in other confidence building measures. 
49 Garten, Jeffrey E. (1997). The Big Ten: The Big Emerging Markets and How They Will Change Our 
Lives. New York: Basic Books, 1997 
50 Cooper, Andrew F. and John English (2005). Introduction: Reforming the international system from 
the top- a Leaders’ 20 Summit. In: English, John, Ramesh Thakur, Andrew F. Cooper (eds.) Reforming 
from the top: A Leaders’ 20 Summit. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2005  
51 Walker, Martin (2006). India's Path to Greatness. The Wilson Quarterly (1976-), Vol. 30, No. 3 
(Summer, 2006), pp. 22-30, 2006 
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3. INSTITUTIONS AS A MEANINGFUL VARIABLE  
 
What all of these categorization schemes have in common is that they are not necessarily 
descriptive, but rather predictive and normative. When we pay attention to the way these 
categories are presented, we realize that the creators of such categories often have an interest 
in the fulfillment of their predictions, hoping to influence reality - unlike researchers who are 
not part of the matter they study. The case of the BRICs shows that all ‘members’ had an 
interest in belonging to the dynamic-sounding category and actively sought to turn O’Neill’s 
classification into reality.52 The incident thus serves as a warning that it is nearly impossible 
to dispassionately divide up the world into categories. In addition, creating static categories is 
difficult because a nation can be described by many variables, and there are different realities 
depending on which variable we observe, some of which can change rapidly. Yet most 
groupings only capture a limited number of variables (‘economic growth’ and ‘overall size’ in 
the case of the BRICs). To create more meaningful categories, we need a different approach 
and observe countries’ behavior, rather than attributes. 
 Instead of looking at economic variables, political systems, or ideology, I will study 
how these countries relate to and negotiate with the world of international institutions. 
Institutions serve like a ‘world index’ that helps gauge where nations stand, because behavior 
towards institutions captures much more than single variables. A country’s behavior towards 
institutions is influenced, among other aspects, by its power, economic indicators, identity 
and political system. We are thus not creating categories for countries, but analyzing how 
countries categorize themselves through their behavior towards institutions. 
 When we use international institutions as our variable, we are able to make 
meaningful distinctions and identify a group of non-established rising powers. From this 
perspective, it becomes clear why the BRIC category is too inclusive. Russia and China are 
both nuclear weapon states recognized under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and 
permanent UN Security Council members with veto power since 1945.53 From an institutional 
point of view, they have been established poles of power since then.54 In the same way, we 
can also identify a group of less recognized, “second-tier” actors that are neither fully part of 
the West nor squarely opposed to the current global order. These countries deal with the 
Western World Order through embracing, abstaining from, or confronting global 
institutions. While scholars have traditionally focused on great powers in international 
                                                 
52 India and Brazil were honored to be included in a group with two established world powers. Russia, 
caught in demographic decline and increasingly autocratic, liked being categorized with three growing 
democracies, and China was comfortable to be part of a group that included democracies, which 
would deflect attention from its human rights abuses and its position as the lone challenger of the 
United States. 
53 One of the major disagreements during BRIC summits was Russia’s and China’s refusal to support 
India’s and Brazil’s quest for a permanent seat on the UNSC. It is precisely this episode that 
exemplified the major difference between Russia and China on the one had, and Brazil and India on 
the other.  
54 Jackson, Robert and Georg Sørensen (2010). Introduction to International Relations. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010. In the 1989, Henry Kissinger considered that the five great powers 
where the US, the Soviet Union, Japan, Europe and China. (Joseph Nye (1991). Bound to lead: The 
Changing Nature of American Power. New York: Basic Books, 1991)  
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politics55, John Ciorciari notes that as rising non-established players approach great power 
status, their strategic choices could have game-changing effects on the international system.56 
It is these ‘undecided’ countries on the fringe of the Western World Order that will, to an 
important degree, determine whether today’s institutions will survive fundamental power 
shifts between nations or not.57  
 How can we best describe these countries? Using institutions as a variable, we can 
best describe these ‘undecided countries’ as ‘fringe countries’. ‘Fringe’ is not meant to imply 
isolation and randomness. Quite to the contrary, the countries in question seem very engaged, 
willing and ready to actively determine their position through their negotiation with the 
international institutions. They can do so in very diverse ways that exceed the binary options 
of integration and confrontation.  
How these fringe nations relate to the international institutions does thus show how 
they relate to what we can call ‘Western World Order’.58 Ikenberry argues that today’s order 
is “an international order with deep and encompassing economic and political rules and 
institutions that are both durable and functional.”59 The West’s system of economic openness 
with social welfare protection essentially served as a template for the construction of today’s 
international order - the Western domestic system was externalized and applied in the 
international context.60 More importantly, Western countries have played such a crucial role 
in the conception and maintenance of our current system61 that we can adequately describe it 
as “Western” (which does not mean that culturally non-Western nations cannot join, but 
simply makes a reference to the system’s creators.62) Ikenberry points out that the order the 
                                                 
55 Waltz, Kenneth (1979). Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw Hill, 1979 
56 Corciari, John D. (2009). What kind of power will India be? Indo-U.S. alignment and India’s Broader 
Foreign Policy Orientation. Panel on “Rising Powers”, ISA New York, 2009. Similarly, Khanna and 
Sikri argue that while they are not as powerful as the “G3” (USA, EU and China), Brazil’s and India’s 
rise and its importance as “swing states” is likely to be one of the defining characteristics of the 
international system in the new century. (Khanna, Parag (2008). The Second World: Empires and 
Influence in the new global order. Random House: 2008. See also: Sikri, Rajiv (2007). India’s Foreign 
Policy Priorities over the Coming Decade. Opinion Asia, 2007) 
57 Profound rearrangements of the global order have taken place historically via post-conflict 
settlements and orchestrating a rearrangement in times of peace will prove immensely complex, as 
power shifts usually lead to conflict. (Ikenberry, G. John (2001). After Victory: Institutions, Strategic 
Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2001)  
58 The term ‘order’ is not free of problems. As John Hall and T.V. Paul point out, it carries normative 
and ideological connotations, as it bears specific conceptions about how political, social and economic 
systems should be structured. Order and peace to some may be perceived differently by another. (Paul, 
T.V. and John A. Hall (eds.) International Order and the Future of World Politics. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999) Hedley Bull distinguished between ‘world order’ and ‘international 
order’, the latter being defined as there is a system of settled expectations. The term Western World 
Order used here refers to Bull’s ‘international order’. (Bull, Hedley (1997). The Anarchical Society. A 
Study of Order in World Politics. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1977)  
59 Ikenberry, G. John (2010). Ikenberry responds: The Rise of Asia and the West, 
http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/2008/05/g_john_ikenberry/ (accessed May 2, 2010) 
60 Ikenberry. John G (1996). The Intertwining of Domestic and International Politics. Polity, Vol. 29, 
No. 2 (Winter, 1996), pp. 293-298 
61 Ikenberry, John G. and Thomas Wright (2008). Rising Powers and Global Institutions. Century 
Foundation, 2008 
62 As Charles Maier points out, American efforts to create multilateral institutions involved, aside from 
idealist Wilsonian ideas, the export of New Deal thinking. In: Maier, Carles (1987) ed. In Search of 
Stability: Explorations in Historical Political Economy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987 
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West established after 1945 is very similar to the order established within Western states.63 
This does not imply that openness and rules are a Western invention.  Amartya Sen claims 
that liberal democracy has multiple birthplaces, and that the West wrongly considers itself to 
be the founder of these principles.64 In addition, there have been international rule-systems in 
several parts of the world, most notably in ancient China, India and Greece.65 Rather than 
arguing that the rules on which the current world order is based have been invented by the 
West, I will call today’s order ‘Western World Order’ to make a reference to the system’s 
creators after World War II. 
 
4. BRAZIL AND INDIA AS REPRESENTATIVE CASES 
 
Brazil and India are representatives of a group of less recognized and less established rising 
‘fringe’ powers - such as Turkey, South Africa, Mexico and Indonesia.66 Neither 
fundamentally opposed to Western structures, nor considered fully as part of the West, they 
are part of the ‘fringe’, and understanding these countries’ trajectories properly is of major 
importance for the future of the international order.67 This study will focus on the category of 
rising fringe powers, which can be distinguished from the ‘core’, and countries that stand 
mostly apart from the Western World Order, such as North Korea or Belarus.  
There are fundamental differences between Brazil and India.68 But their similarities- 
liberal democratic structures and historic ties with and current ambivalence about the West- 
are meaningful. Furthermore, they all have large populations and strong economic growth69, 
                                                 
63 Ikenberry, G. John (2001). After Victory. Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of 
order after major wars. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001 
64 Sen, Amartya (2006). Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny, New York: W. W. Norton, 2006 
65 Armstrong, David (2008). The Evolution of international society. in: Steve Smith, John Baylis, 
Patricia Owens. Introduction, The Globalization of World Politics, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2008 
66 Nayar and Paul write that “India remains less integrated in the international order than most other 
actors (..)”. In: Nayar, Baldev Raj and T.V. Paul (2003). India in the World Order. Searching for 
Major-Power Status. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. See also: Robert A. Pastor. The 
Great Powers in the Twentieth Century. In Robert A. Pastor (1999)(ed.) A Century’ Journey. How the 
Great Powers Shape the World. New York: Basic Books, 1999 
67 According to E.H. Carr, the “problem of peaceful change” is one of the principal challenges in 
international relations (Carr, E. H (1964). The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the 
Study of International Relations (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 208–23.). In the same way, 
Michael Doyle argues that when the leading power begins to lose its preeminence and its followers 
catch up, a warlike resolution of the international pecking order becomes very likely (Doyle, Michael 
W. Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs. Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 3 
(Summer, 1983), pp. 205-235) 
68 Cooper, Andrew F. and Agata Antkiewicz  (2008). Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons 
from the Heiligendamm Process. Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008 
69 Already in 1967, Samuel Huntington argued that the most distinctive feature of the last quarter of the 
20th century would be the rise of powers such as Brazil and India (Turner, Frederick C. (1991). 
Regional Hegemony and the Case of Brazil. International Journal, Vol. 46, No. 3, Regional Powers 
(Summer, 1991), pp. 475-509). In 1988, India had an economy a third of the size of Italy’s. Today, India 
is the fourth largest economy on a purchasing power parity basis and may overtake Japan soon, which 
is currently third. In a similar fashion, Brazil has shown strong growth and stability, which is expected 
to continue (CIA Factbook 2009). The existence of both Western and non-Western elements, their 
pivotal size and their growth thus make Brazil and India good case studies for this category. In a report 
that coined the term “BRICs”, Goldman Sachs published often-cited figures for Brazil and India that 
relied on optimistic assumptions. (Wilson, Dominic. Purushothaman, Roota (2003). Dreaming with 
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and their decisions are bound to have system-wide implications. They have all shown interest 
in becoming more significant actors on the world stage.70 Brazil’s and India’s leadership of 
the G20 developing countries, a group created to serve as a recognized interlocutor in 
agricultural trade negotiations, is a good example of this development - both countries 
assumed control and responsibility, while China held on to a more timid posture.71 The fact 
that they strongly differ with regard to culture and regional context helps us isolate the 
meaningful variables we like to focus on. Brazil is located in one of the most peaceful regions 
and is predominantly Christian, while India is predominantly Hindu but home to all major 
religions, and located in one of the most volatile regions of the world. This combination 
makes the study of Brazil and India compelling.  
Aside from measurable similarities, they also share, to some degree, a common 
identity which shapes their behavior. They are ambiguous about their own identity and about 
their strategy towards the West.72 As Hurrell notes, both Brazil and India still partly 
understand their foreign policy through the prism of North-South relations, positioning 
themselves as developing countries.73 Both supported conceptions of international order that 
challenged those of the liberal Western World Order- such as the revisionist Third Worldism 
in India after 1948 and in Brazil in the 1970s and 80s. India opposed the United States more 
often in the UN General Assembly than Cuba. As Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, a Brazilian 
diplomat, points out in his book Five Hundred Years on the Periphery, “despite the 
differences between Brazil and other large peripheral states, inasmuch as they share common 
characteristics and interests and are far away from one another, they do not have direct 
competitive interests and are therefore able to construct common political projects.”74 On the 
other hand, both Brazil and India have also supported the United States at times. In addition, 
                                                                                                                                               
BRICs: The path to 2050. Goldman Sachs, 2003. Goldman Sachs has altered its forecast to reflect the 
current economic crisis, but general trends remain.  
70 Brazil and India are the only two large “continental powers” that are not represented in the United 
Nations Security Council. (Kennan, George, F. Around the Cragged Hill. A Personal and Political 
Philosophy. W.W. Norton & Company, 1993). Furthermore, in both Brazil and India, there is a strong 
sense of exceptionalism and entitlement to a larger role in international politics. (Lafer, Celso (2001). A 
Identidade Internacional do Brasil e a política Externa Brasileira. São Paulo: Perspectiva, 2001. See 
also: Mohan, C. Raja (2004). Crossing the Rubicon. The Shaping of India’s New Foreign Policy. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) 
71 Gregory, Denise and Paulo Roberto de Almeida (2008). Brazil and the G8 Heiligendamm Process, in 
Cooper, Andrew F. and Agata Antkiewicz (2008). Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons 
from the Heiligendamm Process, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008 
72 Raja Mohan, an Indian scholar, argues that India is in fact part of the West, while Western scholars 
such as Andrew Hurrell place it on the fringes of the Greater West (Mohan, Raja C (2004). Crossing 
the Rubicon: The Shaping of India’s new Foreign Policy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004 and 
Hurrell, Andrew (2006). Hegemony, liberalism and global order: what space for would-be great 
powers? International Affairs, Volume 82, Number 1, January 2006, pp. 1-19(19)). In a similar fashion, 
while Western scholars sometimes see Brazil on the fringes of the West (e.g. Huntington), Brazilian 
scholars oftentimes see Brazil as part of the West. José Guilherme Merquior, for example, referred to 
Brazil as the ‘Other West’: poorer, more enigmatic, more problematic, but not less Western” 
(Merquior, José Guilherme. El Otro Occidente, in Arocena, Felipe. El Complejo de Prospero- Ensayos 
sobre Cultura, Modernidad y Modernización en America Latina, 1993) 
73 Hurrell, Andrew (2006). Hegemony, liberalism, and global order: What space for would-be great 
powers? International Affairs, Volume 82, Number 1, January 2006, pp. 1-19(19) 
74 Guimarães, Samuel Pinheiro (1999). Quinhentos Anos de Periferia. Porto Alegre: Contraponto, 1999. 
In: Vigevani, Tullo and Gabriel Cepaluni. Lula’s Foreign Policy and the Quest for Autonomy through 
Diversification. Third World Quarterly, 28:7, 1309 - 1326 
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both countries are democracies and not ideologically predisposed against Western-style 
institutions. But realism and liberalism, both rational choice theories, do not account for 
intangible aspects such as identity and ideology. 
We can therefore not entirely rely on rational choice theories, but need to include 
social constructivist interpretations. Social constructivists argue that liberalist 
institutionalism and particularly realism are ‘materialist’ theories that focus too much on 
military and economic power, and that ideas, beliefs and identity strongly impact states’ 
behavior. Rather than focusing entirely on rationalism, constructivism emphasizes the social 
and relational construction of what states are and what they seek, and what social meaning is 
attached to objects or practices.75 As mentioned above, identity plays an important role in the 
context of Brazil’s and India’s foreign policy. For example, as Hurrell points out, a certain 
ambiguity remains about whether Brazil’s and India’s language of Third Worldism and 
southern solidarity is simply a rhetorical remnant of the past, interest-driven strategy or a 
reflection of a deeper set of beliefs. If it is the latter, “what happens if the ‘developing country 
identity’ conflicts with the aspiring ‘great power identity’”?76 Their fringe status puts Brazil 
and India in a position where they can, in principle, choose between aligning with and 
confronting the Greater West. The creation of IBSA in 2003, a forum for dialogue established 
by India, Brazil and South Africa, is a case in point. The three have mutually identified 
themselves as similar to a degree that justifies the creation of a forum that is gaining political 
importance. Yet, as several observers have noted, their economic and political interests 
strongly diverge.77 
For example, while Brazil wants to liberalize trade, India is decidedly more 
protectionist.78 IBSA seems to be at least partly motivated not only by their similar 
geopolitical positions as emerging nations on the periphery of the West and their willingness 
to assume regional leadership, but also by their shared belief that the established institutions 
of global governance fail to reflect their newfound importance.79 There is little else that 
would justify their coalition. While it is the main purpose of this study to prove that liberal 
institutionalism can explain reality, I will consider and use constructivist approaches 
complementarily.80 As Ian Hurd points out, there is no reason why the study of international 
                                                 
75 Hurd, Ian (2008). Constructivism. in: The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, Christian 
Reus-Smit, Duncan Snidal (eds.), 2008 
76 Hurrell, Andrew (2006). Hegemony, liberalism and global power: What space for would-be great 
powers? International Affairs, Volume 82, Number 1, January 2006, pp. 1-19(19) 
77 Armijo, Leslie Elliott (2007). The BRICs Countries as Analytical Category: Mirage or Insight? Asian 
Perspective, Vol. 31, No. 4, 2007 
78 Gregory, Denise and Paulo Roberto de Almeida (2008). Brazil and the G8 Heiligendamm Process, in 
Cooper, Andrew F. and Agata Antkiewicz  (2008). Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons 
from the Heiligendamm Process, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008 
79 Alden, Chris and Marco Antonio Vieira (2005). The New Diplomacy of the South: South Africa, 
Brazil, India and Trilateralism. Third World Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 7 (2005), pp. 1077-1095 
80 I recognize the importance of constructivist ideas, but I argue that it is insufficient as constructivism 
does not fully explain how identity and beliefs are the result of some measureable variable, such as 
economic or military power. For example, India’s belief that it is a great power can be explained by its 
continental size and hegemonic presence in the Indo-centric South Asia region, and a long nationalist 
struggle. See, for example: Nayar, Baldev Raj and T.V. Paul. India in the World Order. Searching for 
Major-Power Status. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. For a comprehensive critique of 
constructivism, see: Jervis, R. Realism in the Study of World Politics. International Organization, 52-4, 
1998 
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norms by constructivists is inherently mutually exclusive with the study of strategic 
behavior.81 
Realists, liberalists and constructivists make meaningful contributions when trying to 
explain what rising powers will do. This study argues that liberal theory can, in combination 
with constructivist approaches, fully account for rising fringe countries’ behavior. Yet, the 
way we discuss these questions shows that we have a limited understanding of rising powers’ 
options. Brazil’s and India’s foreign policy strategies do not fit well into any categories82 
because the terms of realists’, liberals’ and constructivists’ disagreement remain undefined. 
First, how do we define the West, who exactly is "the rest", and how do we judge in which 
category countries belong? Second, through what means do countries "confront" and 
"integrate"? And third, what are their options as they do so? Naazneen Barma, Ely Ratner 
and Steven Weber argue that “the future of world politics is either systemic conflict or 
eventual assimilation”.83 But a superficial analysis of Brazil’s and India’s foreign policy shows 
that their options are certainly more nuanced than the binary choice between integration and 
confrontation. In order to understand those options, we must first understand what 
confrontation and integration really mean, and how they relate to other concepts, such as 
alignment, competition, and neutrality. Is neutrality even an option?84 Only once have we 
successfully answered these questions and established a new paradigm we can analyze specific 
countries, adequately describe their foreign policy behavior towards international 
institutions, and understand whether liberalist theory explains the strategy of Brazil and 
India. 
 
5. OUTLINE  
 
In my dissertation I therefore aim to do five things. First, I study several definitions of how 
we can define the West (1.1.). I seek to show that traditional definitions of the West are 
insufficient and do not stand up to rigorous analysis, and that rather than defining what the 
West is, we need to observe its practical consequences. The best way to capture the West and 
understand how nations make use of it is by looking at international institutions (1.2.) Given 
the West’s fundamental role in their creation, we can call the order they establish the 
‘Western World Order’. This concept is ‘post-ideological and transcends cultural, 
civilizational and historic dimensions. But more fundamentally it is the procedures– 
representation, rules, membership, social mobility, fairness, reciprocity, democracy and 
economic interdependency and their constitution-like character- that undergirds these 
                                                 
81 Hurd, Ian (2008). Constructivism. In: The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, Christian 
Reus-Smit, Duncan Snidal (eds.), 2008 
82 Hurrell, Andrew and Narlikar, Amrita (2006). A New Politics of Confrontation? Brazil and India in 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Global Society, Vol. 20, Issue 4, 2006. See also: Almeida, Paulo 
Roberto “O Brasil no Novo Cenário Global: Transformações no Jogo Diplomático Contemporâneo” 
Revista Intellector, 2008 
83 Barma, Naazneen, Ely Ratner and Steven Weber (2007). A World Without the West, The National 
Interest, Number 90, Jul./Aug. 2007 
84 Barma, Naazneen, Ely Ratner and Steven Weber (2007). A World Without the West, The National 
Interest, Number 90, Jul./Aug. 2007 
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institutions.85 I define countries that are partially integrated into the Western World Order as 
“fringe countries”, a category that includes Brazil and India (1.3). Secondly, I provide some 
theoretical background on the liberal perspective on democracies and international 
institutions, and on the international system itself. Here, I show why liberal theory expects 
fringe countries to collaborate and seek integration into the Western World Order (1.4.). 
Thirdly, I establish specific categories that allow us to clarify rising powers’ options, such as 
unconditional integration, revisionist integration, issue-based confrontation and systemic 
confrontation. I will use these categories as a working paradigm for the analysis (1.5.). 
Fourthly, I give a general overview over both Brazil’s and India’s relations to institutions 
which allows me to test whether liberalism can explain Brazil’s and India’s behavior towards 
international institutions (2.1. and 2.2.). For the cases in which liberalism fails to explain their 
behavior, I will, with the help of constructivist theory, develop a hypothesis in order to find 
alternative explanations. Finally, in section 3, I analyze three case studies to test the 
hypothesis and to explain deviations. These case studies have been chosen for two reasons. 
First of all, the UN Security Council, Bretton Woods and the NPT are arguably among the 
three strategically most significant institutions. Secondly, the overview in Part 2 shows that 
Brazil’s and India’s behavior towards these three institutions is highly complex, providing 
additional insight. This is particularly the case regarding the NPT, where both countries 
show more confrontational behavior. 
 
6. HYPOTHESIS 
 
Aside from studying rising non-established powers, this work is essentially about the 
durability of international institutions.86 Contrary to the frequent assertions that non-
established rising powers such as Brazil and India are “revisionist”87, the thesis is that Kantian 
liberal theory, which predicts that democracies will seek international collaboration, and 
liberal institutionalism, which points to the benefits new entrants receive, can fully account 
for Brazil’s and India’s strategy towards today’s international institutions that constitute the 
Western World Order.88 This always holds true except if the rising power in question 
considers the order a particular international institution establishes as highly unjust, void of 
‘intra-institutional mobility’ and impossible to fix. We therefore need to revert to 
constructivist theory to explain the exception in a satisfactory manner. Rising powers will 
therefore integrate and rise within the system, creating a ‘Greater West’ rather than a ‘Post-
                                                 
85 Ikenberry, G. John (1999). Liberal hegemony. In: T.V. Pauli and John A. Hall (eds.) International 
Order and the Future of World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999 
86 While I take into account one domestic factor, namely liberal democracy, this study provides a 
largely international system-level analysis. This approach has its critics. Yet I exclude most other 
domestic factors to keep the number of variables as low as possible and achieve meaningful results.  
87 A former Indian foreign minister argued that  “our size, our potential strength, our traditions and 
heritage do not allow us to become a client state.” Times of India, June 17, 1976. In: Paul, T.V. and 
John A. Hall (1999, eds.) International Order and the Future of World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999 
88 Paul, T.V. and John A. Hall (1999, eds.) International Order and the Future of World Politics. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999 
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Western World’.89 Contrary to realist thought, institutions do not fundamentally change as 
the distribution of power between states changes.90 This hypothesis excludes any 
explanations about non-democratic regimes’ behavior and about international institutions’ 
impact on domestic politics, such as democratization.91  
 
 
7. PERIOD OF ANALYSIS 
 
As mentioned above, there is a particular necessity to further explore Brazil’s and India’s 
position in the world in the context of their most recent transformation. I will therefore 
analyze Brazil’s and India’s policy towards international institutions from 2003 to 2010, a 
period that Dominic Wilson called the “BRICs Decade”.92 There are several reasons why 2003 
was significant, and why it is a useful start for our period of analysis.  
 In 2003, Dominic Wilson and Roota Purushothaman published their Goldman Sachs 
research paper “Dreaming with the BRICs: The Path to 2050”. While Jim O’Neill had created 
the term in 2001, it was this particular report that initiated what we can now call the ‘decade 
of the BRICs’. The report contributed to a vast and surprising increase in global interest in 
emerging powers.   
 Also in 2003, Jacques Chirac became the first Western leader to announce that the G8 
was no longer inclusive, lacked legitimacy and therefore “needed to ‘hear from those that 
represent a growing proportion of international economic activity or population”.93 
Accordingly, he invited the leaders of several emerging powers, including Brazil and India, to 
Evian, where the summit was held. It would be the end of exclusive, Western-dominated G8 
summits and the beginning of growing inclusiveness, culminating in the G8+5 process which 
sought to institutionalize the participation of non-established actors such as Brazil and India. 
In the same year, Luiz Inácio da Silva assumed the Presidency in Brazil. While there is 
no consensus in how far Lula’s foreign policy constituted a continuation of, or a rupture 
with, his predecessor’s foreign policy94, it is accepted that he promoted a more active foreign 
policy that increased Brazil’s visibility in the world, causing an intense debate about what 
Brazil’s role in the world should be.95 Lula envisioned, like no President before him, a more 
                                                 
89 This will occur in rising states’ best interest. The incentive to join institution will increase as 
problems are ever more difficult to solve without collaboration, such as climate change.   
90 Martin, Lisa L. (1999). An institutionalist view. In: Paul, T.V. and John A. Hall (eds.) International 
Order and the Future of World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999 
91 I do not claim that non-democratic regimes will not integrate. Rather, I have decided to analyze 
rising democratic countries because I consider that it is with regard to them that the hypothesis is most 
likely to be proven. If that is the case, a second study should proceed to analyze non-democratic 
regimes. 
92 Wilson, Dominic, Alex L. Kelston, Swarnali Ahmed (2010). Is this the BRICs decade? Issue No 10 /3, 
Goldman Sachs, May 20, 2010  
93 Cited in Corlazzoli, Vanessa and Janel Smith (2008). G8 reform: expanding the dialogue. Paper 
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2008, pp.51-57 
OLIVER STUENKEL – DOCTORAL THESIS 19 
prominent role for his country in the international system. A year later, the Congress Party 
under Sonia Gandhi won a resounding victory, and Manmohan Singh became Prime 
Minister, epitomizing, like Lula in Brazil, India’s definitive emergence as a global player on 
the international stage.96 
A year later, in 2004, Brazil, India, Japan and Germany formed the G4, whose joint 
goal was to achieve a UN Security Council reform and obtain permanent seats. This alliance, 
which ceased to exist in 2006, is seen by many as the first time Brazil and India openly 
assumed their bid to major power status. 
Finally, in 2004, Brazil made the surprising decision to no longer provide the IAEA’s 
inspectors unlimited access to its civilian nuclear power plants, seriously challenging the 
IAEA’s authority, which plays a crucial part in the verification process of the NPT’s rules. 
This move not only had important consequences for the non-proliferation regime, but also 
changed Brazil’s position vis-à-vis the Western World Order.97 
 
8. SOURCES 
 
With regard to sources, I use qualitative data for the period of study of 2003-2010. This 
includes primary sources (government officials’ speeches, national plans, treaties, budgets, 
interviews with diplomats and government officials) and secondary sources (academic 
literature, media and interviews with political analysts). Furthermore, non-Brazilian and non-
Indian diplomats were interviewed who worked with either country during negotiations or 
any other type of interaction. A large part of the sources used were provided by the Brazilian 
Ministry of Foreign Relations, known as Itamaraty, and the Indian Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs, responsible for implementing their respective foreign policies. 
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1. The Paradigm: International Institutions and the 
West 
 
1.1. What is the West?  
 
In order to answer how emerging powers such as Brazil and India behave towards the West, 
we need to understand what the West means. While used frequently in the media, politics and 
academia98, the concept of the West remains abstract99 and poorly understood.100 In addition, 
it is not static, but in motion, continuously adapting to new realities, and imagined in new 
ways by different groups with different interests. This chapter will present ways in which 
scholars have attempted to understand the West, and which perspective is most useful for the 
purpose of this study.  
While sometimes avoided by academics, the concept remains central for a proper 
understanding of international politics. Several studies, such as those dealing with relations 
between Islam and the West, are important, and they show that the West can be used as a 
variable in serious academic studies.101 This is true not only in so-called ‘Western countries’, 
but also outside. Chinese social scientist Sun Ge, for example, notes that  
 
In the narratives of the Asian intellectuals, the West – an idealistic category with almost 
no significance to intellectuals of the West—is already there. Historically speaking, this 
idealistic category functions as the medium that pushes Asians into forming self-
recognition.102 
 
Yet how do we define the West? Which variables or proxies capture and represent the 
concept? In order to get a handle on what the West means and how to use it in this study, we 
need to study the several dimension through which the West is generally defined- the 
historical/religious dimension, the systemic/policy dimension, the culture/value dimension, 
and the geographical dimension. This analysis will help us understand which dimension is 
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most useful for empirical study. If none of them proves functional, we may need to design a 
new, more practical, dimension. 
 
1.1.1. Historical-religious dimension  
 
One of the most common dimensions to define the West is the historical-religious dimension, 
which highlights the importance of Christianity. It is not entirely clear when the concept of 
the West first emerged.103 Alastair Bonnett argues that it is in China where mention of 
‘Western Countries’ were first recorded.104 Most historians, however, say that an initial step 
towards a delineation between West and non-West was taken during Constantine I’s reign as 
Roman Emperor in the 4th century B.C.105 Constantine’s ascendance to power as the sole 
emperor of the Roman empire and the reconstruction of the city of Byzantium, which was 
renamed Constantinople, represented the passing of old Rome.106 Known as the first 
Christian Roman emperor, he was essential in helping Christianity become the dominant 
religion across the Roman Empire.107 The so-called “Constantinian shift” marked the 
legalization of Christianity.108 Constantine’s construction of and focus on Constantinople 
was an essential step in the division between Western Christendom and the Orthodox 
civilization109, which would form a separate cultural identity. In a similar fashion, Shahrough 
Akhavi essentially equates the West to Christianity.110 
Christianity split into East and West, and historians identify the Western Christianity 
as the precursor of the West. In the future, culture - shaping events such as the Reformation, 
the Counter Reformation, and its intellectual legacy, would impact Western Christendom, 
but not Eastern Orthodoxy.111 Huntington argues that “Orthodox civilizations (…) inherited 
from Classical civilization, but to nowhere near the same degree as the West.” He further 
notes that 
 
Western Christianity, first Catholicism and then Protestantism, is the single most 
important historical characteristic of Western civilization. Indeed, during most of its first 
millennium, what is now known as Western civilization was called Western 
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Christendom. There was a well-developed sense of community among Western Christian 
peoples, one that made them feel distinct from Turks, Moors, Byzantines, and others.112 
 
Ideas from Athens, Rome and Jerusalem are also said to have contributed to the formation of 
the West. Jeffrey Hart argues that the “Western being” defines itself through a common 
history, specifically Greek philosophy, cognition and science (“Athens”) and spiritual 
aspiration to holiness (“Jerusalem”).113 In David Gress’ “What is the West? From Plato to 
NATO”, the author identifies a series of historical events that give rise to Western 
civilization. He argues that the “Pre-West”, or “Old West”, which started in A.D. 700, went 
through several phases (Greek civilization, Roman civilization, Christianized Roman 
civilization, and Germano-Roman civilization) and was a prerequisite to the values that arose 
around 1500- such as reason and science, economic development and capitalism, and liberty 
and democracy.114 In “What is the West?” Nemo explains this “cultural morphogenesis” as 
follows: 
 
From this moment on (the papal revolution), civilization becomes a synthesis of Athens, 
Rome and Jerusalem. Scientific and legal reason is, henceforth, in the service of biblical 
ethics and eschatology. Faith expresses itself through the flowering of human nature. 
Classical antiquity is absorbed into the imagination and identity of Christian people 
everywhere in Europe. This synthesis gives rise to a spirit – a cultural form- that is 
without parallel anywhere in the world. It is called the West.115 
 
Beyond Christianity, historians list historic events, ideas and trends - such as liberalism, 
social pluralism and rationality - as the defining characteristics of the West. Explaining what 
made the West Western, Samuel Huntington lists the emergence of several phenomena, 
dating back to pre-Socratic Greek philosophers, to less tangible and non-datable aspects, such 
as individualism. Huntington names the classical legacy (Greek philosophy and rationality, 
Roman law), Western Christianity (Catholicism and Protestantism), European languages, 
separation of spiritual and temporal authority, rule of law, social pluralism and civil society, 
representative bodies and individualism, but he also concedes that individually, “almost none 
of these factors are unique to the West.”116  
Economic transformation and progress is often cited as another key aspect of the 
West. In “The History of the West”, Heinrich August Winkler adds monotheism, missionary 
zeal, colonial expansion and especially the industrial revolution as crucial to the Western 
civilization.117 Several historians also cite John Locke, one of the most influential 
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Enlightenment thinkers, as a symbol of Western thought.118 He contributed to the emergence 
of liberalism which is reflected in the American Declaration of Independence of 1776. Finally, 
Adam Smith’s contributions are frequently considered a key ingredient to Western culture.119 
Both Huntington and Winkler argue that it is the combination of the factors that allowed the 
West to modernize, but that modernity as such is not Western. Citing different historic 
incidents, Bernhard Lewis notes that 
 
…(England) was also the country of Shakespeare and Bacon and, (…) a little later, the 
parliamentary revolution. All these, too, are surely central to what is specifically 
Western about the West.120 
 
At the beginning of the 20th century the West was synonymous with Western Europe. The 
United States was, according to Alastair Bonnett, “understood as Western only in the sense 
that it represented an export or an extension of the real West.”121 This changed dramatically 
after World War II, when the United States turned into the center of the West. The US’ 
transition from peripheral to core state can be explained by its economic and military 
prowess that became visible during the first half of the 20th century. Western Europe 
remained part of the West, but ceased to be the center of it.  
During the Cold War, the West temporarily took on another meaning and turned into 
a synonym of the “free”, US-led World, finding its counterpart in the Communist World led 
by the Soviet Union.122 After the Soviet Union’s demise and the end of the Cold War, several 
analysts predicted, following a classic realist argument, that the Cold War was the primary 
source of Western solidarity123, and that the idea of the West would die as well. As Harries 
argued in 1993, “It took the presence of a life-threatening, overtly hostile "East" to bring [the 
West] into existence and to maintain its unity. It is extremely doubtful whether it can now 
survive the disappearance of that enemy.”124Yet, the concept of the West continued to exist- 
both in the policy world125 and in academia - often in a similar form to its pre-Cold War 
definition. In the same year, Samuel Huntington published The Clash of Civilization and the 
New World Order, which used the concept of the West in a way that it did not need an 
                                                 
118 Cranston, Maurice (1986). Locke and Liberty. The Wilson Quarterly (1976-), Vol. 10, No. 5 
(Winter, 1986), pp. 82-93 
119 Winkler, Heinrich August (2009). Die Geschichte des Westens. Von den Anfängen in der Antike bis 
zum 20. Jahrhundert. Band 1. München: C.H. Beck, 2009 
120 Lewis, Bernard (1997). The West and the Middle East. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 
1997), pp. 114-130 
121 Bonnett, Alastair (2004). The Idea of the West. Culture, Politics and History. London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2004. 
122 Schlag, Gabi, Benjamin Herborth and Gunther Hellmann (2008). Secur(itiz)ing the West. The 
Transformation of Western Order. Conference Paper, 2008 
123 Deudney, Daniel and G. John Ikenberry. The Nature and Sources of Liberal International Order. 
Review of International Studies, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Apr., 1999), pp. 179-196 
124 Harries, Owen. The Collapse of 'The West'. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 4 (Sep. - Oct., 1993), pp. 
41-53. Deudney, Daniel and G. John Ikenberry (1993). The Logic of the West. World Policy Journal, 
Vol. 10, No. 4 (Winter, 1993/1994), pp. 17-25 
125 See, for example: Mahbubani, Kishore (1993). The Dangers of Decadence: What the rest can teach 
the West. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No.4 (Sept.- Oct., 1993), pp. 10-14 
OLIVER STUENKEL – DOCTORAL THESIS 24 
Eastern counterpart.126 Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the West is often 
understood in the context of the West vs. Islam debate.127 
When we look at the idea of the West in its historical dimension, therefore, we can 
observe its persistency across vast quantities of historical time. On the one hand, the concept 
of the West has a strong solidity to it that stood the test of time. On the other hand, it shows 
how strategic and mobile definitions of the West have been across history.128 The idea that 
the West will end with the end of the Cold War ignores history. 
Still, this dimension fails to clearly delineate the West from the non-West, because 
history is not linear and not organized neatly. The events described above that supposedly 
define the West did not occur in a vacuum. They did not affect peoples on one side of the 
border, while leaving those on the other side free of their influence. Rather, the impact was 
strong at the center and gradually diminished with increasing distance.129 Christianity, for 
example, spread across the world, prospering in some regions, failing in others. So did the 
effects of many other ‘Western’ events such as the industrial revolution. Globalization has 
allowed Western concepts to spread even more, which makes this dimension inadequate for 
the purpose of studying contemporary affairs. 
The historical dimension provides some insight, but it has no clear verdict on many 
states. The past two decades have shown that the West has a reality beyond bipolarity.130 
Western Europe, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Iceland and some overseas 
territories are part of the West. Eastern-Central Europe, Romania, Bulgaria and Greece, are 
“close”, but not “inside”.131 But does it count at all that Eastern European states such as 
Romania or the Baltic States move towards the West? Like most scholars, Nemo makes a 
distinction between Eastern and Western Christianity and points out that the “papal 
revolution”, which led to the rediscovery of Roman law and Greek science, did not take place 
in “Eastern Christianity”. Only predominantly Catholic or Protestant societies are thus, 
according to this definition, part of the West.132 Nemo, a defender of the historical-religious 
dimension, does not include Argentina into the West, even though it is a society largely made 
up of Catholic Italian and Spanish immigrants and 97% white.133 It becomes obvious that 
migration of Europeans into other parts of the world, where they mixed with local 
populations, makes this definition difficult to apply. Will the United States still be ‘Western’ 
once whites will constitute the minority in the middle of the 20th century? Is Israel Western? 
The lack of guiding variables to delineate who is Western and who is not shows that this 
dimension is of limited use for academic study.  
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As Karl Deutsch’s analysis makes clear, it is difficult to separate historic aspects from 
cultural aspects, because culture is a product of history. But culture may be more useful as a 
concept to understand what the West is. For example, Deutsch notes that the West is 
different in that it allowed “the rise and persistence of diverse autonomous groups not based 
on blood relationship or marriage,”134 giving power to monasteries and guilds, and later 
associations and clubs, allowing the emergence of what we call pluralism and civil society 
today - during the same periods, strong centralized bureaucracies in Russia, China and 
elsewhere did not allow civil society to emerge.135 While his example is clearly rooted in 
history, it may be more useful to study the cultural manifestation of this historic process. 
Clifford Geertz describes culture as the “webs of significance” that people have, over time, 
created for themselves. Geertz argues that if the observer can successfully interpret these 
webs, culture can help describe and understand social events.136 We therefore proceed to 
study attempts to analyze the West using culture and values.  
 
1.1.2. Cultural-values dimension 
 
Historians argue that the values usually seen as Western are those that emerged 500 B.C. in 
Ancient Greece until the present day: Individualism, freedom, liberty, democracy, rationality, 
human rights, and capitalism.137 German historian Heinrich August Winkler, describes the 
West as a “community of values”, in which he includes Europe, the United States, Canada, 
New Zealand, Australia and, since 1948, Israel.138 Gunther Hellman argues that the West is 
usually seen as a “culturally defined civilization with a clear and stable essence.”139 Dean 
Acheson adds that the West can be defined by commonly held “moral and spiritual values.”140 
Two aspects need to be pointed out in this context. First, history is written by the 
victors - and Western nations have, militarily clearly been on the winning side over the past 
centuries, most visible during the almost all-encompassing global Western dominance at the 
beginning of the 20th century, and the creation of the “Western World Order” after World 
War II. Western history of the West (the story the West tells itself) is therefore likely to suffer 
from some degree of pro-Western bias. As Claude Lévi-Strass points out, non-Western 
historical accounts of the West are rare, so we have only a limited capacity to assess the 
objectivity of the West’s account of the West.141 
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Secondly, as Foucault contends, the self-definitions like the ones above by Heinrich 
August Winkler are rather to be understood as a kind of aspiration and normative concepts 
rather than an adequate description of the past.142 Since when are aspects such as 
individualism, liberty, democracy, rationality, human rights, and capitalism universally 
implemented concepts in Western societies? Individualism and rationality may have existed as 
concepts for a long time, but universal personal liberty remained restricted in many Western 
nations, such as the United States, until the civil rights movement in the 1960s, and several 
European countries, such as Portugal, did not grant women suffrage until the 1930s. Human 
or inalienable rights have been mentioned by thinkers across the ages, such as in 
Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws in 1748 and the Virginia Bill of Rights in 1776.143 But their 
full-fledged application was, until recently, the exception rather than the norm. As Amartya 
Sen points out, similar concepts have been developed in the non-Western world - such as 
during Akbar the Great’s reign in what is today India (1542- 1605).144 Capitalism was not 
introduced as an idea until 1776, and socialism and communism are as Western as capitalism. 
Alastair Bonnett points out that “the assumption that being Western means being law-
governed and socially and technologically advanced is relatively recent.”145 
In addition, the series of virtues named by Western historians to define their own 
civilization, such as human rights and democracy, gloss over the Crusades, religious 
persecution, missionary zeal and World Wars, which bear little evidence of liberty, rationality 
and respect for human rights. Critics of the West such as Noam Chomsky argue that the 
West, and principally the United States, cannot be distinguished from any other dominant 
regimes in world history.146 The West, according to Chomsky, consistently uses democracy 
and humanitarian intervention as a pretext to pursue policies that preserve hegemony,147 and 
that “no US-president since 1945, judged on the principles of Nuremberg, would have escaped 
hanging.”148 Furthermore, according to Chomsky, the West’s intellectual history is just 
another chapter in the overall history of imperialist apologia.149  
The same applies to capitalism, which cannot be said to be a construct inherently 
aligned to Western culture. As Pavan Varma points out as he recounts India’s history, 
“money lending did not incur the reprobation of Hindu moralists, as it did that of medieval 
Christianity (...).”150 Across history, foreign observers such as Marco Polo often remarked on 
the great business instincts of many non-Western cultures.151 
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Countless events in more recent history caused scholars to argue that while “Western 
values” may have a normative importance, one cannot argue that Western nations adhered to 
these values any more than non-Western nations at any given point in history. Colonialism in 
Africa, Latin America, Asia and the Middle East is an example of Western violence of historic 
scale committed against non-Western peoples. More recent incidents point in the same 
direction, such as the U.S. led overthrow of Iran’s Prime Minister Mossadegh, the U.S. 
invasion of Vietnam, which led to over 1 million Vietnamese deaths152 and the Iraq War, 
which led to over 100,000 Iraqi civilian deaths.153 Some more radical voices, such as German 
writer and former politician Jürgen Todenhöfer, argue that “the West is much more violent 
than the Muslim world, and (…) millions of Arab civilians have been killed since colonialism 
began.” As Todenhöfer points out, no Muslim country has attacked any Western country 
over the past two centuries.154 While it is not the objective of this study to evaluate such 
claims, one must point out that the West cannot be defined or distinguished from the non-
West by culture or values.155  
Interestingly, this cultural-values lens has equally often been used by non-Western 
analysts, and they often ascribe specific negative values to the West. It became particularly 
popular in 1990s, when so-called “Asian values”, whose supporters attempted to differentiate 
them from “Western values”, came into vogue, mostly to justify authoritarian regimes in 
South East Asia. Lee Kwan Yew, former Prime Minister of Singapore, and Kishore 
Mahbubani, a Singaporean academic, usually juxtaposition Asian discipline, morality and 
order with Western chaos. As Lee Kwan Yew pointed out during an interview with Fareed 
Zakaria in 1994,  
 
I find parts of [the West] totally unacceptable: guns, drugs, violent crime, vagrancy, 
unbecoming behavior in public- in sum the breakdown of civil society. The expansion 
of the right of the individual to behave or misbehave as he pleases has come at the 
expense of orderly society. In the East the main object is to have a well-ordered society 
so that everybody can have maximum enjoyment of his freedoms. This freedom can 
only exist in an ordered state and not in a natural state of contention and anarchy.156 
 
In a similar vein, Kishore Mahbubani writes that  
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[In the West] “budgetary discipline is disappearing (…), work ethic is eroding (…) 
leadership is lacking (...). Any politician who states hard truths is immediately voted 
out (…) This is massive social decay.157 
 
Indian thinkers, on the other hand, at times equate Western culture to rationality. Indian 
Hindu nationalists often grapple with what they describe as an Indian culture of fatalism, 
passivity and excessive acceptance of life.158 George Tanham laments that there is an 
“absence of strategic planning” in India and blames “the Hindu concept of time, or rather the 
lack of a sense of time”. He argues that “Indians view life as an eternal present, with neither 
history nor future.” This, according to him, discourages planning, since “Hindus consider life 
a mystery, largely unknowable and not entirely under man’s control. In this view, fate, 
intuition, and emotions play important roles, but how, how much and when is never known. 
Man’s control over life is thus limited in Hindu eyes, and he cannot forecast or plan with any 
confidence.”159 While these analysts clearly associate the West with rationalism, there is no 
consensus about this in India. Raja Mohan, for example, rejects Tanham’s analysis and says 
that “India represents the triumph of the values of reason, cosmopolitanism, scientific 
progress and individual freedom.”160 
These contradictory assertions show that generalizing about cultures leads to void 
claims. While some non-Western analysts associate the West to inferior values such as 
promiscuity, decadence, immorality, leisure and racism161, the West is often regarded to be 
technologically superior - even in Japan, which is itself technologically advanced.162 This 
again shows that the West is a term that different groups can use to symbolize virtually 
anything.163 
Contrary to Lee Kwan Yee’s claim, Samuel Huntington depicts a strong work ethic as 
a typically Western (protestant) quality, and argues that the cultures of Latino immigrants 
with their “lack of ambition” and their “tomorrow culture” would dilute the United States’ 
Western culture.164 The only thing both sides agree on is that modernization does not equal 
modernization. Both Huntington and Lee Kwan Yee agree that the West was Western well 
before the arrival of technology, but that the West offered a unique environment for the 
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development and adoption of modern technology. The West has thus had a historic role in 
promoting technological progress and modernity.165 
As this discussion has shown, defining the West through the dimension of values and 
culture is logically not sustainable. Non-Western nations adhere to so-called Western nations 
as much, or as little, as Western nations do. As Amartya Sen points out, “given the cultural 
and intellectual interconnections in world history, the question of what is Western and what 
is not would be hard to decide.”166 We need a better definition to use the concept empirically.  
 
1.1.3. Systemic-policy dimension 
 
Another commonly used way to define the West is by looking at a country’s political system 
and government policies. During the Cold War, such thinking was particularly widespread.167 
The West was made up of liberal democracies, the rest was not. In addition, many policy 
analysts implied and still imply that specific foreign policy strategies, such as the promotion 
of democracy, free trade and the defense of human rights, are essentially Western.168 This 
explains considerations that the concept of the West would disappear after the end of the 
Cold War, because during that period Western nations coordinated many policies against the 
Soviet Union. 
According to Deudney and Ikenberry, Western democracies enjoy “unprecedented 
levels of trust and reciprocity” and share a political order based on capitalist economies and 
liberal societies.169 This shows, they argue, that Western democracies have built more than an 
alliance of convenience among countries seeking individual gain. In 1996, Huntington argued 
that “maintaining the unity of the West (…) is essential to slowing the decline of Western 
influence in world affairs.”170 All these affirmations imply that the West consists of countries 
that are aligned because they have the same goals, policies, or political systems. In 2006, for 
example, Kishore Mahbubani writes about “Western policies” in general, implying that the 
West is, in fact, a coherent political unity. As Anne-Marie Slaughter pointed out, however, 
Mahbubani talks about the “West”, but what he really means is the United States.171  
The attempt to define the West through its system of liberal democracy is difficult to 
sustain empirically. While many liberal democracies are Western, many other democratic 
states such as Colombia, South Africa and Ghana are not. In fact, of the world’s five largest 
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liberal democracies - India, the United States, Indonesia, Brazil and Japan, only one is within 
what we commonly call the West. Yet those who apply this definition rarely include such 
countries when talking about the West. In the same way, Turkey and Indonesia have stable 
democratic systems. The argument that Islam and democracy are incompatible is thus 
unconvincing.172 Democracy may be a concept that originated in the West, but it is difficult to 
claim that democracy in Brazil or India is less of a native concept than in relatively young 
democracies like Germany or Portugal. Neither is it correct to argue that non-Western 
countries are democratic merely because Western countries implemented such a democratic 
system. The opposite is true. The British Empire granted no democratic rights to its colonies. 
They created ruling classes with highly concentrated power that made democratic governance 
less likely. Democratization in former colonies like Brazil occurred independently from 
Western influence. Contrary to what Kishore Mahbubani claims, democracy is not a uniquely 
Western value.173 In the same vein, Alastair Bonnett points out that “it is difficult to articulate 
the principles of democracy and justice as Western.”174 The argument that democracy is a 
Western concept can much rather be understood as a Western narrative than as an adequate 
description of reality. Each group recounts ‘their’ version of the West. As the United States 
turned into the center of the West, free market principles, typically American, were integrated 
into the Western narrative.  
The definition is equally difficult to sustain when looking at actual foreign policy 
strategy. The West may have some common civilizational background, but relationships 
between countries of the West have been marked by conflict and bloody internecine conflicts 
throughout most of its history,175 culminating in the “Western civil wars” of the 20th 
century.176 The idea of common policies is relatively recent, but even now, aligned Western 
policies only occur if there is a common threat such as the Soviet Union. Free trade serves as a 
good example. Western nations may historically have supported free trade, but today there is 
little correlation between a nation’s “Westernness” and its likelihood to support free trade - 
the world’s two most open economies are Singapore and Hong Kong.177 This is not a recent 
phenomenon. In 1981, Mary Kaldor argued in “The Disintegrating West” that due to reduced 
competitiveness in comparison to Japan and Western Europe, it was no longer in the United 
States’ national interest to promote free trade, creating “intra-West” conflicts.178 In the same 
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way, there is no consensus among Western countries on fundamental aspects such as the 
death penalty, international law and global warming.179 
Many analysts affirm the inadequacy of this approach. As a German diplomat based 
in Berlin points out, defining the West according to foreign policy strategy is “impossible”, 
given that so-called Western nations’ foreign policy is increasingly indistinguishable from 
typically non-Western nations.180 In a similar vein, Dominque Moisi asked in 2003 “Does the 
West still exist?,” pointing to a growing political gap between the United States and 
Europe.181 Since the end of the Cold War, Western countries’ policy positions have shown 
evidence of significant differences, especially regarding specific events such as the Iraq War in 
2003182, causing Habermas to speak of a “divided West.”183 
  Harries calls the proposal that the West still existed as a political entity a 
“questionable premise.”184 Despite the lack of cohesion among Western nations with regard 
to foreign policy, sweeping comments such as that of Robin Wright, who writes that “(….) 
the West has two alternatives (…) to press Muslim dominated countries toward political 
pluralism (…)”185 are still very common. 
So far, we have looked at the West in three of its dimensions: the historical/ religious, 
the value / cultural, and the systemic/ policy dimensions. We have found out that values are 
subjective and unsuitable for empirical study. We have also found that the West has a lot of 
stability in its historical dimension, but it is unstable in terms of short-term policy. It was not 
until recently that Western countries even aspired towards common policies - it might be 
that, after the Cold War, such short and medium term policy coherence has ended, but it 
seems overblown to claim that the West as a concept will come to an end. The past two 
decades have shown that the West has a reality beyond bipolarity.186 Despite these findings, 
all three dimensions studied are inadequate and confusing. 
 
1.1.4. Geographic dimension  
 
The fourth dimension through which one can define the West is geographic. According to 
this definition, the West is a specific description encompassing principally Europe and North 
America as well as Australia and New Zealand. Some also include Latin America into the 
geographic West.187 
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The geographic dimension has some merit to explain why some civilizations 
prospered and others did not. Jared Diamond argues that the gaps in power and technology 
between human societies originate in environmental differences, refuting the belief that 
Eurasian hegemony is due to any form of Eurasian intellectual, moral or inherent genetic 
superiority. The author identifies two principal advantages of Europe’s geographical 
characteristics. Europe had not only the best natural endowments of crops and domesticable 
animals, but also an East-West axis that provides a large area with similar latitudes and 
therefore climates, which, in turn, allow populations, plants and animals to migrate. By 
contrast, America’s North-South axis forced Native Americans to get used to new 
environments as they migrated.188  
While Europe was geographically at an advantage, other regions were less fortunate. 
Natural characteristics outside of Europe were conducive to large, monolithic and isolated 
empires vulnerable to technological and social stagnation - until the arrival of Europeans, 
which caused upheaval. Jared Diamond uses China as a potent example; in 1432, the Chinese 
Emperor prohibited the building of large ships, which effectively cut off the Chinese Empire 
from the rest of the world.189 Europe, in contrast, saw the rise of many small nation states, as 
natural barriers such as mountains and rivers provided defensible borders. Yet, the proximity 
of other states and potential threats caused political leaders to constantly correct their 
mistakes and adapt, favoring technological progress.190 
The geographical dimension is easy to use, but it is fairly arbitrary. Armijo and 
Sotero, for example, write that “unlike China, Russia, or even India, Brazil is a Western 
power, securely and nearly inevitably tied with the United States and Western Europe - “by 
(…) geography.”191 Yet, Russia is much closer to Europe, and should, according to that 
definition, be more Western than Brazil. Yet there is no consensus about whether Russia is 
part of Europe or not.192 
While Australia, New Zealand and North America are fairly easy to delineate, 
defining Europe geographically is more difficult. Several analysts have drawn a line that 
designates the Baltic States, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Croatia as Western, and Belarus, 
Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Macedonia and Greece as non-Western.193 A purely 
geographic description may seem like a good option, but it cannot account for a more 
complex reality. If Australians, as descendants of Great Britain, are Western, so should be 
Argentineans, who are predominantly of Italian and Spanish origin. Spain is certainly no less 
European than Great Britain. Despite its much higher number of native American, African 
and Asian populations, the United States is considered a core member of the West, while few 
would classify Argentina as such. The Argentineans themselves, being part of the Western 
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Hemisphere, often call themselves “American”, and most regard themselves as culturally 
Western. 
The four dimensions presented are all true to some degree, but rather than capturing 
the entirety of the concept of the West, they show different groups’ narrative about the West. 
The dimensions analyzed fail to define the West in a satisfactory manner, and they show how 
complicated it is - it seems to be one of the things so big that it is hard to define. In some 
dimensions it is a static monolith-like "Asia." In other dimensions it's very ephemeral - in 
terms of common policy. The West behaves very differently in its different dimensions. In 
addition, different groups define it differently according to their needs. Kemal Ataturk 
idealized the West partly because Westernization would help him defeat the remaining power 
structures from the Ottoman Empire. In the same way, Al-Qaeda portrays the West as evil to 
create a potent image of a common enemy. The concept of the West is extremely elastic and 
so flexible that it even thrives on contradictory usage. Throughout history, for example, it 
was commonplace that the West was pronounced dead by some, while simultaneously 
regarded triumphant by others. In 1907, for example, Little foresaw the West’s end in The 
Doom of Western Civilization,194 while Benjamin Kidd’ Principles of Western Civilization 
praised the West in 1902, predicting its victory.195 The very same contradiction continued 
throughout the century, when Victor Hanson’s Why the West has Won (2001)196 was matched 
by The Death of the West, written by Buchanan in 2003.197 While the Bolsheviks associated 
the West with socialist modernity, the West became a symbol of anti-communism during the 
Cold War. Its fluidity and malleability is likely to ensure its survival in the centuries to come. 
We have seen that it is relatively easy for people in the West to define the West, but 
their vision of the West is more normative than realistic, highlighting the positive aspects and 
omitting negative ones. But non-Westerners have a different point of view, and often define 
their own identity through their opposition to the West. The true difficulty is to find an 
abstract set, model or description that both Westerners and non-Westerners could agree with.  
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1.2. The Western World Order 
 
The previous analysis shows that the West simply does not have an objective reality to it that 
withstands scrutiny from all perspectives. To put it differently, the West cannot be described, 
because it depends on what we mean by it, and whose perspective is used. We will therefore 
never find a perfect explanation of what the West is or whether a country is Western or not.  
But we do have a means to understand the practical consequences. The question can 
best be addressed by William James's ‘pragmatic method’, which is “primarily a method of 
settling metaphysical disputes that otherwise might be interminable.”198 James’s theory 
allows us respond to the question practically without finding an actual solution. The 
pragmatic method, James points out, is to try to interpret each notion by tracing its respective 
practical consequences.199 So practically speaking, the West is not culture, history, policy or 
values. Rather, the West’s practical consequences are institutions. In this case, it is easier to 
describe what the West does than what the West is. Institutions seem to be a very good way 
to capture the West and its practical consequences. 
More practically speaking, nations, taken as a whole, make use of or interact with the 
idea of the West through international institutions. These international institutions make up 
what we can call Western World Order. This makes sense because, when we take all the 
perspectives into account, the Western World Order is the only thing agreed by all to be the 
practical consequence of the West.  
The Western World Order is therefore not the West. Rather, the Western World 
Order is its practical consequence and manifestations of the West. It allows us to measure the 
concept and use it in a meaningful way in empirical study. We can exactly measure a nation’s 
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behavior towards the Western World Order, while we cannot measure a country’s behavior 
towards the amorphous concept of the West. Since the West manifests itself in the Western 
World Order, countries, practically speaking, negotiate with the West through the 
institutions, it allows us to study how countries deal with the West. The West has created the 
Western World Order. We are therefore not talking about the quality of the West, but of the 
actions of it and the procedures it involves.200 Institutions are rule-based systems, and that is 
where the West ‘lives’. The Western World Order is a set of rules that countries use.  
 
1.2.1. The Western World Order according to the West 
 
This fifth dimension, Western World Order, which is constituted by today’s international 
institutions, is the way through which nations operationalize the concept of the West, and 
through which the West manifests itself. To a degree, it is a group of institutions- the “public 
order of the West”201. But more fundamentally it is the Western procedures and way of doing 
business – treaties (constitutionalism), representation, rules, membership, fairness, 
democracy, economic interdependency202 and embedded liberalism - that undergirds these 
institutions.203 Institutions create a system that offers ‘intra-institutional mobility’, i.e. 
members can rise within the institutions that make up the system. Mechanisms tie the 
participating states together through well-anchored international institutions.  
This dimension focuses on processes (“the way of doing things” or “rules of the 
game”) and transcends cultural values and ideological aspects used in Huntington’s “Clash of 
Civilization” to define the West. Although international institutions have a set of values at 
their core204, they are not Western, ideological or exclusive. Fundamentally, the Western 
World Order consists of a very simple idea: the institutionalization of interactions among 
sovereign states, which constitutes the major innovation of international politics in the 20th 
century.205 As Ikenberry argues, it is “dense transnational and transgovernmental networks, 
and pluralistic channels of politics (that) mark this western liberal order.” 206 It is an order 
constituted by ‘globally institutionalized political processes by which norms and rules can be 
negotiated on the basis of dialogue and consent, rather than simply imposed by the most 
                                                 
200 Bradley Klein used a somewhat similar approach when, in 1990, he characterized NATO as a “set of 
practices by which the West has constituted itself”. Klein Bradley S.(1990). How the West was One: 
Representational Politics of NATO. International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 3, Special Issue: 
Speaking the Language of Exile: Dissidence in International Studies (Sep., 1990), pp. 311-325 
201 Deudney, Daniel and G. John Ikenberry (1993). The Logic of the West. World Policy Journal, Vol. 
10, No. 4 (Winter, 1993/1994), pp. 17-25 
202 Ikenberry, G. John (2004). Review: Illusions of Empire: Defining the New American Order. Foreign 
Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 2 (Mar. - Apr., 2004), pp. 144-154 
203 Similarly, Deudney and Ikenberry speak of the ‘West’s spirit’- “common norms, public mores, and 
political identities- is the invisible sinew of the polity.” In: Deudney, Daniel and G. John Ikenberry 
(1993). The Logic of the West. World Policy Journal, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Winter, 1993/1994) 
204 Deudney and Ikenberry argue that the institutions “embody common values are not simply 
narrowly instrumental.” Deudney, Daniel and G. John Ikenberry (1993). The Logic of the West. World 
Policy Journal, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Winter, 1993/1994), pp. 17-25 
205 Martin, Lisa L. (1999) An institutionalist view. In: Paul, T.V. and John A. Hall (eds.) International 
Order and the Future of World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999 
206 Ruggie, John Gerard (1982). International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded 
Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order. International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2, International 
Regimes (Spring, 1982) 
OLIVER STUENKEL – DOCTORAL THESIS 36 
powerful.’207 It is worth repeating here that the Western World Order is called Western not 
because its institutions are based on “Western values”. Section 1.1.1. has shown that such a 
concept is empirically not sustainable. Rather, today’s institutions are a Western creation, 
reason for which we can describe the entirety of the institutions as the Western World Order. 
The rules and norms that undergird the Western World Order cannot be allocated to any 
specific culture. Rather than cultural, they are procedural. 
The Western World Order is a more meaningful and tangible concept than foreign 
policy, culture, values or geography, and it is open to countries commonly not seen as 
‘Western’. Deudney and Ikenberry follow this logic when, in 1993, they included Japan into 
the West. “The West”, as they argue, is “a distinctive political order- a civic union.”208 They 
continue explaining that  
 
“(The West is) bound together by a web of complex institutional links and 
associations. The peace the West has built does not derive simply or mainly from the 
fact that its polities are all democracies, but rather from the structural integration of 
their organs of security, economy, and society. Nor are the political identities in this 
system primarily national; rather, the dominant form of identity is a civic one, in 
which rational reciprocity dominates, and nationalism has been muted into pluralist 
ethnicity.”209 
 
Yet, while we are not defining the West or the fringe as actually constituted by the Western 
institutions, the concept of the West is captured adequately by looking at institutional status- 
the Western World Order is a useful proxy for the West.  
Institutions have a ‘gatekeeper’ function and come very close to representing the 
West. The European Union performs this gatekeeper function: the question of who is 
European and who is not has been largely reduced to the question of membership in the 
institution. Even though Europe as a concept existed long before the EU, being a member 
country is a defining characteristic of being European. This may partly explain the fierce 
debate about Turkey’s accession to the EU. The case of Russia is no different. As Dmitri 
Trenin points out, Russia “left the West” because the West “offered Russia no real prospect 
of membership in either NATO or the EU. The door to the West would officially remain 
open, but the idea of Russia actually entering through it remained unthinkable.”210  
This example shows how strongly membership in some key international institutions 
captures the concept of the West. The G7’s decision to include Russia was, after all, 
principally intended to tie Moscow to the West, underlining the weight of membership. In 
1993 political commentator William Pfaff argued that “the West should act through NATO 
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to guarantee existing borders in the Balkans and in Eastern Europe”211, showing that 
institutions are, in fact, a useful tool to capture what the West is. Similarly, Charles Kupchan 
reasoned in 1996 that the West could only be strengthened by broadening and deepening 
collaborative institutions.212 US efforts to reintegrate Germany into the West after WWII 
consisted largely of inviting the country into the Atlantic and Europe-wide institutions that 
would bind and commit Germany.213 
The case of Turkey is particularly instructive. It shows that a nation’s willingness to 
integrate in international institutions very well reflects its willingness to become part of the 
West - the “political West”, that is, as this is unrelated to “Westernization” in the cultural 
sense. Turkey became part of NATO in 1952, and formally applied to EU membership in 
1987. There have been plenty of examples of anti-Western foreign policy and foreign policy 
rhetoric, but Turkey’s short term political moves cannot conceal its underlying intentions to 
engage with the West, which only become visible when looking at its behavior towards 
international institutions. While a nation’s rhetoric or day-to-day foreign policy decisions are 
highly influenced by short-term political considerations, the decision to join or abstain from 
joining an institution has many more far-reaching consequences and implications. Few 
politicians would seek to integrate their country in an international institution merely to win 
an election. The fifth dimension is therefore more useful than any analysis that seeks to 
include all types of foreign policy decisions.  
NATO is often used as a convenient way to define the West214, and Patrick Jackson 
shows how “occidentalist language” by policy makers in postwar Europe helped NATO turn 
into a Western institution.215 But most other institutions also capture the concept of the West. 
In fact, it is the entirety of dominant international institutions that constitute the Western 
World Order. Institutions as diverse as the European Union, NATO, the World Bank and the 
United Nations adhere to a common principle - that all member states must agree on how to 
disagree, thus strengthening peaceful international collaboration. All institutions are based on 
similar principles and rules of order. Participants agree on these principles, lending 
fundamental legitimacy to the Western World Order. These “rules of the game” set clear 
limits on the exercise of power, and resemble domestic politics where the losing side enjoys 
protection and can continue to participate in the decision-making process.216 This promotes 
stability and reduces the possibility of violence. 
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But if it does not function according to Western values, why is it not called “rule-
based world order”? As Ikenberry and Wright point out, Western countries are the creators, 
owners and managers of institutions such as the UN Security Council, the G8, the World 
Bank, the IMF, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the WTO.217 A critical characteristic of 
today’s liberal internationalism is its Western foundation. While American liberal hegemony 
no longer appears to be an adequate framework to support a liberal international order, the 
United States remain at the center of today’s order, providing public goods of security 
protection, market openness and sponsorship of rules and institutions.218  
A country can integrate into the Western World Order without democratizing or 
westernizing culturally.219 In fact, China is likely to be the next guardian of the Western 
World Order, and it would not have to undergo any fundamental transformation (such as 
democratize) to fully engage in and even lead the Western World Order envisioned in this 
study. This solves frequent tensions between Western and non-Western (particularly, non-
liberal) societies caused by liberal norms of universalism vs. respect for diversity and self-
determination.220 The Western World Order is certainly liberal in nature, but, as a system, it 
exerts no direct pressure on societies to engage in domestic reform. 
This approach surely has its weaknesses. It is minimalist, and, more importantly, so 
inclusive that, when applying this definition, a very large number of countries form part of 
the West. It surely seems counterintuitive to argue that a country such as India can form part 
of the West once it joins all major institutions. Yet, in the same way, it would have seemed 
impossible to consider Japan, now part of the OECD, to be part of the West after World War 
II, while today, as shown above, scholars frequently do so.221 In addition, it needs to be 
pointed out here that the Western World Order is not the equivalent of the West; it is merely 
its manifestation. An analysis several decades in the future may very well show that nearly all 
of the world’s countries, do, in fact, form part of the West. It would thus no longer be a 
helpful means to distinguish groups from each other, and effectively lose its utility as an 
analytic tool. Yet, as the overview has shown above, all other categorizations are analytically 
flawed and do not stand up to rigorous analysis. Even if we adopted a value-based definition, 
every country may soon form part of the West once human rights turn into a universally 
accepted value.  
Yet what may be considered a weakness from an analytical point of view reflects the 
actual strength of the Western World Order: It is easy to join, and most actors can be 
expected to do so. On the one hand, the type of collaboration international institutions imply 
reinforce the very Western idea of an open, rule-based system of democracies - the system 
that is commonly called the Western World Order. But countries with non-Western cultures 
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or non-democratic regimes can very well integrate and rise within these structures established 
by the West.222 Even with the presence of a hegemon, the governance of the international 
economic order is built based on rules. Ruggie argues that their formation and 
transformation represents a “concrete manifestation of the internationalization of political 
authority.”223 The rise of Germany and Japan after World War II is powerful proof that the 
system is flexible and easy to join. The emergence of global problems, such as climate change 
and terrorism, increase the incentives for states to join international institutions as they are 
the only way to effectively address such problems. 
The system is not only easy to join, but also hard to overturn. Given the large number 
of supporters, it is increasingly difficult for “alternative systems” to emerge, as more and 
more people all over the world would have to disrupt their lives if a new order emerged. 
Institutions also have an “increasing-returns” character as they expand, and high “exit costs” 
as disengaging means giving up many benefits. Also, initial set-up costs for new institutions 
are very high.224 Countries join international institutions because they believe that 
membership allows them to better maximize their interests. Since membership has some cost 
(that of losing some autonomy due to the institution’s rules), states only remain part of them 
if the benefits exceed the costs. The World Trade Organization’s membership growth is the 
irrefutable proof that the benefits of membership outweigh the costs.225 Overturning a regime 
members overwhelmingly agree with is very difficult. In addition, the Western World Order 
creates a status quo bias, and thus promotes order in international politics.226 
As a consequence, hard power remains relevant, but its significance is mitigated 
through the constitutional nature of the Western World Order. As a consequence, power 
asymmetries begin to lose their significance.227 Rising powers who seek to have their status 
affirmed seek inclusion into the international institutions rather than merely building up hard 
power. Rather than engaging in power balancing, states can respond to threats by linking 
states in mutually constraining institutions. India’s quest to enter the UN Security Council 
and the G8 are good examples.228 While military strength remains relevant in the Western 
World Order, the main sources of power - economic growth and soft power - can only be 
achieved and projected through integration into the Western World Order. As Martin Wolf 
points out, today’s emerging powers would hardly be emerging without the benefits provided 
by today’s global order - rules about international trade, development aid, war and finance. 
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No matter how large its domestic market, no nation today can progress economically if it 
does not engage in the system.229 
 
1.2.2. The Western World Order according to its critics  
 
In most accounts written from the proverbial 'centre', the periphery is represented and 
interpreted in terms and through imagery that both reflect and reify the interests of the 
core.230 It therefore seems appropriate to analyze opposing points of view.  
Yet, critics of the West are not unified and struggle to establish non-Western ideas. 
‘Non-Western’ scholars have often attempted to establish ‘non-Western’ ways of interpreting 
international relations, only to realize that the assumption that the ‘non-West’ necessarily 
takes a different view than the ‘West’ is highly problematic.231 After all, concepts such as the 
‘Third World’, the ‘Orient’ and ‘Africa’ are essentially Western inventions. The ‘non-West’ is 
thus possibly just a Western idea, and, as will be shown below in more detail, many of the 
West’s fiercest critics are Western themselves. Amartya Sen, an Indian economist, is opposed 
to developing ‘non-Western’ ideas and argues that the West has been highly influenced by the 
‘non-West’, absorbing countless things Westerners deemed beneficial without worrying about 
importing ‘non-Western’ influence. Sen accuses those who seek to delineate the West of 
“praising an imagined insularity.”232 He argues that to call ideas of liberal democracies and 
‘democratic peace’ Western is an example of this insularity.233 
We can categorize the critics of the Western World Order into two groups. The first 
and most important group consists of those who fundamentally agree with the system yet 
point out that some of its characteristics fail to live up to Ikenberry’s claims about openness 
and democracy. These moderate critics such as Hurrell, Gray and Rodrik mostly bemoan the 
economic inequality the system has generated234, yet all contend that the solution lies in 
detailed alterations, not in systemic change. The second group is made up of systemic critics, 
such as Marxists and Islamists, and is largely marginal but at times able to gather 
disproportionate attention given its radical views. This group contains anti-Americans who 
lament the country’s dominance and accuse America of ruthlessly imposing its standards 
globally. Marxists regard the economic system as fundamentally flawed, and fundamental 
Islamic voices criticize Western secularism and modernity. They argue that the Western 
World Order is no different from previous hegemonic systems and just another form of 
                                                 
229 Martin Wolf (2004). Why globalization works. New Haven, NJ: Yale University Press, 2004 
230 Alden, Chris and Marco Antonio Vieira (2005). The New Diplomacy of the South: South Africa, 
Brazil, India and Trilateralism. Third World Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 7 (2005), pp. 1077-1095 
231 Bilgin, Pinar (2008). Thinking past ‘Western’ IR?, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2008, pp 5 
- 23 
232 Amartya Sen (2006). Identity and Violence. The Illusion of Destiny. New York, W.W. Norton, 2006. 
In: Bilgin, Pinar (2008). Thinking past ‘Western’ IR?, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2008, pp 
5 – 23 
233 Amartya Sen (2006). Identity and Violence. The Illusion of Destiny. New York, W.W. Norton, 2006. 
In: Bilgin, Pinar. Thinking past ‘Western’ IR?, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2008, pp 5 – 23 
234 Hurrell, Andrew (2007). On Global Order. Power, Values, and the Constitution of International 
Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. See also: Gray, John. False Dawn: The Delusions of 
Global Capitalism. New :York: The New Press, 1998. See also: Rodrik, Dani. Has Globalization Gone 
Too Far? Public Choice, Volume 97, Numbers 1-2, 214-217, 1997  
OLIVER STUENKEL – DOCTORAL THESIS 41 
domination, in no way different from any other world order that has existed before. 
Wallerstein, for example, cites the systems led by Venice/Genoa, Holland and Britain. For 
him and many other critics, today’s Western-centered order does not represent an extension 
of liberal democratic state structures. 
 
1.2.2.1. MODERATE CRITICS 
 
Some of the most prominent critics of the Western system are, in fact, Western themselves- 
and many of them admit that it is the unique Western system which allows them to openly 
voice such criticism.235 Anti-Western points of view can, and very often do, come from 
thinkers from countries that are deeply embedded in the Western World Order. Samuel 
Huntington, for example, famously argued in 1993 that “the West won the world not by the 
superiority of its ideas or values or religion but rather by its superiority in applying organized 
violence. Westerners often forget this fact, non-Westerners never do.”236 But the most 
widespread criticism is more subtle, mostly regarding distributional issues. Andrew Hurrell 
recognizes that the system provides benefits for all who participate but contends that 
“institutions are not, as liberal theory often suggests, neutral arenas for the solution of 
common problems but rather sites of power and dominance. The vast majority of weaker 
actors are increasingly ‘rule takers’ over a whole range of issues that affect all aspects of 
social, economic and political life.” Barnett and Finnemore write that “international 
organizations often use undemocratic procedures in the pursuit of liberal values, thus creating 
“undemocratic liberalism” in global governance.”237 According to Hurrell, this problem does 
not diminish, but rather increases over time.238 In a similar vein, Lisa Martin argues that we 
have rarely seen “fundamental institutional changes that tilt the distribution of benefits 
substantially in the direction of poor and weak states,”239 and Dirk Messner and John 
Humphrey argue that “the marginalization of developing countries in global fora was 
exacerbated by the events of September 11, 2001.”240 Furthermore, Kalevi Holsti writes the 
major weakness of the current order is that there is no peaceful mechanism for rising powers 
to gain acceptance in the system, due to the built-in bias against aspiring powers.241 Hurrell 
admits that  
 
the density of the norms, rules and institutions of international society has increased 
tremendously, often pushing in the liberal direction. (..) Yet (..) whose solidarist or 
                                                 
235 Chomsky, Noam (1967). The Responsibility of Intellectuals. The New York Review of Books, 
February 23, 1967 
236 Huntington, Samuel (1993). Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, Issue 3, 22-50, 1993 
237 Barnett, Michael and Martha Finnemore (2004). Rules for the World. International Organizations 
in Global Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004 
238 Hurrell, Andrew (2007). On Global Order. Power, Values, and the Constitution of International 
Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007 
239 Martin, Lisa L. (1999). An institutionalist view. In: T.V. Pauli and John A. Hall (eds.) International 
Order and the Future of World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999 
240 Messner, Dirk and John Humphrey (2006). China and India in the Global Governance Arena. 
Conference Paper. Seventh Annual Global Development Conference: At the Nexus of Global Chance. 
Pre-Conference Workshop on Asian and Other Drivers of Global Chance. January 18-19, 2006  
241 Holsti, Kalevi J. (1991). Peace and War: Armed Conflict and International Order. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991 
OLIVER STUENKEL – DOCTORAL THESIS 42 
liberal order? What kind of liberal and liberalizing order is it that seeks to promote 
democracy but ignores distributive justice and brushed aside calls for the 
democratization of global decision making? How stable and how legitimate can such a 
liberal order be when it depends so heavily on the hegemony of the single superpower 
whose history is so exceptionalist and whose attitude to international law and 
institutions has been so ambivalent?242 
 
Some of these critics, often from countries that are not fully integrated into today’s 
international order, at times strike more radical tones, such as Nayar and Paul, who affirm 
that “the entire structure is of Western design and construction, preserves Western power, 
and serves Western interests.”243  
Many critics of the Western World Order are also critics of globalization. 
Globalization is, according to this point of view, a tool of Western imperialism, principally 
aimed at promoting Western interests. A lot of anti-Western sentiment is therefore, implicitly, 
directed against globalization and modernization in general.244 
These critics, often part of the so-called “anti-globalization movement”, are right to 
point out that the Western World Order and globalization are closely intertwined concepts, 
and that several, if not all, of the institutions that make up the Western World Order 
contribute to the institutionalization of global rules and norms. As Nye points out, states are 
increasingly embedded in a ‘cobweb’ of multilateral institutions such as the WTO and the 
World Bank.245 Western imperial expansion was the first step towards modern 
globalization,246 and we can even argue that it is the Western Order which strengthens 
globalization further. Institutions such as the WTO are for many a symbol of globalization. 
International institutions are thus an important dimension of globalization. 
However, these critics do not appreciate the fact that the Western World Order also 
helps contain the negative aspects of globalization. The Non-Proliferation Treaty seeks to 
limit the global spread of nuclear weapons, and the Kyoto Protocol seeks to regulate the 
damaging effects of industrialization on the environment. While some international 
institutions promote or even epitomize globalization, some also help manage the 
phenomenon.  
Many critics of the Western World Order mostly equate the West with the system’s 
manager, the United States. As Anne-Marie Slaughter points out, Kishore Mahbubani in his 
2008 book “The New Asian Hemisphere” speaks about the West but omits Europe entirely.247 
Rather than criticizing the structure of the Western World Order, they criticize US foreign 
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policy. Mahbubani praises the world order the United States have created after World War II, 
but chastises the United States for “tearing holes in the fabric of the overall system it created” 
by violating the very principles it had designed.248  
Mahbubani does not engage in systemic criticism. In fact he concedes that “Asians 
have been among the greatest beneficiaries of the open multilateral order created by the 
United States after World War II, and few today want to destabilize it.”249 Yet, he criticizes 
the West’s main protagonist, the United States, for failing to live up to its standards. In detail, 
he criticizes the United States double standards with regard to a nuclear armed Israel, its 
failure to disarm as agreed to in the NPT, its decision to invade Iraq without UN 
authorization, its pro-Israel bias in the Middle East conflict, the West’s failure to liberalize 
trade further, the West’s failure to assume responsibility regarding climate change, the West’s 
failure to democratize global governance, the United States’ refusal to sign international 
human rights treaties, and West’s failure to increase development aid to the poor.250 
 
1.2.2.2. MARXIST CRITICS 
 
While Mahbubani, just like the vast majority of critics, considers the basic structure of the 
Western World Order as sound and finds fault with specific foreign policy strategies, 
Marxists, World-System theorists and Neo-Gramscians regard the system in its entirety as 
flawed. The principal culprit is not Western state craft. Rather, the Western World Order is 
merely an abusive global capitalist system, while talk of rules and norms is hollow rhetoric.251 
In a similar vein, Chandra argues that the conventional Marxist theory of imperialism 
provides strong insight into the “workings of neo-colonialism.”252 Noam Chomsky does not 
characterize the Washington-led order as open, democratic and rule-based. Rather, he calls it 
hegemonic, violent, economically coercive and imperialist253, arguing that "the primary 
concern of U.S. foreign policy is to guarantee the freedom to rob and to exploit."254 He calls 
the “horrors” of American foreign policy, which are, he contests, mostly “so obvious and so 
self-evident as to be beyond debate”. He characterizes even incidents of Western foreign 
policy generally regarded as positive, such as the Marshall Plan, as “a device by which the 
American people gave $13 billion to American corporations.”255 Western-led globalization is 
merely the latest stage of Western imperialism. These critics, at times pointing to conspiracy 
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theories, usually identify the United States as the source of evil, and usually claim that large 
U.S corporations are in control of the U.S. government.256 
 
1.2.2.3. CLASSICAL THEORIES OF IMPERIALISM 
 
Marx and Engels did not engage in a sustained reflection on geopolitics for history in general, 
and their interest in geopolitics was rather limited to “ad hoc interventions” in the context of 
a global communist strategy.257 Yet Marxist theories of imperialism, particularly developed 
by the second generation of Marxism, represent a more in-depth reflection to explain global 
political developments (principally colonialism) by the dynamics of capitalism. Second-
generation Marxists developed theories of imperialism and pointed to the changing 
characteristics of capitalism, leading to the rise of “monopoly capitalism.” The quest for raw 
materials and the search for new export for new export markets forced the industrialized 
states located in the core are forced to exploit the periphery- hence European nations’ 
decision to acquire colonies overseas.  Since capitalists in the rich world can, thanks to the 
surplus resulting from exploitation, appease their working classes, the socialist revolution 
needs to take place outside of the core - rejecting Marx’ expectation, but justifying why it had 
happened in Russia first.  
While liberalism, openness, inquiry and competition may be viable in the political 
context, it inevitably leads to exploitation in the economic context. The Western rich nations 
are only able to sustain their economic advantage by exploiting the poor, and the system is 
geared towards sustaining this inequality. This situation is aggravated by overproduction 
(due to capitalists’ interest in higher profits) and underconsumption (due to low wages), and 
the joining of forces of banking capital and industrial capital, two former opposed groups of 
capitalists. Colonialism is thus a natural and necessary outgrowth of the systemic dominated 
by this extreme form of capitalism. Similar to Hanna Arendt, who understood totalitarian 
policies within Europe as a potential continuation of colonialism, Classical Marxist theorists 
regard the current Western World Order based on freedom and competition in both the 
political and the economic sphere as unsustainable. Since banks and industry joins hands, 
forming the so-called interests of “finance capital” turns competition that formerly took place 
uniquely between firms into political-military competition between states, leading to 
situations such as the “scramble for Africa”, and eventually leading to world war.  
The West was thus able to hold on to democratic principles only by exploiting other 
parts of the world and keeping them from democratizing.258 The case of military-led 
development in many parts of the world is a case in point. In the 1950s, it became a US 
strategy to create alliances with non-Western military regimes to maintain stability in what 
was then called the ‘Third World’. While military-led modernization was aligned with US 
national security, it certainly inhibited the adoption of Western liberal democracy in some 
instances. ‘Non-Western’ international relations theory thus oftentimes did not evolve in a 
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vacuum259, but in reaction to an at times aggressive and interventionist Western foreign 
policy. This has caused some to question the differentiation between ‘Western’ and ‘non-
Western’ thinking about the Western global order.  
From the Marxist point of view, even less aggressive US administrations are to be 
blamed. Chomsky accuses even more idealist US Presidents such as Bill Clinton of using 
democracy and humanitarian intervention as a pretext to pursue policies that preserve 
American hegemony260, arguing that no US-president since 1945, “judged on the principles of 
Nuremberg, would have escaped hanging.”261 Chomsky argues that America’s intellectual 
history is just another chapter in the overall history of imperialist apologia.262 Contrary to 
supporters of the Western system, he argues that realpolitik has therefore not been an 
obstacle to Western ideals, but a fundamental part of it. The Western World Order furthers 
the development of international capitalism, and rather than making the world more alike, it 
deepens the divide between the core, the semi-periphery, and the periphery. In short, it is the 
old modernization theory in a new guise.263 The Western World Order wrongly supplanted 
what he calls the “natural balance of power” in the world.264 September 11, according to 
Chomsky, was caused by misguided American activism which caused tensions and 
exacerbated problems. This is because presidents are puppets controlled by America's 
corporations who take all key decisions with regard to US foreign policy. 
In several instances, Chomsky was right to call US foreign policy unprincipled and 
opportunistic. In his 1982 collection of essays entitled “Towards a New Cold War”, 
Chomsky criticizes the tacit support by the United States for Indonesia's brutal war against 
the people of East Timor265, which would only receive the world’s attention after East 
Timorese independence in 1999. 
Chomsky therefore sees little difference between the Western World Order and 
previous systems, such as the Roman Empire, in the sense that they are all based on power, 
not on values. “We are hardly the first power in history”, Chomsky argues, “to combine 
material interests, great technological capacity, and an utter disregard for the suffering and 
misery of the lower orders.”266 He thus dismisses the argument that any nation outside of the 
international institutions would want to join. In a similar vein, Weber questions the 
attractiveness of the system, arguing that  
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at least half the world’s population simply did not benefit meaningfully from sixty-
plus years of Western-led economic growth and technological change. For those 
outside the West who did benefit, the vast majority attribute their advancement not 
to liberal ideology, the beneficence of the West or the post–World War II American-
led order, but to state-directed capitalism and resource nationalism run by illiberal 
states. (…) re-surfacing an American commitment to post–World War II style 
multilateralism with post–World War II institutions is no longer meaningful.267 
 
Several Marxist claims about the global capitalist systems remain relevant, and some 
problems predicted by Marx himself are more pertinent today than they were at the time of 
writing. Marx foretold that while capitalism could generate growth, it would fail to benefit 
the masses. Marx’ claims cannot be rejected easily. As Andrew Hurrell points out,  
 
inequality of power and of condition continues to be one of the distinguishing 
features of international life and the big picture is reasonably clear. Roughly 85% of 
the world’s income goes to the richest 20% of the world’s population, whilst 6% 
goes to the poorest 60%.268  
 
Many of Marx’ predictions, however, such as about the importance of the working class in 
international relations, failed to materialize. Chomsky’s and other Marxist theorists’ critique 
of US foreign policy is valuable, but often fails to be constructive as it is not constrained by 
practical considerations. In addition, several of the arguments used by classical theories of 
imperialism can be criticized on empirical grounds. For example, the rates of return from 
capital exports to the colonies have historically not been higher than compared to domestic 
investments. In fact, investments overseas where exposed to higher risks, and the overall 
economic effect of the colonies on the core is thought to be relatively small.269  
 
1.2.2.4. WORLD-SYSTEMS-THEORY 
 
The Latin American Dependency School developed Leninist ideas on imperialism further. 
The so-called dependistas, who believe in economic dependency theory made popular by 
Brazil’s former President Henrique Cardoso, Enzo Faletto and Raul Prebisch, argued that 
there is a natural hierarchy in the international system. An important figure in this context is 
André Gunder Frank, who bases his claims on Marxist assumptions. According to Frank, it is 
impossible for peripheral countries (those located outside Western Europe, Canada, the US, 
and Japan) – to develop economically as they are integrated in the world-capitalist system in 
a subordinated role.270  
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This approach, called world-systems theory, is most prominently represented by 
Immanuel Wallerstein, who sought to make up for the deficiencies of previous Marxist 
theorists by providing a theoretical framework for the interpretation of the entire history of 
the capitalist world system.271 Wallerstein’s unit of analysis is the world economy, and he 
presupposes a single international division of labor. Strong states are part of the core because 
they have a combination of a high skill and high capitalization regime, while weak states in 
the periphery have the opposite, which creates a constant surplus transfer from the periphery 
to the core. This allows the capitalists in the core to pacify their own working class by 
exploiting the periphery, cementing the hierarchy between core and periphery. The power of 
a state is thus determined by its integration into the economic structure of the international 
division of labor.272 The semi-periphery, which contains both economic characteristics of the 
core and the periphery, is strongly influenced by the economic interests by the core, while 
retaining an industrial base at home. According to Wallerstein, this system emerged first in 
Europe when Western Europe was able to develop high-skilled manufacturing capacity, while 
Eastern Europe and overseas regions continued to focus on low-skilled agriculture, allowing 
Western Europe to dictate the terms of their unequal relationship. In the process of economic 
globalization, Western Europe, and later the United States, were able to extend their terms on 
the entire world. Despite a strong tendency towards maintaining the system, Wallerstein 
concedes that it is possible for peripheral states to move into the core.  In order to do so, 
states in the periphery must develop the capacity to innovate in the field of capital-intensive 
production, which will eventually translate into commercial, financial, and then ultimately 
military superiority. As Teschke points out in his analysis, Wallerstein basically reduces state 
interests to the interests of the trading ruling class. In addition, Wallerstein’s system of states 
is a direct product of the capitalist system.273 Since today’s system is merely an episode in the 
never-ending cycle of hegemonic powers, today’s system is no different from all the previous 
ones. As a consequence, world-system theorists have generally expected today’s system to be 
in terminal decline.  
 
1.2.2.5. NEO-GRAMSICAN INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
 
Neo-Gramscian international political economy (IPE), which probably presents the most 
prominent Marxist theory in the present-day international relations discourse thanks to 
Robert Cox, essentially argues along similar lines, saying that the United Kingdom and the 
United States had imposed free trade on the rest of the world, successfully deluding others 
that this was to the benefit of all, while it in fact benefited the hegemon. International 
financial institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF and even the UN are seen as tools 
created by the hegemon to strengthen the current distribution of power. Thinkers such as 
Cox therefore advise states in the periphery not to engage in such institutions, as they were 
unsuitable for the construction of counter-hegemony. The hegemon is able to exploit the 
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periphery, which has a less sophisticated production process. This approach certainly 
overlooks the fact that US national interests cannot easily be equated to those of 
transnational capital. Still, this approach remains popular in academic circles, and it has 
some appeal among Brazilian and Indian foreign policy makers. Neo-Gramscian thinkers 
reject the notion that the system is fair, open and democratic 
 
1.2.2.6. THE ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE 
 
Several Islamic countries take issue with the values that undergird the institutions that make 
up the Western World Order. Their reaction to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is 
an interesting example. The Universal Declaration, adopted by the United Nations Assembly 
in 1948, serves as a symbol for the global extension of a Western rule-based order. 
Representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran, for example, continue to object to the 
Universal Declaration, arguing that it is a Judeo-Christian construct incompatible with 
Islamic Sharia.274 In 2000, the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam was established at 
the meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), which does not guarantee 
freedom of religion or gender equality. The Declaration’s article 24 says that “All the rights 
and freedoms stipulated in this Declaration are subject to the Islamic Sharia.”275 This example 
underlines that the Western World Order is seen, by several members of the OIC, as a form 
of Judeo-Christian cultural imperialism, implied by calling the Declaration “universal” rather 
than “Western” or “Christian”. 
Finally, Al Qaeda and Islamic fundamentalism can be, especially since September 
2001, regarded as one of the principal opponents of the Western system. Since then, several 
analysts have argued that the West is under attack from ‘global jihadism’. The topic at times 
dominated the media to such a degree that it made the discussion about what the non-West 
thinks about the West more difficult.276 While it is difficult to generalize and dangerous to 
mix fundamentalist views with Muslim ones, there is some evidence that Muslim leaders 
regard the promotion of democracy and human rights by the West as a hypocritical strategy 
of imperialism.277 
As Bernard Lewis points out, classic Islam divides the world into the House of Islam, 
where Muslim law and faith prevail, and the House of Unbelief, which Muslims ultimately 
need to bring to Islam.278 Just as Christendom regarded Islam as the principal enemy for long 
periods, Islam has, for the past fourteen centuries, seen Christendom (or the West) as its main 
rival. After making significant inroads in Sicily, Spain and even France, Muslims suffered a 
string of defeats: The loss of its European territories, an advancing Russia, the Western 
                                                 
274 Littman, David (1999). Universal Human Rights and Human Rights in Islam. Midstream (New 
York) February/March 1999; http://www.dhimmitude.org/archive/universal_islam.html (accessed 
February 14, 2010) 
275 Organization of the Islamic Conference (1990). Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, 1990 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/cairodeclaration.html (accessed October 15, 2009) 
276 Bilgin, Pinar (2008). Thinking past ‘Western’ IR?, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2008, pp 5 
– 23 
277 Armstrong, David (2008). The Evolution of international society. in: Steve Smith, John Baylis, 
Patricia Owens. Introduction, The Globalization of World Politics, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2008 
278 Lewis, Bernard (1990). The roots of Muslim rage. Atlantic Monthly, 17 (4), 1990, pp 17 – 26 
OLIVER STUENKEL – DOCTORAL THESIS 49 
occupation of the Middle East, and the invasion of foreign (mainly Western) ideas, forever 
changing Muslim culture. In the Muslim World, Europe and America are generally seen as 
the same unit, as the West is defined through the religious dimension. Anti-Western sentiment 
in the Muslim World has many causes - the French occupation of Algeria, the British 
occupation of Egypt, American support for Israel, US support for authoritarian regimes in the 
Muslim world and Western imperialism (cultural, religious and military-related) and 
Christian rule over Muslim minorities, an accusation commonly found in the radical Islamist 
literature.279 
But, Islamists fight not against the Western World Order itself; rather, they disagree 
with Western values such as secularism and modernism that spread through “cultural 
globalization.”280 The comparison between Islam’s relations with the Soviet Union and the 
West makes this clear. It is noteworthy in this context why radical Islamist hatred is so much 
stronger against Christendom than it has been against the Soviet Union, which also 
subjugated millions of Muslims. The reason may be that the issues that most markedly 
troubled Muslim culture, such as consumerism, were not present in Soviet culture. In 
addition, Soviet secularism was not attractive enough to pose any threat to Muslim rulers- 
contrary to Western secularism and liberty.281 Western modernity, once admired and 
imitated, was later criticized and rejected. When Islamist fundamentalists denounce and fight 
against the Western global order, they actually fight against Western secularism and Western 
modernism, not against the institutions that make up the Western World Order per se. As 
early as 1990, Bernard Lewis identified such a clash of civilizations.282 
These critics are certainly right to make some kind of connection between the 
Western World Order and Western values such as secularism and modernism. A rule-based, 
open and democratic Western World Order may be non-ideological, but it certainly is based 
on secularism and the belief in sensible, man-made rules.  
It is striking that regimes opposed to the Western World Order continue to partially 
participate in it, and fail to propose a viable alternative. North Korea, for example, can be 
considered one of the nations least integrated into the Western order283, so it seems 
appropriate to understand its point of view of the system. North Korea is not a member of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO)284 and a US arms embargo against North Korea has 
been in effect for over 50 years.285 North Korea has withdrawn from the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT), North Korea has not ratified the 2000 UN 2008 TIP Protocol, and Kim Jong-
Il, North Korea’s leader since 1994, has been termed a “serial rule-breaker” by the 
international press.286 North Korea, which severely restricts freedom of assembly287, has been 
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part of the United Nations since 1991, but it has joined few other international institutions. 
The government in Pyongyang has written very little about global governance in general, but 
North Korea’s behavior demonstrates that it does not regard participating in international 
institutions as beneficial to its national interest. North Korea’s withdrawal from the Non-
Proliferation Treaty indicated that its government regards international treaties as invasive 
and as an excuse to exert influence. Yet, North Korea is still part of the United Nations, 
which indicates some basic acceptance of the principles of the Western World Order. Iran is 
no different. Ayatollah Khomeini argued after 1979 that international institutions such as the 
UN were part of the United States’ strategy of oppression. 288 Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, 
President of Iran since 2005, continues in confrontational rhetoric when alleging that the 
Western World Order is driven by Zionist and Christian interests.289 However, Iran never 
retreated from the UN. 
To conclude, the West’s opponents can be categorized into two groups. The 
dominant group consists of moderate critics who accept the Western World Order in 
principle but criticize specific features of it, such as a lack of redistribution. The second group 
is mostly made up of radical critics such as Noam Chomsky whose critique is much more 
sweeping. According to them, it is impossible to repair the system, as the system’s 
undergirding principle - the free market - is itself flawed. While supporters of the Western 
World Order talk about rules and democracy, opponents talk about capitalism and 
exploitation. This group is largely limited to academic circles, and its proposals are often 
vague and mostly irrelevant for policy makers. In the same way, Islamist critics who grapple 
not necessarily with the Western World Order per se, but with the effects it has in their own 
societies, are unlikely to have a lasting effect on the debate. As Bernard Lewis points out in 
“What Went Wrong? Western Influence and Middle Eastern Response”, once leading peoples 
in the Middle East struggled to come to terms with modernity introduced by force from the 
West,290 but they fail to offer a viable alternative.  
The vast majority of critics thus does not seek to destroy the system, but doubt that 
the Western World Order is as rule-based, open and beneficial for all as Ikenberry claims. 
The key challenge for supporters of the Western World Order will be to meaningfully 
respond to critics’ key charge that the Western World Order does not always provide the 
benefits to all its members as its proponents claim. 
 
1.2.3. Conclusion 
 
 
A society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of 
certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive 
themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and 
share in the working of common institutions. 
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- Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (1997)  
 
So far we have shown that the Western World Order is potentially the best way to represent 
the West, this order being defined by Western procedures and way of doing business - 
treaties, representation, rules, membership, fairness, ‘social mobility’ and democracy.291 At 
the same time, moderate critic voices question whether all such claims are true, and radical 
voices argue that the Western World Order is not defined by fairness, openness and rules, but 
by economic coercion and exploitation, and that the system is therefore unattractive to 
outsiders. 
Critics are right to point out that not all international institutions are open and 
democratically structured. While institutions such as the WTO are indeed open, rule-based 
and democratic, others are closed and club-based, and a mere reflection of power. 
International institutions that are truly democratic and open, such as UNCTAD, are often 
avoided by Western nations, who prefer closed and hierarchical, non-democratic institutions 
such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, where voting rights are tied to 
financial contributions.292 The composition of the UN Security Council, one of the most 
important international institutions, is a reflection of the distribution of power after World 
War II. The five permanent members with veto power - the United States, China, Russia, the 
United Kingdom and France - are the only Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) under the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, which has often been criticized as a non-democratic treaty that allows 
strong nations to “lay down the law on weak ones”.293 Brazil’s and India’s difficulties to join 
the UN Security Council show that fringe nations are, in fact, excluded from the Western 
World Order despite their desire to join. Yet, there is evidence that change is taking place in 
the few organizations that are not entirely democratic. While the G20, which was designated 
to deal with the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009, is far from being as democratic as 
ECOSOC, it is more inclusive than the G7, which dealt with previous financial crises. 
Changing quota shares in the IMF and the World Bank, two key institutions of global 
financial governance, shows that institutional power structures are not as static as they once 
seemed. The majority of institutions, such as the WTO, are entirely just and democratic. 
Even the organizations that are not entirely just strongly moderate the practice of power 
politics.294 As Ikenberry rightly points out, institutions “reduce the return to power” He 
explains that  
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 [Reduced return to power] means that [institutions] reduce the possibilities that a state can 
turn short-term gains into a long-term power advantage. Taken together, constitutional 
agreements set limits on what actors can do with momentary advantages. Losers realize that 
their losses are limited and temporary- to accept those losses is not to risk everything nor will 
it give the winner a permanent advantage.295 
 
Critics of the Western World Order are numerous. Andrew Hurrell, certainly no opponent of 
international institutions, admits that “not all is well (…) with the institution the world 
currently has.”296 More radical critics with less influence on policy makers, like Noam 
Chomsky, argue that rather than treaties, representation, rules, membership, fairness, social 
mobility, democracy, the West has established the Western World Order through hegemony, 
military power and economic coercion. The central focus of “Hegemony or Survival: 
America's Quest for Global Dominance”, published in November 2003 lies on the United 
States' political, military and economic motives, in contrast to its outward rhetorical support 
for democracy, the Middle-East peace process, free trade, and human rights.297 Do Western 
institutions not live up to their Western ideals of rules, democracy and openness? 
Critics of the Western World Order also make reference to the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, which is often considered unjust by emerging non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS),298 
because nuclear weapon states (NWS) force others to obey harsh restrictions, while they do 
not fulfill their promise to disarm. Nuclear disarmament is indeed an obligation that ought to 
be respected, and the treaty will not be fully just until NWS have taken more meaningful 
steps towards disarmament. Still, the structure of the NPT can be considered just for two 
reasons. It is open to all parties, and all members will enjoy equal rights to develop peaceful 
nuclear energy.  
In this context, it is important to point out that the principal creator and owner of the 
Western World Order, the United States, is not part of or obstructs several international 
regimes299, such as the UNFCC, the Ottawa Treaty (Mine Ban Treaty)300, or the ICC 
(International Criminal Court).301 Peter Spiro points out that “although the United States has 
                                                 
295 Ikenberry, G. John (1999). Liberal Hegemony and the Future of American Postwar Order. In Paul, 
T.V. and John A. Hall, International Order and the Future of World Politics. Cambrige: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003, pp. 123–145. See also: Ikenberry, G. John 2001. After Victory: Institutions, 
Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press 
296 Hurrell, Andrew (2007). On Global Order. Power, Values, and the Constitution of International 
Society. 2007, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
297 Chomsky, Noam (2003). Hegemony or Survival: America's Quest for Global Dominance, 
Hegemony or Survival: America's Quest for Global Dominance, 2003 
298 Spektor, Matias (2010). How to read Brazil’s Stance on Iran, First Take, Council of Foreign 
Relations, http://www.cfr.org/publication/21576/how_to_read_brazils_stance_on_iran.html (accessed 
June 2, 2010) 
299 Roberts, Adam (2008). Variable Geometry: Is anyone in charge of today’s non-polar world? 
Internationale Politik, Fall 2008  
300 Ikenberry, G. John (2001). After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of 
Order after Major Wars. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.  The Ottawa Treaty has been 
signed by 122 governments so far, but not so by Russia, China and the United States (www.icbl.org)  
301 Weiss, Thomas G. The Illusion of UNSC reform. The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 4, pp. 
147-166, Autumn 2003 
OLIVER STUENKEL – DOCTORAL THESIS 53 
accepted the North American Free Trade Association and participation in the World Trade 
Organization, it has spurned important multilateral regimes, relating to arms control, the 
environment, war crimes, human rights, and other emerging global issues”- a strategy critics 
have called “international law à la carte,”302 while readily assuming the role as exceptional 
power. As Charles Krauthammer, a conservative commentator put it in 1990, “our best hope 
for safety in such times (…) is in American strength and will (…) to lead a unipolar world 
unashamedly laying down the rules of world order and being prepared to enforce them.”303 
Does this mean that the United States is less integrated into the Western World Order 
than the United Kingdom, a country that is part of virtually all international institution, 
ranging from the UN Security Council, NATO, the EU, the ICC and the Ottawa Treaty? 
 
                          
 
Map of all countries that have signed the Ottawa Treaty (Source: http://www.icbl.org/intro.php)  
 
The fact that the United States remains outside of a series of international treaties, and its 
occasional disrespect for institutions (such as President Bush’s decision to invade Iraq in 
2003) indeed requires further explanation.  
A sense of exceptionalism and its preponderant position can explain US behavior to 
some degree. American uniqueness is a recurring topic in American history; already prior to 
independence, settlers of the thirteen colonies shared a strong sense of exceptionalism304- due 
to religious zeal and geographic isolation. While several historians, such as Ian Tyrell, have 
repudiated the role of American exceptionalism305, it continues to play a major role in both 
the media and academia.306 There is, as a consequence, a strong tradition of anti-
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internationalism in America, and it can be regarded as an irony of history that a nation that 
relished political isolation came to create the post-War Western international order. 
American preponderance complicates matters further. Richardson points out that “the United 
States may not be hegemonic, but it is preponderant, its influence not just greater than that of 
others, but different in kind.”307 As the strongest and richest nation on earth, the United 
States is the only country that can - temporarily, at least - disrespect international institutions 
and, as anti-internationalists point out, “afford to safeguard its sovereignty.”308 The United 
States has been in a unique position of the Western World Order since its inception - in the 
position of owner and manager of the system.309 One can therefore argue that the concept of 
American exceptionalism is indeed valid in the context of international relations.310 Following 
a classic realist argument, the United States at times abstains from or confronts international 
institutions due to its exceptional power.311 Despite the United States’ rejection of a series of 
international institutions, it remains the provider of the most important global public good, 
security, vital for maintaining the stability of today’s Western World Order.312 
The vast majority of international regimes that exist are purely open, democratic and 
rule-based. Several take time to change.  The International Criminal Court, the Mine Ban 
Treaty and the Convention of the Rights of the Child are examples for institutions that allow 
immediate unconditional integration. Yet, critics rightly point out that some of the key 
international institutions that make up the Western World Order are not as easy to join as 
Ikenberry likes to claim. The World Bank and the IMF are often used as examples of non-
democratic institutions. When looking at IMF quota shares as a multiple of world GDP 
share, Belgium is, after Saudi Arabia, the most overrepresented country of all, with a factor of 
over 2.5.313 Brazilian Finance Minister Guido Mantega said after the IMF meeting in Istanbul 
in 2009 that “we can only hope that over-represented advanced countries will realize that they 
may do great harm to the fund if they attempt to block or delay quota and voice reform.”314  
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Power continues to play a role, but that does not alter the collaborative and liberal 
nature of the system. Liberal institutionalists do not deny that large powers use bargaining 
power in multilateral negotiations, sometimes described as the “coordination of the 
powerful”, to obtain the results they most prefer. Actors, as Stein points out, have different 
endowments and different possibilities and different bargaining strengths, and institutions 
cannot entirely undo these differences.315 A similar situation occurs when a group of powerful 
nations create a club, forcing those outside to choose between joining and staying out. A 
country’s behavior towards the international system thus reflects both a country’s hard 
power and its view on norms. Lisa Martin is right when she points out that too often, 
international institutions change too slowly to adequately reflect shifts in the distribution of 
power between states. But there are plenty of examples that show that change is taking place. 
Institutions, as Giovanni Sartori points out, are “first and above all instruments which limit, 
restrain and allow for the control of the exercise of political power.”316 Even the system’s 
critics admit that despite its inadequacies, it succeeds in significantly limiting the returns to 
power. 
Despite the criticism, the Bretton Woods institutions are relatively flexible, and 
Brazil’s and India’s interest proves their attractiveness. While it is true that both the IMF and 
the World Bank have been slow to modify their voting structures, there is no legal 
impediment that prevents non-established powers to assume a more powerful role in either 
institution. Quite to the contrary, as World Bank President Zoellick pointed out in 2009, 
adjustments in the voting structure show that the Bank seeks to balance power between 
developed and developing countries.317 In addition, it seems to be only a question of time 
before the rule that the IMF President must be European and the World Bank President 
American will be dropped.318 If a rising power is willing to increase its financial contributions 
to the Bretton Woods institutions, as Brazil and India have pledged to do in 2009, they can - 
with some delay - expect to be granted more powers in the organizations’ decision making 
process. Both countries’ harsh criticism can possibly be interpreted as a negotiation strategy 
to increase pressure on the institutions to adopt change faster. This does not mean that there 
is no room for improvement in the ways these institutions are governed, but it repudiates the 
claim that the Bretton Woods institutions are closed elitist clubs. In the vast majority of cases, 
established powers have been willing to put principles of inclusion over cultural cohesion, for 
example, by integrating Japan into virtually all closed clubs, such as the G7 or the OECD.  
The UN Security Council is therefore 'the exception that proves the rule.' It is indeed 
closed, non-democratic and hierarchical, but can largely be explained not by the United 
States’ wish to exclude others, but by historical context. The creation of an exclusive, veto-
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wielding Security Council was seen as a necessary measure, given the recently failed attempt 
to establish a more open and democratic League of Nations. Rather than grounding itself on 
the principle of vae victis (“Woe to the conquered ones”)319, the post World War II 
institutions sought to reintegrate the losers of the conflict. The following five decades would 
prove Roosevelt and his colleagues right, since the United Nations turned out to be more 
resilient and practical than its predecessor. Despite its relative importance, the UN Security 
Council can therefore not overshadow the multitude of other institutions whose openness 
support Ikenberry’s claim. The Western system is, in several instances, inconsistent, but the 
basic gist of the western system remains valid.  
Objections and critics of the Western World Order are frequent but proof of the 
system’s strength and openness. In addition, objections to the Western World Order of 
underrepresentation and injustice in international institutions are frequent because there is 
international diplomatic space within which the critique takes place. That place is a Western 
creation. The key international institutions of the Western World Order, such as the United 
Nations, offer a highly visible platform for critics of the very system. System critics such as 
Fidel Castro, Hugo Chavez and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad have all used the General Assembly 
to criticize the manager of the Western system. Global media and universities offer further 
vehicles for critics to voice their concerns. Institutions thus provide a better space for 
opposing the greater West because formalized procedures legitimize differences of opinion. 
The legalistic institutions designed by the West are precisely the vehicles used by fringe 
nations to most effectively express their grievances. There has never been any comparable 
safe space in any previous world system. Examples such as the 1989 fatwa against Salman 
Rushdie, issued by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini320, and the Jyllands-Posten Muhammad 
cartoons controversy in (2005-06), which caused more than 100 deaths321, show that this 
international space which provides a safe haven for critical voices remains unique. In few 
other places can one safely rebuke the authorities. This criticism cannot be explained by 
Marxists, who, as Benno Teschke rightly argues, wrongly characterize peripheral actors as 
mere “passive recipients rather than as active participants in specific geopolitical encounters 
(…).”, an assertion which, according to Teschke, raises the charge of Eurocentrism.322 
Furthermore, given the numerous asymmetries and problems institutions suffer, it 
would be premature to announce their triumph. Several existing institutions need to undergo 
reform in order to remain relevant. Rather, it is the institutions’ underlying procedures that 
have triumphed. Occasional inconsistencies in the Western World Order are unlikely to ever 
be eliminated entirely. They reflect a natural tension between idealism and realpolitik.323 For 
example, U.S. Presidents Nixon and Reagan were guided by a more Machiavellian rationale 
and often supported authoritarian regimes that were human rights violators, in order to 
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secure the greater national interest of regional stability.324 The Carter and Clinton 
administrations, on the other hand, have been influenced by idealist ideology, seeking to 
strengthen international institutions.325 Realpolitik has historically been an obstacle to 
Western idealist principles. Yet critics who point to problems with the specific decision-
making rules within some institutions fail to appreciate that this discussion can only take 
place because we have begun to think within a framework based on procedures and rules as 
the guiding principle for international politics. This proves how strong and effective this 
procedures-based paradigm has become, and specific problems in some institutions do not 
weaken the overall argument.  
The same argument applies to the institutions’ effectiveness. Critics also point out 
that today’s institutions often fail to deliver solutions to global challenges. While the World 
Trade Organization is highly democratic, its members have failed to strike a comprehensive 
agreement over the past years. This does not, however, mean that the WTO has lost its 
legitimacy. Quite to the contrary, in a democratic system, finding solutions naturally becomes 
more difficult, as is visible in national parliaments across the world.  
Fringe states, some of them the system’s fiercest critics, inadvertently prove the 
consistency of the Western World Order. If the critics’ claims were true, and institutions were 
hegemonic, violent, economically coercive and imperialist, non-Western countries would not 
want to join Western institutions. They would engage in classic power balancing behavior, as 
realists would expect it. Emerging non-Western powers, such as Brazil and India, however, 
seem to make a serious effort to join the existing international institutions- they want to be 
part of an open, fair, democratic, rule-based, law-based world order. In a similar fashion, 
Lisa Martin points out that “the trend towards institutionalization is not accidental, nor is it 
something that is being imposed on reluctant governments. It is the result of government 
choice.”326 They do so because they reckon that joining the system provides maximum 
benefits. Ultimately, Ikenberry claims, power is based on sustained economic growth. The 
best way to achieve growth (and thus to become powerful) is by integrating into a system that 
provides benefits.327 As Brazil’s then-President Fernando Henrique Cardoso pointed out in 
2000, “there is little to be gained by clinging to old-fashioned models of autarky and of 
refusing to integrate (….).”328 
Critics respond that many developing nations were coerced to join the Western World 
Order, especially since the 1970s when the first major debt crisis between the West and the 
developing countries started. Gramscian thinkers argue that poor countries had no other 
choice but to accept the IMF’s help and implement neo-liberalist policies. Lloyd Gruber 
points out that if a few powerful states create a system, they change the status quo, making 
                                                 
324 Bell, Cora (1984). The First Term: From Carter to Reagan. Foreign Affairs. Special Essay: America 
and the World 1984 
325 Kaufmann, Burton I. Scott Kaufmann (2003). The Presidency of James Earl Carter. Lowrance, KS: 
Kansas University Press, 2003. See also: Lowry, Rich (2004) Paying the Price for the Clinton Years, 
Washington, D.C.: Regnery Press, 2003 
326 Martin, Lisa L. (1999). An institutionalist view. In: Paul, T.V. and John A. Hall (eds.) International 
Order and the Future of World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999 
327 G. John Ikenberry (2008). The Rise of China and the Future of the West, Foreign Affairs; 
Jan/Feb2008, Vol. 87 Issue 1, p23-37 
328 Cardoso, Fernando Henrique (2000). An Age of Citizenship. Foreign Policy, No. 119, Summer, 2000, 
pp. 40-43 
OLIVER STUENKEL – DOCTORAL THESIS 58 
non-members worse off. As an example, he argues that Italy was worse off when Germany 
and France created the European Monetary System (EMS), which forced Italy to join.329  
But coercion cannot explain rising powers’ behavior. Gruber may be right 
regarding to regional financial clubs, but it is unlikely to apply to all global institutions. Quite 
to the contrary, the structure of many international institutions is such that there is a ‘free 
rider’ problem, which benefits non-members. The case of India and the NPT is a good 
example. India enjoys the benefits of a world without nuclear proliferations, but does not 
subject itself to inspections. And, while developing countries may have indeed been coerced 
to accept IMF credit, Brazil’s and India’s decision to join the IMF as lenders was entirely 
voluntary and cannot be explained by coercion. In addition to helping nations such as Brazil 
and India rise, the Western World order helps them protect their interests, symbolized by 
Brazil’s numerous victories in trade disputes. Lisa Martin captures Brazil’s and India’s 
rationale when she argues that  
 
Concerns about the distribution of benefits among the members of institutions are real, 
and are inherent in politics in a world of power asymmetries. But the appropriate 
response to such concerns seems to lie in more careful consideration of how institutions 
can be designed so as to provide benefits to the weak, rather than in rejecting the 
strategy of institutionalization wholesale.330 
 
The end of the Cold War is perhaps the most powerful example to prove the attractiveness of 
the Western World Order.331 Rather than excluding a former rival, Western leaders decided 
to integrate a weakened Russia with the same rationale as Roosevelt towards the end of 
World War II, when he argued that China be included as a member of the UN Security 
Council, reasoning that “in 40 or 50 years' time China might easily become a very powerful 
(…) nation.”332 And, more importantly, the institutions such as NATO continued to function, 
contrary to what realist scholars such as Mearsheimer had predicted.333 This showed that the 
institution were in fact durable, and that they did not fall apart once the common external 
threat had disappeared.334 Furthermore, the Soviet Union acquiesced to a united and strong 
Germany tied to NATO because Soviet leaders knew that the institutional aspects of the 
Western World Order made it highly unlikely that NATO would take advantage of the 
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faltering Soviet Union.335 Similarly, German reunification was acceptable to Soviet leaders 
only because the new nations would be deeply enmeshed and tied town in the existing 
security structures. In fact, some Soviet analysts at the time even argued that a neutral 
Germany would be more dangerous than a Germany integrated into NATO. During a 
conference in 1990, James Baker asked Gorbachev: “Assuming unification takes place, what 
would you prefer: a united Germany outside NATO and completely autonomous, without 
American forces stationed on its territory, or a united Germany that maintains its ties with 
NATO, but with the guarantee that NATO jurisdiction or troops would not extend west of 
the current line?” Embedding Germany into the military structure of the Western World 
Order seemed to be preferable even to those not integrated into this very order. It was not the 
US, but NATO that eventually won the Cold War and assured the peaceful transition. US 
behavior is another indicative behavior for the strength of the constitutional character of the 
Western World Order. Rather than using unrestrained power, the United States pursued an 
“institution building agenda”, and promoted NATO extension, the creation of NAFTA, the 
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the World Trade Organization (WTO).336 
The reactions to the US’ unrestrained behavior in 2003 are proof that nations across 
the world are invested in the system and have the freedom to oppose the strongest nation.337 
The Western World Order is more than simply an American world order.338 The 
international backlash, largely channeled through the international institutions (the UN 
Security Council), contributed to the US’ growing isolation and the election of a President 
who promised to strengthen America’s insertion into the international system. As Arthur 
Stein points, out, “the complaint of US unilateralism only makes sense in a world where the 
presumption is that states do not act unilaterally as a matter of course.”339 Actors believe in 
multilateralism because they have developed trust in a system that genuinely promotes such 
multilateralism. These are, as Doyle had already pointed out in 1983, “the normal workings 
of a liberal alliance of independent republics.”340 The Western World Order survived even at 
the height of American unipolarity (when many analysts argued the US suffered from the 
‘imperial temptation’ and was intent on ‘world domination’341) at the beginning of the 21st 
century. Yet even then, the United States did not become an empire in the classic sense, but 
rather the leading actor in “an open and democratic order that has no name or historical 
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antecedent.”342 This was largely because America realized that being a major player in a 
democratic system is both more effective and less costly than an imperialist system of 
American rule.343 It is the same logic that leads Ikenberry to predict the system’s survival once 
China becomes the world’s most powerful nation.344 This prediction may strike many as 
counterintuitive, as it is hard to imagine an autocratic China to lead and sustain global 
system that is fundamentally democratic. Yet most likely, the mutual benefits are too large, 
and the global challenges too threatening to be ignored by China. With regard to specific 
issue-areas, such as human rights, this may temporarily lead to tensions, but they will 
unlikely be of a different kind than the ones we are experiencing today. 
America’s relative decline and the institution’s continued attractiveness underlines the 
strength of the very system. The Western World order is not merely an American World 
Order. Today’s international regimes may have been created under US hegemony, but they 
are maintained even after the conditions that allowed their rise have disappeared, giving rise 
to “post-hegemonic cooperation.”345 The weakening of U.S. economic preponderance, Robert 
Gilpin and Paul Kennedy argued in the 1980s, would eventually cause the public institutions 
that constituted the Western World Order to collapse.346 They argued that the United States 
would simply no longer be able to underwrite the institutions.347 Similarly, Michael Doyle 
argued in 1983 that the decline of U.S. hegemonic leadership may pose dangers for the liberal 
world,348 and Charles Kindleberger said that “for the world economy to be stabilized, there 
needs to be one stabilizer.”349 Yet despite the founder’s reduced economic weight, the 
Western World Order has not lost its attractiveness, which shows that it is more than a 
purely US-led order.350 Despite an intensification of American power after 1990,  the order 
has strengthened.351 While the United States’ participation is still crucial for institutions such 
as NATO, the Western World Order possesses an integrity beyond American preponderance, 
and further US decline in the future is unlikely to undo the Western World Order. This is 
because according to the model developed, what matters are the institutions and the Western-
inspired practices they are based on. After China will have become the world’s largest 
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economy around 2025, this Western system can very well live on under Chinese leadership.352 
In fact, Robert Keohane even argues that the emergence of the Kyoto Protocol and the 
creation of the International Criminal Court without U.S. leadership show that new global 
institutions can exist without the United States, arguing that “there is little reason to believe 
that hegemony is either a necessary or a sufficient condition for the emergence of cooperative 
relationships.”353 If its rules are widely considered legitimate by nation-states, markets, and 
civil society, the Western system can very well continue despite the decline of its creator, the 
United States.354 In the 19th century, liberal order rested, as Albright points out, on British 
hegemony355, yet the power transition on top went smoothly without systemic upheaval. 
Contrary to what Marxist theory claims, the Western World Order is not a 
hegemonic construct, but a constitutional one.356 It may need a hegemon to create regimes, 
but they can live on after hegemony.357 After World War II, the dominant power did not 
divide the world up into spheres of influence as it had happened in imperialist times. The 
absence of such divisions enabled fringe nations to compete directly with the core, allowing it 
to become part of the same system.358 The system’s power does not solely rest on one country, 
but on a sustained network, contrasting the concept of hegemony. Further, more, the “win-
win structure” implicit in the Western World Order causes it to be self-replicating, which 
causes strong incentives for others to take part. As Ikenberry argues, the international system 
in place since WWII is different from any other system in modern history.359  
 
Ikenberry and Wright stress these differences when they argue that 
 
These multilateral institutions and security pacts are not simply functional mechanisms that 
generate collective action. They also are elements of political architecture that allow states 
within the order to do business with each other. The liberal character of the international 
order provides access points and opportunities for political communication and reciprocal 
influence. In effect, the political architecture has given the postwar order its distinctive liberal 
hegemonic character. Rules, institutions, networks, and political relationships are embedded 
in this order giving it its overall character: an open and expandable liberal order, one in which 
the powerful capitalist democracies are tied together through alliances and governance 
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institutions; an order that, more so than in the past, is built around agreed-upon universal 
rules that allow access and participation by a wide and growing array of states; and an order 
in which the material benefits of the open system flow in all directions.360 
 
Types of International Order  
 Balance of Power Hegemonic Constitutional 
Organizing principle Anarchy Hierarchy Rule of Law 
Restraints on 
concentrated power 
Counterbalancing 
coalitions 
None Binding institutions 
Source of stability  Equilibrium of 
power 
Preponderance of 
power 
Limits on the return 
to power 
Source: G. John Ikenberry (2001). After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of 
Order after Major Wars. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 
 
There can be significant variations within each category. Hegemonic orders, for example, can 
be extreme and take the form of empires, in which weak states are coerced and not fully 
sovereign. They can also be more benevolent, and built around some consensual, 
institutionalized principle. There are, naturally, borderline cases in which it is unclear 
whether a certain political order is a strongly benevolent form of hegemonic order, or 
whether institutional restraints on the exercise of power are already to strong that we can 
speak of constitutionalism (“weak constitutionalism”). As Ikenberry points out, in a purely 
constitutional order, power is tamed by making it less consequential, reducing the incentives 
for states to move towards classic hegemonic and balance of power orders.361 
One of the key characteristics of the Western World Order is intra-institutional 
mobility and flexibility, which proves that the theory of hegemonic stability is misguided. 
Japan and South Korea rose from poor isolated nations into rich well-integrated actors. So 
are Brazil and India today, several decades after South Korea’s rise. The theory of hegemonic 
stability (THS), which presupposes a rigid hierarchy in the system held in place by a 
hegemonic power, is also mistaken.362 The rise of non-established powers and relative decline 
of the United States is a powerful riposte to such claims. The system is not rigid, but fluid. It 
is not hierarchical, but democratic, allowing powers to rise (such as China) and fall (such as 
the Soviet Union) within the system without causing systemic damage. 
The first two decades after the end of the Cold War were marked by a constitutional 
world order with occasional and limited hegemonic elements due to US unilateralism. Several 
analysts have, since the end of the Cold War, written about potential combinations between 
the hegemonic and constitutional world order, and Ikenberry’s concept of “weak 
constitutionalism” is proof of that discussion. Yet as rising powers such as China, Brazil and 
India emerge, a hegemonic type of international order is no longer an option in an 
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increasingly multipolar world. Rather, we witness a constitutional order with elements of 
balance of power politics. Given that our current constitutional order is highly stable, realist 
analysts’ predictions that we are entering a phase similar to that of the 19th century in Europe 
on a global scale are flawed. Rather, we may experience a stable constitutional system with 
some influence of balance of power politics. Rising powers engage in balancing behavior (e.g. 
by increasing its military strength) because they do not fully trust the validity of the 
constitutional order. Balancing does not mean that they reject the rule-based order; rather, 
nations see it as an insurance they can resort to if other nations break the rules.   
Given this scenario, it will be increasingly important to study the potential tension 
between constitutional and balance of power elements in the international system and 
understand the nature of this interaction. In general, we can point out that there are two 
possibilities for this to take place- balance of power within the constitutional framework, and 
outside of it. The vast majority of balancing will take place within the institutions, a behavior 
termed “soft balancing” 363, seen in the World Trade Organization, where developing 
countries joined to challenge the developed countries’ position. This behavior does not prove 
realist scholars right who expect balancing; rather, it proves the strength of the constitutional 
system.  
Yet when the constitutional order proves too weak, emerging actors will engage in 
balancing behavior outside of the institutional framework, which will create tension between 
the two different types of international order, principally because they treat power very 
differently. This may be particularly true in regions where the institutional density is low, 
such as in Asia. India, aided by the United States, is already engaging in balancing behavior 
against China in the security realm. While a sophisticated constitutional system like today’s 
reduces the returns to power, it will not entirely eliminate them. Power thus still matters, and 
as a consequence, there will be some balancing behavior. Balance of power dynamics outside 
of the institutions may thus very well pose the major challenge to the deepening of the 
constitutional system. Modern balancing behavior, however, is likely to be different from 
traditional cases, such as during the Cold War, since all countries are deeply embedded into 
the existing structures. India may very well balance China militarily in the future, but it will 
occur against the backdrop of a plethora of institutions that tie the two nations together- 
such as the WTO, the G20, possibly soon the UN Security Council, and the institution to deal 
with climate change. The two types are thus not mutually exclusive. The Western World 
Order is likely to gain strength as the number of committed members steadily rises, increasing 
institutions’ ability to provide solutions to pressing global problems such as climate change. 
This will increase the institutions’ legitimacy further, creating a virtuous cycle. But it would 
be overly optimistic to assume that balance of power will disappear entirely.  
After introducing the concept of the Western World Order, a question remains. How 
‘Western’ is the Western World Order, i.e., in how far is the Western World Order a product 
of Western culture? Is the Western World Order merely procedural, as claimed above, or is it 
also about content? We have shown that Western nations have created the Western World 
Order after World War II. As Ikenberry points out, many of the institutions created 
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resembled those that had already existed domestically in the United States.364 This suggests 
that the United States had an advantage since it merely had to copy the structures at home 
and apply them to the globe. He also shows that the United States established the system in 
the first place in order to integrate as many nations as possible, and restrain its power to 
some degree in order to increase acceptance and thus the longevity of the system.365 It is 
difficult to tell whether a non-Western nation would have been willing and able to create a 
similar order. There is virtually no historical evidence of non-Western nations who limited 
their power after winning a war in order to create a more stable order. On the other hand, 
there is a lot of evidence that Western victors have done so, most notably in 1815, 1919, and 
in 1945. Yet, this can be explained by the simple fact that Western nations won the large 
majority of major wars over the last centuries. In addition, a balkanized Europe with frequent 
wars lent itself very well to the creation of rules and specific types of order after conflicts. 
There is thus no ultimate proof that non-Western nations could not have created a stable 
order similar to the Western World Order. The more interesting question is, in how far does 
it westernize the countries that decide to become part of it? 
There are two fundamentally different ways we can think of and theorize on these 
questions. The first interpretation is that the Western World Order is made up of rule-based 
institution which have nothing to do with culture. The democratic rules and norms are above 
culture and purely procedural, not substantive. We shall call this the strong version.  
The weak version, on the other hand, would be that the rules and norms established 
by the United States are historically bound, tied to so-called “Western attitudes”. In his 1835 
work Democracy in America, the French writer Alexis de Toqueville explored the effects of 
the rising equality of social conditions on Western society. He argued that a democratic 
system severely changed culture.366 Accepting this argument, we could expect the countries 
that join the Western World Order to westernize culturally as well. There is some empirical 
evidence to back up this claim. Cortell and David, for example, argue that, once a country 
joins an international institution, domestic actors increasingly frame their argument in the 
context of the institution.367 In addition, international institutions are more intrusive than 
ever before. Surprise monitoring of nuclear sites, once unimaginable, has become the norm. 
Strobe Talbott, former Undersecretary of State, famously argued that expanding NATO 
would promote democratization in Eastern Europe.368 
One cannot deny that the Western World Order has a domestic analogy in Western 
liberal democracies, and that these democracies, in turn, did certainly not evolve in a vacuum 
untouched by cultural aspects. But as we have shown in section 1.1.1. (What is the West?), 
none of these values or political structures can be described as inherently Western. 
Membership in some institutions, such as the WTO, may have domestic consequences, 
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forcing previously shielded industries to open up, or to accept certain rules regarding labor 
conditions. But to argue that the success of the Western World Order westernizes its members 
is to overlook the fact that ‘Western values’ are a largely void concept. 
Thus, we can affirm that the Western World Order affects domestic structures and 
values of countries that integrate, largely by changing the costs and benefits of various 
alternatives.369 The ‘Western World Order’ is therefore not entirely procedural. There is a 
relation between procedure and content. However, as our previous analysis has shown, this 
content does not belong uniquely to the West.  
The West has certainly triumphed with regard to procedures, and the procedures are 
likely to live on no matter which country will lead the international order. Yet while 
procedures and rules are stable, ways of life and values are malleable and change. During the 
past centuries, Europe and the United States have been able to define modernity, while 
peoples in other regions sought to copy their values and behavior. So overwhelming was 
Europe’s and America’s dominance that analysts struggled to differentiate between 
modernization and what so-called ‘westernization.’370  
There is some relationship between the procedural and the content-related issues, and 
the success of the Western World Order thus certainly helps those to some degree who are 
able to define modernity to spread the content and the values they champion. The West still 
plays a key role in defining modernity. As a consequence, the success of the rule-based 
Western World Order certainly facilitates the spread of concepts such as democracy, human 
rights and environmental standards. Yet these are not inherently ‘Western’, and soon 
countries like China may be able to assume leadership in some areas. The rule-based and 
open Western World Order may at some point help China disseminate its best practices. For 
example, emerging powers may, in the near future, set global standards with regard to 
poverty-reduction programs and agricultural innovation. History seems like a useful guide. 
Free market principles, for example, have traditionally not been part of the West, yet as the 
United States began to succeed as a result of free trade, the concept was integrated into the 
Western narrative, and the Western World Order soon began to promote free trade. In the 
same vein, the Western World Order will be able to integrate and promote practices from 
China if they prove successful. This may certainly lead to tensions. But the tensions will 
largely be limited to the question what best practice is and thus should, through the rule-
based Western World Order, disseminated.  
 The key argument that it is the procedural characteristics that make the West special 
thus remains intact. Conflicts will take place within the system, not between systems. Within 
a system, those who can define modernity will succeed, and democracy and human rights are 
likely to benefit from the success of the Western World Order. Yet, the spread of the Western 
World Order is fundamentally different from ‘cultural westernization’. As has been shown 
above, human rights and democracy are not inherently Western values. In addition, the 
Western World Order is not a one-way street, and once rising powers such as China are able 
to define modernity, they may use the rule-based, open and democratic system to influence 
value-systems across the world, including in Europe and the United States. 
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1.3. Introducing the fringe 
 
1.3.1. Defining the fringe 
 
Using the criteria of membership in international institutions, we can identify a group of 
countries that are increasingly powerful, yet not fully integrated into the fifth dimension of 
the West - the global institutional network - in a way that would adequately reflect their 
newfound position. These countries may be called the “fringe” of the Greater West. India’s 
economic and military might, for example, are increasing - yet India is neither a member of 
the UN Security Council nor the G8, nor has it signed the NPT or joined a major military 
alliance system such as NATO. In the same way, Brazil is not a permanent member of the UN 
Security Council, it is reluctant to join the OECD371, and has repeatedly violated the NPT 
over the past years. Furthermore, Brazil and India are among the WTO members who most 
frequently issue complaints at the WTO.372 Finally, neither Brazil nor India are keen to 
embrace Western notions of liberal internationalism such as conditionality on development 
aid and the ‘responsibility to protect’. 
Yet, needless to say, the term 'fringe' is problematic because some associate it to 
inferiority and economic dependence on the center. It is sensible from the Western-centric 
point of view; it may be condescending, even inaccurate, from the 'fringe' point of view.373 
Dividing the world into a center and a fringe evokes the dependency theory, still popular 
Brazil and India, which supposes that the rich center systematically exploits the periphery.374 
World-system theorist Immanuel Wallerstein created three zones, with a semi-periphery as a 
buffer between the core and the periphery.375 Taking up Wallerstein’s concept, Rodrigues 
Vieira, a Brazilian scholar, argues that the BRIC countries are in the semi-periphery, defining 
them as “countries that are industrialized but have not yet achieved welfare levels comparable 
to those in the global north”376- that is, his categorization is based on economic development. 
Paulo Roberto de Almeida, a Brazilian diplomat, describes Brazil as “peripheral”, and argues 
that it has been one of the few nations on the periphery that has actively participated in the 
construction of a new economic international order in various epochs.377 In a similar fashion, 
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Brazil’s Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs implicitly identifies a fringe 
when he argues that “Brazil (…) has to react to the political initiatives of the great powers, 
especially (...) the United States. Brazil has to articulate political, economic and technological 
alliances with peripheral states of the international system to defend and protect its 
interests.”378 
The concept developed here, however, focuses solely on institutions, not on 
economics. It presupposes no static dependence, but mobility, and facilitates the fringe’s 
integration through a centripetal force. Contrary to Wallerstein and Dependency Theory, this 
study does not suggest that the core exploits the fringe in any way. Directly opposed to 
Marxist views, the central argument of this study is that the Western World Order draws the 
fringe towards and into the center. Looking at Brazil, we can immediately see that it does not 
merely trade with “the core”. Brazil, once economically weak and dependent, has developed, 
and its most important trading partners, China, the United States and Argentina, are located 
in different parts of the world (and are part of different categories of Wallerstein’s model.  
In the interviews for this study, Brazilian and Indian policy struggled to characterize 
their countries’ positions.379 Many prefer to think of their policies as 'multipolar,' or 
‘reformist.’380 In the 1960s, Brazil sought to adopt an ‘independent’ strategy, followed by 
‘responsible pragmatism’ in the 1970s.381 The discussion about whether Brazil should seek to 
join the OECD exemplifies this ambivalence. While Rubens Barbosa, an influential former 
diplomat, argued that Brazil should join the OECD382, joining the ‘club of the rich’ that 
essentially symbolizes the West was rejected by the government for ideological reasons.383 
Yet, Brazil has, in comparison to India, developed its capitalist model in close orientation to 
the West, in comparison with the varied socialist experiments in India.384 Still, Brazilian 
diplomats usually reject the claim that Brazil is generally “satisfied” with the current world 
order. This view is supported by Andrew Hurrell, who points out that  
 
There is (…) broad continuity in Brazil’s generally negative view of the international 
economic and political system: the malfunctioning of the global financial system; the 
continued protectionism in the developed world and the broken trade promises (…); 
the extent to which multilateralism is under severe challenge, in terms of both the 
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difficulties facing the Doha Trade Round and the crisis within the UN as a result of the 
Iraq conflict.385 
 
The creation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961, an intergovernmental 
organization of states considering themselves not formally aligned with or against any major 
power bloc was an expression of how states that want to neither align or oppose the Western 
World Order sought to position themselves.386 In India’s case, this turned out to be the 
singular feature of the country’s police since Independence in 1947. Nehru himself often had 
existential doubts about whether he belonged to the East of the West.387 In articulating India’s 
views, it turned out to be much more aligned with the Soviet Union than with the West.388 In 
1976, a constitutional amendment was passed to make India a socialist republic.389 During 
interviews for this study, Indian interviewees made affirmations as diverse as “India is not 
part of the West” and “India is essentially part of the West.”390 Raja Mohan, an influential 
Indian foreign policy thinker, sees India “returning to the West” after a misguided alignment 
with the Third World after Independence. Mohan laments that India was the only democracy 
that stood against the West during the Cold War on most issues, and former Foreign Minister 
Jaswant Singh described the history of India’s bad relations with the United States as ‘fifty 
wasted years’.391 
The reason why there are so many neutral or inadequate terms for what is called 'the 
fringe' is specifically that such terms avoid the question of how to characterize 'fringe 
nations.' The apparent success of the BRIC label, a largely void term that merely groups four 
disparate emerging economies392, in both the media and the academic world393 shows the 
yearning for an adequate term. The “Second World”, a concept developed by Parag Khanna, 
is a good example for a concept that specifies a group of countries without characterizing or 
predicting anything specifically.394 “Second World” delineates emerging powers from the 
Western established powers, but it does not encompass ideas like independence and 
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multipolarity. “Swing states”, a term frequently used in domestic US politics395, but also used 
by several international relations scholars, such as Ciorciari, Ajami and Mohan396, does not 
characterize a state as a whole, it rather reflects a state’s strategy to occasionally switch sides, 
however, it does not clearly imply any power relationship to other states. George Kennan’s 
category of “monster countries”397 or Dirk Messner’s category of “anchor countries”398 refers 
to the size and importance of a group of nations, but not to their position in the context of 
the Western World Order. The concept of the fringe therefore adequately captures the 
countries in question. ‘Fringe nations’, on the other hand, implies a specific relation to the 
Western world as well as their proximity to the non-West.  
There are several other examples that exemplify the fringe metaphor and shed light 
on some of its characteristics. Marking the first use of the term in 1937, T.L. Smith defined 
the “urban fringe” as “the built-up area just outside of the corporate limits of the city.”399 
Thirty years later, Robin Pryor observed that “the fringe varies from city to city (…) in the 
Netherlands a fringe is barely recognizable, Paris is somewhat similar to the U.S.A. in the 
intermingling of scatter and land use, but there is a closer dependence on public transport.”400  
Similar to international politics, defining the fringe is not straightforward: “(…) 
differentiations have (…) been made, qualitatively, within the fringe: the “urban fringe” and 
the “rural-urban fringe”401; the “limited fringe” and the “extended fringe”402, the “suburban 
fringe zone”, the “outlying adjacent area”403 and the “inner and outer fringe areas.”404 These 
zones are defined along rural and urban characteristics. A fringe zone can therefore remain a 
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mixed zone (with rural and urban characteristics), it can “ruralize” (de-urbanize) and detach 
itself from the city, or it can urbanize, e.g. by increasing population density or by building 
mass transit systems that improve the connection to the city. In the same context, Whitehand 
argues that the fringe areas often “cease to be the fringe.405 
“Characteristics of the fringe”, according to Pryor, need not be intermediate nor on a 
continuum between rural and urban, yet distinctive location and internal heterogeneity and 
transition do make possible a unitary if not uniform definition.”406  
 
Source: Pryor, Robin J. (1968). Defining the Rural-Urban Fringe. Social Forces, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Dec., 
1968), pp. 202-215 
 
Institutional fringe status may coincide with cultural fringe status.407 “Fringe countries” such 
as Brazil and India tend to have much in common with the Greater West - democracy, for 
instance408 - but, at the same time, they share several typically non-Western characteristics409, 
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such as the memory of colonization.410 This is reflected in the fringe nations’ struggle to 
reconcile their identities as developing countries and their new roles as emerging global 
powers.411 Khanna’s definition of these rising fringe nations as the “Second World” is a first 
step, but he does not provide a developed theory or systematic evidence for his 
categorization. In 2009, The Economist wrote that Brazil was seen as the “most Western of 
the BRICs”, implying that Brazil was, in effect, part of the fringe – not fully Western, but in 
the West’s immediate sphere of influence.412 Juan de Onis writes that Brazil has long been 
regarded as a “peripheral country.”413 Cultural aspects, however, are not the focus of this 
study, and the concept of the fringe will be used entirely with regard to the concept of the 
“West” developed here. So, for this study, it is possible and profitable to understand the 
group of nations that are 'on the periphery' of the West concretely, in terms of their 
membership (or lack thereof) in Western institutions. They are on the 'institutional fringe.'  
An important related question is whether being on the institutional fringe is a 
temporary or a permanent state. Can fringe nations walk the line without being one or the 
other, or will they inevitably be pulled in one direction? Both realist and liberal theorists 
implicitly assume that the institutional fringe is a temporary position; for if “towards” or 
“away” from the Greater West are the only options for nations on the fringe, we can expect 
rising powers to either fully integrate and become part of the Greater West, or to turn into 
clear antagonists.414 Against this, Ciorciari argues that the combination of being a “swing 
state” and a rising power allows countries to exercise pivotal leverage and “pick and choose” 
between the West and the non-West, thus maximizing the benefits by remaining on the fringe. 
What is the fringe according to the fringe? Foreign policy pronouncements from 
fringe countries back up Ciorciari's point of view. Policy makers in Brazil and India 
frequently call their foreign policy strategy “independent”.415 There is evidence of both 
countries’ growing strategic assertiveness and self-confidence in pursuing an “activist foreign 
policy”416 beyond their respective regions.417  In both societies, there is a predominant 
assumption that their nation has a destiny that has yet to be fulfilled, which has, inevitably, 
had a strong influence on foreign policy strategy.418 In 2005, Celso Armorim, Brazil’s foreign 
minister, expressed the desire to “increase, if only by a margin, the degree of multipolarity in 
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the world.”419 Both countries are invested in altering the international system. At the same 
time, they have a strong interest in rising within and engaging with the established structures. 
Gregory and de Almeida argue that there is a conception in Brazil’s government that 
“supposes a fixed “peripheral” status for Brazil.”420 Precisely through their unwillingness to 
position themselves either as fully integrated or completely detached from the Western World 
Order, Brazil and India implicitly affirm their fringe status.421  
What is the future of the fringe? If Ciorciari is right that being on the fringe allows 
states to benefit disproportionally422, we may assume that countries such as Brazil and India 
will seek to remain on the fringe. This explanation would account for ambiguous strategies 
that involve both integrative and confrontational elements.423 One could argue that rising 
fringe countries may be quite comfortable on the fringe, careful not to align themselves with 
either the Greater West or the ‘non-West’.424  
Finally, at what point would the term ‘fringe’ no longer be appropriate for today’s 
‘fringe’ countries? A fringe country can seek complete integration into all institutions that 
make up today’s Western World Order. Turkey is a good example. It was a founding member 
of the OECD (1961), it is member of NATO (since 1952), and signed the NPT (1969). Turkey 
signed a Customs Union agreement with the EU in 1995 and was officially recognized as a 
candidate for full membership on 12 December 1999, at the Helsinki summit of the European 
Council. While Turkey is not yet an EU member, its strong institutional commitment makes 
it part of the core, rather than the fringe. If fringe countries such as Brazil and India sought 
similarly strong integration (e.g. if Brazil became part of the OECD, the UNSC and NATO), 
they would cease to be fringe countries. At the same time, countries can reduce their 
institutional commitment and withdraw from international treaties, like North Korea did 
when it withdrew from the NPT in 2003. 
 
1.3.2. The Western World Order according to the Fringe  
 
Brazil and India are good representatives of the fringe category. As was shown in detail in 
section 1.2., Brazil and India are partially integrated into the Western system (as liberal 
democracies and IMF lenders), but not enough as to represent a purely Western perspective. 
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Amâncio Oliveira and Janina Onuki describe Brazil as “peripheral, but with potential to play 
an autonomous role in international politics.”425 India’s leadership in the Non-Aligned 
Movement and Brazil’s status as an observer indicate a certain distance to the Western-led 
world order. Brazil and India have aligned in many instances, but they also belonged at some 
point to the West’s principal opponents. In the 1930s, for example, the Bengali scholar 
Rabindranath Tagore appealed to India’s masses when he called for pan-Asian spiritualism to 
counter “Western materialism”.426  
Brazil and India traditionally have seen the world through a North vs. South prism, 
West vs. non-West, and colonizer vs. colonized prism. They developed their identity and 
created their foreign policy in between these reference points. The questions of how to relate 
to the Western World Order has always been tied to the question “Who are we? First world 
or Third world? Western or not?” Maria Regina Soares de Lima, a leading foreign policy 
scholar in Brazil, sees Brazil torn between “unconditional alignment” with the United States 
and “globalist model”, which implies an “independent” and “pragmatic” international 
orientation.427 
In the interviews conducted for this study, Brazilian and Indian academics show a 
heterogeneous understanding of the Western World Order, mixing ideological criticism with 
pragmatic affirmation. Rhetoric is often anti-Western and highly critical of international 
institutions such as the IMF, which is often ideologically regarded as a tool of Western 
dominance. Mohan points to a strong “anti-imperialist” tradition and to nativist ideologies 
which put India and the West at opposite poles. 428 As Oliveira and Onuki point out there is a 
widespread opinion among Brazilians that given its position at the periphery, Brazil can only 
engage in “conformism, subordination, without space for courage.”429 And Samuel Pinheiro 
Guimarães, President Lula’s chief foreign policy strategist, divides the world into sovereign 
states and subordinate ones, the center vs. the periphery, and “contented” states vs. 
“contesting,” placing Brazil in the latter category of each juxtaposition.430 US-friendly policies 
in the 1990s driven by “liberal fascination”, only contributed to more subordination, 
according to Guimarães. Instead, Brazil should “challenge the giants.”431 However, this 
opinion is by no means generally accepted, but frequently criticized as “third worldish” and 
“dogmatic”, as a Brazilian diplomat called it.432 More pragmatic voices recognize that India’s 
fundamental values and interests are broadly compatible with those of the West, pointing to 
                                                 
425 de Oliveira, Amâncio Jorge and Janina Onuki (2006). Resenha de “Uma visão altiva da periferia de 
Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães”, Revista Brasileira de Ciêncas Socais, outubro, vol.21, número 062, 
Associação de Pós-Graduação e Pesquisa em Ciências Socais, São Paulo, pp.154-157 
426 The Economist Correspondent (2009). Banyan: Come together. Dec 10, 2009 
427 Soares de Lima, Maria Regina (2003). Na trilha de um política externa afirmativa. Observatorio da 
Cidadania, 2003 
428 Mohan, C. Raja (2004). Crossing the Rubicon. The Shaping of India’s New Foreign Policy. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004 
429 de Oliveira, Amâncio Jorge and Janina Onuki (2006). Resenha de “Uma visão altiva da periferia de 
Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães”, Revista Brasileira de Ciêncas Socais, outubro, vol.21, número 062, 
Associação de Pós-Graduação e Pesquisa em Ciências Socais, São Paulo, pp.154-157 
430 Guimarães, Samuel Pinheiro (2006). Brasil na Era dos Gigantes. Rio de Janeiro: Contraponto, 2006 
431 Guimarães, Samuel Pinheiro (2006). Brasil na Era dos Gigantes. Rio de Janeiro: Contraponto, 2006 
432 Telephone interview with a Brazilian diplomat based in Brasília, Brazil, July 1, 2010  
OLIVER STUENKEL – DOCTORAL THESIS 74 
its “deeply entrenched democratic heritage, its successful market economy and its open 
culture and English language.”433 
At the same time, both Brazilian and Indian scholars have often attempted to 
counteract against the assumption of a ‘teleological Westernization’ (“they all seek to become 
like the West anyhow”) - which caused them to find a way to somehow do things differently. 
Former undersecretary of defense Ashton Carter comments that Indian diplomats are 
“notorious for adhering to independent positions regarding world order.”434 Pinar Bilgin 
describes fringe nations’ strategy as ‘almost the same but not quite’, suggesting that 
“‘mimicry’ may be a way of ‘doing’ world politics in a seemingly ‘similar’ yet unexpectedly 
‘different’ way”.435 When Brazilian and Indian scholars align with Western or American 
points of view, they at times apologetically argue that the spread of US approaches can be 
explained by the emergence of the US as the ‘dominant producer of both ideas and things’, 
which coincided with and provided a basis for the modernization and/or Westernization 
projects of elites in various parts of the world.436 
In India, for example, different groups characterize the Western World Order in 
different ways- some as a menace, some as an opportunity. Rahul Sagar identifies four groups 
that seek to influence India’s foreign policy making at this point: Moralists, Hindu 
nationalists, strategists and idealists. Moralists contend that India should play an exemplary 
role in the world, forming an opposition to Western violence and greed. Hindu nationalists 
contend that India needs to defend Hindu civilization, against Muslims but also against 
Western cultural influence such as vagary, secularism and modernity in general. Realists say 
India should increase its military might and become a global power, essentially adopting 
Western tools. Liberals seek to promote social progress through trade and greater 
international interdependence, which implies strong engagement with all nations, including 
the Western ones. These four groups have distinct foreign policy objectives, being “moral 
exceptionalism, martial vigor, state power, and wealth.”437 They also strongly differ 
regarding how they frame and interpret the Western World Order. Moralists seek to create a 
counter-example to the West by creating a large nation with no military might, which is 
deemed unnecessary. Tagore articulated this in a well-known letter to Yone Noguchi, a 
Japanese intellectual, ‘Asia’ intended to contrast its ‘great heritages of culture and good 
neighborliness’ with the ‘rapacious imperialism which some of the nations of Europe were 
cultivating’.438 This group regards international institutions often as ploys by Western powers 
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to cheat a well-meaning and naïve India. For example, India views proposals by developed 
countries for mandatory universal caps on greenhouse gas emissions as ‘green imperialism’ 
and the NPT regime as ‘nuclear apartheid.439 To them, dominant powers use a postcolonial 
discourse that “takes as its essentialist premise a profound ‘otherness’ separating Third 
World from Western countries”.440 In a similar fashion, Hindu nationalists seek to decouple 
themselves from the West, and ultimately create a civilization that does not need any 
alliances. There are some contradictions, though, because they envisage a traditional, non-
modern lifestyle, but at the same time call for modern arms that can avoid humiliations the 
Hindus suffered during Muslim and British invasions. Strategists, on the other hand, believe 
that it must copy the West and join the Western World Order. They argue that India must 
modernize culturally combat the Hindu belief system that is fatalistic in nature and keeps 
people from taking the initiative. ‘Rational analysis, so vital to Western societies,’ it argues, 
‘has less influence in Indian society’, where a belief in ‘the inability to manipulate events 
impedes preparation for the future in all areas of life, including the strategic’.441 Strategists 
grapple with the Indian mentality that has been described as “jugaad”, a colloquial Indian 
term that translates as ‘a quick fix’ or ‘a work-around’.442 Sagar explains that this mentality 
has its roots in India’s “uneven encounter with modernity: the forms and institutions have 
been imported or grafted on, but the spirit of modernity, an innate appreciation of rational 
thinking, has not taken root.”443 While there are fundamental differences between strategists 
and realists with regard to how the world works, both agree that India must integrate into the 
Western World Order. Sagar predicts that this pro-Western, collaborative vision will prevail. 
A certain ambivalence about Brazil’s and India’s position towards the Western World 
Order is visible.444 Engaging with the Western World Order has provided benefits, but also 
caused humiliation. The IMF’s influence in the early nineties was so palpable that one 
economist claimed that “while the rajputs and princely states had a fair degree of autonomy 
in relation to the British colonial government (…), under IMF-World Bank tutelage, the 
union minister of finance reports directly to 1818 H Street NW, Washington, D.C., bypassing 
the parliament and the democratic process.”445  In a similar fashion, Joseph Stiglitz compared 
India’s agreement to the IMF with the “surrender of Maharajas to the British.”446  
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At the same time, there is, in India and Brazil, a growing consciousness that accepting 
a multilateral order built on U.S. principles has allowed India to grow phenomenally.447 A 
Brazilian diplomat admitted that IMF intervention in Brazil was “crucial”, but that this was 
“not a popular thing to say.”448 Despite their ambivalence about the Western World Order, 
and their uncertainty about whether they themselves are Western or not, the fringe is 
probably the party that most explicitly equates the international institutions with the West - 
there is an ideological predisposition to criticize and refrain from integration, but a pragmatic 
necessity to join the system to continue to benefit from it and a desire to rise within it. Both 
countries are thus in critique of the West, but they also use the Western system to their 
advantage.  
Brazil’s and India’s role in the G77 reflects both countries’ journey from ideological 
critics to pragmatic (and at times reluctant) supporters over the past decades.449 As part of the 
G77 and as an observer of the Non-Aligned Movement, Brazil has historically sought to 
promote a more prominent role for the UN General Assembly (GA) by envisioning greater 
GA involvement on questions regarding military intervention, for example.450 Some critics 
have pointed out that Brazil’s attempt to enter the UN Security Council as a permanent 
member is not entirely about democratizing the UN, but rather about creating an “expanded 
oligarchy”, as a former Brazilian diplomat has called it. While Security Council Reform is 
also one of the Non-Aligned Movements goals451, Brazil does not have all the developing 
countries’ support in this project, and it has been at times accused of being a “traitor” by 
seeking permanent UN Security Council membership, which would make it part of the 
“global elite.”452 While India has a rich history of confronting Western countries and models, 
Mohan argues that India “woke up” and now rejects anti-Western modes of thinking.453 
Rhetorically, Brazil often remains aligned with the principles espoused by most G77 
members and nations of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which are more critical of the 
current global order. The G77’s principal goal was to change the rules of the global economic 
regime to better serve the interests of the developing world.454 In addition, NAM and G77 
defend the principle of non-intervention. Nehru harbored contempt for power politics, and 
his decision to create the NAM was a product of his idealist stance. In the same way, Brazil 
has been at times strongly aligned with the NAM and G77. For example, the Brazilian 
government abstained from the UN Security Council resolutions on arms embargos to 
Yugoslavia once ethnic cleansing had begun, on intervention in Haiti after the coup, and on 
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peacekeeping operations in Rwanda and Somalia.455 In this respect Brazil continues to side 
with development countries, and it remains a country with a strongly Westphalian outlook. 
While it regards interference approved by the UN Security Council as legitimate, it 
traditionally has been reluctant to vote for any type of measures that violate a country’s 
sovereignty. The Brazilian government is therefore highly critical of the concept of “R2P” 
(Responsibility to Protect), which it believes can be easily misused as a pretext for aggressive 
military intervention. In addition, Brazil has rarely openly criticized any human rights abusers 
over the past decades. This may be partly explained by the fact that the Brazilian foreign 
policy elite remains concerned about a possible foreign intervention in its Amazon region, 
which it has difficulty in controlling.456  
But Brazil and India face a dilemma: There is a growing gap between their critical 
rhetoric, aligned with G77 members, and their pragmatic engagement, aligned with their 
national interest. Traditionally critics of the system and defendants of the poor, they have 
benefitted enormously from the Western World Order. Brazil has quietly departed from the 
G77’s more radical calls for “total democracy”, a proposal that seeks to replace the UNSC 
with the General Assembly. Despite continuous rhetorical support for reform, Brazil has not 
assumed leadership in reviving ECOSOC457, indicating that it does not regard this as a 
priority. 
In a similar fashion, India’s rhetoric is often not aligned with actual behavior. India’s 
representatives have called for revitalization of the UN General Assembly for years. In April 
2010, for example, Hardeep Puri, Permanent Representative of India to the U.N., said that 
"The General Assembly should take the lead in setting the global agenda and restoring the 
centrality of the United Nations in formulating multilateral approaches to resolving 
transnational issues”.458 Indian representatives usually argue that the Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC), which, despite its pre-eminence in the charter, has proved too weak to 
provide coherence to the work of the specialized agencies, should be at the heart of 
international efforts of development.459 India’s foreign policy is still influenced by its ties to 
the Non-Aligned Movement and the G77. Yet despite the confrontational rhetoric, Indian 
policymakers have long realized that systemic confrontation does no longer serve their 
interests, and it increasingly finds itself “between the two worlds”, as an Indian ambassador 
in Europe points out.460  
Brazil and India are thus engaging with the Western World Order, while at the same 
time criticizing some of the system’s norms and procedures. For example, both countries also 
remain reluctant to accept Western notions of liberal internationalism—particularly ideas 
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like political conditionality on development aid and the “responsibility to protect.”461 Yet, 
while non-Western international relations scholars regard attempts to “think past Western 
IR” as praiseworthy, they recognize the difficulty to separate Western from non-Western 
thinking. After all, fringe nations’ thinking has been strongly influenced by Western ideas. As 
Pinar Bilgin points out, “there may be elements of ‘non-Western’ experiences and ideas built 
in to ‘Western’ ways of thinking about and doing world politics. The reverse may also be 
true. What we think of as ‘non-Western’ approaches to world politics may be suffused with 
‘Western’ concepts and theories.”462 Fringe countries’ efforts to search for a proper strategy 
have resulted in the emergence of ways of thinking and doing that are - according to HK 
Bhabha - ‘almost the same but not quite’463 
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1.4. Liberalism and international institutions: Theoretical 
considerations 
 
What have we learned so far? In section 1.1., we started off with the question of how to 
define the West and the non-West. We analyzed several dimensions through which we can 
understand the West, understood that most of them are difficult to sustain empirically, and 
came to a pragmatic conclusion. We understood that rather than identifying something that is 
the West, it is a certain behavior, a “way of doing things” that represents the West well: It is 
the institutions in which nations engage and where agreements are made that makes a 
country Western or non-Western (1.2.) We also identified a fringe category of nations that is 
not fully integrated in the Western World Order (1.3.) Identifying institutions as the viable 
proxy allows us to make explanations about Brazil and India.  
Section 1.1. also showed that supporters of the Western World Order look at it in a 
different way than its opponents do. While supporters predict an expansion of the Western 
World Order and interpret history against the backdrop of ever growing freedoms, the 
system’s critics see at times an expansion of hegemonic power, which uses international 
institutions as a thin veil of colonialism and the drive towards global dominance. The fringe 
countries’ perspective is more nuanced.  
The arguments made by the supporters of the Western World Order are more 
convincing. Many non-established nations seek fuller participation. Just by their engagement, 
they are becoming more integrated into the Western World Order, and rules are spreading. 
Some of the institutions are far from the Western ideal, but they remain attractive. Even if 
some governments of non-established powers criticize specific aspects of the international 
system (such as during the annual World Bank and IMF meeting in Istanbul in 2009)464, they 
largely support the system. Independently of what each organization seeks to do, or by whom 
it is led, it is the nature of the institutions that is part of the liberal tradition, and the fringe 
countries’ participation in them is, in itself, a movement towards what we define as the West. 
This section seeks to highlight the origins of the liberal tradition and to build up 
theoretical depth to strengthen the case. Does Kantian liberal theory support the argument 
that even if a non-established country criticizes the system, its engagement strengthens the 
very system? Can liberal theory explain why non-integrated nations seem to affirm the 
institutions?  
What is the inner structural logic that makes institutions attractive? What exactly is 
the structure of Western institutions that has the effect of drawing in other nations? Why 
have some institutions failed in the past? The League of Nations, for example, failed to create 
this logic. What were the factors that kept this institution from developing this inner logic? 
There is something of today’s structure that makes them easy to join and hard to overturn. 
Why is this system easier to join than the system in the 19th century? That will be one of the 
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key questions discussed in this section. We are thus moving from a historical argument 
towards a political science argument, searching for a deeper claim from political philosophy.  
 
1.4.1. The history of liberalism and the emergence of liberal 
institutionalism  
 
There is no canonical description of liberalism, or a definite consensus about who the most 
important theorists of liberalism are.465 Jeremy Bentham, Adam Smith, Schumpeter, 
Immanuel Kant and John Locke- who argued that men had inalienable ‘natural rights’ to life, 
liberty and property466- are often regarded as the major liberal thinkers who have shaped the 
study and practice of international diplomacy.467 Other scholars have included Montesquieu, 
David Hume, Thomas Jefferson, Karl Popper and John Rawls in the group of key liberalist 
thinkers.468 Of all of them, Immanuel Kant is probably most often considered the most 
important liberal philosopher.469 This section seeks to give a brief overview of the history of 
liberalism in the context of international relations, and proceeds to show in how far one of 
liberalism’s modern manifestations, liberal institutionalism, can explain Brazil’s and India’s 
behavior.  
Liberalism is a wide field, and liberalist thinkers’ views on whether the dominant 
causes are found in the nature of the human being, domestic society or international relation 
differ.470 They do, however, agree in that they believe that the most adverse effects of anarchy 
in the international system can be surmounted by individual and domestic factors, and that 
stable peace on a global scale is possible.471 And, despite some contradictions, for example 
between liberal pacifism and liberal imperialism, Doyle argues that liberalism leaves “a 
coherent legacy” on foreign affairs.472 It seems appropriate, however, to situate the origins of 
liberalism historically.  
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1.4.1.1. MAGNA CARTA (1215) 
 
The Magna Carta is an important herald of liberal thought. Although there is some dispute 
among historians about the details of the creation of the document, the Magna Carta, 
conceived shortly before, during or shortly after a meeting between barons and King John of 
England in Runnymede in 1215473, constitutes one of the earliest legal charters. The Magna 
Carta (Great Charter) required the king to declare a series of rights and respect legal 
procedures (such as habeas corpus), allowing freemen to appeal against unlawful detention. 
During the first four centuries the document’s influence was confined to England and the 
British Isles, but later it contributed to the establishment of constitutional law in the English-
speaking world. As Hazeltine points out, it had a strong effect upon the constitutions and 
laws of the American Colonies and the Federal Union after the American War of 
Independence.474 The essence of the Magna Carta is also reflected in the United States Bill of 
Rights, which established specific rights for citizens that limited government power: “No 
person shall be (...) deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”475  
The document has thus been, indirectly, an important precursor to parliamentary 
sovereignty, democracy, and human rights. Several liberal scholars, such as Jeremy Bentham, 
in his Fragment on Government (1776), used and developed ideas articulated in the Magna 
Carta.476 The influence of the Magna Carta can be tracked all the way to the creation of 
today’s liberal Western World Order. Eleanor Roosevelt, one of the important proponents of 
human rights legislation in the 20th century, frequently referred to the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, as a “Magna 
Carta for all mankind.”477 
 
1.4.1.2. MACHIAVELLI (1469 – 1527) 
 
Nicolò Machiavelli’s The Prince, published in 1532, made a major contribution to political 
thought, because his was among the first works to clearly distinguish between political 
realism and political idealism.478 Although Machiavelli himself was not a liberal theorist, he 
set the state for the emergence of liberalist thinkers, and he is said to have strongly 
influenced, among others, John Locke, David Hume, Montesquieu, and most of the principal 
American founding fathers - Thomas Jefferson, George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, 
John Adams and Alexander Hamilton.479 Yet, Sullivan concedes that Jefferson and his fellow 
Americans at the time did not see any major differences between liberalism and 
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republicanism, but rather thought of them as essentially the same.480 Also, Benjamin Franklin 
objected to politics oriented by the pursuit of glory Machiavelli had proclaimed481, and 
Thomas Adams, despite frequently reading Machiavelli’s accounts, strongly objected to the 
philosopher’s claim that it was impossible to form a constitution on the basis of popular 
reflection and choice.482 
Scholars do not agree on whether Machiavelli merely unearthed an older type of 
republicanism present in the Ancient Roman Republic and Aristotle, as Pocok (1981) argues, 
or whether, as Rahe contends, Machiavelli's republicanism was not rooted in antiquity but is 
entirely novel and modern.483 Machiavelli focused on republicanism, mostly in the form of 
civic virtue. This became an important theme in modern political philosophy, and there is a 
general consensus that it became a central part of American political values.484  
Machiavelli’s influence on liberalism was more subtle than that of Locke and Kant. 
While classic thinkers such as Aristotle, Cicero and Aquinas assumed that the human being 
was essentially good, and that politicians should be virtuous, Machiavelli argued that there 
was a large gap between “how one lives and how one should live.” He called citizens in 
general “wicked” and claimed that only those would be successful in politics who violate 
moral traditions whenever necessary.485 This caused Cardinal Pole to argue in 1532 that The 
Prince had been “written by the hand of Satan.”486  
The fact that Machiavelli wrote “what men do rather than what they ought to do”, as 
Francis Bacon put it, also made him the founder of political realism. In this dimension, he 
anticipated Hobbes in his understanding of nature, which would later influence realist 
thinkers. His views on foreign policy underline this point. Similar to modern neorealist 
thought, Machiavelli argues that republics are constrained to wage war due to several 
domestic reasons, but more importantly, to preempt foreign threats.487 Neutrality is, 
according to Machiavelli, not an option, as the neutral actor will be despised by both the 
winner and the loser of a conflict in the region. Since war cannot be avoided, every nation 
must constantly prepare for it, and attack if the opportunity arises. As merely defeating an 
enemy in battle brings only temporary relief (he will regroup and attack again), the complete 
annihilation of the enemy is necessary, and territorial expansion the logic consequence. His 
views on foreign policy thus radically differ from Kant’s, who would, three centuries later, 
proclaim the pacific union of democratic and peaceful states. 
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Yet, despite his realism that transcends Aristotle and the other classic thinkers’ 
assumption that virtue and politics are ultimately incompatible, Machiavelli does touch upon 
liberal ideas such as due process when arguing that accusations “have need of true 
corroborations and of circumstances that show the truth of the accusation.”488 And, while he 
never mentioned the existence of (then common) natural, God-given law, he stressed the 
importance of men-made law and justice; a concept liberals after him took up and developed 
further.  
 
1.4.1.3. HOBBES (1588 –1679) 
 
Hobbes’ analysis of the state of nature, articulated in his 1651 Leviathan, was so important 
that it remains the defining feature of realist thought until this day.489 Hobbes lends, along 
with Machiavelli, his name to the realist tradition of thought in international relations, and is 
often categorized together with Thucydides, Morgenthau and Churchill.490 In the book 
Leviathan, which was strongly influenced by Hobbes’ perception of chaos and disorder 
during the English Civil War, the author argued for the necessity of a social contract between 
the citizens and the absolute ruler. A strong central state was necessary to avert the “state of 
nature”- a situation Hobbes described as Bellum omnium contra omnes (“War of all against 
all”), in which life would be "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short."491 Peace, in Hobbes’ 
view, is “a period of recuperation from the last war and preparation for the next.”492 Hobbes 
has been called a classic realist in that he sees the source of anarchy in the nature of human 
beings and in the state itself- rather than, as structural realist Kenneth Waltz, in the nature of 
the international system of states.493 
Rational (Hobbesian) citizens will accept the absolutist sovereign principally because 
they are aware of the disastrous consequences of the system’s dissolution. Citizens do not 
accept the sovereign because of admiration, but because of a strong interest in self-
preservation. Once the ruler fails to provide order, or proves “negligent”, his legitimacy will 
vanish and citizens will start a rebellion. They will start a rebellion because self-defense, 
according to Hobbes, is on of men’s natural rights- an idea liberal scholars would build on. 
This poses formidable constraints on the absolute sovereign, and causes the ruler to be 
sensitive to his of her constituents’ needs.494  
A somewhat similar logic applies to external relations. Hobbes argued that since 
there is no central authority in international relations, the relations between nations are 
marked by total anarchy and fear of war; and states are “upon the confines of battle, with 
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their frontiers armed, and canons planted against their neighbors round about”495. Without a 
common sovereign to control them (an “international Leviathan”), there is neither justice nor 
injustice in the international system.496 The Law of Nations, Hobbes contends, is the Law of 
Nature.497 Confederations of Nations are conceivable, not only in response to outside threats- 
there is always the danger of reverting back to hostility. Hobbes deemed all-encompassing 
institutions, like the United Nations, impossible.498 
Yet, it is not entirely clear that Hobbes is a foundational figure in the neorealist 
tradition.499 After all, contrary to Machiavellian logic, Hobbes did not glorify war, and saw it 
as his objective to find mechanisms to avoid it altogether - hence his social contract theory. 
Scholars of the “English school” argue, contrary to realists, that Hobbes’ analysis of the 
world implicitly calls for the creation of international rules and norms to avoid the state of 
war.500  
While it remains a controversial argument, the way Hobbes characterizes constituent- 
ruler relations, war remains a costly and thus rare incident. As Michael Williams argues, 
“since the sovereign may be asking (and potentially compelling) the citizens to put their lives 
at risk at war (and thus potentially allowing them to rebel on the grounds of self-
preservation, which is their right by nature) it can do so only if the vast majority of the 
population continues to trust in the sovereign’s adjudication of the situation (risk) and the 
necessity to risk citizens’ lives.”501 Hobbes’ Leviathans are therefore not necessarily aggressive 
to one another or bent on attacking, since the rulers do not want to risk losing the 
constituents’ support. Hobbes believed citizens must go to war if the sovereign wants them 
to, but he reckons war greatly increases the risk of domestic rebellion. This idea was picked 
up and further developed by Kant, who argued that empowered citizens would never support 
war. He thus agreed to one of the basic liberal principles that domestic politics and foreign 
policy are strongly intertwined. Williams further argues that Hobbes probably did envision 
the existence of transnational norms. Despite fundamental differences between Hobbes and 
liberal thought, for example with regard to the ‘state of nature’, several of his ideas can be 
found in later liberal thinking.  
 
1.4.1.4. LOCKE (1632 – 1704) 
 
Aside from Kant, Locke’s emergence is a key definitive moment of the liberal intellectual 
trajectory, and he is often regarded as the “Father of Liberalism” and the influential 
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Enlightenment thinker. Robert Faulkner called him the “first liberal democrat.”502 Locke 
strongly diverged from Hobbesian logic as he rejected absolutist rulers, promoting political 
legitimacy based on individual consent instead.503 These demands were possibly influenced by 
the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the Bill of Rights a year later, two events that would 
mark the end of absolutist rule in the country. While constitutional monarchy and 
parliamentary democracy were already incipient at the time, Locke’s ideas could be 
considered revolutionary. 
While Locke, like Hobbes, developed a social contract, his work can be seen in direct 
response to Hobbesian absolutism. His support of religious tolerance, liberty, property, and 
the importance of education, on the separation of the church and the state, and his conviction 
that all men –in their natural state- are equal and independent had a great influence on 
America’s founding fathers. Indeed Maurice Cranston argues that Locke’s influence on the 
founding fathers and on American attitudes towards life itself exceeded that of any other 
thinker.504 Locke’s natural right for everyone to defend his “Life, health, liberty, or 
possessions" became the basis of the phrase in the US Declaration of Independence that 
allows the right to “life, liberty and pursuit of happiness.” Locke’s ideas in general received a 
warmer reception in the United States than in Europe, where traditional, feudal power 
structures remained strong.505 
Locke’s ideas need to be understood in the appropriate historical context. When he 
was 29, and the Restoration had reinstalled the ousted King Charles II’s son on the throne, 
Locke’s views on authority were still very much aligned with those of Hobbes, causing several 
scholars to ask whether “Locke was Hobbesian.”506 As Coby points out, Locke frequently 
came to similar conclusions as Hobbes. Locke agreed in principle that man’s life in nature, if 
not “solitary”, is “poor, nasty, brutish and short.”507 Over the next years, Locke became 
associated with the leading figures in Amsterdam around the Dutch Prince William of Orange 
who planned and eventually succeeded in toppling King James II in 1688.508 Locke’s major 
piece, Two Treatises, captured the growing sentiment in England that absolutism was no 
longer acceptable. Locke built on Hobbes’ social contract and justified rebellion (“right to 
revolution”) if citizens were not granted a political voice. Citizens entrusted power to a ruler, 
but they could take back their support at any time if the ruler did not respect the citizens’ 
natural “inalienable” rights.509 
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1.4.1.5. KANT (1724 – 1804) 
 
Following chronological order, Kant’s theory of the pacification of foreign policy among 
liberal states and the creation of a “pacific union” (also called “democratic peace”510) is one 
of the most significant contributions of liberalism to international affairs, and later, liberal 
institutionalism.511 It is intriguing how permanent his influence is, how accurate his 
predictions are, and how valid his claims remain. Kant’s vision stands in direct antithesis to 
Hobbes’ argument that anarchy best accounts for “the competition, the fear, and the 
temptation toward preventive war that characterize international relations.”512 From the 
realist point of view, international peace is only possibly through the abolition of 
international relations- through the creation of one world state or through complete 
isolationism- two hardly viable options.  
Since Kant, liberalist thought was split into two major schools: a laissez-faire- 
oriented “conservative liberalism” and a social democratic “liberal liberalism.”513 Despite 
their differences, they agree on the necessity of four institutions: First, all citizens should be 
equal before the law and enjoy all civil liberty (freedom of expression, assembly, religion). 
Second, those who govern must be elected by the people. This is particularly important in the 
context of foreign policy- a country’s decision to go to war, for example, must be backed by 
the voters, and it cannot be motivated by a monarch’s or military elite’s wishes. Third, both 
sides respect private property and privately held business, excluding the possibility of 
socialism or state capitalism. Fourth and finally, economic action is directed by supply and 
demand, and not by state bureaucracies. The difference between laissez-faire liberalism and 
social democratic liberalism (“welfare liberalism”) are that supporters of the latter argue that 
the state should play a larger role assuring equal opportunity for all citizens to exercise 
freedom.514 
 
1.4.1.6. LIBERALISM IN THE 20TH CENTURY 
 
In the 20th century, policy makers for the first time thought about applying liberal ideas in 
foreign policy. Despite liberalism’s occasional prominence among intellectuals, realism had 
remained the most influential form of thinking for political decision-makers at all times.515 
Centuries after the liberal discussion culminated in the articulation of a liberal international 
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order, without any tangible impact on the real world, these ideas came to pass in the 20th 
century, when liberal thinking in international relations reached a high-water mark.  
Propelled by the horrors of World War I, many liberal scholars began to think about 
how to avoid war in the future.516 Realists called them, somewhat condescendingly, 
‘idealists’.517 During World War I, Woodrow Wilson, political science professor518 and 
probably the most famous liberal advocate at the time, used Lockean arguments to justify the 
use of force against tyranny.519 In his “War Message” of April 2nd 1917, he proclaimed that  
 
our object now, as then, is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the 
world as against selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and 
self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will 
henceforth ensure the observance of those principles.520 
 
After World War I, Wilson sought to promote a “liberal international order.”521 At that 
point, most liberal thinkers had accepted the idea that peace was not a natural condition, but 
one which must be actively constructed.522 This infused liberalism with the necessary 
pragmatism to propose more constructive ideas policy makers could apply. The result was 
the creation of the League of Nations, the first real world manifestation of liberal thought in 
international affairs. The principle idea behind the League, collective security, stood in a 
marked contrast to the classic alliance system which responds to external threats, called 
‘collective defense’. 
The extraordinary failure of the grand idealist experiment, the League of Nations, 
changed liberal idealist thinking fundamentally, infusing another dose of pragmatism. The 
ability to yet again influence policy makers was proof that the lessons learned during the 
failure of the League of Nations were crucial to build a more viable, sustainable World Order 
after World War II.  
Liberalism may have had its strongest moment after World War II, when America 
built a postwar international order around an array of governance institutions. These were 
most notably the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, 
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the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and regional security alliances.523 In 
his State of the Union address on January 6, 1941, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
proposed “the four freedoms”, which people “everywhere in the world”524 ought to enjoy. He 
strongly influenced other leaders such as Churchill, who proclaimed “the enthronement of 
human rights” after World War II. 525 The creation of the postwar order in 1945 was by no 
means a purely liberal enterprise. As Ikenberry writes, “’realist’ lessons from the League of 
Nations debacle in the 1920s were combined with ‘liberal’ lessons from the regional 
imperialism and mercantilist conflict of the 1930s.”526 
Roosevelt’s four freedoms, (freedom of speech and expression, freedom of religion, 
freedom from want and freedom from fear), and the institutions the United States would 
build, reflected Kant’s definitive articles in his 1795 Perpetual Peace.527 Rather than realizing 
short-term gains, the United States seized the opportunity to embed a series of liberal 
principles that benefited all members of the system. As proof of their commitment, the United 
States created and participated in institutions that constrained its freedom, defying realist 
thought.528 
Why did liberal ideas come to pass after World War II? To some degree, this may be 
historical contingency: The effective application of large scale violence during both World 
Wars created a compelling vision to adopt the vision Kant had developed two centuries 
earlier. Yet, this is not entirely true. Rather, the emergence of a liberal international order is 
the product of a Hegelian process in which each historical event is the product of the lessons 
learned in the past. The intellectual effort that helps create understanding of an era bears fruit 
towards the end of that era, and this understanding will impact the next era.529 From this 
perspective, the construction of the liberal world order in the 20th century can be seen as the 
product of trial and error and uneven progress, like Kant had predicted in “Perpetual 
Peace.”530 The Magna Carta could be seen as a starting point of a long road that culminated 
in a series of conferences in 1945 that would create the foundations of the first functional 
liberal world order- there was thus clearly something systemic at work, and the establishment 
of the Western World Order cannot be explained by the extreme violence applied in World 
War I and II alone. 
During the Cold War, liberals increasingly focused on the importance of international 
institutions. They were called liberals essentially because by focusing on international 
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cooperation and institutions, they accepted the possibility of change and improvement, which 
are fundamental liberal notions. In addition, the argument that international institutions are 
a mutually beneficial agreement builds on the classical liberal argument about self-interested 
individuals engaging in mutually beneficial exchanges, an argument brought forth by Adam 
Smith.531 What began as the study of international institutions and regional integration in 
Europe transformed in the 1980s into regime theory, which was later renamed ‘neoliberal 
institutionalism.’532 Initially defined narrowly to international organizations with a physical 
presence (staff, offices, etc.), the definition slowly broadened to what we today understand as 
an international institution- norms, rules and decision-making procedures in a specific area. 
At the same time, regional integration in Europe strengthened the transformation of 
liberalism from a normative to a theoretical school of thought. In 1972, Robert Keohane and 
Joseph Nye contended that states could no longer take merely other states into account, as 
institutions were growing increasingly powerful, and a growing interdependence between 
different kinds of actors.533 This line of thought was vigorously attacked by realists of the 
time such as Kenneth Waltz.  
This new institutionalist literature broke with liberal tradition and borrowed a lot 
from realist theory534, but was categorized as ‘liberal’ because it focuses on mutually 
beneficial cooperation535, and because it is fundamentally optimistic. As Doyle shows, liberal 
institutionalists carry with themselves the conviction that constitutional governments will 
eventually create a pacific union where war is no longer necessary.536 Neoliberal 
institutionalists admitted that states were driven by power and interests, but argued that 
international institutions fitted into that equation very well. Contrary to traditional liberals, 
liberal institutionalism defines itself solely in empirical terms, no longer normatively.537 Game 
theory became a principal tool to prove that in some instances, the establishment of 
institutions could be in states’ best interest. Despite these agreements, Jervis points out that 
ideological differences between neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism remain.538 For 
example, contrary to realism, the liberal vision of how the world should be organized 
fundamentally rests on the domestic analogy. Just like domestic affairs should be regulated 
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by rules and norms, global affairs should be regulated as well.539 In addition, Francis 
Fukuyama, who, influenced by Hegel, argued that the victory of liberal democracy represents 
transformation in world affairs540, was pilloried by neo-realists. More recently, analysts like 
Karl Kaiser reflect this argument when they declare that “a democratic form of government is 
the most reliable guarantee that a state will adopt prudent and peaceful behavior in external 
politics.541 
The continued success of the Western World Order after the Cold War strengthened 
liberal institutionalism as realists struggled to explain the phenomenon. Realists had 
unanimously predicted the end of NATO because the alliance no longer faced an external 
threat. Quite to the contrary, NATO blossomed and even engaged in “out-of-area 
operations” in Yugoslavia and Afghanistan, which looked a lot more like collective security 
than collective defense. 
 
1.4.2. Why democracies are more likely to integrate  
 
As the previous section has shown, the development of liberal thought began with 
Machiavelli about five centuries ago, found its high point with Kant three hundred years 
later, and had a major impact on global politics another two hundred years later with the 
articulation of a liberal international order, initially promoted by the United States after 
World War I and then successfully implemented after World War II - culminating in a system 
of global governance built around the United Nations, which the then US Secretary of State 
Cordell Hull hailed as the key to “the fulfillment of humanity’s greatest aspirations.”542  
 
1.4.2.1. REALISM, LIBERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
 
Realism sees little connection between domestic and international politics.543 The explicit 
purpose of realist theory, the dominant type of international relations theory in the United 
States since World War II, was to extract the study of international relations from the study 
of domestic and comparative politics.544 According to Waltzian realist thought, international 
politics is carried out in anarchy, while domestic politics is carried out in a hierarchical 
system - two fundamentally different organizing principles. The system is made up of states 
(‘units’) that are alike in character, undifferentiated by function. States’ behavior may differ 
because of their varying material capabilities, but anarchy remains the defining influence on 
all states.545  
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Liberalist scholars, on the other hand, assert that one cannot neatly separate 
international politics from domestic politics.546 Ikenberry points out that in some countries, 
domestic politics can be anarchical, whereas international politics in some areas is strongly 
institutionalized.547 Stein, for example, argues that “it is increasingly recognized that 
international relations have domestic roots and domestic consequences.”548 According to 
them, domestic politics and international politics affect each other. Democracies’ foreign 
policy behavior is different from non-democratic regimes’ foreign policy. On the other hand, 
the international context has an impact on the domestic situation. Foreign policy at times 
impacts elections. The Cold War serves as an example of how international politics affected 
domestic politics in both the United States and the Soviet Union, centralizing and 
strengthening their respective state apparatus.549 
 
1.4.2.2. LIBERALISM AND DEMOCRACIES’ FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR 
 
There is a series of assertions liberalist theory makes about democracies’ behavior in 
international politics.550 Democracies are less likely to fight wars against each other551, they 
are more likely to conclude trade agreements552, and they are more likely to cooperate in 
general and seek membership in international organizations. This section will focus on 
international institutions and trade to understand why, according to liberalist thought, 
democracies are in fact more likely to integrate in international institutions than non-
democratic regimes.  
As Milner, Mansfield and Rosendorff argue, the probability of states cooperating on 
trade policy strongly depends on their regime type. The more democratic a state, the more 
likely it will be to conclude trade agreements. According to their analysis, “the superior 
ability of elections in democracies to constrain leaders prompts democratic rulers to be more 
cooperative internationally than their non-democratic counterparts. 553 Autocratic leaders, on 
the other hand, face fewer worries about re-election, so they have fewer incentives to 
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relinquish policy autonomy and sign trade agreements, making them less likely than 
democratic leaders to seek commercial cooperation. 
Several thinkers, including Kant, have pointed out that liberal democracies are 
inherently peaceful because politically empowered citizens are, contrary to autocratic 
monarchs, unwilling to bear the cost of war. Montesquieu, Paine and Schumpeter have 
argued that capitalism and trade leads to rationality and makes war less likely. In addition, 
Doyle points out that regular elections in liberal democracies cause frequent changes of 
leadership. That reduces the chance that personal animosities between heads of state cause 
long-term friction.554 Weart argues that tolerance and compromise are central aspects of 
democratic culture, so diplomats from democratic countries will seek to find negotiated 
agreements rather than engage in conflict.555  
Yet, while these arguments may explain to some degree why democracies do not fight 
other democracies, they fail to explain why democracies engage in war with non-democratic 
regimes. Historical evidence that democracies in general are more peaceful than non-
democratic regimes is weak.556 In Perpetual Peace, written in 1795, Kant argues that his vision 
of a pacific confederation can only turn into reality if all states have agreed to the three 
“definitive articles” the author postulates (republican civil constitution, commitment to 
pacific union, cosmopolitan law).557 Cosmopolitan law includes moral-ethical considerations 
(foreigners cannot be expelled if they face persecution abroad), but also commercial interests 
(promoting division of labor and free trade). As a consequence of the alliance between two 
liberal states, economic interdependence eventually follows. There exists a separate peace 
between liberal democracies, and there is strong empirical evidence that supports Kant’s 
claim.558 Liberalism has succeeded in its creation of a zone of peace, but failed in guiding 
foreign policy outside the liberal world.559 
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Why are democracies more likely to engage in a democratic, rule-based and open 
international system? According to Kant, it should be one of liberal states’ foreign policy 
goals to preserve, strengthen and expand the pacific union-560 or, as Doyle has put it, to build 
a “steady worldwide pressure for a liberal peace.”561 Ikenberry argues that elites who work in 
the context of democratic domestic state structures try to engage in an international order 
that is congenial with their domestic system.562 Democracies will prefer to exist in the midst 
of an international system imbued with democratic values, strengthening the importance of 
democratic polity on a global scale. The “stickiness” of interlocking institutions is thus 
greater between democratic regimes than between non-democratic regimes, because 
democracies’ promises are more reassuring.563 The decentralization and openness of 
democratic states provides opportunities for all states to consult and make representations 
directly, thus strengthening their willingness to make serious commitments.564 This brings us 
back to a previously mentioned argument: After World War II, the United States created 
today’s system because they sought to enlarge the modern liberal welfare state, thus creating 
an international order fully aligned with their own system. The IMF and the World Bank, set 
up to solve problems inherent to liberal capitalism, can be seen as the direct extension of 
welfare systems as they exist in liberal democracies:565 economic openness with social and 
welfare protection, a system John Ruggie has called “embedded liberalism” (economic 
liberalism qualified by certain overarching political goals).566 There is evidence that the 
democratic structure of the principal states involved in the creation of the postwar order in 
1945 facilitated the process. Both American and European leaders argued that their 
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commitment to collaboration was based on their shared democratic institutions. Democracy 
was, according to Ikenberry, “both an end and a means.”567 After the end of the Cold War, 
the same principle applied. Despite the disappearance of a common threat, the asymmetries 
of power among the Atlantic community provided incentives to increase rather than lessen 
their mutual commitments. The democratic structure of these states increased their capacity 
to do so.568 
 
Table: Democracy and Institutional Agreement 
Characteristic Implication 
Transparency Reduces surprises 
Generates higher confidence information 
Decentralized policy process Policy viscosity 
Opportunities for enforcement 
Open and decentralized system Access and voice opportunities  
Transnational and transgovernmental 
connecting points 
Source: Ikenberry, G. John. After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of 
Order after Major Wars. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001 
 
This system also helps avoid confrontation. By setting up international institutions, liberal 
states practice ‘co-binding’, that is, “they attempt to tie one another down by locking each 
other into institutions that mutually constrain one another.”569  
 Liberal democracies have thus, because of their domestic political system, an inherent 
interest in engaging with international institutions. As Kant points out, the citizens across the 
world, including in liberal democracies, would benefit enormously if the natural evolution of 
world politics reached its endpoint: a global pacific union of liberal states.570 International 
institutions can be seen as a crucial vehicle in the project of reaching this endpoint. Kant 
foresees setbacks and disappointment, but points to several possibilities of how the pacific 
union can be expanded. The “transnational track” is particularly interesting. According to 
this idea, the pacific union will expand one by one, with each ‘candidate country’ presenting a 
different project. 
There is significant historical evidence for Kant’s prediction of the pacific union. 
Despite Anglo-French rivalry, liberal France and liberal Britain created an alliance against 
illiberal Germany prior to World War I. Liberal Italy, member of the Triple Alliance with 
Germany and Austria, ended up supporting Britain and France, which allowed it to avoid 
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war against other liberal states. And, despite tensions between the United States and Britain, 
America ended up supporting Britain in its war against Germany.571  
While Kant’s pacific union was never supposed to be an official alliance—he develops 
no systematic embodiment of his treaty572- international institutions have, to some degree, 
formalized this group of nations. He did conceive some sort of mutual non-aggression pact, 
and the implementation of his third definitive article - cosmopolitan law - requires the 
creation of international institutions to monitor these rules.573  
Several realist scholars, such as Joseph Grieco, Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer, 
criticize the liberal approach. Walt, for example, argues that “strong statistical support for 
the proposition is limited to the period after World War II, when both the US-led alliance 
system and the Soviet threats to Western Europe’s democracies discouraged conflict between 
republics.”574 Grieco points out that, aside form the risk of being cheated, states are unlikely 
to engage in cooperative behavior because of the relative gains of other actors.575 According 
to this logic, states refuse to cooperate if they believe that the other side may gain more from 
the cooperation than they will. Yet Grieco’s basic assumption is not entirely sound. States are 
not as concerned about relative gains logic as he claims. They are willing to accept if their 
counterpart occasionally gains more if they gain more in other instances. 
Realists fail to take international institutions into the equation: Relative gains logic 
may play some role in a fictitious world where one state can only engage with another once in 
history. In such a world, states may try to cheat the other side as they do not have to fear any 
retribution. In a world regulated by international institutions, however, states meet not only 
twice, but infinite times. In fact, they meet all the time, creating a constant “multiple-play” 
character of the game.576 They have both adhered to the same principles, norms, rules and 
decision-making procedures, so there is enough trust that cheating is no longer an issue. In 
addition, states may cooperate in one area with little benefit, in order to build sufficient trust 
to find partners in another area, where they obtain higher payoffs from collaboration. 
International institutions play a key role in this aspect, as they constitute safe and rule-based 
means to engage in such collaboration. This is not only true once a strong state is declining 
and too weak to uphold a hegemonic system, as Keohane argued, but also as systems are 
created in postwar settlements, as Ikenberry as shown.577  
State actors are less interested in short-term gains than realists believe. Brazil’s 
decision to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state is a case in point. 
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Immediate gains for Brazil in the security realm were virtually non-existent. Some argue the 
treaty even harmed Brazil’s national interest, as it lost its right to develop nuclear weapons. 
The Brazilian government was motivated by more subtle, less measurable benefits, such as 
trust building and a slow reintegration into the Western World Order after democratization 
in 1985. Brazil assumed that greater integration would provide it tangible benefits at a later 
stage. 
Realists exaggerate the importance of gains or advantages achieved by other states 
they cooperate with. There is ample historic evidence that countries that engage in 
cooperation are most concerned with absolute gains logic - they care about their benefits 
irrespective of the other side.578 Furthermore, as measuring one’s own gains against those of 
another state is increasingly complex, cross-issue cooperation is very difficult.579 If 
institutions provide mutual benefits, states are likely to shift loyalty and resources to 
institutions. As Stein points out, there is a lot of institutionalized cooperation and much of it 
has differential payoffs.580 This shows that even if states are purely rational, self- interested 
actors, collaboration is indeed possible and likely.581 
With the arguments shown above, we can provide a predictive account of the strategy 
fringe countries will employ regarding international institutions. If this proposition is true, 
we would expect both Brazil and India to seek integration on all counts. If we apply Kantian 
liberal theory to Brazil and India, two liberal democracies that have accepted all three of 
Kant’s “definitive articles” of peace, they should have a strong incentive to engage in 
multilateral institutions and integrate into the Western World Order. If they do as we predict, 
we may also be able to construe that as evidence of what the West is. 
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1.5. How do fringe nations relate to international institutions? 
 
In this section, we seek to develop categories that help us define fringe nations’ strategies 
towards international institutions. Before we talk about these categories, however, we must 
better understand the relationship between a nation and an international institution. 
 
1.5.1. Fringe nations and the Western World Order 
 
How do we define institutions? We can differentiate between international institutions (the 
equivalent of international regimes) and international organizations. International 
institutions are issue-specific. They provide rules, norms and decision-making procedures 
that specify how states should behave in a specific area. International organizations, by 
contrast, are physical entities with staff and offices, i.e. with an organizational structure. 
There are international institutions without an organizational structure (e.g. the Ottawa 
Treaty against landmines), and some international institutions for which an organizational 
structure emerged (e.g. the WTO), then turning into an international organization. This 
differentiation is only of minor importance for the purpose of this study.582 
 Institutions are not simply implicit rules of the game, as some realists argue.583 Stein 
points out that all recurrent behavior is guided by some rule, so the entire study of 
international politics could be renamed as the study of international institutions.584 Both 
social constructivism and the English School fall into this trap, failing to delineate the role of 
institutions in international relations.585 
 Krasner, using a more pragmatic approach, therefore identifies four fundamental 
elements of an international institution: Principles, norms, rules, and decision-making 
procedures.586 An institution must be based on a series of principles (i.e. “the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons is bad”), assuming that global welfare will be maximized by the pursuit of 
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1999) For the purpose of this study, my definition of an international institution is more rigorous.  
584 Stein, Arthur A. (2008). Neoliberal Institutionalism, in: The Oxford Handbook of International 
Relations, Christian Reus-Smit, Duncan Snidal (eds.), 2008 
585 Arthur A. Stein (2008). Neoliberal Institutionalism, in: The Oxford Handbook of International 
Relations, Christian Reus-Smit, Duncan Snidal (eds.), 2008 
586 Krasner, Steven. (1985). Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. See also Krasner, Stephen D. (1982). Structural causes and regime 
consequences: regimes as intervening variables. International Organization, 36: 185-205, 1982. This 
definition has also been adopted by other neoliberal institutionalists such as Robert O. Keohane. 
(Keohane, Robert O. After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984)  
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this goal.587 Norms spell out general standards of behavior, while rules specify, at a more 
detailed level, what members can and cannot do.588 The rules of a regime are difficult to 
distinguish from its norms, and at the margin they merge.589 Rules can be altered more easily 
than norms, because there may be more than one set of rules that can achieve a given set of 
purposes.590 Finally, explicit decision-making procedures stipulate who holds power in the 
institution, how to take joint decisions, how to take in new members and how to punish rule 
breakers.591 
Now that we have properly defined institutions, the following question must be, why 
do they exist in the first place? What causes two or more states to establish an international 
institution? Liberal scholars argue that states create institutions to facilitate collaboration and 
avoid coordination problems (aptly shown in the prisoner’s dilemma)592, which is difficult in 
a purely anarchic system.593 The fundamental motivation behind the creations of institutions 
is to help states reach the Pareto frontier, the situation at which no more joint gains are 
possible.594 Institutions that provide mechanisms of inspection and surveillance make it more 
difficult to cheat.595 Furthermore, international institutions act like a regulator in a market, 
assuring that actors do not destroy public goods- by overfishing the ocean or polluting the air 
(although some institutions such as the WTO deal with private goods). Hurrell writes that 
“global governance is best understood as a response to the increasingly serious collective 
action problems generated by growing societal, ecological, and economic 
interdependence.”596 States may also create international institutions to reduce the 
governance costs that autonomous decision-making creates - it is cheaper to act through an 
                                                 
587 Keohane says that “the principles of regimes define, in general, the purposes that their members are 
expected to pursue. For instance, the principles of the postwar trade and monetary regimes have 
emphasized the value of open, nondiscriminatory patterns of international economic transactions.” 
Keohane, Robert O. 2005). Preface to the 2005 Edition. In: Keohane, Robert O. (1984). After 
Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1984 
588 For example, the WTO does not force members to resort to free trade right away. 
589 Some scholars even equate rules and norms. Barnett and Finnemore, for example, define rules as 
“explicit or implicit norms (…) that define the social world and the behavior of actors in it.” (Barnett, 
Michael and Martha Finnemore (2004). Rules for the World. International Organizations in Global 
Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004) 
590 Keohane, Robert O. Preface to the 2005 Edition. In: Keohane, Robert O. After Hegemony. 
Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1984 
591 John Mearsheimer offers a similar definition: According to him, an institution is “a set of rules that 
stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and compete with one another. They prescribe 
acceptable forms of state behavior, and proscribe unacceptable kinds of behavior.” (Mearsheimer, 
John J. (1994). The False Promise of International Institutions, International Security, Vol. 19, No.3, 
(Winter 1994, 1995), pp.5-49)  
592 In: Kuhn, Steven (2009). "Prisoner's Dilemma", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 
2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/prisoner-
dilemma/ (accessed December 1, 2009) 
593 Axelrod, Robert and Robert O. Keohane (1985). Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies 
and Institutions. World Politics, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Oct., 1985), pp. 226-254 
594 Martin, Lisa L. (1999). An institutionalist view. In: T.V. Pauli and John A. Hall (eds.) International 
Order and the Future of World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999 
595 Richardson, James L. (2008) The Ethics of Neoliberal Institutionalism. in: The Oxford Handbook 
of International Relations, Christian Reus-Smit, Duncan Snidal (eds.), 2008 
596 Hurrell, Andrew (2007). On Global Order. Power, Values, and the Constitution of International 
Society. 2007, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
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institution than to assemble a coalition of the willing for every single problem.597 Both 
neoliberal institutionalism and realism agree that states create or join institutions out of self-
interest. The key difference is that realists contend that once the regime no longer provides 
these benefits, rising powers will create other institutions. Institutions are thus similar to 
alliances. 
The question whether international institutions have, in fact, any impact on nations’ 
behavior is a major contention between realist and liberal thought. Realists and neo-realists 
argue that institutions have no impact at all, while liberal scholars disagree and contend that 
institutions strongly affect nations’ behavior, generally contributing to peace. They agree 
however, on a series of basic assumptions. The international system is fundamentally 
anarchical, states are unitary actors, regimes promote international order, and they are the 
product of rational self-interested actors.598 
Realist scholars argue that international institutions are an epiphenomenal 
component of international relations, reducible to state power and interests, and thus no real 
actor in international relations at all.599 International organizations work within the 
framework of inter-state relations, not vice versa.600 In addition, they are usually disguised 
alliances between states and thus ephemeral. As realist thinker John J. Mearsheimer points 
out in “The false promise of International Institutions”, there is no evidence that global 
governance has any influence on states’ behavior.601 International institutions do not mitigate 
the anarchy of the international system. States are the only actors on the international arena, 
so the study of the relations between the state and an institution is entirely futile. According 
to Mearsheimer, what explains war and peace are not institutions, but ‘balance of power’. 
The most powerful states in a system create and shape international institutions, which are 
then primarily used to “act out” these power relationships. Realists point to the fact that 
most institutions were created by hegemons, and that the current system rests on the political 
hegemony of the United States.602 States may build alliances and decide to cooperate, but they 
                                                 
597 Robert O. Keohane gives a good example of why institutions reduce transaction cost: “An extreme 
example if provided by the settlement between Iran and the United States in 1981, in which American 
diplomats held hostage by Iran were liberated in return for the release of Iranian financial assets in the 
United States. Elaborate arrangements were made, involving Algeria and Britain, to ensure that neither 
side could double-cross the other by withholding its part of the bargain after receiving what it wanted. 
In the complete absence of an international regime linking the United States with the revolutionary 
government of Iran, laborious negotiations were necessary to set up an ad hoc arrangement to permit a 
balanced reciprocity that benefited both sides.” Keohane, Robert O. After Hegemony. Cooperation 
and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984 
598 Little, Richard (2008). International regimes. In: Smith, Steve, John Baylis, Patricia Owens. The 
Globalization of World Politics, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008 
599 Stein, Arthur A.(2008). Neoliberal Institutionalism, in: The Oxford Handbook of International 
Relations, Christian Reus-Smit, Duncan Snidal (eds.), 2008. See also: Ikenberry, G. John (2001). After 
Victory. Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of order after major wars. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2001 
600 Smith, Steve, John Baylis, Patricia Owens (2008). Introduction, The Globalization of World Politics, 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2008 
601 Some notable realists, such as Joseph Grieco, however, have admitted that international institutions 
do have some impact on states’ behavior. (Grieco, Joseph (1993). Cooperation among Nations. Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1993)  
602 Stein, Arthur A. (2008). Neoliberal Institutionalism, in: The Oxford Handbook of International 
Relations, Christian Reus-Smit, Duncan Snidal (eds.), 2008. See also: Keohane, Robert O. After 
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will change their strategy when it seems convenient.603 All realist theoretical concepts, such as 
‘bandwagoning’ or ‘balancing’ therefore refer to a nation’s behavior towards other states.604 
Liberal scholars disagree. While the underlying assumption remains the same (the 
system is anarchical and states want to maximize power), international institutions alter the 
way states aim to maximize their power. Institutions have an “ordering capacity” 605, they 
facilitate and thus increase cooperation between states because they offer a safe and rule-
based means to doing so - they thus overcome the problem of anarchy. Furthermore, 
international institutions exercise power by “fixing the meaning of issues (“e.g. genocide is 
unacceptable”) and diffusing norms.606 In an increasingly interdependent world, the state 
loses its status as the privileged sovereign institution. The state becomes one of many actors, 
and international institutions are a key feature of this new, complex system.607 
Institutions also promote trust building. Each member state agrees to forswear 
actions that, without guarantees that other members will play by the rules, it would be 
prudent to pursue.608 States are less willing to disregard institutions because their behavior 
may hurt them at a later point in a different issue area. Liberal institutionalists call these 
phenomena the “shadow of the future”609 and “issue-linkage”, pointing to the fact that issue 
areas are increasingly interdependent. Effective monitoring thanks to technology and reduced 
transaction costs are further reasons that make cooperation an attractive option for most 
states.610  
International institutions are independent actors in international relations as they 
mitigate the constraining of anarchy in the international system.611 Barnett and Finnemore 
                                                                                                                                               
Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1984 
603 Mearsheimer, John J.  (1994). The False Promise of International Institutions, International 
Security, Vol. 19, No.3, (Winter 1994, 1995), pp. 5-49 
604 see, for example, Ciorciari, John D.  (2009). What kind of power will India be? ISA Conference 
Paper, New York, 2009 
605 Ikenberry, G. John. (1999).  Liberal Hegemony and the Future of American Postwar Order. In Paul 
and Hall, International Order and the Future of World Politics, pp. 123–145. 
606 Barnett, Michael and Martha Finnemore (2004). Rules for the World. International Organizations 
in Global Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004 
607 Hurrell, Andrew (2007). On Global Order. Power, Values, and the Constitution of International 
Society. 2007, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore argue that 
understanding international organizations as social creatures and bureaucracies helps show that they 
are, while also influenced by states, fairly autonomous entities. (Barnett, Michael and Martha 
Finnemore (2004). Rules for the World. International Organizations in Global Politics. Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2004.) 
608 Ikenberry, G. John (1999). Liberal Hegemony and the Future of American Postwar Order. In Paul 
and Hall, International Order and the Future of World Politics, pp. 123–145. 
609 Ruzicka,  Jan , Nicholas J. Wheeler (2010). The puzzle of trusting relationships in the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty. International Affairs 86: 1 (2010) 69–85 
610 Keohane, Robert O., Joseph Nye (2000). Governance in a Globalizing World. New York: Brooking 
Institution Press, 2000 
611 The example of UNHCR is telling and shows that international institutions often take on a proper 
dynamic states no longer closely control. Barnett and Finnemore write that “when states created 
UNHCR in 1951, they gave it a three-year life span, almost no autonomy, and a very circumscribed 
mandate. UNHCR was to provide legal, not material, assistance only to people who had been 
displaces by events in Europe prior to 1951. Yet the agency was able to capitalize on refugee-producing 
events and use its institutional position and moral authority to expand the concept of refugee, to widen 
its assistance and protection activities, and to significantly extend its sphere of operations. By the late 
1970s it was no longer a small European refugee agency but a global humanitarian organization.” 
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argue that “while state demands are extremely important” for international institutions, 
“state action by no means determines all, or even most, IO behavior.”612 They are also the 
best means for state actors to deal with the complex phenomenon of globalization. Relations 
between states and institutions are therefore important.   
Section 1.4. on liberalism has shown that ideological affinity increases states’ 
propensity to create durable strategic ties by including a sense of trust and shared purpose.613 
Yet international institutions also affect non-democratic regimes’ behavior. Independently of 
the regime type, it is easier to break a verbally made promise than a written contract. 
Empirical studies have found that states mostly comply with the agreements they make.614 
Large and powerful countries such as China undertake domestic reform and change their 
behavior in order to join the WTO. The United States attempts to change other countries’ 
behavior by working through the UN Security Council - as evidenced by more than one 
hundred UN Security Council resolutions sponsored by the United States since the UN’s 
inception.615 While structural realists would expect other countries to actively balance against 
the United States, reality shows that they mostly balance within the system - a behavior 
termed “soft balancing” by T.V. Paul.616 They do so because they have sufficient trust in the 
international institutions. As Ikenberry points out, the logic of balance is to check power with 
power; the logic of institutional binding is to restrain power through the establishment of an 
institutionalized political process. But institutions also take on a life on their own and shape 
and constrain the dominant states that created them - the WTO, for example, has constrained 
US behavior on several occasions.617 
 Liberal theory thus is correct in assuming that international regimes increase the 
chance for sustained international cooperation and commitment, no matter whether a 
country is democratic or not. Institutions are therefore an entity states can independently 
relate to- confronting, integrating, etc. Yet, given the complexity of relations between a state 
and an institution, these relationships are often misunderstood.  
Relations between a state and international institutions are unlike interstate relations, 
and contrary to realist thought, a country’s policy towards an international institution is not 
the same as the country’s policy towards the governments that form part of this particular 
institution. We thus cannot be reductive, as the institution is something other than the sum of 
its members. 
                                                                                                                                               
(Barnett, Michael and Martha Finnemore (2004). Rules for the World. International Organizations in 
Global Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004)  
612 Barnett, Michael and Martha Finnemore (2004). Rules for the World. International Organizations 
in Global Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004  
613 Ciorciari, John D. (2009). What kind of power will India be? ISA Conference Paper, New York, 
2009 
614 Stein, Arthur A. (2008). Neoliberal Institutionalism, in: The Oxford Handbook of International 
Relations, Christian Reus-Smit, Duncan Snidal (eds.), 2008 
615 United Nations (2010). www.un.org  
616 Paul, T.V. (2005). Soft Balancing in the Age of Hegemony. International Security, Volume 30, 
Number 1, Summer 2005, pp. 46-71 
617 As Ikenberry points out, there is a historical misconception that the policies and institutions that 
supported free trade and economic openness are the stuff of “low politics”. In fact, peace and security 
would have been impossible in a postwar world of closed and exclusive economic regions. Ikenberry, 
G. John (2001). After Victory. Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of order after major 
wars. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001 
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India’s behavior towards the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), for example, is 
confrontational: It refused to sign the treaty which was meant to be a global standard. That 
does not mean, however, that it confronts all the countries that joined the NPT, such as the 
United States. Quite to the contrary: While India continues to refuse to sign the NPT, its 
relations to the US have strengthened since 2005, when the United States acknowledged India 
as a nuclear power.618 That means there is a way to confront an institution without severing 
all ties to the institution’s members.  
Given the complexities, what is the best way to think about relations between a state 
and an institution? As the above example with India, the United States and the NPT has 
shown, we cannot think of the relations between a state and an institution with the same 
framework we use for state-state relations. Yet, there certainly is some relation between the 
two. The current world order has been described as an “American project,”619 and the United 
States can be seen as the “gatekeeper” of many of the clubs, sitting atop of a global hierarchy, 
countries critical of the global order are often critical of the United States as well.620 A 
country that decides to consistently undermine all institutions, such as North Korea, can 
hardly be close to a government that chooses to integrate into all institutions, such as 
Germany. Yet, the approximation in 2009 and 2010 between a NPT-obliging country- Brazil- 
and a country that violates the NPT- Iran- show that we cannot safely infer from state-
institution relations to state-state relations. 
We can thus state that when fringe countries deal with many institutions, they are 
grappling with the Western World Order. Rather than thinking about the case of India and 
the NPT in the context of state-state relations, or of India vs. the NPT’s member states, we 
can understand the situation in the context of the Western World Order. By refusing to sign 
the NPT, India made a confrontational move against the non-proliferation regime, and with 
it the Western World Order based on rules and norms. A country’s strategy towards 
international institutions reflects a government’s beliefs in how it should relate to the current 
world order. As will be discussed, this does not mean that India seeks to undermine the 
Western World Order in general. It may be that another aspect, as such India’s need to assure 
regional security, trumps its desire to strengthen the Western World Order.  
So how can fringe countries interact with the Western World Order? On the one 
hand, they are not yet fully integrated into the system, so they can seek integration to be 
invited to participate in and influence important decisions. On the other, they may also build 
counter-hegemonic alliances and create a parallel system—an extreme form of confrontation. 
The traditional perspective is that fringe nations are “in or out”, that they can either seek to 
become part of the system or confront it.  
                                                 
618 Carter, Ashton B (2006). America's New Strategic Partner? Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 4 (Jul. - 
Aug., 2006), pp. 33-44. As other NPT signatories such as Brazil pointed out, the United States 
effectively ‘rewarded’ India for engage in highly confrontational behavior.  
619 Ikenberry, G. John (2004). Liberalism and Empire: Logics of Order in the American Unipolar Age. 
Review of International Studies, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Oct., 2004), pp. 609-630 
620 Ciorciari notes that the United States have the power to issue “superpower approval”. Relations to 
the United States therefore matter, even when analyzing a nation’s strategy towards international 
institutions.  
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Yet, a more careful analysis shows that they can also pursue a plethora of other, more 
subtle strategies that are harder to categorize.621 For example, does Brazil’s and India’s quest 
for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council constitute “confrontational” or “integrative” 
behavior?622 While many may call it revisionist, it shows that both countries accept the 
Security Council in principle- theoretically, they could also call for an abolition of the 
Security Council and argue that the General Assembly, or an entirely new organ should 
replace it— which would be a far more confrontational move.623 Thus, the campaign for a 
permanent seat certainly contains parts of both integration and confrontation, yet neither 
label adequately captures the essence of the strategy. Ricardo Seitenfus and Baldev Raj Nayar 
have described Brazil’s and India’s strategy as “reformist”, saying that Brazil does not 
question the overarching principles (such as the veto power in the UNSC), but it seeks low-
key reform (such as seeking a permanent seat.)624 Seitenfus argues that Brazil’s strategy 
towards the UN Security Council reflects the country’s strategy towards international 
institutions in general.625 
Similarly, if South America, led by Brazil, were to establish a unified, EU-like 
structure based essentially on ‘Western’ norms and procedures, neither ‘integration’ nor 
‘confrontation’ would adequately describe Brazil’s strategy. “Alignment” could be more 
fitting.  
While established powers such as the United Kingdom and Italy confront the Western 
World Order only in specific instances, emerging fringe countries such as Brazil, China and 
India are less integrated into the system and thus seem to engage in confrontational behavior 
more frequently. Brazil and India have pushed for UN Security Council Reform, India has 
refused to sign the NPT, Brazil has not signed any additional inspection provisions, and 
Brazil and India are among the WTO members who most frequently issue complaints at the 
WTO.626 India has, Nayar and Paul write, “serious disagreements with several international-
order norms promoted by the status quo powers.”627 
Do rising powers oppose international regimes more often than established powers? 
To begin with, they are less integrated and their foreign policy is thus naturally less aligned 
with the Western World Order. When the present order was conceived, Brazil and India were 
not considered, so there is no space for them. In addition, as Paul argues, international 
                                                 
621 Ciorciari, John D. (2009). What kind of power will India be? ISA Conference Paper, New York, 
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institutions may be seen as a tool by rising powers to limit the dominant power’s options.628 
But other factors may cause Brazil and India to confront more often. As rising powers, they 
feel they deserve more weight in international institutions, and they argue that their 
participation is necessary to legitimize existing institutions. They are not “status quo” powers 
as their strategies harbor revisionist elements. Abdul Nafey and Raja Mohan therefore call 
India a “revisionist” power.629 Yet, what looks like confrontational behavior does not 
necessarily constitute actual confrontation, but may be explained by the fact that these 
nations are located on the fringe of the Western World Order.  
Fringe nations appear to be constantly confronting established states through their 
institutions. But in fact they are in a complicated negotiation not with those states, but with 
the Western World Order generally. If Brazil and India integrate and then confront within the 
system, they may do so merely to win their rightful place within the institutions, not to 
undermine the institutions themselves. There is thus a danger of misinterpreting benign 
confrontation within the system with systemic confrontation. This stems from a 
oversimplification and reduction of rising powers’ options to integration and confrontation. 
But, it is more complicated than that. There are many options. There are strategies that are 
not unconditional integration, but they are not confrontation, either. There are strategies in 
between. 
It is becoming clear that we cannot make progress on either adequately explaining the 
past or predicting the future with realist or liberal theories until we have a better way of 
defining the terms for the options fringe powers have. Analyzing a nation’s behavior towards 
international institutions is more complex, and it cannot fully be captured by confrontation 
vs. integration. International institutions are highly diverse, which makes analyzing a 
country’s policy towards institutions in general - towards the Western World Order - highly 
complex.630 
Several scholars have attempted to characterize rising powers’ behavior, but it usually 
involves their behavior towards the established powers rather than the institutions created by 
the established powers. Paul and Pape, for example, have called rising powers’ strategy “soft 
hedging” or “soft balancing” respectively, which involves using political ententes and 
multilateral institutions to constrain the United States, while avoiding security arrangements 
that, from a US perspective, could be considered counter-hegemonic alliances.631 
                                                 
628 Paul, T.V. (2005). Soft Balancing in the Age of Hegemony. International Security, Volume 30, No.1, 
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Rubicon (2004). The Shaping of India’s New Foreign Policy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004 
630 Most institutions represent a particular policy area – such as nuclear proliferation, economic 
development, international finance, or trade, while others act in a multitude of disciplines, such as the 
United Nations. 
631 Paul, T.V. (2005). Soft Balancing in the Age of Hegemony. International Security, Volume 30, No.1, 
pp. 46-71, Summer 2005 See also: Pape, Robert A. (2005) Soft Balancing against the United States. 
International Security, Volume 30, No. 1, pp. 7-45, Summer 2005 
OLIVER STUENKEL – DOCTORAL THESIS 105 
1.5.2. Integration strategies  
 
1.5.2.1. UNCONDITIONAL INTEGRATION 
 
Regimes can be defined as (…) principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international 
relations. Principles are beliefs of act, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of 
behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or 
proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for 
making and implementing collective choice.632 
 
- Stephen Krasner,  
Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables 
 
 
1.5.2.1. UNCONDITIONAL INTEGRATION 
 
Integrative behavior vis-à-vis an international institution can take place in several forms. First 
of all, a country can seek membership in an institution and actively support it in its entirety. 
As Krasner has convincingly argued, an institution is defined by its principles, norms, rules 
and decision-making procedures.633 ‘Principles’ can also be understood as the ‘spirit’ of the 
institutions. If a new member seeks integration and fully accepts the institution’s principles, 
norms, rules and decision-making procedures, we can speak of “unconditional integration”. 
Turkey’s decision to seek membership in NATO in 1952, its decision to apply to the 
European Union in 1987, emerging powers’ decision to lend more money to the IMF, or any 
countries’ decision to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) are 
examples for integrative behavior.   
This strategy is at times accompanied by domestic worries about losing one’s 
sovereignty or foreign policy independence. As India’s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh 
moved India’s closer to the institutional mainstream, he saw himself forced to promise that 
“nothing will be done that will compromise, dilute, or cast a shadow on India’s full 
autonomy in the management of its security and national interests.”634 In the same way, John 
Bolton argues that treaties like the Ottawa Treaty (Mine Ban Treaty) impair America’s 
sovereignty.635 We can call this strategy “unconditional integration.” Unconditional 
integration into a particular institution implies that the new signatory or member country 
fully accepts the rules and values that undergird the international institution or regime. 
                                                 
632 Krasner, Stephen D. (1982). Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening 
variables. International Organization, 36: 185-205, 1982 
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Countries give up some degree of autonomy, but they also gain something in return. 
In the case of the World Trade Organization (WTO), nations adopt a variety of rules that 
have a large influence of how they conduct their trade policy. Membership in the WTO 
means a balance of rights and obligations. As the WTO rightly observes, nations “enjoy the 
privileges that other member-countries give to them and the security that the trading rules 
provide. In return, they had to make commitments to open their markets and to abide by the 
rules.”636 Several international regimes, such as the WTO, the CTBT or the Ottawa Treaty 
are structured in a way that members can only engage in the institution through 
unconditional integration. Countries interested in joining are usually not granted special 
rights. 
 
1.5.2.2. REVISIONIST INTEGRATION 
 
Opposed to unconditional integration is revisionist integration. It seems adequate here to 
once again remember Krasner’s point that institutions are defined by principles, norms, rules 
and decision-making procedures.637 If countries agree on an institution’s principles and 
norms, but seek to reform its rules and decision-making procedures prior or after their entry, 
we can speak of revisionist integration. Revisionist integration thus aims at some reform, but 
seeks to preserve the so-called ‘spirit’ of the organization. Revisionist is important and often 
strengthens an institution. Using different categories, Keohane argues that discord helps 
stimulate mutual adjustment in international affairs.638 
Germany’s strategy towards the UN Security Council is a classic example. Germany 
does not seek to undermine the UN Security Council- quite to the contrary, it seeks inclusion 
in the institution, underlining the importance it assigns to the body. However, Germany’s 
entry requires a change in the rules and decision-making procedures of the UN Security 
Council. Germany’s strategy has been called “revisionist” and “anti-status quo”.639 German 
policy makers call their own strategy “reformist”640, yet there is certainly a confrontational 
element involved. Germany seeks to put pressure on current members to change the 
institutions’ decision-making procedures, which implies confronting them to some degree.  
Other examples are several countries’ campaign to replace the G7 with the G20 to 
address the world’s most urging challenges. Among others, India has been one of the leading 
advocates for a stronger G20, attempting to break the G7’s long-standing grip on key 
decisions of global finance. While these countries called for the actual abolition of the G7 as 
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Transatlantic Relations, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns 
Hopkins University, Washington, DC, June 1-2, 2009  
640 Nass, Matthias (2004). Wir wollen da rein! DIE ZEIT 16.09.2004 Nr.39 
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the world’s principle forum for debate, their behavior did not constitute “radical 
confrontation” as it merely implied an expansion of an already existing mechanism that 
would not exclude any current members.  
In the same way, Brazil’s and India’s desire to expand their voting rights at the World 
Bank constitutes revisionist integration. Both countries see to change the way the institution 
operates. All the categories so far presented are “institutionalist”641 strategies as they 
constitute the engagement with existing institutions, not an anti-institutionalist, realist 
strategy. 
Revisionist integrator is often wrongly understood as systemic confrontation. The 
examples given above are often cited in the media and academic studies to prove rising 
powers’ interest in undermining the institution. The contrary is true. Revisionist integration 
has a positive effect as it allows additional states to engage, increasing its reach and 
legitimacy. As will be shown in section 2 and 3, in most cases, states’ revisionist strategy is 
justified, so their strategy also contributes to the institution’s openness, fairness and social 
mobility. 
 
1.5.2.3. SYSTEM-STRENGHTENING INTEGRATION 
 
Once a country has made a contract with an institution and is part of it, it can engage in 
another type of integration, which we shall call “system- strengthening integration.” The first 
one is like making a contract. In the second one, members are not making a contract; they are 
making a pledge to lend more support to the organization. As member or signatory of an 
international regime or institution, it can increase or reduce support through several 
mechanisms. A member can, for example, support an institution through high financial 
contributions or troop provisions. India, Bangladesh and Pakistan are the world’s largest 
troop providers to United Nations peace-keeping missions and thus increase the peacekeeping 
regime’s effectiveness and reach. This is particularly important because the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations’ (DPKO) ability to engage in conflicts is directly related to the 
number of troops member states are willing to provide. The three nations’ troop deployments 
therefore fortify the system and allow the UN to provide more effective peacekeeping. We 
shall call such a behavior “strengthening integration”. 
What motivates a country to engage in each one of the strategies, and how are they 
related? The strategies are, to some extent, dependent on the type of institution. As noted 
above, there are some institutions and regimes that only allow unconditional integration, 
such as the Ottawa Treaty against the use of land mines. A member cannot employ 
revisionist integration because the regime is reduced to a contract on one issue area, such as 
land mines. International contracts thus only allow for unconditional integration. More 
complex international institutions with a larger portfolio and actual procedures such as 
voting and policy engagement, allow room for revisionist behavior. Strengthening integration 
is possible in all types of regimes. While it is possible to strengthen the UN through financial 
help and troop deployments, states can exert pressure on others to sign certain treaties.  
                                                 
641 Soares de Lima, Maria Regina (2003). Na trilha de um política externa afirmativa. Observatorio da 
Cidadania, 2003 
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Why would a country integrate into an institution but not engage in strengthening 
integration? As nations seek to maximize benefits, they may see benefits in unconditional 
integration, but not in strengthening integration after that. Or they may have difficulties 
assuming a leadership rule and exposing themselves too much. This may be particularly the 
case for fringe nations that are relatively recent members of international institutions.  
How do scholars from emerging powers interpret their options? Several Brazilian 
scholars have created the two categories of “autonomy through participation” vs. “autonomy 
through distance.”642 Autonomy through participation, as used in the Brazilian context, is 
similar to unconditional integration, and is often criticized as “subordination”. Autonomy 
through participation does not foresee any ability to reform the system as described in the 
category ‘revisionist integration’. “Autonomy through distance” is, as shown below, similar 
to “passive confrontation”.  
This Brazilian juxtaposition does not include “revisionist integration” because 
Brazil’s perspective is based on the assumption that the Western World Order is marked by 
“American unipolarity”643, and that emerging powers cannot change the structure of it. This 
vision interprets the Western World Order as a less flexible, more rigid structure. This is a 
fundamental difference from the way the Western World Order has been described in this 
study.  
While several Brazilian authors suggest that participation implies acceptance of and 
resignation to the system as it is, and that the United States is interested in stopping emerging 
powers’ rise, this study argues, similarly to Ikenberry, that the system is open, rule-based and 
democratic, and that emerging powers are welcome and able to join and rise within the 
system.644 The traditional Brazilian definition overlooks the crucial fact that rising powers are 
rising in the first place because the system allows and encourages them to do so.645 Implicitly, 
however, even those who consider the system as characterized by American domination 
recognize the system’s unique strengths. When Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães recommends that 
Brazil “challenge the giants” and be a “revisionist power”, he calls on Brazil to push for 
reform of the UN Security Council - a key component of the Western World Order. Once 
Brazil becomes a permanent member of the Council, as Guimarães hopes for, it will be more 
deeply integrated into a newly fortified Western World Order than ever before. His claim 
thus affirms the claim that today’s system is easy to join and hard to overturn. “Revisionist” 
strategies do, in fact, constitute “revisionist integration” as long as a country does not seek to 
destabilize the existing world order. 
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1.5.3. Alignment strategies  
 
How does an alignment strategy differ from an integrative behavior? A strategy of alignment 
does not necessarily imply integration. A country aligns with an international institution if it 
actively supports the same principles and norms, but if it does not become a member. In this 
case, the rules and decision-making procedures do not apply to it. In most cases, integration 
does not take place because the institution is limited to a geographic region, and the country 
in question lies outside of that region. Alignment also takes place if a regional organization is 
created that pursues the same principles and norms as those promoted by the existing 
institutions that form the Western World Order. Characterizing regionalization on similar 
principles as those stipulated in global institutions as ‘alignment’ departs from the Wilsonian 
perspective, which regards regional alliances in general as prone to create instability.646  
Japan’s goals and values may be aligned to those of NATO- for example, in 
Afghanistan, but it is not part of NATO and thus does not actively participate in its missions. 
Alignment is therefore more common when speaking about regional organizations such as 
the European Union, ASEAN or NATO. A nation that lies outside of the institution’s region, 
but pursues the same goals, or even collaborates with the institution, can thus be said to be 
aligned. The United States, for example, can be said to be aligned with the European Union 
on issues such as nuclear proliferation. In the same way, the creation of the European Union 
is not an alternative to the US-led Western World Order, but a “filling” of it.647  
While realist scholars have argued that the creation of the European Union may pose 
a threat to the United States648, the EU is complementary, as it is guided by the very same 
principles that undergird the Western World Order. The creation of the EU or of any other 
regional bodies that support rule-based and open principles can thus be described as 
alignment. Brazil’s and Argentina’s decision to form Mercosur together with Uruguay and 
Paraguay can equally be seen as alignment as it is based on the same rules and norms that 
undergird the Western World Order. In this respect, Mercosur can similarly be seen as a 
regional manifestation of the Western World Order, because it promotes similar principles. 
The same seems to be true for IBSA, an alliance of India, Brazil and South Africa.649
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1.5.4. Confrontation strategies 
 
To confront international institutions implies opposing the rules that undergird the 
institutions and to directly or indirectly undermine their effectiveness. There are three 
confrontational strategies countries can adopt with regard to international institutions.  
 
1.5.4.1. SYSTEMIC CONFRONTATION 
 
First, a nation can seek to create a counter-institutional alliance aimed at limiting or 
hindering the institution’s activities. This takes place when an institution not only opposes an 
institution’s rules and decision-making procedures, but also its norms and, most importantly, 
its principles (i.e., its ‘spirit’). North Korea’s behavior towards the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) can be described as confrontational. Not only did it withdraw from 
the organization in 1994, but it has also actively sought to hinder the institution’s work, for 
example by expelling international observers in 2002.650 Such a behavior is particularly grave 
as it is in the nature of the NPT that if at least one state confronts the treaty, the entire 
systemic logic embodied in the NPT will be reduced and possibly fatally undermined.651 This 
is what we may call “radical / systemic confrontation.” States can create parallel institutions 
to balance the power of an already existing (usually regional institution). The Warsaw Treaty 
serves as another historical example.  
Sometimes it is difficult to tell whether a strategy constitutes alignment or systemic 
confrontation. After the Kosovo Crisis in 1999, for example, Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny 
Primakov proposed the creation of a “strategic triangle”, consisting of Russia, China and 
India, to create a counterweight to NATO652- an initiative that eventually failed. In 2001, 
China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan created the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization, a regional club designed to confront Islamic fundamentalism and 
promote economic development. In these specific cases, we cannot immediately tell whether 
states engage in alignment or confrontation. If the alliances mentioned are based on freedom, 
openness and fairness, there is no reason why states like Russia and China cannot be part of 
an alignment strategy. The rules and norms that underlie the institutions are decisive in this 
context.  
States seem to engage in systemic confrontation if they consider the institution unjust. 
The case of Germany’s decision to leave the League of Nations on September 19, 1939 may be 
instructive. After having applied for membership in 1926, Germany had been admitted to the 
institution in 1933. Why did Germany engage in systemic confrontation against the League of 
Nations, which represented the heart of the international system at the time? When Germany 
and France were engaged in a dispute over the payments stipulated in the Versailles Treaty 
and the French occupation of the resource-rich Ruhr Basin, the German government 
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preferred bilateral negotiations. As Count von Bernstorff pointed out in 1924, Germany 
decided not to ask the League of Nations to help settle the dispute because Germany had lost 
confidence in the institution’s impartiality. He furthermore notes that “the League, indeed, 
has hardly ever shown justice to Germany.”653 Wolfgang Schwarz expressed a similar 
sentiment in 1931 when he argued that “Germany (…) is like a fellow who has been hit below 
the belt too often, and feels it is time he left the ring.”654 Specifically, he called for 
disarmament rules that would apply to both Germany and the rest of Europe. Furthermore, 
he argued that Germany had no choice but to be an “unsatisfied” revisionist power given that 
many Germans lived separated from Germany by the Versailles Treaty.655 Germany regarded 
the international regime not as democratic, fair or transparent, but as a “Diktat”656 and 
perceived itself as an unfairly treated victim. From the German point of view, the League of 
Nations provided virtually no possibility to rise within the system, i.e., no ‘intra-institutional 
mobility’. By retreating from the League of Nations in 1935, Germany actively sought to 
destabilize the existing international system.657 
India’s and Pakistan’s behavior in the context of nuclear non-proliferation fall into 
the same category. Swaran Singh writes in 1998 that “India's May 1998 tests violated no 
international treaty obligations.”658 While it may be true that both countries never signed the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty and thus did not break international law, the nature of the non-
proliferation regime is such that not signing the NPT amounts to systemic confrontation. 
Specifically Pakistan’s behavior weakened the non-proliferation regime. Accordingly, other 
countries interpreted India’s behavior as confrontational, evidenced by the condemnations 
and sanctions the country endures in the tests’ aftermath.659 
 
1.5.4.2. PASSIVE CONFRONTATION 
 
Confrontation is not necessarily a proactive strategy. The failure to act can also constitute 
confrontation. This is particularly the case with large nations such as Brazil and India. Their 
size and international importance is such that their decision not to engage in an international 
institution, or its decision to not engage constructively, as seen during the United Nations 
Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen in December 2009, amounts to confrontational 
behavior. While India’s environment minister maintained in 2009 that “India is not part of 
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the problem”660, India’s emissions projections are such that any agreement without India’s 
participation will not have the desired effect, given that India is poised to become one of the 
world’s major polluters.661 India emissions currently make up around 4% of the total, but 
with an economy expected to grow around 8% per year over the coming decades, India plays 
a great role in the climate debate.662 India’s role can be described as “passive confrontation”.  
Small countries’ passivity is often inconsequential, but large countries’ passivity often 
implies, in practice, systemic confrontation. The Maldives or Paraguay may decide not to 
participate, but as their decision not to participate in a global problem solving mechanism 
rarely affects the overall picture, it cannot be described as confrontation. Ikenberry claims 
that “for better or for worse, states must operate in, come to terms with, or work around (the 
Western) World Order.”663 In a nation of Brazil’s and India’s weight and responsibility, even 
working around today’s order constitutes a confrontation. 
 
1.5.4.3. ISSUE-BASED CONFRONTATION 
 
Finally, a country can actively partake in an international organization (and thus agree with 
its core tenets), but disagree with the mainstream opinion, or behave in a non-constructive 
way. India, for example, has been called a “nay-sayer” with a “rejectionist approach”664 given 
its intransigence during trade negotiations, and Cohen argues that India’s foreign ministry is 
most skilled at “getting to a no”.665 Narlikar and Hurrell discern an emerging confrontation 
between the North and the South.666 At the same time, India would never consider leaving the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), and Indian policy makers rightly claim that, as long as 
they respect the rules, it has every right to defend its national interest.667 It is therefore not 
confronting the framework or the system, but a specific issue within the system. Helio 
Jaguaribe, an influential Brazilian sociologist, essentially made his case for issue-based 
confrontation when we argued that the Brazilian government should not engage in 
“antagonistic confrontation”, but merely in “autonomy-driven confrontation”, disagreeing 
on content, not on the framework within with the discussion was taking place.668 
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This may be called “issue-based (non-systemic) confrontation.” T.V. Paul and Robert 
Pape argue that second-tier powers engage in “soft-balancing” against the United States, 
which involves “the formation of limited diplomatic coalitions or ententes, especially at the 
United Nations.”669 This behavior may be interpreted as confrontational by US analysts, but 
it poses no systemic challenge. Quite to the contrary, the fact that rising powers use 
international institutions as a vehicle for their foreign policy goals (e.g. constraining the 
United States) shows, if anything, their acceptance of the Western World Order based on 
rules and norms - a system that offers them to specifically agreed-upon ways to disagree. Both 
liberal and non-liberal states have eschewed traditional balancing because of their proven 
ability to influence American foreign policy through international institutions670 - proof that 
the Western World Order provides a rule-based and open platform to articulate policies. 
 “Issue-based confrontation” within international institutions has become the norm 
and the trademark of the Western World Order - for example, by denying the UN stamp of 
approval on U.S.-led interventions.671 In 1999, China opposed the U.S.-led NATO invasion of 
Kosovo, (rightly) arguing that it lacked UN approval. Throughout the crisis, China worked 
through the UN Security Council to uphold the sovereignty norm, which it considered 
essential to “counter U.S. hegemony in the post-Cold War era.”672 When countries engage in 
issue-based strategies, they decide to disagree ‘within the system’, i.e. according to the rules 
and norms established by the institutions, because they regard this as the most effective 
strategy to defend their national interest. It is the ability fringe nations have to successfully 
defend their national interest through issue-based non-systemic confrontation that sets 
today’s Western World Order apart from any previous global system in history. By contrast, 
previous systems, like the system after the Napoleonic Wars, were hierarchical inside Europe 
and imperial in the rest of the world.673 
 
1.5.5. Conclusion  
 
This exercise provides us with a paradigm we can use as we proceed to analyze Brazil’s and 
India’s strategy towards the Western World Order. The seven options presented allow us to 
categorize and evaluate both countries’ behavior regarding international institutions since 
2000. It is noteworthy that of the seven strategic options emerging fringe countries face, five 
strengthen the Western World Order: unconditional integration, revisionist integration, 
strengthening integration, alignment and issue-based confrontation. Pursuing any of these 
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five strategies strengthens the Western World Order and leads to what we shall call the 
‘Greater West’, and not the ‘Post-Western World.’ The ‘Greater West’ is not an ideological or 
cultural concept. As shown in section 1.1., we understood that rather than identifying 
something that is the West, it is a certain behavior, a “way of doing things” that represents 
the West well: It is the institutions in which nations engage and where agreements are made 
that makes a country Western or non-Western. This includes culturally non-Western 
countries and non-democratic regimes.  
This analysis makes clear that what is often described as “confrontational” in the 
academic literature is, in fact, integrative behavior. Amrita Narlikar and Andrew Hurrell, for 
example, call Brazil’s and India’s strategies at the World Trade Organization “politics of 
confrontation.”674 Their description adequately describes the two countries’ behavior in the 
WTO. From a systemic perspective, however, their behavior is far from confrontational. 
Quite to the contrary, they actually strengthen the WTO by frequently making use of its 
institutionalized dispute mechanism. The possibility of engaging in controlled “issue-based 
confrontation” empowers fringe countries to engage, and fringe countries strengthen the 
Western World Order in turn. As mentioned above, this is the trademark of today’s order.  
Liberal theory as presented in section 1.2. predicts that fringe nations will chose one 
of these five strategies that strengthen institutions. Section 2 and 3 will review Brazil’s and 
India’s strategy vis-à-vis international institutions and analyze whether liberal theory is able 
to explain both countries’ behavior. Given the high number of cases (n), and the vast cultural 
domestic differences between Brazil and India, we consider that if both countries’ behavior 
can be fully explained by liberal theory, we can apply it to other countries in this category as 
well. 
 
Fringe countries’ options with regard to the Western World Order 
1. Unconditional integration  
2. Revisionist integration  
3. System-strengthening integration 
4. Alignment  
5. Systemic (radical) confrontation 
6. Passive confrontation  
7. Issue-based confrontation  
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2. Brazil’s and India’s policy towards the Western 
World Order 
 
After we have created an adequate framework in section 1, we can, in Part 2, proceed to 
analyze Brazil’s and India’s strategy towards the Western World Order. Part 2 is meant to 
provide a general overview over both Brazil’s and India’s strategy towards the most 
important institutions that make up the Western World Order: the UN, the WTO, the NPT, 
the IMF and the World Bank, the G8, the G20, and NATO.675 Each subsection consists of one 
country’s strategy towards one particular institution. Based on this, a country’s respective 
strategy towards an institution will be characterized according to the categories established in 
section 1.5. Aside from conventional research and interviews, diplomats from India and 
Brazil were asked to classify their own country’s behavior based on the categories above. The 
next two subsections (2.1.1. and 2.1.2.) will give an overview over Brazil’s political and 
economic background and foreign policy decision-making in Brazil. 
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2.1. Historical Review and Integrative Analysis: Brazil and 
international institutions 
 
2.1.1. Political and Economic Background: Brazil  
 
Before analyzing Brazil’s foreign policy strategy towards the Western World Order, it seems 
adequate to give a brief overview of Brazil’s domestic political and economic situation. This 
can provide a better understanding of the context in which Brazil is making decisions, and the 
interests that stand behind them. India is an instructive example that focusing on foreign 
policy decisions by itself is insufficient.  
Considering India’s foreign policy alone, for example with regard to trade 
liberalization and nuclear non-proliferation, the country can be described as a stubborn “nay- 
sayer” unwilling to make any concessions.676 Shedding light on domestic political and cultural 
issues, however, reveals that domestic constraints related to food security and to a very large 
and inefficient agricultural sector limit India’s room for maneuver in trade negotiations. In 
addition, “civilizational pride” and a “colonial mindset“ have created a culture in which “it is 
easier for a minister to come back home empty-handed as a wounded hero, rather than to 
come back with something after having had to make a compromise.”677 This view has been 
indirectly confirmed during several interviews with diplomats based in Delhi.678 
Brazil’s socioeconomic profile cannot be categorized easily.679 It possesses both 
characteristics of rich and poor countries, which puts it in a hybrid position between the 
developed and the developing world. Brazil’s industry is booming, and its agricultural 
industry is highly competitive. At the same time, it suffers from problems that normally 
characterize the social infrastructure of much poorer countries, such as a lack of social 
cohesion and a poverty rate of about 20%.680 This somewhat schizophrenic role is reflected in 
Brazil’s international standing as a country that is torn between a developmentalist outlook, 
its ties to rich nations, and the ambition to become a global player.681 Nobody epitomizes this 
ambiguity better than Brazil’s President Lula (2003-2010), who, in 2005, was warmly 
welcomed both at the World Social Forum (WSF) in Porto Alegre (an event organized by the 
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so-called ‘anti-globalization movement’), and the G8 Summit in Gleaneagles and the World 
Economic Forum in Davos, two exclusive summits for the rich and powerful.682  
Brazil’s relations with the IMF reflect its domestic transformation. In 1999, Brazil 
faced a dramatic currency crisis683, and needed help from the Fund. Until 2002, the IMF lent 
money to Brazil, which had a significant impact on the way the country saw itself in the 
world. The government’s decision to lend $10 billion to the IMF, announced in September 
2009 was interpreted by many Brazilians as a big step away from that traditional role. As 
Hurrell notes, Brazil still partly understands its foreign policy through the prism of North-
South relations, positions itself as a developing country, and feels a strong loyalty to other 
poor nations.684 It supported conceptions of international order that challenged those of the 
liberal West- such as the revisionist Third Worldism in Brazil in the 1970s and 80s. 
Yet, after years of being on the receiving side, Brazil is slowly turning into a 
noteworthy provider of development assistance and has lent money to the IMF since 2009. 
While Brazil, like most non-DAC development actors, does not report its financial outflows 
for development cooperation, estimates of Brazilian aid range from $345 million to $1275 
million685, and development aid can be expected to rise further. The Brazilian Cooperation 
Agency (Agência Brasileira de Cooperação686, commonly referred to as “ABC”) is the center 
piece of a growing effort that reflects greater global aspirations, such as for a permanent seat 
in the UN Security Council. Despite these developments, the Brazilian government refuses to 
be considered a “donor”, calling itself a “partner in development.”687 Brazil’s development 
assistance programs are still fairly uncoordinated, but we can expect them to professionalize 
in the coming years.688 Its reluctance to be called a ‘donor’ but a ‘partner’ may be a symbol 
that Brazil is comfortable in a position between the developed and the developing world.  
Over the past years, Brazil has experienced a historic period of economic growth and 
political stability, paired with greater confidence and a more active and assertive foreign 
policy. Growth is expected to continue, and, despite the relatively recent democratization in 
the second half of the 1980s, political institutions have reached an unprecedented level of 
stability. While President Lula’s highly active and personalized foreign policy strategy is 
unlikely to continue under the next President,689 Brazil’s new status will inevitably give it 
more international influence and responsibility.  
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Both President Cardoso and Lula pursued largely conservative economic policies. 
After President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, of the Social Democratic Party (PSDB) had 
successfully created a solid economic framework, Brazil underwent an important power 
transition that further strengthened its institutions. When President Lula from the left-wing 
Worker’s Party (PT) became President in 2003, he agreed to continue Cardoso’s pragmatic 
policies, creating a broad policy consensus.690 As a consequence, economic policy differences 
between the two major candidates to succeed Lula in January 2011 (Dilma Rousseff, Lula’s 
preferred replacement, and José Serra from the Social Democratic Party, PSDB) were 
minor.691 
While there is an unsolved dispute among academics about whether the transition 
from Cardoso to Lula constituted more of a rupture or a continuation692, it is fair to say that 
foreign policy is one of the only areas in which Cardoso and Lula have differed most. While 
President Cardoso sought to align Brazil with established powers such as the United States, 
President Lula aimed to strengthen South-South cooperation.693 Lula focused on Brazil’s 
relations with other emerging countries such as India and China. He also frequently visited 
Africa and aimed to intensify economic and political ties with countries such as South Africa 
and Angola. This involved increases in development aid, mostly to Portuguese-speaking 
Africa. Lula’s conception of the “South” is ideological, vaguely encompassing all poor 
developing countries, and Brazil has aimed to position itself as the “leader of the South”. In 
several instances, Lula sought to coordinate developing countries’ positions to maximize 
benefits, most notably regarding trade.694 Brazil’s foreign policy is the result of the traditional 
“rich vs. poor” dichotomy habitually adopted by Brazil’s Workers Party’s (PT). Yet, there is 
also an economic rationale to it. Apart from strengthening Brazil’s reputation in the 
developing world, Brazil is seeking to access new markets and promote Brazilian companies 
such as Petrobras (oil), Vale (mining), Odebrecht (engineering and construction) and 
Embraer (aviation).695 Aside from agricultural products, the Brazilian government believes 
that demand in developing countries for Brazilian biofuel could grow strongly in the future.696 
President Rousseff is likely to continue Lula’s foreign policy strategy with a strong focus on 
South-South cooperation.  
Similar to India, maintaining autonomy has historically been an overarching goal of 
Brazil’s foreign policy.697 In Brazil’s case, this can be explained by a profound discontent with 
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the United States’ dominance in the Western Hemisphere and worries of US dominance. 
Brazil’s Foreign Minister Dantas (1961-1963) created the so-called “Independent Foreign 
Policy” tradition. Since then, governments have used different approaches to manifest the 
country’s independence. Autonomy has been such a pervasive theme that foreign policy 
analysts have divided Brazil’s strategy into three periods: Autonomy through distance, 
autonomy through participation, and autonomy through diversification.698 Prior to 
democratization, Brazil remained fairly isolated and employed an economic strategy of 
import-substitution.699 After democratization in the late 1980s, the country liberalized and 
began to engage more actively in international institutions, symbolized by the Cardoso 
administration’s decision to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Finally, in 2003, under the 
Lula administration, Brazil actively sought to diversify its partnerships, focusing on South-
South diplomacy in particular. 
The next President, Dilma Rousseff, will continue to seek to enhance Brazil’s 
international role. This includes a stronger insertion and weight in international institutions 
that deal with development- such as the IMF, the World Bank and the UN Security Council. 
Rousseff is likely to continue Lula’s at times anti-Western rhetoric, and she sees a 
contradiction between climate change and economic development, and believes that rich 
countries have a “historic responsibility” to deal with climate change.  
Until recently, foreign policy remains a topic only discussed among Brazil’s elites.700 
Yet, due to Lula’s more politicized foreign policy, international issues are increasingly visible 
in the domestic political debate, and there is a growing consciousness about Brazil’s role in 
the world among Brazil’s middle class. 
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2.1.2. Foreign policy decision-making in Brazil  
 
This subsection will provide a brief overview about the foreign policy making process in the 
Brazilian government. 
 Itamaraty, Brazil’s Foreign Ministry, has traditionally been Brazil’s key foreign policy 
decision maker.701 Prestigious, traditional, highly opaque, and bureaucratically insulated, 
Itamaraty has held a quasi-monopoly on foreign policy since World War II.702 With regard to 
foreign policy, senior diplomats were thought to be able to strongly influence the Presidents, 
who rarely traveled abroad.703 Ernesto Geisel, the most imposing figure of the military regime 
(1964-1985), left Brazil only twice per year on average, and most international trips had 
symbolic value, while Itamaraty had negotiated the details. Former diplomats, most notably 
the Baron of Rio Branco, the “father of Brazilian diplomacy”, are among the most revered 
figures in Brazilian history.704  
Brazilian diplomacy was guided by the realist principles that domestic and 
international politics are two separate disciplines, often isolating foreign policy making from 
any domestic influence. The main argument used by traditionalists was that foreign policy 
was of national interest and should therefore be protected from special interests.705 This 
approach was first proposed in the 1930s by President Vargas, who sought to separate foreign 
policy from civil society since he believed stakeholders confused public interests with private 
ones.706 Parliamentarians, who are too close to the daily political struggle, and lack specific 
knowledge about international politics, should therefore be excluded from the decision-
making process. This process was widely accepted until recently.707  
Since the early 1990s, however, Itamaraty has steadily lost influence due to a series of 
reasons. The first is democratization and the pluralization of interests and growing public 
scrutiny. The Foreign Ministry’s structure and tradition to take decisions behind closed doors 
and shielded from the press may have been adequate during a military dictatorship. Yet, after 
the end of the military dictatorship and democratization in the 1980s, Itamaraty’s procedures 
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were, while often highly effective, no longer viable in a vibrant democracy where different 
stakeholders fight for influence. As Maria Regina Soares de Lima points out, Presidents had 
to start explaining foreign policy decisions to voters, which led to a politicization of foreign 
policy natural in democratic regimes.708 NGOs and business, local government (on state, city 
and municipal level) and interest groups began to openly vie for influence, dramatically 
increasing the number of stakeholders.709 While parliamentarians are still often unaware of 
foreign policy issues, they have begun to participate in the foreign policy discussion. NGOs 
have gained extraordinary influence during the Lula administration, especially in areas such 
as human rights and the environment.710 Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, one of the chief foreign 
policy strategists, argued in 2006 that international and domestic policy are intimately 
interdependent.711 
The second aspect that caused Itamaraty to lose influence is the growing issue linkage 
in modern foreign policy. Contrary to traditional diplomacy, today’s foreign policy often 
consists of complex negotiations that diplomats alone cannot grasp. It is increasingly 
necessary to engage specialists who are located in other ministries- such as the Ministry for 
Environment, Labor, Trade, etc. To preserve power, Itaramaty decided to set up 
international relations departments within other ministries and to fill them with its own 
diplomats to maintain the modus operandi.712 Still, growing complexity has made it more 
difficult for Itamaraty to keep foreign policy in a black box. 
The third aspect is that given Brazil’s rise, the country’s interests all over the world 
expanded, which made foreign policy making more challenging. As Brazilian firms begin to 
engage in different parts of the world, trade relations diversify, and global responsibilities 
increase, a relatively small cadre of diplomats is no longer able to control Brazil’s foreign 
policy making process. This tendency has only increased since President Lula engaged in a 
more active foreign policy, taking interest in regions and disciplines Brazil had rarely before 
shown interest in issues such as negotiating with a defiant Iran in June 2010. As Castro and 
Valladão de Carvalho point out, Lula attempted to assume a protagonist role in both South 
America and outside of the region.713 
Fourthly, there has been a presidentialization of foreign policy in Brazil.714 Both 
President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) and President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva 
                                                 
708 Lima, Maria Regina Soares de (2000). Instituições Democráticas e Política Exterior. In: Contexto 
Internacional, vol. 22, n. 2, julho-dezembro., 2000 
709 Hirst, Mônica, Lima, Maria Regina Soares de (2002). Contexto international, democracia e política 
externa. Política Externa, vol.11, n.2, 2002 
710 Figuiera, Ariane C. Roder (2007). O processo de tomada de decisão em política externa no Brasil: 
Uma análise preliminar, 1º Encontro Nacional da ABRI Política Externa, Brasília, Brazil, 25-27 July, 
2007 
711 Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães (2006). Brasil na Era dos Gigantes. Rio de Janeiro: Contraponto, 2006 
712 Figuiera, Ariane C. Roder (2007). O processo de tomada de decisão em política externa no Brasil: 
Uma análise preliminar, 1º Encontro Nacional da ABRI Política Externa, Brasília, Brazil, 25-27 July, 
2007 
713 de Castro, Marcus Faro and Maria Izabel Valladao de Carvalho. (2003) Globalization and Recent 
Political Transitions in Brazil. International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science 
politique, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Oct., 2003), pp. 465-490 
714 Cason,  Jeffrey and Timothy Power (2006). Presidentialization, Pluralization, and the Rollback of 
Itamaraty: Explaining Changes in Brazilian Foreign Policy from Cardoso to Lula. Conference Paper. 
“Regional Powers in Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Near and Middle East” December 11 and 12, 
2006, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg 
OLIVER STUENKEL – DOCTORAL THESIS 122 
(2003-2010, henceforth “Lula”) used foreign policy as their signature issue and personally 
engaged in many foreign policy decisions. Mônica Hirst notes that “Presidential diplomacy” 
became particularly important since the Cardoso years.715 President Lula was the first head of 
state to place a foreign policy advisor between himself and Itamaraty, further diminishing the 
Foreign Ministry’s influence, and allowing domestic party politics to influence foreign policy 
making.716 
Finally, the resulting popularization and multiplications of opinions has caused the 
media and academia to engage in foreign policy analysis, further increasing opinions. The 
1990s have seen an unprecedented increase in university programs on international affairs. An 
increasing number of think tanks, such as the Fundação Getúlio Vargas, help bridge the gap 
between academia and policy making, further adding to the pluralization of the foreign policy 
discussion. 
During the period of analysis of this study (2003-2010), Itamaraty is thus not as 
powerful as before, and the President supervised and controlled an increasingly complex 
foreign policy making process influenced by a multitude of stakeholders from different parts 
of society. Despite these changes, diplomats remain the best sources for information for 
scholars of foreign policy.  
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2.1.3. Brazil and the UN  
 
In order to analyze Brazil’s strategy towards the United Nations between 2003 and 2010, it 
will be useful to apply Krasner’s definition to the United Nations. As mentioned above, 
Krasner identifies four fundamental elements of an international institution: Principles, 
norms, rules, and decision-making procedures.717 An institution must be based on one or 
more principles, which is like a fundamental belief (“avoid war”). Norms spell out general 
standards of behavior, while rules specify, at a more detailed level, what members can and 
cannot do. Finally, decision-making procedures stipulate who holds power in the institution, 
how to take joint decisions, how to take in new members and how to punish rule breakers. 
  How can we define the United Nation’s principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures, and how does Brazil behave towards them? The United Nation’s overarching 
principles and norms are very general to such a degree that every country on the planet agrees 
with them. Its rules and decision-making procedures are, given the institution’s varied tasks, 
very diverse, so we will analyze them one by one.  
  A country such as Brazil does not have one single strategy towards the United 
Nations. Its strategy to obtain a permanent seat in the UN Security Council may figure 
prominently, but it does not reflect Brazil’s behavior in other areas. This section will 
therefore be divided in seven subsections:  
1) Brazil’s views on the UN’s overall responsibilities and its financial contributions,  
2) the UN Security Council,  
3) the UN General Assembly 
4) Peacekeeping Operations and  
5) the UN’s activities in Brazil  
Each section will give an overview over Brazil’s strategy and evaluate which description of the 
ones developed in 1.5. best describe the Brazilian government’s behavior. Subsection 6) will 
conclude. There are many other parts of the United Nations that deserve attention, such as 
the UN Global Conferences, UNHCR, the ILO, ECOSOC, UNCTAD and the WHO, which 
will not be considered here due to the limited space. 
2.1.3.1. BRAZIL’S VIEWS ON THE UN’S OVERALL RESPONSIBILITIES AND ITS FINANCIAL 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
Brazil fundamentally agrees with the principles and norms espoused by the United Nations718, 
which are to avoid war, defend human rights, combat poverty and promote social progress.719 
Brazil has been a charter member of the United Nations since its foundation in 1945, and it 
participates in all of its specialized agencies. Brazil’s engagement in the UN and its criticism 
of it shows that the Brazilian government has a sense of ownership of the organization, and it 
regards the UN as the most legitimate international institution. Brazil also regards the UN as 
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the most adequate organization to deal with security issues, climate change, and the fight 
against poverty. Brazil has fully embraced the United Nations since its very inception, when it 
failed to convince the other members to be granted a permanent seat on the UN Security 
Council. As a consolation prize, Brazil has the right to speak first during sessions at the UN 
General Assembly. Between 2003 and 2010, this commitment and belief in the United Nations 
has remained unchanged.720 
Brazil’s financial contributions have increased and are now reflecting enthusiastic 
rhetoric, constituting strengthening integration. Between 2003 and 2007, Brazil contributed 
on average $340 million per year for the UN’s operational activities. This is a lot more than 
fellow developing countries such as India, which contributed $35 million per year in the same 
period,721 but it can largely be explained by the cost-sharing mechanism (see section 2.1.3.5.), 
through which most of the money is spent on self-supporting activities within the country. 
Brazil is one of the countries with the highest percentage of contributions tied to a specific 
activity, which reduces the organization’s agility and increases dependence. Historically, 
Brazil called for a larger role in the UN not due to its financial contributions, but due to its 
large population. In 2005, Brazil contributed a little over 1.5% to the total budget.722  In 2009, 
Brazil’s net contribution to the UN’s regular budget barely exceeded $20 million, compared 
to Japan’s $405 million.723 This may be low, but support for specific agencies has increased 
strongly. Aside from $25 million for UNDP, Brazil has pledged to support the World Food 
Program with $300 million.724 Brazil still spends a lot more bilaterally, which raises questions 
about both Brazil’s seriousness about strengthening the UN. But that can be explained by its 
interest in increasing the political impact on recipient countries, which is arguably lower if 
money is spent on the UN.725 To conclude, we can affirm that Brazil agrees with the United 
Nations principles and norms and supports the institution adequately financially. Thus, on a 
macro level, we can certainly speak of unconditional integration.726 
 
2.1.3.2. BRAZIL AND THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 
 
Brazil has occupied a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council for two years nine 
times. In October 2009, it was elected a tenth time to occupy a seat from 2010 to 2011. Brazil 
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is thus, together with Japan, the country that has held a non-permanent seat for the longest 
period of time (18 years in total as of January 2010).  
  A permanent seat on the UN Security Council has been the objective of Brazil’s 
foreign policy since 1995, when Fernando Henrique Cardoso assumed the Presidency.727 This 
was based on a simple observation: since Brazil lacks significant military power, it regards 
multilateralism as the only way to project its power and influence outside of its borders. Since 
Brazil lives in an exceptionally peaceful neighborhood, it is unlikely that Brazil will ever 
engage in a military build-up. The United Nations, and a permanent seat on the UNSC, are 
therefore seen, largely out of necessity, as one of Brazil’s best bets to turn itself into a global 
actor.728 Assessing Brazil’s strategy regarding the UNSC has been widely popular among 
scholars, while few have analyzed reform proposals of the UN’s other entities729, and it at 
times seemed as though this particular topic eclipsed all other matters related to the United 
Nations.730 
 Brazil’s efforts are also motivated by the belief that Brazil deserves a more prominent 
role as the South American representative and the belief that international institutions are 
more legitimate and effective if developing countries are adequately represented.731 While 
some conservative voices have denounced the quest for UNSC as an “unnecessary adventure”, 
there is now a solid consensus that Brazil deserves a permanent seat.732 For Brazil, a reformed 
Security Council reflects on the legitimacy and thus on the effectiveness of the entire UN 
organization, and no UN reform is thus complete without a reform of the UN Security 
Council.733  
  In 2004, Brazil, India, Japan and Germany formed the G4, whose joint goal was to 
achieve a UN Security Council reform and obtain permanent seats. In 2005, the UN Assembly 
voted on a reform proposal, which also included two permanent seats for African countries. 
The proposal failed, largely because African countries were unable to agree who would 
                                                 
727 Herz, Mônica (1999). Brasil e a Reforma da ONU, Lua Nova – Revista de Cultura e Política, nº46. 
1999 
728 When Lula became President in 2003, he maintained this foreign policy objective. While President 
Cardoso sought closer ties to the United States and Europe, Lula hoped to achieve UNSC reform and 
entry by aligning with and gaining support from other emerging powers and African countries 
(Vigevani, Tullo and Gabriel Cepaluni (2007). Lula’s Foreign Policy and the Quest for Autonomy 
through Diversification. Third World Quarterly, 28:7, 1309 – 1326, 2007) 
729 See, for example: Avelar, R. (2003). O Brasil no contexto das reformas das Nações Unidas, FHDSS-
UNESP - Franca, 2003; http://www.franca.unesp.br/revistari/Renata%20Avelar%5B1%5D.pdf 
(accessed May 16, 2010) 
730 Lacerda, A. (2009). Lula espera reforma do Conselho de Segurança em 2009, Estado de São Paulo, 
October 15, 2009; http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/nacional,lula-espera-reforma-do-conselho-de-
seguranca-em-2009,451128,0.htm (accessed Dec 30, 2009) 
731 Gregory, Denise and Paulo Roberto de Almeida (2008). Brazil and the G8 Heiligendamm Process, in 
Cooper, Andrew F. and Agata Antkiewicz  (2008). Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons 
from the Heiligendamm Process, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008 
732 Saraiva, J.F. (2010). Internacional: O Brasil e a reforma da ONU, Teoria e Debate nº 62 - abril/maio 
de 2005, Fundação Perseu Abramo; http://www.fpabramo.org.br/conteudo/internacional-o-brasil-e-
reforma-da-onu (accessed May 23, 2010) 
733 See G4 (2007). The United States’ decision to invade Iraq without a UN Security Council resolution 
caused some to call the quest for Security Council reform irrelevant, as it would not be able to 
constrain US power (Weiss, Thomas G. The Illusion of UNSC reform. The Washington Quarterly, 
Vol. 26, No. 4, pp. 147-166, Autumn 2003), yet, for Lula, the Iraq War only strengthened his argument 
for reformed and more legitimate UN Security Council. 
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occupy the two permanent seats.734 While the G4 has, for now, ceased to exist as a vehicle for 
achieving Security Council Reform, Brazil continues to press for expansion. 
 Brazil’s behavior with regard to the UN Security Council seems to be a case of 
revisionist integration. Brazil fundamentally agrees with the UNSC’s principles (the 
prevention of war), its norms and rules (pass resolutions by a majority to allow 
interventions), but it disagrees with the Council’s exclusive decision-making procedures, 
which establish five permanent members with veto powers and seven non-permanent 
members without veto power. Brazil’s strategy towards the UNSC will be analyzed more 
comprehensively in Part 3. 
 
2.1.3.3. BRAZIL AND THE UN ASSEMBLY 
 
The United Nations General Assembly is the only principal organ of the United Nations in 
which all members have equal representation, and Brazil has historically taken it very 
seriously. Yet, despite its negative reputation as a powerless and ineffective organ, it has 
significant responsibilities, such as overseeing the budget and appointing the non-permanent 
members to the UN Security Council.735 
 As part of the G77 and as an observer of the Non-Aligned Movement, Brazil has 
historically sought to assign a more prominent role for the UN General Assembly (GA) by 
envisioning greater GA involvement on questions regarding military intervention, for 
example.736 Some critics have pointed out that Brazil’s attempt to enter the UN Security 
Council as a permanent member is not entirely about democratizing the UN, but rather about 
creating an “expanded oligarchy”, as a former Brazilian diplomat has called it. With regard 
to Security Council Reform, the Non-Aligned Movement is torn737, and Brazil does not have 
all the developing countries’ support in this project. 
 Despite Brazil’s leadership role in the G77 and its ability to influence other 
members738, Brazil has quietly departed from the G77’s more radical calls for “total 
democracy” which includes proposals to limit the UNSC’s freedom through the General 
Assembly.739 Despite continuous rhetorical support for reform, Brazil has not assumed 
                                                 
734 Okouma, G.O. (2007). UN Security Council Reform: A Transitional Approach, UN Chronicle 
Online Edition, 2007  
http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2007/webArticles/120307_security_council_reform.html (accessed 
Dec 30, 2009) 
735 United Nations (1945). UN Charter of the United Nations; 
 www.un.org/en/en/documents/charter/index.shtml  
736 Herz, Mônica (1999). Brasil e a Reforma da ONU, Lua Nova – Revista de Cultura e Política, nº46. 
1999 
737 Rajamani, L. (1995). Democratisation of the United Nations, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 
30, No. 49 (Dec. 9, 1995), pp. 3140-3143. See also: Weinlich, Silke. Die Reform der 
Entwicklungszusammenarbeit der Vereinten Nationen: Eine Analyse des Verhaltens und der 
Positionierung wichtiger Staaten gegenüber Reformoptionen. Discussion Paper, German Development 
Institute (GDI), 2010 
738 Weinlich, Silke (2010). Die Reform der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit der Vereinten Nationen: Eine 
Analyse des Verhaltens und der Positionierung wichtiger Staaten gegenüber Reformoptionen. 
Discussion Paper, German Development Institute (GDI), 2010 
739 Herz, Mônica (1999). Brasil e a Reforma da ONU. Lua Nova Revista de Cultura e Política, 1999 
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leadership in reviving ECOSOC740, indicating that it does not regard this as a priority. While 
Brazil aligns with developing countries on security issues, its position resembles that of liberal 
democracies regarding issues such as women’s rights and gay rights, where it is at odds with 
most developing countries. It actively collaborates with the NAM concerning questions of 
disarmament. This strategy shows that Brazil’s strategy today is much more pragmatic than 
its at times ideology-driven rhetoric may indicate. Brazil never actively supported revisionist 
integration, its action with regard to the UN General Assembly is mere issue-based 
confrontation, not only towards developed countries (on issues such as disarmament), but 
also against developing countries (for example, on women’s rights). 
Brazil’s strategy can best be described as system-strengthening integration, as it has 
consistently promoted a stronger role for the UN General Assembly, without engaging in 
confrontational behavior. It fundamentally agrees with the UN General Assembly’s principles 
(assuring peace and security, maintaining the functionality of the United Nations), norms, 
rules and decision-making procedures (equal representation of states, voting on resolutions). 
This analysis will not analyze Brazil’s voting behavior in the UN General Assembly, as such 
an analysis is unlikely to produce meaningful results. In the period of analysis, Brazil has 
often voted in a bloc with other G77 members. For example, it has supported a condemnation 
of the United States’ economic embargo against Cuba.  However, rich nations’ voting 
behavior is too disparate to convincingly argue that Brazil has consistently voted against the 
established powers, which would constitute issue-based confrontation (and thus constitute 
integration).741 
2.1.3.4. BRAZIL’S TROOP CONTRIBUTIONS 
                                                 
740 When the United Nations was founded, the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) was 
designed similarly to the UN Security Council (UNSC). Unlike the UNSC, however, ECOSOC was 
placed under the authority of the General Assembly. ECOSOC was therefore always been a “second-
class” body, merely recommending policies.  Strengthening ECOSOC has been one of Brazil’s goals in 
the past, but the government now wishes to aim higher, focusing entirely on the Security Council  
741 While voting behavior showed an East-West-NAM division during the Cold War, a North-South 
cleavage emerged in the early 1990s. (As Holloway points out, East-West-NAM division was not the 
only characteristic of the Cold War. He argued that, with the expansion of membership in the 1960s, a 
Third World voting bloc developed, and that the emergence of a new majority of former colonies 
shifted the agenda in the General Assembly away from security. In: Holloway, Steven. Forty Years of 
United Nations General Assembly Voting. Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de 
science politique, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Jun., 1990), pp. 279-296.) As Kim and Russett pointed out in 1993, 
“the North-South division now overwhelmingly defines the terms of political debate in the General 
Assembly.” Studies that analyze voting behavior in the General Assembly usually seek to identify 
voting blocs that emerge regarding to so-called “super-issues”. In a major study in 1965, for example, 
Alker identified ‘Muslim questions’ and ‘colonialism’ as two super-issues along which voting blocs 
formed. Each issue creates different voting blocs. In a 1993 study by Kim and Russett, ‘self-
determination and disarmament’ and ‘human security’ (development, human rights, international 
security) were the main super issues. (Self-determination, according to the authors, reflects the South’s 
concern with neo-colonialism and classic colonialism) Brazil has, according to them, consistently voted 
with the Non-Aligned Movement between 1991 and 1993. (Kim, Soo Yeon and Bruce Russett The New 
Politics of Voting Alignments in the United Nations General Assembly. International Organization, 
Vol. 50, No.4 (Autumn, 1996), pp.629-652) The Non-Aligned Movement has often been called 
confrontational from Western countries, while non-aligned members would refer to Brazil’s strategy as 
integrative or aligned.  
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Peacekeeping missions consist of observers, police and troops. A country’s decision to 
provide troops is crucial for the United Nations to carry out peacekeeping missions. Although 
providing troops is not tied to financial obligations, it constitutes a significant commitment to 
peacekeeping operations and the United Nations in general. Sending troops into conflict 
zones represents a political risk, as peacekeepers are at times hurt or killed during missions. 
The four tables below provide the numbers of personnel Brazil, Argentina, India and 
Bangladesh (for comparison) have provided. 
Table: Brazil 
Year       Personnel (Observers, Police and Troops)742 
as of Dec 31 
2000 95 
2001 100 
2002 77 
2003 82 
2004 1367 
2005 1270 
2006 1252 
2007 1278 
2008 1352 
2009 1344 
 
Table: Argentina 
Year       Personnel (Observers, Police and Troops)743 
as of Dec 31 
2000 522 
2001 634 
2002 631 
2003 554 
2004 1103 
2005 897 
                                                 
742 United Nations (2010). Peacekeeping contributions per year,  
www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributions/ 
743 United Nations (2010). Peacekeeping contributions per year;  
www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributions/ 
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2006 899 
2007 897 
2008 893 
2009 861 
Table: Bangladesh 
Year       Personnel (Observers, Police and Troops)744 
as of Dec 31 
2000 3285 
2001 6010  
2002 4211 
2003 4730 
2004 8024 
2005 9529 
2006 9681 
2007 9856 
2008 9567 
2009 10427  
 
Table: India 
Year       Personnel (Observers, Police and Troops)745 
as of Dec 31 
2000 2738  
2001 2883 
2002 2746 
2003 2882 
2004 3912 
2005 7284 
2006 9483 
                                                 
744 United Nations (2010). Peacekeeping contributions per year;  
www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributions/ 
745 United Nations (2010). Peacekeeping contributions per year;  
www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributions/ 
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2007 9357 
2008 8693 
2009 8757 
 
The analysis shows that Brazil’s troop contributions clearly constitute system-strengthening 
integration. Brazil has some tradition of sending peacekeepers abroad. In 1956, Brazil’s 
President Kubitscheck sent peacekeepers to Sinai, and it continuously sent soldiers into 
conflict zones after that, for example, to Yugoslavia and Timor Leste.746 It also sent 1,300 
peacekeepers to the UN mission in Angola, the largest military force it had sent abroad since 
World War II.747 Yet, in comparison to June 2004, Brazil’s troop contributions remained 
small in comparison to the world’s large providers. We can detect a sharp rise in Brazil’s 
troop contributions in 2004, when Brazil assumed the leadership of the MINUSTAH 
peacekeeping mission in Haiti.748 In 2004, the amount of Brazilian peacekeepers exceeded the 
number of Argentinean peacekeepers, who are also active in Haiti.  
 Brazil’s engagement can be explained both by a genuine belief in the utility of the 
peacekeeping missions, by its interest in obtaining a permanent seat on the UN Security 
Council, and by a general desire to affirm its rising power status. In 2006, former President 
Cardoso affirmed that “Aside from making the Brazilian position in the region clear, and this 
without arrogance, I am convinced that leadership is exercised, not proclaimed.”749 This date 
marks a significant departure from introversion to international participation. Brazil remains 
far behind India and Bangladesh, who are among the world’s most important providers of 
peacekeeping troops. Yet, leading a peacekeeping mission, however small, requires not only 
trained soldiers, but also more political responsibility and risk. Brazil’s decision to head the 
mission in Haiti is a first step towards assuming more responsibility in the global system of 
peacekeeping. Brazil’s behavior can therefore be regarded as system-strengthening 
integration, as it fundamentally agrees and supports the peacekeeping missions’ principles 
(maintain or enforce peace), its norms and rules (internationally sanctioned intervention) and 
decision-making procedures.  
 
2.1.3.5. THE UN’S ACTIVITIES IN BRAZIL 
 
The United Nation’s activities in Brazil show that Brazil supports the Millenium 
                                                 
746 Vigevani, Tullo and Gabriel Cepaluni (2007). Lula’s Foreign Policy and the Quest for Autonomy 
through Diversification. Third World Quarterly, 28:7, 1309 – 1326, 2007  
747 Hirst, Mônica (2005). The United States and Brazil. A Long Road of Unmet Expectations. New 
York: Routledge, 2005. 
748 Gregory, Denise and Paulo Roberto de Almeida (2008). Brazil and the G8 Heiligendamm Process, in 
Cooper, Andrew F. and Agata Antkiewicz  (2008). Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons 
from the Heiligendamm Process, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008. See also: Vigevani, 
Tullo and Gabriel Cepaluni (2010). Lula’s Foreign Policy and the Quest for Autonomy through 
Diversification. Third World Quarterly, 28:7, 1309 – 1326, 2010  
749 Cardoso, Fernando Henrique (2006). A Arte da Política. A História que Vivi. Rio de Janeiro: 
Civilização Brasileira, 2006 In: Vigevani, Tullo and Gabriel Cepaluni. Lula’s Foreign Policy and the 
Quest for Autonomy through Diversification. Third World Quarterly, 28:7, 1309 - 1326 
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Development Goals (MDGs).The United Nation’s activities in Brazil take place in several 
different areas. There are currently three “joint programs” in which two or more UN 
agencies work with local partners to design, implement, accompany and evaluate activities 
geared towards achieving the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).750 These 
programs deal with a) the promotion of race- and gender-related equality, b) public safety, 
crime and vulnerable youth, c) Social Services and Education. As the United Nations 
Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for Brazil (2007-2011) points out, the UN’s 
activities in Brazil have the following overarching objectives (with share of financial 
resources): 1. Expand access to public services (69,6%), 2. Reduce gender- and race-related 
inequality (4,3%), 3. Reducing violence (10,2%), 4. Improving governance (8,1%) and 5. 
Promoting equitable and environmentally sustainable economic development (7,9%).751  
 Given its stable economic development, UN funds allocated to Brazil have been 
sinking since the late 1970s, but Brazil continues to use UN services in an unorthodox way.752 
In the face of pressure to improve governmental services and a relative lack of human 
capacity and an apparent inability to modernize labor laws, the Brazilian government and 
UNDP have developed the so-called “cost-sharing mechanism”. 
 Contrary to traditional approaches, where the UN provides funds, this mechanism 
involves governments providing resources to UN agencies for development activities in their 
own countries. The top self-supporting countries in 2007 were mostly Latin American, led by 
Brazil.753 The mechanism involves providing the funds and essentially hiring UNDP staff to 
do both secretarial and managerial work public employees would normally do. Brazilians 
hired through the UN system are more expensive, but they are temporary consultants. This 
allows the government to avoid the cumbersome bureaucratic process of hiring public 
employees.754 In 2000, the Brazilian government paid $180 million to UNDP for hiring 
consultants and coordinating projects, while around half of this amount was financed by the 
World Bank and the IADB.755 Critics have pointed out that while such a mechanism ensured 
financial sustainability for UNDP, it undermined the Brazilian government’s ability to 
develop sustainably. Despite attempts to curb the excessive use of the mechanism, little has 
changed over the past decade. In 2005, the government paid $191 million to UNDP756, in 2007 
Brazil paid $388 million in self-supporting contributions for operational activities. 
                                                 
750 United Nations (2010). Ações Conjuntas do Sistema das Nações Unidas no Brasil; http://www.onu-
brasil.org.br/acoes_conjuntas.php (accessed May 24 2010) 
751 United Nations Development Assistance Framework (2005). Marco de Assistência das Nações 
Unidas para o Desenvolvimento (2007-2011), UNCT Brasil, December 2005 
752 Galvani, F. and Morse, S. (2004). Institutional sustainability: at what price? UNDP and the new 
cost-sharing model in Brazil', Development in Practice, 14: 3, 311 - 327, 2004 
753 United Nations (2010). Comprehensive statistical analysis of the financing of operational activities 
for development of the United Nations system for 2007, Report of the Secretary-General, UN 
document A/64/75–E/2009/59, New York: UN (www.un.org/en/ecosoc/julyhls/oa2009.shtml (accessed 
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754 Weinlich, Silke (2010). Die Reform der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit der Vereinten Nationen: Eine 
Analyse des Verhaltens und der Positionierung wichtiger Staaten gegenüber Reformoptionen. 
Discussion Paper, German Development Institute (GDI), 2010 
755 Galvani, F. and Morse, S. (2004). Institutional sustainability: at what price? UNDP and the new 
cost-sharing model in Brazil', Development in Practice, 14: 3, 311 - 327, 2004 
756 United Nations (2010). Comprehensive statistical analysis of the financing of operational activities 
for development of the United Nations system for 2007, Report of the Secretary-General, UN 
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  Brazil’s agreement risks diluting the UN’s mission, but it helps the UN survive 
financially. The cost-sharing mechanism, widely in used in Brazil, does not contribute to the 
strengthening of the United Nations. Rather, it pulls the organization away from its raison 
d’être, which is to alleviate poverty in the world’s poorest nations.757 Still, the cost-sharing 
mechanism was not found to directly damage the UN’s performance elsewhere. It would be 
exaggerated to claim that this behavior constitutes confrontation.  
 Despite engaging in the cost-sharing mechanism to put off difficult reform, Brazil 
signed up to the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) and promotes this goal 
domestically. Brazil’s engagement with the UN in Brazil can therefore be characterized as 
system- strengthening integration. 
2.1.3.6. CONCLUSION 
Area Activity Brazil’s strategy  
UN’s overall 
responsibilities and 
financial contributions to 
the UN 
Brazil regards UN as the 
most legitimate 
international institution 
System-strengthening 
integration 
UN Security Council  Seeks UNSC expansion Revisionist integration 
UN General Assembly Full participation, some 
engagement in 
strengthening institution  
System-strengthening 
integration 
Peacekeeping  Small number, but 
increasing; leadership in 
MINUSTAH mission in 
Haiti 
System-strengthening 
behavior 
The UN in Brazil Projects supporting the 
MDGs, cost-sharing 
mechanism 
System-strengthening 
integration 
 
To conclude, we can say that the United Nations as a whole is regarded in Brazil as an 
international institution legitimate to take important decisions, for example with regard to 
military intervention and climate change758, and that Brazil seeks to enhance its role in the 
organization, symbolized by its quest for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. 
Contrary to this claim, however, Brazil’s financial contributions have been fairly 
insignificant, and the cost-sharing mechanism raises questions about why the UN is so 
                                                                                                                                               
document A/64/75–E/2009/59, New York: UN; http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/329/74/PDF/N0732974.pdf (accessed May 3, 2010) 
757 Galvani, F. and Morse, S. (2004). Institutional sustainability: at what price? UNDP and the new 
cost-sharing model in Brazil, Development in Practice, 14: 3, 311 - 327, 2004 
758 In addition, Brazil’s President Lula is said to eye the top job of the organization once he leaves office 
in 2011. 
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massively engaged in a country that is no longer one of the world’s poorest. 
  Brazil’s policy towards the UN contains elements of system-strengthening integration 
(UN in general, UN General Assembly, Peacekeeping, UN in Brazil), and revisionist 
integration (UN Security Council).With the exception of the financial aspect, then, we can 
argue that Brazil’s strategy towards the UN is overwhelmingly integrative. 
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2.1.4. Brazil and the WTO 
The WTO is one of the most important international institutions. While each institution 
represents a part of the Western World Order, the WTO plays a special role as the major 
institution to represent the economic dimension of this Western World Order. The WTO has 
radically changed the world’s trade environment, creating a level playing field and reducing 
America’s ability to take action unilaterally.759 A country’s decision to join or not to join this 
system (as Russia, for example) has a major impact on the way it conducts economic policy. 
Becoming a member forces domestic interest groups to organize and create channels into 
influence politics, which can democratize internal procedures and make them more 
transparent.760 The WTO  is so all encompassing, with almost every country seeking to join,  
that it virtually constitutes compulsory jurisdiction in international trade law.761 
The WTO constitutes a good example of how well-functioning institutions engage 
nations through a mixture of benefits and obligations.762 It seeks to increase trade by setting 
up binding global rules that equally apply to all members, notwithstanding economic 
strength, and it is constantly at work adjudicating and attempting to resolve trade disputes 
among its member states.763 It is often named as an institution that not only restrains weaker 
members, but also its most powerful one, the United States.764 
Despite these positive traits of the World Trade Organization, the global trade regime 
faces severe problems. The Doha Round of the world trade talks, initiated in Qatar in 
November 2001, has been in deadlock for eight years, and it seems unclear how to ease the 
blockades and revive the negotiations. The recent proliferation of regional and bilateral 
agreements may make success of the Doha talks even less likely, although past agreements 
have also emerged amidst pessimism.  It would be therefore wrong to praise the World Trade 
Organization without pointing to the global trade regime’s significant limitations. Yet even 
when the Doha Round will fail to be concluded, the World Trade Organization maintains its 
utility, for example through the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM). 
Using Krasner’s definition, what are the WTO’s principles, norms, rules and decision-
making procedures? The WTO principles, captured in their normative framework are, above 
all, about facilitating market access. Behind that stands the larger belief that international 
trade in general creates benefits for all and that it can help reduce poverty. Among its norms 
is making sure that the market made available is "appropriately and fairly" accessed. For 
                                                 
759 Noland, Marcus (1999). Learning to love the WTO, Foreign Affairs, Vo. 78, No.5, September / 
October 1999 
760 Aaditya Mattoo and Arvind Subramanian: From Doha to the Next Bretton Woods: A New 
Multilateral Trade Agenda, Foreign Affairs, January/ February 2009 
761 Ikenberry, G. John (2001). After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of 
Order after Major Wars. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001 
762 Despite these benefits, the World Trade Organization is one of the most frequently criticized of all 
international institutions. (See, for example: Aaditya Mattoo and Arvind Subramanian: From Doha to 
the Next Bretton Woods: A New Multilateral Trade Agenda, Foreign Affairs, Vol 88, No. 1, January/ 
February 2009) 
763 Esserman, Susan and Robert Howse (2003). The WTO on Trial. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 1 
(Jan. - Feb., 2003), pp. 130-140 
764 Ikenberry, G. John (2001). After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of 
Order after Major Wars. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001 
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example, the WTO provides for anti- dumping, countervailing, and safeguard measures.765 
The WTO’s rules and decision-making procedures are based on consensual democracy. A 
trade deal can only be ratified if all countries agree. In addition, the dispute mechanism is the 
principal tool countries have to make their voice heard and challenge other countries, no 
matter how big. On the other hand, states lose some autonomy. 
While many criticize the WTO for being too slow, Paul Blustein argues that it is 
precisely the slow pace and the difficulty of getting everybody on board that lends the 
organization its legitimacy.766 Brazil’s membership is proof of that legitimacy, and several 
Brazilian diplomats have shown pride in how well they know the details of the WTO’s 
complex informal rules of diplomacy.767 Amrita Narlikar even points to systemic issues, 
arguing that “the root causes of the failure at Cancun relate to the design and workings of the 
WTO as an international institution, and substantive imbalances in its agreements.”768 In 
addition, Robert Keohane admits that some of the provisions of the Uruguay Round can 
worsen the situation of poor countries particularly if their negotiation teams are poorly 
staffed.769 Despite that, the fact that developing countries have been voluntarily joining the 
WTO in large numbers is proof that they consider the organization as fundamentally just, 
rejecting claims that the rules of the international trading system are stacked against the 
developing countries.770 The low returns of power in the WTO are such that “losers are more 
likely to agree to their losses and prepare for the next round.”771 
The trade dispute mechanism, created with the WTO,  is a way for countries to 
exercise their rights. Each member can initiate a trade dispute at the World Trade 
Organization’s dispute settlement body (DSB) if its government believes another state is 
breaking the rules. Furthermore, there are few barriers to initiate a trade dispute. Between 
2001 and 2008, half of all disputes were initiated by developing countries.772 In order to 
engage in a trade dispute mechanism, a country must trust the system and believe its judges to 
be impartial. 70% of all disputes are solved by negotiation and without the imposition of 
retaliation. Even Brazil and Argentina, two countries that have developed a lot of mutual 
trust, usually prefer to solve trade disputes through the WTO rather than solving it 
bilaterally. Brazilian diplomats pointed out during the interviews that the establishment of 
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the trade dispute mechanism during the Uruguay Round was a significant victory for 
Brazil.773  
Brazil signed the so-called “Final Act” of Marrakesh in 1994, which created the 
WTO.774 Brazil’s decision to engage is thus conscious and by no means automatic. Russia, a 
fellow BRIC country, has decided not to join the World Trade Organization. After 16 years 
of negotiating with the WTO, Vladimir Putin announced in 2009 that Russia would no longer 
seek to enter, forming a customs union with Belarus and Kazakhstan instead. Russia, which 
exports mainly oil and gas, two items that are not covered by the WTO775, thus has more 
freedom to raise import tariffs arbitrarily for political reasons, something WTO members 
cannot do. 
As Andrew Hurrell points out, Brazil is a frequent user of the dispute settlement 
mechanism, which shows that it agrees with and has trust in the WTO’s rules and decision-
making procedures.776 As countries trade more, the scope for trade friction increases. China, 
for example, which had negotiated for 13 years prior to joining the WTO777, overtook 
Germany as the second largest exporter in 2009, and, as a consequence, half of the trade 
disputes discussed at the WTO now involve China. In the same way, the number of Brazilian 
complaints has been growing: It is the fourth most frequent complainant after the United 
States, the European Community and Canada (India is in sixth place). Mônica Hirst notes 
that U.S.-Brazil trade disputes are particularly noteworthy.778 This has not always been the 
case. Over the past decade, Brazil altered its trading patterns, became less dependent on trade 
with the global north, while fighting more in the WTO to attain its trade interests in the 
global arena. In the list of members subject to trade complaints, Brazil is in the eight position 
(India is third).779 As Vigevani and Cepaluni point out, “The WTO panels against the USA 
and the European Union regarding cotton and sugar demonstrate the meaning of the use of 
legal mechanisms.”780 States that win trade disputes are usually allowed to retaliate against 
the other party and increase tariffs. While states often do not impose all the tariffs they are 
entitled to, Brazil usually retaliates aiming to inflict maximum economic damage. After 
winning a dispute over cotton in March 2010, Brazil may be the first country to follow 
through and impose retaliatory tariffs in several industries and also inflict harm in the area of 
intellectual property rights and services - as stipulated by the WTO. According to Celso 
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Lafer, Brazil’s former Foreign Minister, the dispute settlement body is fundamental for the 
success of the multilateral system of commerce as established by the WTO, which has as its 
function to prevent unilateral interpretation and self-help in the application of norms by 
means of economic retaliation and repressions.”781  
Why does Brazil like the WTO? Marcus Noland gives a convincing answer when he 
argues that  
 
Although a country can still try to exploit legalistic loopholes, the WTO has 
proven in many cases - including the notorious transatlantic banana dispute - 
that it can serve as a relatively objective judge and jury. That point ties in with a 
second advantage: because the WTO is a genuinely multilateral body, other 
countries do not view it as a proxy for American interests.782 
 
Several Brazilian diplomats have confirmed this view during interviews,783 supporting the 
view that thanks to the WTO, disputes are solved largely on the basis of the rule of law 
instead of power politics.784 Celso Lafer, a strong supporter of the WTO, invokes Immanuel 
Kant and argues that the WTO contributes to the creation of “perpetual peace”, because “the 
principle of transparency contributes to greater expectations of security.”785 
As Vigevani and Cepaluni point out, the Lula administration’s major initiatives are 
situated in the framework of international trade negotiations786, and the G20 is regarded as a 
major showcase of the results of these initiatives. The G20 emerged at the 5th Ministerial 
WTO Conference held in Cancún in September 2003.787 While coalitions of developing 
countries at the WTO usually have a limited duration and impact, the G20 has been able to 
live on and to solidify. Developing countries continue to use the G20 to coordinate their 
policies because they reckon it maximizes their benefits. It is the first time developing nations 
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have been able to coordinate their policies sufficiently to fundamentally change the context of 
future trade negotiations, and their behavior constitutes a classic form of “soft balancing”.788 
Brazil’s behavior during trade negotiations, especially in Cancún, has frequently been 
described as ‘confrontational’. Yet, as shown in section 1.3., issue-based confrontation does 
not constitute systemic confrontation, and Brazil does not consider leaving the WTO. The 
majority of WTO members are developing nations, so it seems logical that they, after 
traditionally failing to influence the outcome of negotiations significantly, would attempt to 
coordinate in a more effective way.789  
As this brief analysis shows, in the WTO Brazil frequently engages in issue-based 
confrontation through the dispute settlement mechanism. It thus strengthens the institution. 
Brazil fundamentally agrees with the WTO’s principles (reducing trade barriers increases 
welfare), its norms and rules (dispute settlements, multilateral trade negotiations, summits), 
and decision-making procedures (one vote per country, necessity to obtain consensus to 
achieve new trade deal). 
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2.1.5. Brazil, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
 
The NPT is the centerpiece of the global non-proliferation regime. Having come into force in 
1970, it has three pillars that seek to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons, promote 
disarmament, and enhance the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The five permanent members 
of the UN Security Council are the five recognized nuclear weapon states (hereafter NWS), 
the other 184 members have signed as non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). 
Brazil has historically been a prominent actor in the context of nuclear energy and 
non-proliferation. In the 1960s already, it assumed leadership in the disarmament discussion, 
arguing that rich nations should spend money on development aid instead.790 However, Brazil 
saw its efforts largely thwarted as rich countries were unwilling to reduce their nuclear 
stockpiles. 
Brazil opposed the NPT early on and described it as a ‘colonialist threat.’791 
Paradoxically, Brazil had signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which declared Latin America as a 
nuclear free zone, shortly before the creation of the NPT. Brazil rejected the treaty for a 
variety of reasons. Nationalists argued that the country should retain the ability to develop 
nuclear weapons. They also fundamentally disagreed with a treaty that put Brazil in a lower 
category than the five established nuclear powers, and one that would limit the country’s 
sovereignty but allow inspectors into the country. Finally, opponents often falsely argued that 
signing the NPT would somehow limit Brazil’s ability to develop nuclear energy. In 1975, 
Brazil signed a historic nuclear deal with West Germany, buying the technology to complete 
the entire fuel cycle.792  
In the following decades, Brazil secretly attempted to develop nuclear arms. Brazilian 
diplomats and military officials continued to call the NPT “iniquitous and discriminatory.”793 
This development that abruptly ended as the military dictatorship drew to a close and the 
democratically elected President Collor openly rejected any nuclear ambition to reintegrate 
Brazil into the international community. 
After the 1990s, Brazil turned into a responsible stakeholder, signing both the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the NPT. Brazil’s and Argentina’s willingness 
to forgo the right to develop nuclear weapons and the subsequent strategic collaboration 
between the two in the form of Mercosur was seen as a model to be emulated by rivals across 
the world, particularly for India and Pakistan.  
In the context of growing assertiveness, the Lula government changed strategy yet 
again and sought to strengthen Brazil’s nuclear capacities. Brazil attempted to achieve 
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mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle - a goal it quickly achieved - and began building nuclear-
powered submarines.794 
In 2004, Brazil for the first time violated the NPT as it did not allow IAEA’s 
inspectors enter its nuclear plant in Resende near Rio de Janeiro.795 The Brazilian government 
vigorously denied that it was planning to build nuclear bombs and explained that it sought to 
protect industrial secrets from the inspectors. This claim, however, is specious as there is no 
known case of IAEA inspectors stealing commercial secrets.796 The government also points 
out that it would never develop bombs as this goes against the NPT, the Tlatelolco Treaty, 
and Brazil’s constitution. Yet, during his election campaign, Lula frequently lambasted the 
NPT as unjust797, and several policy makers have argued that it has lost its significance. 
Changing the constitution is indeed not easy, but no serious obstacle if a President knows 
how to appeal to emotional nationalism. In addition, high-ranking policy makers and some 
army generals have continuously called for the development of nuclear weapons, even though 
official denials usually follow promptly.798 
In conclusion we can say that Brazil’s behavior seems to constitute systemic 
confrontation. Given the centrality of the inspections, this brief analysis shows that Brazil 
may agree with the overarching principle of the NPT (nuclear disarmament and non-
proliferation) on an abstract level, but it confronts the rules and decision-making procedures 
of the treaty, and disagrees with the principles and norms of the treaty itself. This behavior 
has been confirmed during the NPT conference in 2010, where Brazil refused to sign any new 
rules that would strengthen the inspection regime. A more exhaustive analysis of this Brazil 
and the NPT will be provided in Part 3. 
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2.1.6. Brazil and the IMF/ World Bank  
 
2.1.6.1. BRAZIL AND THE IMF 
 
Brazil has been a major client for decades, and similar to many recipient countries, the IMF’s 
behavior has often been controversial in Brazil.799 As recently as 1999, a $41.5 billion rescue 
package was set up by the IMF, and a new exchange regime was adopted which caused a 
dramatic depreciation of the currency and high public debt.800 Yet, due to a successful 
monetary reform under Brazil’s President Cardoso and a strong economic performance in the 
following years, Brazil was able to repay its debt (approx. $15.6 billion) in December 2005, 
two years ahead of schedule.801 
Brazil’s relationship with the IMF has thus changed dramatically during the past 
decade. This fundamental change became obvious during the yearly IMF meeting in Istanbul 
in 2009, where Brazil’s finance minister, Guido Mantega, announced that Brazil would spend 
$10 billion (€6.8 billion) to buy IMF bonds to boost the fund’s resources. The Brazilian 
representatives at the meeting went out of their way to stress the symbolic importance of that 
contribution. 802  
Brazil’s decision to lend money to the IMF is tied to Brazil’s desire to reform the 
institution in two areas. The first is vote reform: Brazil believes it is necessary to enhance 
emerging powers’ weight in the decision making process, and to reduce richer countries’ 
influence. In Istanbul, developed nations proposed to increase developing countries’ voting 
share in the IMF by 5%, which would bring the developing countries’ total share to 48%.803 
Promises to increase developing countries’ voting share further were made at the G20 summit 
in South Korea in October 2010.804  
 Secondly, Brazil seeks to modify the way the fund operates. As a recent recipient of 
IMF credit and subject to its policy recommendations, Brazil seeks less stringent 
conditionalities. 805 Conditionalities today are already less rigid than they were before. Brazil 
called the FCL (Flexible Credit Line), a tool recently created by the IMF with few strings 
attached,806 a “breakthrough.”807  
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Brazil’s behavior clearly shows that it seeks to strengthen the fund through its 
engagement and financial support. It is quite natural that the Brazilian government seeks vote 
reform in this context. The Brazilian government rightly argues that developing countries’ 
contributions, such as from Brazil, Russia, India and China, will boost the fund’s legitimacy 
and its ability to convince countries in trouble to adopt its recommendations.808 Brazil’s 
strategy towards the IMF can therefore be classified as revisionist integration.  
 
2.1.6.2. BRAZIL AND THE WORLD BANK 
 
The World Bank has a long history in Brazil, starting to finance projects shortly after its 
inception. In the 1970s, the Bank turned into one of the largest funding sources of social 
projects in Brazil.809 The Bank continues to finance a large number of projects there, in areas 
such as infrastructure. 810 Despite this engagement, the World Bank still has a negative 
reputation in Brazil, just like in many other developing countries.811 
Brazil rightly points out that the World Bank remains dominated by established 
powers and seeks more influence in the World Bank for itself and other emerging powers. 
During the 2009 G20 Summit in Pittsburgh, heads of governments agreed to shift voting 
power within the World Bank, increasing developing countries’ weight by 3%. It was unclear 
at that point whether Brazil was set to push for further reform, but there are signs that the 
most recent shift will not satisfy policy makers in Brasília. Prior to the summit, Brazil had 
asked for a bigger increase.812 
This brief overview shows that while Brazil seems to seek  change in some of the 
World Bank’s procedures and gain influence in the institution, it also seeks to strengthen the 
regime. Critics have rightly pointed out that Brazil’s push towards more responsibility can be 
explained by its desire to obtain more power. At the same time, however, the Brazilian 
government points out that the World Bank would gain much more legitimacy if emerging 
powers had a greater say in the institution. This shows that Brazil agrees with the principles 
of the Bretton Woods institutions (global financial stability), its norms (lending upon 
conditionalities), but disagrees with some rules (the type and strength of conditionalities), 
and the decision-making procedures (quotas and voting shares). Brazil’s strategy towards the 
Bretton Woods institutions will be analyzed more in-depth in the case study in Part 3. 
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2.1.7. Brazil and the G8 / G20 
 
The G8813 started as a meeting of a small number of heads of state or government of the 
leading post-industrial democracies.814 Then still with five members, (G5) it had been 
promoted by the United States as an acknowledgement of US decline and the need for a 
trilateralist (US, Europe, Japan) management of established countries’ interests.815 The US 
also preferred the new group to the already existing G10, which it thought contained too 
many European powers.816 
The institution used to attract very little attention until 2005, when it came to be 
considered no longer as a mere regular meeting of powerful politicians, but one of the most 
notable institutions of today’s global governance. By then it had added Russia as a full 
member in 2003 to coax it into aligning with the established powers. This does not 
necessarily have to do with the summit itself, but rather with the fact that civil society 
identified the G8 as a meaningful institution, change agent, or culprit for global problems. In 
2005, famous musicians such as Bono and Bob Geldof led the “Make Poverty History 
Campaign” prior to the G8 summit in Gleneagles in Scotland, which led to the gross 
exaggeration of the G8’s perceived power.817 Since then, meetings are so visible that they have 
been forced to address all of the major global issues. While the leaders used to discuss 
macroeconomic issues, discussions have diversified and now include everything from poverty 
reduction to terrorism and climate change. Critics have pointed out that it remains unclear in 
how far the G8 summits have been able to effectively deal with global challenges, and that its 
effect so far has been, at best, divisive. 
As the G8 came to be seen increasingly as “the centre of global governance”818, 
criticism mounted. One of the most frequent criticisms leveled at the organization was its 
focus on established powers (at times called “Western-centeredness”) and its failure to 
represent emerging powers such as China, India and Brazil. In addition, critics pointed out 
that all G8 members, with the exception of Canada, had an imperial past.819 It was thus in a 
classic dilemma of legitimacy vs. efficiency.820  
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To increase its legitimacy, the G8 leaders included emerging powers’ leaders at the 
Evian summit in 2003. In 2005, after Tony Blair had invited Brazil, China, India, Turkey and 
Mexico to discuss climate change, a ‘G8+5 process’ was initiated with the plan to involve the 
‘outreach group of 5’ more frequently.821 These countries have since then been called ‘anchor 
countries’.822 
 In 2007, the German government hosted the G8 meeting and initiated a process that 
later became known as the ‘Heiligendamm Process’, named after the town where the summit 
was held. Brazil, India, China, South Africa and Mexico were invited to participate in the 
summit. The motivation for this inclusive process was the recognition that major emerging 
powers would have to become active partners in shaping global governance, and that global 
problems such as global warming cannot be solved by a small group.823 
 Does Brazil seek integration in the G8? As Anthony Payne argues, it remains to be 
seen whether Brazil and the other “early twenty-first century winners” will work within this 
“framework of western leadership”, symbolized by the G8,824 or whether it will pursue 
options outside of the G8, “including championing the traditional solidarity with the 
developing world”.825 President Cardoso (1995-2002) often seemed to prioritize inclusion into 
the G7 over inclusion into the UNSC as he regarded it as a more realistic undertaking.826 
Brazil has accepted invitations to participate in the ‘Outreach Group’, but it has been highly 
critical of the G8’s lack of legitimacy and remains skeptical about joining.827 Along with India 
and China, it considered it somewhat humiliating to be placed at a side table or to be “invited 
for breakfast and lunch”, while not being admitted to the most important discussions.828 As a 
response to their only partial inclusion during the Heiligendamm meeting in 2007, the 
‘Outreach Group’ decided to meet separately and drafted their own position paper. This 
paper showed their fundamental interest in a more active role in the international institution 
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and a desire to pursue an integrative strategy.829 At the same time, they showed that they were 
not willing to engage as second-class participants and accept all of the rules defined by the big 
powers, which indicates a classic example of revisionist integration. 
Brazil rejects the G8 (if it remains static) and seeks to replace it with the more 
inclusive G20. As Gregory and de Almeida point out, the Brazilian government under Lula 
rejects the G8 and seeks to create a more inclusive system. While it has never rejected 
invitations to participate in the G8 summits, it has made clear that it is its desire to come for 
the “main course”, rather than merely “desert”, when all important decision have already 
been made.830 Brazil’s strategy therefore contains some confrontational elements, as it rejects 
the G8’s exclusive approach. At the same time, the Brazilian government may be reluctant to 
join a highly exclusive club such as the G8 as it does not want to be seen by other developing 
countries as being part of the global rich. A similar argument keeps Brazil from joining the 
OECD.831 
In 2009, the G20 for the first time turned into a meeting for heads of state, for the first 
time receiving more media attention than the G8 meeting. It is difficult to predict whether the 
G20 will fully replace the G8 or whether both will continue as parallel institutions. 
Brazil’s Finance Minister Mantega sees the G20 “at the top of the pyramid, providing 
guidance and support to international financial institutions.”832 While the Brazilian 
government is content to have a seat on the G20-table, it continues to ask for the addition of 
a permanent seat for the Group of 24, a forum for developing nations from Latin America, 
Asia and Africa. Finance Minister Mantega stressed that this was necessary to counter the 
excessive influence of European nations, whose weight is larger due to a permanent seat for 
the European Union.833  
This brief overview shows that Brazil has a strong interest in working with the G8 
and in integrating in the G20. It engages in revisionist integration because the changes Brazil 
desires would either radically expand the G8 or empower the G20. Brazilian diplomats are 
quick to point out that Brazil will not accept any type of second-class participation. Rather, it 
is likely that Brazil will only accept a spot on the table if it is granted full membership. There 
is thus fundamental agreement about the G8’s and G20’s principals (addressing global 
challenges) and its norms (summit-based communication), but disagreement with specific 
rules (exclusive invitation-based participation) and decision-making procedures (exclusive 
creation of joint statement).  
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2.1.9. Brazil and Latin America 
 
This section will analyze Brazil’s regional policy and analyze how its attempts to 
institutionalize regional cooperation fit into the categories presented in this model. There are 
a large number of regional institutions, but four are of strategic significance: Mercosur, 
UNASUR, the Inter American Development Bank (IADB), and the Bank of the South. The 
principal question here will be whether regional institutions constitute a form of alignment (if 
principles and norms are similar) or systemic confrontation (if principles and norms are 
opposed).  
 
2.1.9.1. BRAZIL AND MERCOSUR 
 
Ideas of regional integration have a long history in Latin America, dating back to the days of 
independence in the 1820s.834 The creation of a free trade agreement or even a customs union 
had been propagated since the 1930s, but ‘import substitution industrialization’ (ISI) policies 
by several countries in the 1960s, which involved protectionist measures, made integration 
difficult.835 Economic stagnation in the 1980s, the apparent success of regional integration in 
Europe, and the end of the military dictatorships in several countries made Latin America’s 
political elites more amenable to new ideas. 
Furthermore, the end of the Cold War forced both Brazil and Argentina to rethink 
their place in the world. In a new international order dominated by one power, both 
Argentina and Brazil saw their role diminished, and there was a fear among foreign policy 
elites that South America would become irrelevant in the Post Cold War order.836 With 
military rule having ended in 1983 and 1985 respectively, Argentina and Brazil saw regional 
integration as the best way to prevent this scenario, speak with one voice and protect 
strategic interests.837 In addition, integration got a boost by both Brazil’s and Argentina’s 
shared belief that open and liberalized markets, privatization and fiscal discipline – 
personified by the ‘Washington Consensus’ - would enhance economic growth.838 Regional 
integration was thus, since the 1980s, one of the most important subjects of Brazilian 
diplomacy.839 
Recognizing the opportunity created by their predecessors’ confidence-building 
measures, Brazil’s Fernando Collor de Melo and Argentina’s Carlos Menem decided to 
develop Mercosur, the Common Market of the Southern Cone. Both Uruguay and Paraguay 
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joined the new club. Its foundation treaty was signed in Asunción in 1991 and included a 
schedule of tariff reductions.840 Aside from the occasional lapse, all members adhered to the 
new rules, and a free trade area was established in 1994. Nevertheless, numerous exceptions 
that were supposed to be eliminated over time, persisted, and Mercosur turned into a customs 
union, albeit imperfect, in 1995. Despite its shortcomings, it became the most ambitious 
project of regional integration in the region.841 Several countries have since become associated 
members, such as Chile, Bolivia and Venezuela.842 Mercosur is also sustained by a democracy 
clause, which indicates that we can easily categorize Mercosur not as an anti-hegemonic 
alliance, but as an expression of alignment. Mercosur is based on the same rules as those that 
sustain the Western World Order. 
Economic integration continued as South American economies grew during the 1990s, 
which made South American business elites look favorably upon Mercosur. The pie 
continued to grow for all until Brazil devalued its currency in 1999, which strongly reduced 
Argentinean exports to Brazil.  
Argentina’s traumatic currency crisis and default in 2001 brought further economic 
integration largely to a halt. Mercosur’s star seemed to fade as neither Brazil nor Argentina 
were willing to scrap protectionist measures. This caused some business groups to call for the 
abolition of the flawed customs union, which was riddled with exceptions, and return to a 
free trade area. The failure to agree on an effective mechanism to settle disputes further 
slowed progress. Particularly Brazil insisted that Mercosur should remain an 
intergovernmental organization rather than a supranational body.843 Political integration, 
such as the creation of a regional parliament, now seemed highly unlikely and the idea was 
largely kept alive by small groups of academics across Latin America, Europe and the United 
States. 
Yet, rather than abandoning Mercosur after the economic turmoil, it remained high 
on the presidential agenda. In his inaugural address in 2003, Lula even called for regional 
political integration, arguing that economic integration was just the beginning.844 Mercosur is 
often seen as a strategic alternative to close ties with the United States.845 But since Mercosur 
is based on the same rules and norms as the Western World Order, these are complementary 
strategies.  
                                                 
840 Gregory, Denise and Paulo Roberto de Almeida (2008). Brazil and the G8 Heiligendamm Process, in 
Cooper, Andrew F. and Agata Antkiewicz  (2008). Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons 
from the Heiligendamm Process, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008 
841 While a free trade area eliminates tariffs, a customs union takes integration to higher level by 
creating a common external tariff.  
842 Venezuela applied for full membership in 2006. Its entry has yet to be ratified by Brazil’s and 
Paraguay’s Congress. See Reuters Correspondent (2007). Venezuela’s Mercosur entry unlikely- Brazil 
senator. Reuters, July 4, 2007 
843 Mecham, Michael (2003). Mercosur: A failing project? International Affairs, 79, no. 2 (2003): pp. 
369-87 
844 Cason, Jeffrey and Timothy Power (2006). Presidentialization, Pluralization, and the Rollback of 
Itamaraty: Explaining Changes in Brazilian Foreign Policy from Cardoso to Lula. Conference Paper. 
“Regional Powers in Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Near and Middle East” December 11 and 12, 
2006, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg 
845 Soares de Lima, Maria Regina (2003). Na trilha de um política externa afirmativa. Observatorio da 
Cidadania, 2003 
OLIVER STUENKEL – DOCTORAL THESIS 148 
But despite grand rhetoric that “Mercosur is our destiny”, the Brazilian President was 
not willing to elevate Mercosur’s constitutional status or bear the costs of its consolidation.846 
Since the Argentine crisis in 2001, there have been some efforts and even success. In 2004, for 
example, Brazil pushed through a free trade zone between Mercosur and the Andean 
Community. This achievement, however, seems insignificant given how much time South 
American presidents have spent talking up Mercosur.847 At present, Mercosur is stuck in a 
“suspended transitional phase”, comparable to where the European Union was in the 
1960s.848 
There are several other institutional outfits like CAN and UNASUL, none of which 
are very meaningful yet. Further North, the Andean Community (CAN, formerly Andean 
Pact), which consists of Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia and Peru, has existed since 1969, but 
integration has not moved beyond free trade and free travel for its citizens. Due to its 
comparatively small size, it generally has been eclipsed by Mercosur, which has been 
regarded as the most likely candidate to emulate the European Union in South America.849In 
May 2008, the Union of the South American Nations (Unasur) was founded after twelve 
Presidents from both Mercosur (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay), the Andean 
Community (Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Colombia) and four other countries (Chile, 
Venezuela, Guyana, and Suriname) signed the Constitutive Treaty in Brasília.850 While 
Unasur has the explicit goal to emulate the European Union, it does not have an 
administrative body of its own yet, rather using Mercosur’s and the Andean Community’s 
existing bureaucracies.851 
Andrew Hurrell argues that Mercosur could be intended to be a counterweight 
against the United States852, yet Mercosur’s principles are fundamentally aligned with those of 
the Western World Order. Mercosur seeks to strengthen relations between its members, 
promote trade and thus elevate living standards, and promote social progress. It also contains 
a democracy clause, which, although not properly enforced, points to the fundamental 
alignment with the Western World Order, promoting foreign policy making based on norms, 
rules and respecting international regimes. 
 
2.1.9.2. BRAZIL AND THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (IADB) 
 
We cannot fully comprehend Brazil’s views on international financial institutions without a 
discussion about the Inter-American Development Bank. Many of Brazil’s demands with 
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regard to the Bretton Woods institutions (such as more decision-making power for recipient 
nations) have been implemented in the IADB, which makes Brazil’s behavior in this 
institution an interesting subject. 
The IADB853, founded in 1959, seeks to strengthen the process of economic and social 
development in Latin America and the Caribbean. It is the largest source of multilateral 
financing in the region, although it is only slightly ahead of the World Bank.854 
While the IADB’s mission is largely similar to that of the World Bank in fundamental 
aspects, it differs slightly regarding its internal distribution of power. Aside from its regional 
focus on Latin America, its power structure gives more rights to developing countries, which 
control the majority of the decision-making bodies of the Bank.855 Some argue that if 
developing countries had more decision-making power in international lending institutions, 
developed countries would have less leverage to coerce the borrowers. Others argue that peer 
pressure creates a strong motivation not to default. Yet, this peer pressure did not stop 
Argentina from defaulting in 2001. In any case, the borrowing countries’ larger influence has 
an impact on how the IADB is perceived by Latin American policy makers. Hugo Chavez, 
who has fiercely criticized the World Bank, has never spoken out against the Inter American 
Development Bank, and Venezuela continues to benefit from the IADB.856 
 The IADB is larger than the World Bank in Latin America. It has disbursed loans of 
approximately $8.1 billion in the past year (ending October 31, 2009). With 25% of the total 
funds, Brazil received most of the loans. Brazil does thus receive less per capita than other 
nations, considering that 35% of all Latin Americans (200 out of 570 million) are 
Brazilians.857 Given the IADB’s different power structure, it is not perceived as a tool of 
imperialism by Brazilian politicians. Rather, the organization regularly appears in the local 
news when Bank President Luis Alberto Moreno and local politicians inaugurate new 
projects.858 Furthermore, the IADB’s work is not affected by political instability in several 
Latin American countries. As Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Uruguay strengthen their 
institutions and pursue centrist policies, Venezuela, Argentina, Ecuador and Bolivia are 
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increasingly unpredictable and dominated by populist policies. While these political 
developments may have negatively affected chances to coordinate policies across the 
continent, the IADB is one of the few regional bodies that work properly. 
The IADB is not meant to undermine or replace the Bretton Woods organizations. 
Rather, they are complementary, and an integral part of the Western World Order. Brazil 
fully supports the IADB and its strategy can be categorized as unconditional integration. 
 
2.1.9.3. BRAZIL AND THE BANK OF THE SOUTH (BANCO DEL SUR) 
 
The Bank of the South, on the other hand, is an attempt to replace the World Bank and the 
IMF, so we can categorize it as systemic confrontation. The project, promoted by Venezuela’s 
increasingly autocratic Hugo Chavez, is a reaction to ongoing crises of relevance in Latin 
America confronting the IMF and the World Bank.859 In April 2007, Ecuador’s President 
Rafael Correa expelled the World Bank representative in the country, declaring him a 
“persona non grata.”860 In the same month, Venezuela’s President Chavez announced his 
country’s withdrawal from both the IMF and the World Bank. Venezuela was later forced to 
reverse its decision to prevent default clauses in the country’s sovereign bonds.861 An 
Ecuadorean government official stressed that "Latin America has been impoverished and 
harassed long enough that we have no other choice [but to] start Banco del Sur."862 This 
episode shows that both Venezuela and Ecuador are engaging in systemic confrontation. 
The Bank of the South is a Venezuelan project. After a summit in Cochabamba in 
2007, Hugo Chavez announced that the Bank of the South had raised $7 billion in paid-in 
capital from member countries that now number six (Venezuela, Bolivia, Argentina, Ecuador, 
Brazil and Paraguay, with Nicaragua, the Caribbean and possibly some Asian countries 
conveying interest). While this is $2 billion more than the Latin American contributions to 
the Inter-American Development Bank, it is uncertain how serious the members’ pledges have 
been. In addition, many questions remain unanswered, such as the Bank’s infrastructure, 
lending framework, and types of guarantees.863 
Brazil has lent rhetorical support, but the Brazilian government has not assumed any 
leadership in the process. With the biggest and richest member on the continent so reluctant 
to support the project, there is reason to believe that the Brazilian government quietly hopes 
that the project will fizzle out, like so many previous regional projects. Its behavior is 
therefore not confrontational. According to Michael Shifter, vice president of the Inter-
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American Dialogue, the Bank of the South is unlikely to gain sufficient significance to become 
a tool of systemic confrontation.864 
To conclude, Brazil’s engagement with regional bodies clearly constitutes alignment 
with the principles and norms supported by the Western World Order. Both Mercosur and 
the Inter American Development promote the free flow of goods in the region, the combat 
against poverty and for political stability. While the Bank of the South would, if successful, 
constitute a confrontation, Brazil is unlikely to assume leadership in the process. 
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2.1.10. Brazil and NATO 
 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the most important security 
organization in the world.865 Its traditional raison d’être was to protect the United States and 
Western Europe during the Cold War from the Soviet Union.866 Since the end of the Cold 
War, however, NATO has changed fundamentally, and is no longer limited to the Northern 
Atlantic. As Karl Kaiser points out, NATO’s first shots were fired in Bosnia, which is not 
connected to the potential conflict for which it was once created. In addition, in Bosnia, 
NATO was allied with Russia, its traditional adversary.867 It has also supported AU 
peacekeepers in Darfur, assisted tsunami victims in Indonesia and earthquake victims in 
Pakistan.868 The organization has expanded eastwards significantly, and the discussion 
remains about how far it should advance, with some even arguing for Russia’s inclusion869, 
which would fundamentally change the alliance.870  
NATO’s mission in Afghanistan to combat Al Qaeda reflects the tendency that 
threats are increasingly unrestricted by geographic boundaries.871 NATO was therefore 
forced to “go global.”872 Daniel Fried, former US assistant secretary for European and 
Eurasian Affairs, argued that the security challenges facing NATO are violent extremism, 
terrorism, nuclear proliferation, failed states, cyber attacks and insecurity of energy 
resources, none of which are entirely limited to a geographic region.873 Ivo Daalder and James 
Goldgeier argue that NATO should open membership to “any democratic state in the world 
that is willing and able to contribute to the fulfillment of NATO’s new responsibilities.” 
Daalder and Goldgeier mention, among others, Brazil and India as potential new members, 
whose inclusion would turn NATO into a “legitimate and capable adjunct to the UN by 
helping to implement and enforce its decisions.”874 This opinion is far from accepted. In 2009, 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel argued that a “global NATO” does not make sense, 
elaborating that “it can provide security outside its area, but that does not mean membership 
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across the globe is possible.”875 Yet, the discussion shows that NATO is becoming 
increasingly relevant for non-members, particularly fringe countries such as Brazil. 
NATO’s difficulties to define its identity are not new. In 1962, Alastair Buchan 
criticized Senator Fulbright for using NATO as a synonym for the “free world”, pointing out 
that Brazil and India were similarly free.876 
But the recent array of new missions in very different regions and conflicts, and its 
uncertainty about to whom it should extend membership reflects NATO’s new type of 
struggle to define its mission and its identity.877 Karl Kaiser argues that after the Cold War, 
NATO’s main task is no longer to contain Russia, but global crisis management, 
peacekeeping, non-proliferation and support for collective security.878 If NATO truly aspires 
to be an instrument of global collective security, it matters for fringe nations as well. 
So how does Brazil see NATO? And how can we best characterize Brazil’s relations 
with NATO? As an emerging power with global ambitions, NATO plays an important role 
for Brazil, as several Brazilian diplomats based in Brasília attest.879 Liberal theory predicts 
that Brazil, as a democratic country, will eventually join NATO. This possibility has been 
discarded by Brazilian government officials.880 The last such attempt was made under 
President Reagan, who informally proposed to Brazil a South Atlantic Pact that would cover 
the Southern limit of NATO. This proposal was rejected by officials in Brasília.881 But this 
needs to be seen in its historical context, in which the Brazilian government was suspicious of 
the United States. Today, the situation looks different. If NATO opened itself up to the 
possibility of expanding geographically and made an offer to Brazil, there would be little 
reason to expect Brazil to categorically reject it. The Rio Pact, to which all nations on the 
Western hemisphere are signatories, constitutes a collective security clause.882 On September 
11, all American nations condemned the terrorist attack and, invoking the Rio Pact, pledged 
support and willingness to help the United States defend itself. 
How did Brazil, a country that has traditionally espoused the principle of state 
sovereignty and non-interference883, react to NATO’s decision to intervene in Kosovo? In the 
Declaration of the Rio Group on March 25, 1999, its members lamented that the parties had 
failed to reach a diplomatic solution, but they refrained from condemning the NATO 
bombings. The Declaration also expressed worry about NATO’s decision to proceed without 
                                                 
875 Brzezinksi, Zbigniew (2009). An Agenda for NATO, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 5, 
September/October 2009 
876 Buchan, Alastair (1962). The Reform of NATO. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 40, No. 2 (Jan 1962), pp.165-
12 
877 Talbott Strobe (2002). From Prague to Baghdad: NATO at Risk., Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 6 
(Nov-Dec 2002), pp.46-57 
878 Kaiser, Karl. Reforming NATO (1996). Foreign Policy, No. 103 (Summer, 1996), pp. 128-143 
879 Telephone interviews with a former Brazilian ambassador to a Western European country and a 
Brazilian diplomat based in Brasília, June 1, 2010  
880 Telephone interviews with a former Brazilian ambassador to a Western European country and a 
Brazilian diplomat based in Brasília, June 1, 2010 
881 Brooke, Jim (1981). Dateline Brazil: Southern Superpower, Foreign Policy, No.44 (Autumn, 1981), 
pp.167-180 
882 Talbott Strobe (2002). From Prague to Baghdad: NATO at Risk., Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 6 
(Nov-Dec 2002), pp.46-57 
883 Serrano, Mónica and Lorena Murillo S. (2001). La crisis de Kosovo y América Latina: el dilema de 
la intervención. Foro Internacional, Vol. 41, No.1 (163) (Jan-Mar 2001), pp.5-34 
OLIVER STUENKEL – DOCTORAL THESIS 154 
UN Security Council approval.884 According to Serrano and Murillo, the document’s authors 
thus attempted to find a compromise between protecting human rights and respecting state 
sovereignty. Brazil rejected Russia’s proposal of calling NATO’s intervention an 
“international threat to peace and stability”, but several Brazilian officials criticized NATO’s 
“double standards” and the strategy of “selective intervention.”885 The Brazilian government 
also decided not to follow Chile’s initiative to send police forces to the Balkans to help 
stabilize the situation. Brazil thus chose a middle way, neither fully condemning nor 
supporting NATO’s campaign.886 
How did Brazil react when, two years later, the United States invaded Afghanistan, a 
move that in 2003 turned into the most extensive military campaign in NATO’s history? 
Despite its pacifist outlook, Brazil did not oppose the US invasion of Afghanistan, which was 
not authorized by the UN Security Council. It also did not oppose the UN Security Council 
when it established the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to secure Kabul in 
December 2001. In 2003, NATO assumed control of ISAF. At the same time, several Brazilian 
diplomats affirm that Brazil “never” considered deploying troops or engaging otherwise in 
Afghanistan.887 They explain this not necessarily with the country’s opposition to NATO’s 
efforts in general, but with the Brazilian tradition of not interfering in armed conflict.888 A 
Pew Poll in 2010 showed that 37% of Brazilians thought it was worthwhile to keep NATO 
troops in Afghanistan.889  
This brief overview shows that Brazil remains on the sidelines with regard to NATO 
over the past years. Brazil did not participate in either NATO’s mission in Kosovo or 
Afghanistan, but it also did not create any obstacles, as for example in 2003 when it opposed 
the US invasion in Iraq. While Brazil has historically been a large arms exporter890, as Amaury 
de Souza, a Brazilian security analyst points out, Brazilian support for the Afghanistan 
mission would be inefficient due to the large geographic distance and Brazil’s logistic 
limitations.891 Most importantly, however, all diplomats interviewed point to Brazil’s 
aversion to and lack of experience of engaging in military conflict. This does not mean, 
however, that there is no potential for engagement with NATO. Brazil’s leadership in Haiti 
in the context of MINUSTAH shows that Brazil shares the values and ideals embraced by 
NATO. As Brazil is not located in the same region as NATO, its lack of engagement does not 
constitute any type of confrontation. As a signatory of the Rio Pact, which establishes a 
similar concept of collective security as NATO’s article 5, Brazil pursues an alignment 
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strategy.
OLIVER STUENKEL – DOCTORAL THESIS 156 
2.2. Historical Review and Integrative Analysis: India and 
international institutions 
 
2.2.1. Political and Economic Background 
 
Before analyzing India’s foreign policy strategy towards the Western World Order it seems 
adequate to give a brief overview of India’s domestic political and economic situation. This 
can provide a better understanding of the context in which India is making decisions, and the 
interests that stand behind them. 
Like Brazil, India is difficult to categorize.892 At times, India plays the role of a 
developing country with an “anti-Western” mindset, in other moments, that of a democratic 
and global player aligned with the established powers.893 Edward Luce aptly described India 
as “one country, two planets”- referring to the vast inequality between Westernized urban 
elites and the poor rural population.894 Some basic figures make this clear. On the one hand, 
India’s economy is the fourth largest in the world by purchasing power parity, with $3.297 
trillion, and the 12th largest using by nominal GDP, with $1.21 trillion.895 India has grown by 
an average rate of more than 7% in the decade since 1997, which has reduced poverty by 
about 10 percentage points.896 On the other hand, over 300 million people - around 60% of 
India’s labor force, virtually all of them under the poverty line - work in the agricultural 
sector and contribute only 18% to national GDP. India has by far the largest agricultural 
workforce in the world. In China, by comparison, only 80 million people work in agriculture. 
Along similar lines, India’s urbanization is low, at 30%, and roughly 40% of Indians over 15 
are illiterate. Every year, 25 million people leave the countryside and move into urban areas, 
increasing the size of the city’s sprawling slums. Its large and inefficient agricultural 
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workforce explains India’s sensitivity about opening the country to international trade of 
agricultural goods. 
India has undergone liberalization and strong economic growth since the 1990s.897 
The reforms included industry deregulation, privatization of state monopolies, and easing of 
foreign trade rules. Prior to that, it had essentially been a state-led economy, since the 
Congress Party, India’s most dominant political group, had traditionally been deeply 
influenced by British Fabian socialism.898 Although Amrita Narlikar argues that important 
policy changes have been made before899, the liquidity crisis of 1991 and the subsequent deal 
with the IMF is usually seen as the beginning of reform which laid the groundwork for 
today’s economic growth. Stephen Cohen argued that while it was still unclear whether 
reforms would have the desired impact during the 1990s, it became clear in 2000 that “the 
specter of collapse had passed”, and that India was finally emerging as a great Asian power 
along with China and Japan.900 
India’s historic transformation is reflected in its new role as IMF lender. As described 
in more detail in Section 3.2., India has received large IMF loans that had a considerable 
impact on the way India perceives itself, often causing humiliation and a feeling of 
impotence.901 Repaying IMF debt and, in 2009, starting to lend money to the IMF is having a 
strong impact on India’s collective self-esteem. Confidence grew so much that the BJP-led 
government decided, before the 2004 election, to refuse to accept foreign aid except from a 
handful of major donors.902   
India’s success is tied to Manmohan Singh’s policies. As Minister of Finance (1991-
1996) in the Rao administration, Singh dismantled the ‘License Raj’, which is seen as the 
single most important step in the economic reform process India underwent in the 1990s. In 
2004, the BJP-led government coalition “National Democratic Alliance” (NDA), which had 
continued liberalization, was unexpectedly ousted. The Indian National Congress, led by 
Sonia Gandhi, obtained the highest number of votes.903 Rather than making herself Prime 
Minister, Gandhi chose the technocrat Manmohan Singh as Prime Minister, who continued 
to pursue his prudent economic policies initiated in the 1990s. 
Despite innumerable critics who point to large-scale corruption, personality cults in 
Indian politics and a “crisis of values” 904, India’s political institutions are stable. Contrary to 
all predictions, Indians adapted to both self-rule and democracy very quickly, and except for 
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a short and mild authoritarian stint during Indira Gandhi’s reign, India’s democracy has 
survived, defying many political theories that see a correlation between per-capita income 
and democratic governance.905 As Baldev Raj Nayar points out, the Indian elite’s insistence 
on the subordination of the military to civilian authority is noteworthy.906 The transfer of 
power in 2004 was surprising, but went smoothly.907 India’s Congress Party, led by Sonia 
Gandhi, won a convincing victory in May 2009, winning a further and stronger mandate to 
continue the reforms undertaken over the past five years. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, a 
former Economics minister and architect of widely hailed economic reform in the early 1990s, 
is the first Prime Minister since Nehru to be appointed for a second five-year term. He is 
expected to serve for at least three years, if not until the end of the term, before 39-year old 
Rahul Gandhi takes over if Congress remains in power. Despite the presence of smaller anti-
globalization parties that form part of the government, India’s foreign policy strategy is 
therefore unlikely to change radically in the medium term.908 
Over the next decade, India thus faces much larger domestic development challenges 
than Brazil. In desperate need to accommodate a growing population, the Indian government 
should greatly improve urban infrastructure. Yet, the state of rural infrastructure is even 
more precarious, and large-scale improvements are needed to give the rural population a 
chance to escape poverty. Prospects for sustained growth are strong909, and if India succeeds, 
the rewards will be plentiful: According to Goldman Sachs, the Indian economy is set to 
become the third largest in the world by 2050.910 Despite economic progress, domestic 
economic development is likely to be the major challenge for decades to come.  
Aside from the conflict with Pakistan, foreign policy remains an elite topic. Several 
regional parties, especially caste-based parties, have no foreign policy at all. The conflict with 
Pakistan remains the exception, which is a frequent topic both in the national media and in 
schoolbooks.  
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2.2.2. Foreign Policy Decision-Making in India  
 
The Prime Minister traditionally takes all key foreign policy decisions in India. The country’s 
first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, occupied the post of Foreign Minister at the same 
time for seventeen years.911 While no Prime Minister after Nehru occupied both positions, 
most Indian Prime Ministers dominated foreign policy, leaving virtually no decision-making 
power to their Minister of External Affairs. Aside from Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister 
since 2004, Shiv Shankar Menon, Singh’s National Security Advisor (NSA), is believed to be 
the key foreign policy decision maker in the Indian government.912  
Four competing groups seek to influence India’s foreign policy: Moralists, Hindu 
nationalists, strategists and idealists. Moralists argue that India should play an exemplary 
role in the world. Hindu nationalists contend that India needs to defend Hindu civilization, 
mostly against Muslim threats. Realists say India should increase its military might and 
become a global power. Liberals seek to promote social progress through trade and greater 
international interdependence. As Rahul Sagar points out, these four groups have distinct 
foreign policy objectives, being “moral exceptionalism, martial vigor, state power, and 
wealth.”913 
Moralists historically had strong influence, but the results proved ultimately 
unsatisfactory. They argued that the basis of all foreign policy should be principles, rather 
than interests. India should lead on the basis of soft power, based on ideological appeal, 
rather than hard power. The decision to create and lead the Non-Alignment Movement was 
the result of an orientation that was seen as nobler and free of balancing of power 
considerations. India’s leadership is all the more noteworthy because the country lacked any 
significant economic or military capacities after independence, so it possibly thought to make 
up for this lack by exercising “value-leadership”.914 Nehru argued against a quick military 
build-up and Gandhi even asked the NCI to implement a law that would rule out any military 
action from the Indian side, a request with was rejected. China’s attack on India in 1962, for 
which India was wholly unprepared, destroyed Nehru’s hopes that it could turn into a major 
power without building up serious military force. Personally shattered, he never recovered 
physically and died less than two years later.915 Nehru’s policy towards China was marked by 
naive sentimentalism, envisioning a political federation between the two countries he saw as 
carriers of the world’s two greatest civilizations.916 
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Yet, the moralists’ influence subtly persists. There are few instances of Indian 
expansion outside of its region, and all major wars have been fought on Indian territory. In 
addition, India’s political leadership has historically been diplomatically skilled but inept 
with regard to the use of violence.917 As realist former foreign minister Jaswant Singh laments 
in 1999, “there has been a near total emasculation of the concepts of state power”, facilitated 
by excessive piety and ahisma (non-violence).918 In a way, India continues to fight its 
honorable struggle for freedom by defending poor nations on the international stage through 
argumentative diplomacy. Alliances in the realist sense continue to be looked down upon, 
compromising India’s independence and slightly nobler stance. As a consequence, Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh was heavily criticized for a nuclear deal he made with the United 
States in 2006. In the same way, Indian policy makers have accused developed countries of 
exercising ‘green imperialism’ by proposing mandatory universal caps on greenhouse gas 
emissions. More recently, there has been growing tension between principles (defending poor 
countries from exploitation) and interests, which are increasingly aligned with developed 
countries. Where the moralists’ influence is most visible in is India’s foreign policy rhetoric, 
where every move is justified by some high-sounding principle.919 
Hindu nationalists stand in direct opposition to Nehruvian moralist thinking. Using 
an argument quite common in neighboring China, Hindu nationalists seek to revive the 
ancient Hindu civilization and restore old glory. They point out that unlike Europe and the 
United States, the subcontinent constitutes a single civilization which has endured over three 
millennia, making it one of the most ancient in the world.920 In practice, this means massive 
rearmament, not necessarily to attack, but to be able to defend itself without others’ help. 
Hindu nationalists have therefore highly criticized the NPT, which would leave India 
vulnerable to other nuclear powers.921 The Baratiya Janata Party (BJP), which adheres to this 
ideology, has been able to dominate in some regions, but generally fails in creating national 
appeal in a society which is, with four major religious groups and a dozen major languages, 
the most heterogeneous in the world.922 In the context of foreign affairs, Hindu nationalists’ 
arguments often have a realist rationale. 
 Realists promote India’s military build-up, but without civilizational undertones. 
They follow an ancient Indian realist tradition initiated by the “Indian Machiavelli” 
Chanakya, alternatively called Kautilya and Vishnugupta (c. 340-293 BC),  and their 
fundamental argument is that force is the sole arbiter in international politics. Contrary to 
Hindu nationalists, who are skeptical of modernity but seek a traditional society imbued with 
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‘Hindu virtues’, realists argue that military power will be unsustainable without rapid 
economic growth and modernization. Indira Gandhi was probably the Indian leader most 
strongly influenced by realist thinking. Realists argue that ‘Hindu fatalism’ has historically 
prevented ‘rational thinking’ and proper planning. Instead, what is common is “jugaad”, a 
colloquial Hindi term that can be translated as “a quick fix” or a “work around”.923 India’s 
decision to test nuclear weapons in 1998 was seen as a realist move in order to obtain major-
power status.924 
 Idealists seek economic progress through trade and international collaboration. This 
line of thinking got a boost in 1991, as India was forced to accelerate deregulation and 
integrate more into the world economy due to a severe liquidity crisis, which almost caused 
India to default on its debt repayments.925 This opening, however, was also motivated by a 
fear of falling behind China.926 Liberals argue that India’s economic development will 
eventually lead to better relations with Pakistan, as the Pakistani government will no longer 
be able to reject the benefits of trading with India. With regard to China, idealists have been 
able to strongly influence the Indian government. As a result, trade between India and China 
has surged, reaching $40 billion in 2010.927 In addition, India has sought greater trade ties in 
the region, through regional agreements such as the South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC) and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which 
it is a ‘full dialogue partner. 
 Irrespective of these four schools of thought, there is an overarching conviction that 
India is destined to be a world power again. Nehru pointed out that India should be the 
fourth power after the US, the Soviet Union, and China. And, as one foreign minister 
declared in 1976, “Our size, our potential strength, our traditions and heritage do not allow 
us to become a client state.”928 This aspiration to become a major power explains the 
importance of self-reliance under all Indian governments after 1947, even when these policies 
failed to bring positive results.929 Policy makers are keenly aware of the fact that India is the 
second most populous nation on earth, and that it is expected to overtake China at some 
point during the next decades. This makes it hard for Indians to accept situations in which 
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small countries hold more power in international institutions, such as the IMF.930 The fact 
that small countries such as the Netherlands or Belgium have more votes than India is an 
often used argument to symbolize the inequality of the Bretton Woods institutions.931 Indian 
analysts have called India a “status-inconsistent nation”, pointing to the gap between the 
weight India has in today’s international institutions and India’s actual weight. “No 
country”, Nayar and Paul point out, “views itself as a rising power more than India does,” 
arguing that “India is perhaps sui generis (…)”, justifying a sense of ‘Indian 
exceptionalism’.932 This opinion is not limited to India’s elite. Stephen Cohen points out that 
Indians in general believe, unlike people in other countries such as Brazil, that their country 
has “both a destiny and an obligation” to become a major power.933 Pavan Varma argues 
that, given the extremely high importance Indians ascribe to status, “they are very insulated if 
denied the esteem that they believe is their due.”934 Raja Mohan points to India’s ideological 
claim that it is the “world’s most important democracy” and welcomes that fact that India is 
turning from a defensive ‘porcupine’ (“vegetarian, slow-footed and prickly”) to a ‘tiger.’935 
 
Brazil, India and IBSA 
 
IBSA, which stands for India, Brazil and South Africa, is a forum created in 2003 to exchange 
ideas of mutual interest in areas such as trade, security, technology and social development.936 
Previously, India, Brazil and South Africa had been known as the G-3, a group that had 
jointly decided to break the patent of an HIV / AIDS drug and to provide generic drugs to 
domestic patients. The Lula administration has continuously stressed that IBSA’s interests go 
beyond the expansion of individual economic benefits and that it should have a common 
identity.937  An example for developing countries’ attempt to institutionalize South-South 
relations, IBSA has generated significant interest in the academic community. IBSA’s depth, 
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however, should not be overestimated, especially given the three countries’ different interests 
on matters such as trade. 
IBSA coordinates two UNDP-financed projects; one in Haiti and one in Guinea-Bissau; their 
impact, however, remains symbolic.938 
 Thus, no matter how IBSA will evolve, it will not replace established mechanisms of 
development cooperation such as the World Bank - neither is it supposed to in its current 
form.  
India seems least committed to IBSA, possibly due to the numerous strategic threats the 
country faces in its region. Still, the Indian government is likely to continue to rhetorically 
support the alliance, even though interests may at times diverge.939 For example, while Brazil 
wants to liberalize trade, India is decidedly more protectionist, given its large and inefficient 
agricultural sector.940 In the same vein, India continues to oppose the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT), while Brazil is one of its principal defenders. 
 Brazil’s and India’s commitment to IBSA shows that they both believe the current 
international power structures do not grant them the respect they deserve - one of the few 
areas in which  they agree.941 Yet, few policy analysts in India take IBSA seriously. Several 
academics bemoan that the student exchange programs announced as part of IBSA have 
never been implemented. Given the lack of coherent interests among its members, it is certain 
that IBSA will not propose a ‘new type’ of development cooperation based on values different 
than those of the traditional development model used by established powers.942 While this 
may have been a vague idea and motivation for the foundation of IBSA, its implementation 
remains uncertain. 
IBSA is therefore still too insignificant to be meaningfully categorized. If it is to grow in its 
current form, it is certainly an example of alignment with the current world order. 
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2.2.3. India and the UN  
 
It will be useful to apply Krasner’s definition to the United Nations and analyze India’s 
strategy towards the United Nations between 2003 and 2010 accordingly. As mentioned 
above, Krasner identifies four fundamental elements of an international institution: 
Principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures.943 An institution must be based on 
one or more principles, which is like a fundamental belief (“avoid war”). Norms spell out 
general standards of behavior, while rules specify, at a more detailed level, what members can 
and cannot do. Finally, decision-making procedures stipulate who holds power in the 
institution, how to take joint decisions, how to take in new members and how to punish rule 
breakers. 
 How can we define the United Nations’ principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures, and how does India behave towards them? The United Nations’ overarching 
principles and norms are very general to such a degree that every country on the planet agrees 
with them. Its rules and decision-making procedures are, given the institution’s varied tasks, 
very diverse, so we will analyze them one by one. 
 The United Nations’ mission is ample, and its organizational structure highly diverse. 
A country such as India does not have one single strategy towards the United Nations. Its 
strategy to obtain a permanent seat in the UN Security Council may figure prominently, but it 
does not reflect India’s behavior in other areas. This section will therefore be divided into 
seven subsections:  
1) India’s views on the UN’s overall responsibilities and its financial contributions,  
2) the UN Security Council,  
3) the UN General Assembly 
4) Peacekeeping Operations  and 
5) the UN’s activities in India  
Each section will give an overview over India’s strategy and evaluate which description of the 
ones developed in 1.5. best describe the Brazilian government’s behavior. Subsection 6) will 
conclude.  
 
2.2.3.1. INDIA’S VIEWS ON THE UN’S OVERALL RESPONSIBILITIES AND ITS FINANCIAL 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
India fundamentally agrees with the principles and norms espoused by the United Nations, 
which are to avoid war, defend human rights, combat poverty and promote social progress. 
India regards the United Nations as the most important international organization and it 
regards the UN as an institution that can bestow legitimacy on controversial international 
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action.944 It never supported Sukarno's initial ambition for the Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM) to create an alternative world order to that of the “Western-dominated UN”.945  
At the same time, India has, for many years, been one of the leading voices calling for 
a democratization of the United Nations in order to make it more effective.946 Already in 
1960, India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, addressed the General Assembly and 
raised the issue of reform, arguing that  
 
The structure of the UN when it started was weighted in favor of Europe and America. It 
did not seem to us to be fair to the countries of Asia and Africa but we appreciated the 
difficulties of the situation and did not press for any changes. With the growth of the UN 
and with more countries coming into it, that structure today is still more unbalanced. 
Even so, we wish to proceed slowly with agreement and not to press for any change 
which would involve an immediate amendment of the charter and raising of heated 
controversies. Unfortunately, we live in a split world which is constantly coming up 
against the basic assumptions of the UN. We have to bear with this and try to move ever 
more forward to that conception of full co-operation between nations.947  
 
For India, one of the main roles of the United Nations is to serve as a platform that allows it 
to criticize the Western World Order. Aside from the ideological dimension, the UN also 
serves to pronounce its claim for leadership to both the international and domestic 
audience.948 Criticizing the established powers is therefore often a political calculation, to 
gain votes at home or to pledge allegiance to the other members of the G77 and Non-Aligned 
Movement. India’s basic notion of the necessity of reform has not changed fundamentally 
since then. Despite the UN’s inability to engage in more comprehensive reform, India remains 
committed to the organization. In 2006, the Indian government nominated then-UN Under 
Secretary Shahshi Tharoor as a candidate for UN Secretary General, and Indian diplomats 
actively promoted his campaign, which ultimately failed.949  
India’s frequent criticism is proof that it highly values the United Nations. The Indian 
government remains convinced that the United Nations are the most adequate organization 
to deal not only with poverty reduction, but also with climate change and peacekeeping. It 
considers the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and its Kyoto 
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Protocol as the most appropriate framework for addressing climate change.950 India is 
currently ambivalent on how to approach the challenge of climate change. While the Indian 
government initially refused to even consider emission targets, India announced, in October 
2009, a joint plan with China to cut Greenhouse Gas emissions, even though the 
government’s principal goal remains economic development, clearly trumping the 
environment.951 Despite its shortcomings and India’s view that its power structures are 
outdated, the UN thus continues to occupy an important spot in Indian discussions about 
global governance. While the World Bank and the IMF are considered more important with 
regard to development aid, the UN is thought to be of major importance in the area of 
climate change and international security, such as peacekeeping. 
These findings, however, cannot conceal India’s relatively modest financial 
contributions to the United Nations’ budget. Its financial contributions for operational 
activities by the UN have risen from $13 million (2003) to $52 million (2005), or 0.4% of the 
UN’s total budget952, but decreased to $37 million in 2007.953 Brazil, in comparison, 
contributed ten times as much on average.954 In 2009, India’s net contributions to the UN’s 
regular budget $10.9 million, half of Brazil’s contributions, and less than 10% of the United 
Kingdom’s contributions.955 In 2009, India contributed less than 0,02% of UNICEF’s regular 
budget. While India disburses ever growing sums for South-South partnerships, its voluntary 
contributions to the UN budget remain very small. Rather than making the UN system more 
coherent, India’s contributions contribute more to its fragmentation.956 But there have been 
positive aspects too. Over the past decades, the World Food Program (WFP) provided India 
with around $1 billion. More recently, however, India has turned into one of the major 
donors to the WFP, providing assistance through the WFP to Afghanistan (over $10 million), 
Iran and Iraq.957 India is also a major contributor to the United Nations Disaster Assessment 
and Coordination (UNDAC) and to UNHCR. This has largely domestic reasons as India 
seeks to prevent refugee inflows from bordering unstable states. 
India’s financial contributions are incompatible with the rhetoric about the United 
Nations’ importance, but it can be explained by India’s low per-capita income. Critics charge 
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that India’s bilateral aid has increased sharply over the past years, to over $1billion, which 
indicates that India does have the necessary financial resources. As Grimm et al point out, 
India is one of the most important “emerging donors”958 who could change the landscape of 
development aid in general. Yet, it is common that countries spend more money bilaterally 
than through multilateral organizations. 
 
2.2.3.2. INDIA AND THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 
 
The Security Council is the most powerful organ of the United Nations.959 Given its 
prominence, UN Security Council Reform has traditionally been regarded as a crucial part of 
any wider UN reform.960 Similar to Brazil, UN Security Council Reform has been one of 
India’s key objectives over the past decade. The fact that India is one of the few member 
states that has been elected six times to the body underlines the importance of the entity for 
the Indian government.961 In the Indian ministry of external affairs’ annual report in 1992/93, 
the government pressed for the expansion of the UN Security Council (though not the 
revision of the veto). In the same document, it also argued that the UN Security Council 
should be answerable to the General Assembly.962 According to the Indian government’s 
national priorities, the UN’s principal goal in India at this point is to promote “social, 
economic and political inclusion for the most disadvantaged, especially women and girls”.963 
The UN’s vast activities show that despite India’s recent economic progress, it will, for a long 
time to come, be in need of the UN’s assistance. 
India believes its permanent presence on the UN Security Council would lend this 
institution greater legitimacy, which shows that it fundamentally agreed with the UNSC’s 
principals of promoting peace and security. It also agrees with its norms, a relatively 
exclusive meeting of the powerful to pass binding resolutions with the ability to call for 
military intervention. It does not agree, however, with the exclusive decision-making process 
and the veto-power the P5 members enjoy (specific rules and decision-making procedures). Its 
strategy constitutes revisionist integration. The Indian government bemoans that governance 
structures, particularly in the UNSC, “had not been able to keep up with contemporary 
realities.”964 Indian politicians believe that India should have been granted a permanent seat 
                                                 
958 Grimm, S., J. Humphrey, E. Lundsgaarde, S. de Sousa (2009): European Development Cooperation 
to 2020: Challenges by New Actors in International Development, Working Paper No. 4, 7th 
Framework Programme, May 2009  
959 von Freiesleben, Jonas (2008). Reform of the UN Security Council. Paper, Center for UN Reform, 
11 November 2008 
960 Kennedy, Paul. and Bruce Russett (1995). Reforming the United Nations. Foreign Affairs, Vol 74, 
No. 5, September/ October 1995 
961 Nafey, Abdul (2008). India and the G8: Reaching out or out of reach? In: Cooper, Andrew F. and 
Agata Antkiewicz  (2008). Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons from the Heiligendamm 
Process, Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008 
962 Kumar, J.D.  (1994). Democratisation of the UN, Deccan Herald, January 3, 1994  
963 United Nations (2010). United Nations in India, UN Resident Coordinator's Office; 
http://www.un.org.in/_layouts/UNDP/pTeam.aspx (accessed May 24 2010) 
964 United Nations (2009). Urging faster UN reform, India says world body should lead response to key 
challenges. September 26, 2009. UN News Centre;  
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=32300&Cr=General+Assembly&Cr1= (May 7, 
2010) 
OLIVER STUENKEL – DOCTORAL THESIS 168 
on the UNSC in 1945.965 After failing to obtain a seat in 2005, when India was part of the G-4 
(together with Germany, Japan and Brazil), the Indian government is determined to 
continuously press for expanding the Council, even though short-term success is unlikely. 
China is seen as a crucial gate keeper in India’s attempt to advance in the UN Security 
Council, and this - together with an appreciation of China’s growing economic importance - 
is one of the reasons that India aims to improve relations with China, despite an ongoing 
border dispute in Arunchal Pradesh. In the future, India is more likely to team up with Brazil 
in its attempt to obtain a seat, as Germany and Japan weaken India’s claim that developing 
countries need to be better represented. India’s behavior towards the UN Security Council 
will be analyzed in-depth as a case study in Part 3. 
 
2.2.3.3. INDIA AND THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
 
For years, India’s representatives have called for a revitalization of the UN General Assembly, 
seeking to strengthen the system. In April 2010, for example, Hardeep Puri, Permanent 
Representative of India to the U.N., said that  "the General Assembly should take the lead in 
setting the global agenda and restoring the centrality of the United Nations in formulating 
multilateral approaches to resolving transnational issues.”966 In a similar fashion, Indian 
representatives usually argue that the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), which, 
despite its pre-eminence in the charter, has proved too weak to provide coherence to the work 
of the specialized agencies,967 should be at the heart of international efforts of development. 
Yet, developed countries largely avoid ECOSOC and prefer less democratic institutions. In 
the same vein, the UN General Assembly is much less powerful than the exclusive and non-
democratic UN Security Council. 
India fundamentally agrees with the UNGA’s principles, norms, rules and decision-
making procedures. India’s foreign policy is still influenced by its ties to the Non-Aligned 
Movement and the G77.968 During the 2003 trade negotiations in Cancún, for example, India 
assumed, together with Brazil and China, a leadership role and convinced other developing 
countries to maintain a relatively rigid posture.969 India seeks to represent, in Nehruvian 
tradition, other developing countries, and it remains strongly committed to multilateralism. 
As a consequence, India speaks out for a stronger UN General Assembly and ECOSOC. 
However, similar to Brazil, there is reason to doubt India’s pro-poor policy once it has a 
permanent seat on the UN Security Council. This points to the larger question of whether 
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rising powers such as India are truly interested in more democratic global institutions, or 
whether they merely seek to join an “extended oligarchy”. 
Aside from a stronger role for the United Nations General Assembly, India has 
traditionally argued for UN Security Council Reform - in accordance with the 1992 Accra 
Declaration of the Non-Aligned Movement.970 India’s position has thus traditionally been 
part of the Non-Alignment Movement, although the NAM never reached the cohesion of a 
power bloc. Furthermore, India has diverged increasingly to the pragmatist side. India, a co-
founder of the NAM in 1955, has always pledged adherence to the movement, and Indian 
political leaders continue to mention it frequently.971 However, there has been growing 
internal criticism of India’s NAM stance972, and India’s foreign policy over the past decade 
indicates that it at times diverges from its traditional, multilateralist strategy - for example 
when it signed a bilateral nuclear deal with the United States.973 A former Indian diplomat 
argued that India exerts considerable influence over both the G77 and NAM, a leadership 
position India will attempt to hold on to as long as possible. He admits, however, that India’s 
economic development may make India’s adherence to both clubs increasingly untenable.974 
In a similar fashion, Nayar and Paul argue that “emotionally though not formally, India has 
(..) already left (…) the Non-Aligned Movement.”975 Raja Mohan adds that “by the late 
1990s, [India] was compelled to look for ways to ease out of the political straightjacket the 
NAM had become on its external relations.”976 This points to a deeper mismatch between 
India and the G77. According to George Tanham, “India argues for the legal and moral 
equality of all nations, yet it looks down on smaller states and seeks a permanent seat on the 
UN Security Council.”977 This view is confirmed by Pavan Varma, who writes that “Indians 
are exceptionally hierarchical in outlook, bending more than might be thought to be required 
before those who are perceived to be ‘superior’, and dismissive or contemptuous of those 
accepted as ‘inferior’.978 
 
2.2.3.4. INDIA AND TROOP CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
India is one of the world’s principal contributor of troops to UN peacekeeping missions since 
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the end of the Cold War979, so its strategy clearly constitutes strong system- strengthening 
behavior. India has recently contributed $2 million to the UN peacekeeping fund. As tables 3 
and 4 below show, India contributes slightly less than Bangladesh, but still a very large 
number of personnel. Indian peacekeepers do by no means avoid dangerous missions. In 
2000, for example, India sent a battle-experienced contingent to Sierra Leone authorized to 
use deadly force.980 
 Considering that political leaders who send peacekeeping troops take a significant 
political risk as they deploy their soldiers in dangerous regions, how can we explain such a 
strong commitment to UN peacekeeping? India’s leadership in this regard needs to be 
understood in the context of high-minded Nehruvian idealism. Rather than playing the 
American game of realist power politics, Nehru continuously sought to assert India’s 
leadership through ahimsa (non-violence), and all leaders since have made their mark by 
strengthening the UN’s peacekeeping operations with significant manpower. In addition, 
contributing soldiers to missions is regarded as an opportunity to strengthen India’s claim for 
a more prominent position both in the UN and the world. Given that India’s financial 
contributions to the UN are low, Indian diplomats often point to India’s leadership in the 
context of peacekeeping when arguing for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Yet 
even aside from these strategic considerations, the Indian government strongly agrees with 
the UN peacekeeping operations’ principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures. 
Table: Bangladesh 
Year       Personnel (Observers, Police and Troops)981 
as of Dec 31 
2000 3285 
2001 6010  
2002 4211 
2003 4730 
2004 8024 
2005 9529 
2006 9681 
2007 9856 
2008 9567 
2009 10427  
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Table: India 
Year       Personnel (Observers, Police and Troops)982 
as of Dec 31 
2000 2738  
2001 2883 
2002 2746 
2003 2882 
2004 3912 
2005 7284 
2006 9483 
2007 9357 
2008 8693 
2009 8757 
 
2.2.3.5. THE UN’S ACTIVITIES IN INDIA 
 
India allows the UN to operate freely in India, collaborating with the organization’s work to 
achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Given the countless development 
challenges India faces, the United Nations’ activities in India take place in a wide array of 
areas, with 25 UN entities active in India.983 There are four joint programs in the areas of 
strengthening public management with regard to planning, budgeting, implementing and 
monitoring, preparing the implementation of India’s decennial population Census in 2011, 
combating HIV/ AIDS, and increasing inclusion of poor and marginalized groups. While 
India has asked donors from smaller countries to leave, it continues to collaborate with, and 
support the United Nations’ activities in the country. Given that India’s stance towards 
development is increasingly self-confident, India’s decision to allow the UN to operate in 
India shows the trust the Indian government continues to have in the organization.  
 
2.2.3.6. CONCLUSION 
 
This brief overview of India’s behavior towards the UN shows that India’s strategy is a 
mixture of different types of integration. India’s contributions are relatively small, but need 
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to be put in context of a still very low per capita income.984 In all other areas, however, India 
engages in integrative behavior and strengthens the United Nations. There is a strong overall 
agreement with the United Nations’ principles and norms. In the context of the most 
prominent reform, of the UN Security Council, India engages in revisionist integration 
(disagreeing with decision-making procedures) thus strengthening the United Nations.  
 
Area Activity India’s strategy  
UN’s overall 
responsibilities 
India regards UN as most 
legitimate international 
institution 
System-strengthening 
integration  
UN Security Council  Seeks UNSC expansion Revisionist integration 
UN General Assembly Full participation, some 
engagement in 
strengthening institution  
System-strengthening 
integration 
Peacekeeping and 
financial contributions 
Financial contributions 
low, but very large troop 
contributions  
System-strengthening 
behavior 
The UN in India Projects supporting the 
MDGs 
System-strengthening 
integration 
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2.2.4. India and the WTO 
Given the institution’s structure, India has integrated unconditionally - as all the other WTO 
members. As Esserman and Howse point out, the WTO has reduced the role of international 
diplomacy and strengthened the rule of law. There has been, in short, a judicialization of 
international trade985, a development described positively by most Indian diplomats 
interviewed for this study.986 Despite these improvements, the shortcomings of the global 
trade regime, described in more detail in section 2.1.4., also need to be pointed out. Global 
trade talks, initiated in Doha in November 2001, have been marked by blockade and 
stagnation, and it is uncertain whether they can be revived.  
Just like Brazil, India is a frequent user of the dispute settlement mechanism. It is the 
fourth most frequent complainant, the United States, the European Community, Canada and 
Brazil being on top. Despite India’s relatively low participation in global trade, it is ranked 
third in the list of nations subject to trade complaints, Brazil being in the 8th position. Using 
the dispute mechanism is fundamental to reaping the benefits the WTO provides. While some 
argue that it is difficult for least-developing countries to initiate trade disputes due to the high 
legal cost987, this restriction does not apply to India.988  Despite the cost-related problems, the 
past fifteen years of judicial dispute settlement have therefore been a success overall. 
Since 2001, India has filed seven claims with the WTO Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB), two against the United States; three against the European Communities; and one each 
against Brazil and Argentina.989 In the case of local trade disputes, India certainly seems to 
substitute the WTO’s DSB with a regional dispute settlement990, which may point towards the 
creation of stronger trade links with India’s neighbors. 
Despite its combative stance during negotiations, India considers the WTO to be 
fundamentally just.991 Similar to this view, Esserman and Howse argue that the WTO judges 
have “displayed levels of integrity and independence that rival those found in the best 
domestic court systems.”992 In addition, multilateral trade negotiations allow emerging 
countries to work together, which makes them much stronger than when negotiating with the 
United States on a bilateral basis.993 
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Furthermore, during interviews for this study, Indian policy makers pointed out that 
they believe the WTO allows India to progress economically and expand its power.994 Nayar 
and Paul recommend that “for the sake of higher economic growth, it is necessary for India to 
participate fully in rule-based international economic organizations, such as the WTO.” They 
continue arguing that “the critics who advocate quitting WTO are mistaken in their position, 
since rule-based organizations work more to the benefit of weaker economic players than 
power-based ones.”995 
India’s behavior during trade negotiations, such as in Cancún, is described as 
confrontational, but it is merely issue-based confrontation. After the failure in Cancún, 
European and American analysts mostly blamed the G20, and India as one of its leaders. 
Bergsten, for example, argues that “ironically, it was China and India - the largest and most 
successful developing countries - that triggered Doha's demise because they were unwilling to 
open their own markets sufficiently to permit an agreement.”996 It is true that of all the 
groups of developing countries that were created before the negotiation, the one that received 
most attention was the G20 (actually G22) led by India, Brazil and China.997 
Why did India engage in issue-based confrontation? As Amrita Narlikar and Rorden 
Wilkinson point out, “key to the emergence of the group was the disillusionment of many 
developing countries with the EU-US text on agriculture and a memory of similar collusion in 
the past by the developed countries.”998 This shows the importance of perspective. 
Developing countries regarded developed countries’ behavior prior to Cancún as 
confrontational, and their behavior in Cancún as the adequate response.999 In fact, Narlikar 
captures developing countries’ diplomats’ memories of the failed talks well when she argues 
that “the fact that they were able to maintain their positions in the endgame suggests that, 
finally, after years of signing agreements that they did not understand and that were reached 
through fuzzy processes of negotiation, developing countries had finally put their foot 
down.”1000 India’s leadership in Cancún can thus be seen in the context of confrontation, but 
also in the sense of empowerment. 
Does signing bilateral trade deals mean that a country engages in systemic 
confrontation? Laura Carstens points out that India is more successful in reducing trade 
barriers through regional trade blocks such as SAFTA and IAFTA, and thirteen bilateral 
trade deals, than through the WTO.1001 According to our definition, a country engages in 
systemic confrontation when it actively undermines an institution. We would thus describe 
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India’s strategy towards the WTO as systemically confrontational if it actively sought to 
undermine multilateral trade negotiations, for example, by tempting other nations to move 
away from the WTO and pursue exclusively bilateral deals. This is obviously not the case. 
India does, like many other countries, bilateral trade deals. That does not indicate, however, 
that India seeks autonomy from the WTO, ceasing to use its dispute mechanism or leaving 
the WTO, as several diplomats confirmed.1002 
India engages in an extreme form of issue-based confrontation and thus strengthens 
the system. This issue-based confrontation becomes most visible during trade rounds and 
trade disputes, which fortify the institution. India agrees with the WTO’s principles (reducing 
trade barriers increases welfare), its norms and rules (dispute settlements, multilateral trade 
negotiations, summits), and decision-making procedures (one vote per country, necessity to 
obtain consensus to achieve a new trade deal). 
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2.2.5. India and the NPT 
 
India assumed leadership in the context of nuclear proliferation at an early stage. Under the 
leadership of Homi Bhabha, a world-renowned nuclear scientist, India sought to ready itself 
for the nuclear era in 1944, three years prior to Independence from the United Kingdom.1003 
Bhabha would later become the President of the UN International Conference on Peaceful 
Uses of Atomic Energy in Geneva in 1955. 
India has long pursued the schizophrenic policy of promoting disarmament and 
secretly developing nuclear weapons at the same time. This was due to the peculiar 
combination of an idealist mindset and the desire to seek the moral high ground paired with a 
rapidly deteriorating security situation in Asia. At the same time, Indian policy makers felt 
that the NPT’s fundamental principles were unjust and did not provide India with the 
position it deserved in the world. They called the NPT ‘nuclear colonialism.’1004 When its 
attempts to promote actual disarmament failed, India proceeded to test nuclear weapons in 
1974. 
The nuclear tests in 1974 and India’s behavior in the following two decades put India 
at odds with the international non-proliferation regime, as well as both superpowers.1005 The 
tests were essentially a response to China’s invasion in 1962 and its transformation into a 
nuclear state in 1964. Facing the latent military threat from both China and Pakistan, the 
mainstream security analysts equated signing the NPT with vulnerability and impotence. 
India did not openly assume nuclear weapons status, however, and said it had merely 
conducted “peaceful explosions”, but had no intention to build nuclear weapons. 24 years 
later, in 1998 however, India once again exploded nuclear weapons, this time fully assuming 
nuclear weapons status, causing international condemnation and economic sanctions. 
Reaching out towards an isolated India, the United States signed a historic nuclear 
deal with India in 2005. After several years of confidence building measures, the United States 
recognized India as a nuclear power, a recognition India had felt entitled to for several 
decades.1006 The deal was fiercely criticized, particularly by powers who had decided not to 
pursue nuclear arms, such as Brazil. The Brazilian government complained that while it had 
adhered to the rules and accepted international inspections since joining the treaty, India was 
rewarded for failing to sign and continuing to refuse inspections in its military nuclear 
facilities. 
 India’s behavior seems to constitute passive confrontation, which, given the structure 
of the proliferation regime, amounts to systemic confrontation. India may agree with the 
overarching principle of the NPT (in fact, it is a strong supporter of a world free of nuclear 
weapons), but it fundamentally disagrees with the NPT’s norms and rules, which caused to it 
refrain from signing the treaty. India’s behavior significantly destabilizes the non-
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proliferation regime. In 2006, Ashton Carter, former US undersecretary of defense, argued 
that the US-India nuclear deal would not damage the NPT, pointing out that North Korea 
and Iran were already breaking the rules, no matter what India did.1007 Yet, Carter did not 
take into consideration how other emerging democracies such as Brazil and Turkey would 
interpret the deal. Contrary to what official government sources indicate, there is a vibrant 
internal discussion inside the Brazilian government about the merits of obtaining nuclear 
arms.1008 Due to India’s decision to build them, Brazil remains as the only non-nuclear BRIC. 
The fact that a rising power can “get away” with systemic confrontation and maintain and 
strengthen crucial partnerships may cause others to behave in a similar way. There is an 
additional aspect that explains why India’s behavior is so serious. The world can only make 
significant progress towards non-proliferation if all countries join and obey the treaty. A 
single country is, in theory, enough to undo the benefits. As long as at least one state stays 
outside the treaty, the trusting relationships that are embodied in the NPT will be diminished 
and may even be fatally undermined.1009 While India is not the only country to remain outside 
of the treaty (Israel, Pakistan, North Korea are the others), integrationist behavior would 
strongly increase the pressure on the other three.  
This interpretation of India’s nuclear strategy has been contested by both Indian 
diplomats and Indian policy makers, who generally see no confrontational element in India’s 
policy. They argue that India would very much like to join the NPT, but cannot because it 
does not allow it to be recognized as a nuclear weapons state (NWS). They argue that India is 
a “conscientious abstainer”, underlining that India has been a responsible guardian of its 
nuclear weapons policy since its second nuclear explosion in 1998.1010 Yet, irrespective of 
whether the NPT is just or not, India’s behavior is clearly not system-strengthening. Even if 
we categorize India’s behavior as passive confrontation, this ultimately amounts to systemic 
confrontation given India’s importance and the nature of the NPT. India’s stance towards the 
NPT will be analyzed more in-depth in Part 3. 
                                                 
1007 Carter, Ashton B. (2006). America's New Strategic Partner? Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 4 (Jul. - 
Aug., 2006), pp. 33-44 
1008 Interview, Brazilian Diplomat, Itamaraty, Brasilia, July 23, 2010. 
1009 Ruzicka, Jan , Nicholas J. Wheeler (2010). The puzzle of trusting relationships in the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty. International Affairs 86: 1 (2010) 69–85 
1010 Phone interview with an Indian diplomat based in New Delhi, April 25, 2010 
OLIVER STUENKEL – DOCTORAL THESIS 178 
2.2.6. India and the IMF/ World Bank 
 
2.2.6.1. INDIA AND THE IMF 
 
Similar to Brazil, India has been an IMF recipient for decades but repaid its debt ahead of 
schedule. And, similar to Argentina’s debt crisis in 2001 and its effects in Latin America, the 
Asian crisis in 1997 has eroded the IMF’s legitimacy in the region. 
  The IMF’s role in India has often been controversial, and many policy makers 
criticized the World Bank Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL) signed in December 1991 for 
increasing poverty levels in the country.1011 The intervention caused political tension inside 
the government as measures were highly unpopular among the poor, who had voted for the 
ruling Congress Party in the previous elections. 
When Indian officials announced that their country would turn into a lender to the 
IMF, it represented the end of a long transformation, led by Manmohan Singh first as Finance 
Minister, then as Prime Minister. Narlikar rightly argues that India’s current growth is not 
merely the result of good policies since the mid-1990s, but of fundamental changes well 
before that.1012 Still, the impact of Singh’s efforts to dismantle the “license raj”, a complex 
system of state licenses that stifled economic innovation, cannot be underestimated. In a 
similar fashion, he convinced Indians that some aspects of the Nehruvian and the Gandhian 
beliefs about economic development had to be reconsidered. 1013 
With 1.89% of total voting rights at the IMF, India feels its newly found economic 
strength is not adequately reflected. As in Brazil, the fact that small countries such as the 
Netherlands or Belgium have more votes than India is an often used argument to symbolize 
the inequality and pro-Europe bias of the Bretton Woods institutions.1014 As Aaditya Mattoo 
and Arvind Subramanian point out, the IMF lost its status as an interlocutor in emerging 
markets after having failed to provide enough money and imposing unnecessarily tough 
conditions, which Asians believe aggravated the crisis.1015 
During the IMF meeting in Istanbul, the Indian government proposed a quota shift of 
7% towards the developing countries. 1016 India thus seems to be engaging in revisionist 
integration. 
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2.2.6.2. INDIA AND THE WORLD BANK 
 
India and the World Bank have a long history of collaboration and today India is the Bank’s 
largest client.1017 The World Bank strategy proposed the lending of $14 billion for the period 
of 2009 to 2012 to India. In the context of the financial crisis, the World Bank provided a 
total of $14 billion to India.1018 In a formerly colonized country concerned about defending its 
sovereignty, Bank intervention is traditionally contentious1019 and criticized by the opposition 
and the media.1020 
 In addition, there is an increasing tension between India’s identity as a great power 
and its 300 million people under the poverty line who still require massive outside 
intervention to reduce the their plight. Those who propagate India’s great power status find it 
increasingly inadequate to have international institutions such as the World Bank deal with 
internal issues. 
Similar to Brazil, India seeks more influence in the World Bank for itself and other 
emerging powers. Indian government officials have frequently called for the developing 
nations share in the World Bank to increase to 47%.1021 
Tied to this quest for more influence is an interest in changing the Bank’s approach, 
which India considers to be ‘humiliating’. In this respect, its position is similar to that of 
Brazil, which also has recent memories of being a developing nation dependent on outside 
help. Rowland argues that this recent experience may cause India to reform the way the 
World Bank deals with its clients. However, this change may not be technical, but rhetorical, 
which may indeed change the World Bank clients’ perception of the Bank’s behavior.1022 
India therefore agrees with the principles of the Bretton Woods institutions (global 
financial stability), and considers a well-capitalized Bank necessary to confront future 
challenges.1023 It also agrees with the institutions’ norms (lending upon conditionalities), but 
disagrees with some rules (the type and strength of conditionalities), and the decision-making 
procedures (quotas and voting shares). India’s strategy towards the World Bank seems to be a 
classic case of revisionist integration, but will be analyzed more in depth in Part 3.  
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2.2.7. India and the G8 / G20  
  
As section 2.1.7. (Brazil and the G8/ G20) has made clear, the G8 has been facing ample 
criticism over the past decade.1024 Critics mostly point to the ‘democracy deficit’ of the G8 
and argue that it can hardly solve crucial problems without the participation of rising powers 
such as China, India and Brazil.1025 These critics are often from established countries. Robert 
Zoellick, World Bank President, argued in 2008 that the G7 was “not working” and that “We 
need a better group for a different time,” asking for the inclusion of several emerging 
countries, including India.1026 Despite, or because of this criticism, the G8 summits are, 
together with WTO negotiations, the most visible events in the context of global governance. 
In the same context, the G8 fell in the trap of vastly overestimating its power when Tony 
Blair and Gordon Brown suggested in 2005 that they could ‘make poverty’ history’- to which 
Joseph Stiglitz, former chief economist of the World Bank, ironically responded that the 
summit could not even bring about ‘the end of the beginning of ending poverty”.1027 
India has left the question about how emerging powers should deal with the G8 to 
other rising actors such as Brazil and China. This may be due to India’s strong interest in UN 
Security Council reform, and entry into the G8 is regarded as less valuable than entry into the 
UN Security Council. In this regard, it strongly differs from Brazil, whose President Cardoso 
(1995-2002) at one point even prioritized entry into the G8 over that of UNSC reform.1028 
Abdul Nafey points out that India is not under pressure to obtain a seat at the table, knowing 
that time is on its side.1029 There is a sense among Indian policy makers that it is the 
developed countries’ responsibility to invite emerging powers, and that “if the G8, especially 
the US, fail to (…) realize that the folly of leaving out emerging economies, the loss is theirs, 
not of India or China.”1030 This “wait and see-strategy”1031 does not necessarily point to a lack 
of interest, but rather to hurt pride and frustration. An Indian diplomat admitted that the 
Indian government found it “offensive” that they had not yet been invited as full members.1032 
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 While India regarded the 2006 Summit in St. Petersburg positively, the Indian 
government did not hide its disappointment when the G8 issued a joint statement before 
consultation with the “Outreach 5” (consisting of Brazil, India, China, Mexico and South 
Africa) had taken place. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said that if India were invited 
again, he would like to interact with the G8 leaders before they interact amongst themselves, 
not afterwards.1033 Still, India remains keen to engage in the G8, as it gives it a chance to 
leverage it for its own internal economic transformation. 
 India welcomed the creation of the G20 and seeks to assume a leadership role.1034 
“The G8 had become redundant because it was not a representative of the world”, Rediff, an 
Indian news agency, announced triumphantly. “It included only wealthy nations like Britain, 
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,  Russia and the United States.”1035 While policy 
makers frequently point out that the G20 can be no substitute of the UNSC, it was received as 
an important signal in Delhi that the structures of the Western World Order are not set in 
stone. The continued existence of the G8, however, has caused some Indian diplomats to 
wonder whether the G20 would be relegated to a second-tier meeting again once the financial 
crisis was over. Other diplomats are more confident and predict that the G8 will become less 
and less important as it did not contain India and China.1036 The G20 summit in Pittsburgh in 
2009 received unusually high attention in the Indian press, and Indian policy makers are said 
to regard the summits as very important - this may also have to do with the fact that India is a 
full member (unlike the G8, which Indians dislike because it failed to grant India full 
membership).1037 At the G20 summit in the United States in 2009 and in Canada in 2010, 
India’s position was strengthened by the fact it was one of the participants with the best 
economic growth indicators, along with China.1038 As Eswar Prasad pointed out, “India’s 
response to the crisis has been far more mature than that of many developed economies, 
without reflexive moves towards financial protectionism or a reversal of initiatives towards 
financial market development. This gives India credibility that should allow it to punch 
beyond its weight class.”1039 India is currently advocating that future G20 Summits should be 
held by rotation in a developed country and an emerging market, showing that it seeks to 
engage further and assume responsibility. 
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 As this short overview shows, India is more reluctant to enter the G8 than other 
emerging economies such as Brazil. India’s reluctance can be explained by its fear of being 
given G8 membership in compensation for not being offered a permanent seat on the UN 
Security council. If offered a spot, India could be expected to seek to implement some changes 
in the agenda and work of the G8. This could complicate negotiations, but also broaden the 
G8’s scope. As Abdul Nafey points out, India convinced the United States at Heiligendamm 
to engage in further negotiations under then UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC).1040 There is thus fundamental agreement about the G8’s and G20’s principles 
(addressing global challenges) and their norms (summit-based communication), but 
disagreement with specific rules (exclusive invitation-based participation) and decision-
making procedures (exclusive creation of joint statement). 
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2.2.8. India and Asia 
 
India’s neighborhood is dangerous, characterized by the conflict with Pakistan.1041 It is 
regional context where Brazil’s and India’s realities differ most strongly. Interstate warfare is 
rare and unlikely in South America. Asia, and South Asia in particular, is considered to be 
one of the most unstable regions in the world.1042 This conflict began with the creation of the 
two states and the conflict over Kashmir in 1947. Of the four wars that occurred since then 
(using a definition of at least 1,000 battlefield deaths) between the two states, all were 
initiated by Pakistan.1043 The reason for the ongoing conflict is captured well by Ashely Tellis 
when he argues that “Pakistan regarded partition as necessary and inevitable. … but 
incomplete (without Kashmir), while India regarded partition as unnecessary and tragic, but 
fundamentally complete.”1044 
Yet aside from the conflict with Pakistan, a border conflict with China and political 
instability in Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Myanmar cause further instability in the 
region. For example, estimates are that 16 million Bangladeshi refugees currently reside in 
India, mostly in the states of Assam and West Bengal.1045 Pakistan and Afghanistan, both 
semi-functional or failed states, complete the picture. India is, as one diplomat called it, “an 
island of stability in a sea of mayhem.”1046 
As a consequence, India has not been able to assume the regional leadership one 
would expect considering its demographic and economic dominance. Raja Mohan points out 
that India is “frustrated by the extreme difficulties of dealing with its neighbors” and argues 
that India has a “Gringo problem”, causing similar resentment in the region to what the 
United States face in the world.1047 This points to the fact that despite India’s preponderance 
in the region, its smaller neighbors are not inclined to accept India as a leader. Elites in 
neighboring countries frequently lament the corrupting cultural influence of India’s 
Bollywood movies, and any attempt India has made in the past to articulate its own ‘Monroe 
Doctrine’ were rejected by smaller states.1048 
This section will analyze India’s strategy in the regional institutions and evaluate it 
according to the categories created in section 1.5. Given political instability, there are fewer 
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regional institutions than in Europe, and of those that exist, India is not well-integrated. We 
will therefore give a brief overview over India’s strategy towards the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB). 
The Asian Development Bank can be seen as a regional version of the World Bank. 
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) was established in 1966 to promote economic and social 
development in Asian and Pacific countries through loans and technical assistance. The Bank 
is financed by its 67 member states, of which 48 are from the region, and 19 are donor states 
from other regions of the world - such as the United States, several EU-members and 
Turkey.1049 Seeking to implement its vision of a region free of poverty, the ADB’s main 
instruments comprise loans, technical assistance, grants, advice, and knowledge. The Bank 
mostly lends to governments, yet also at times to private companies through equity 
investments, guarantees and loans. Similar to the Inter American Development Bank (IADB), 
the ADB has a AAA-rating which allows it to borrow at cheap rates. Last year, ADB 
approved $10.5 billion of loans for 86 projects, which makes it an influential institution in 
Asia. The ADB’s voting structure is similar to that of the IADB. Recipient countries in Asia 
hold 65% of the votes, against 35% for non-regional members, of which the United States 
(12.75%) and Canada (4.47%) are the most powerful. Of the Asian countries, Japan has most 
weight (12.75%), followed by China (5.44%) and India (5.32%). As one of the Bank’s biggest 
shareholders, the President of the Asian Development is traditionally Japanese. The current 
Bank President is Haruhiko Kuroda.1050 
 The conflict between India and China is reflected in the ADB. In early 2009, the Bank 
initially endorsed a $2.9 million water project in Arunchal Pradesh, a region in India that is 
also partly claimed by China. The Chinese government severely criticized the project, 
accusing the Bank of interfering in the political affairs of its members.1051 The project was 
eventually cancelled.1052  
 As the only genuinely Asian institution, the ADB plays an important role in the 
context of the creation of an Asian identity. The concept of “Asian Values”, propagated by 
Singapore’s former Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew and political writer Kishore 
Mahbubani1053, has always strengthened the ADB’s position. Although India does not 
subscribe to so-called “Asian values”, it recognizes the ADB as a distinctly Asian organization 
and therefore seeks to be part of it.  
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The importance India attributes to the ADB can also explained be the relative 
dysfunction of most other regional bodies it participates in. The East Asia Summit, first held 
in Kuala Lumpur in 2005, has not yet achieved much, and ASEAN-plus-6 seems unlikely to 
become a reality anytime soon.1054 
India’s behavior can therefore be classified as alignment. India will continue to 
support the Asian Development Bank as a tool to deal with development challenges. Aside 
from its effectiveness in fighting poverty in the region, India sees the ADB as an important 
vehicle to maintain a dialogue with its Asian counterparts, a project of major importance 
given India’s fragile ties with the region. 
                                                 
1054 Economist Correspondent (2009). Distant dreams, The Economist, October 29, 2009 
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2.2.9. India and NATO  
 
NATO’s activities are increasingly global. As described in section 2.1.9. (Brazil and NATO), 
the Cold War eliminated the military alliance’s raison d’être, which was to defend the ‘free 
world’ against the Soviet Union. Contrary to what many analysts, mostly from the realist 
camp, predicted, NATO did not disintegrate - quite to the contrary, it prospered, took on 
new missions, and France decided to reintegrate its forces into NATO command.1055 In its 
mission in Bosnia, NATO was allied with NATO, and it has engaged in disaster relief in 
Africa and South Asia, which caused Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier to describe the 
organization as ‘Global NATO’.1056 This seems somewhat premature, as NATO’s 
engagement in Africa, Latin America and Oceania is very small. Yet, there is a notable 
eastward orientation, symbolized by the discussion of whether to include Russia as a 
member.1057 NATO’s decision to engage in Afghanistan symbolized the end of any regional 
focus of the organization, as its focus now lies fully in Central Asia. 1058 
In this context, India is becoming a significant partner for the world’s foremost 
military alliance. Its sudden large presence in Afghanistan, where it took over the mission in 
2003 after the US invasion in 2001 has strengthened the importance of India for the alliance. 
In fact, India has become one of NATO’s most important strategic allies. During the Munich 
Security Conference in 2001, NATO chief Anders Fogh Rasmussen argued that New Delhi 
had a "stake" in Afghanistan as he sought "a stronger, more inclusive security coalition" of 
countries like India, principally in order to “tackle terrorism, cyber attacks, energy cut-offs, 
piracy and climate change.”1059 Sonali Huria points out that NATO sees India as an “anchor 
state in Southern Asia.”1060 India’s participation in the effort to stabilize Afghanistan and 
combat the Taliban is considered crucial by the NATO command.1061 India possesses 
considerable soft power in Afghanistan, and it enjoys a better reputation than the ISAF 
forces, partly because India does not engage in military action but merely in reconstruction 
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efforts. Military collaboration has been particularly strong between India and the United 
States, and the two armies regularly train together.1062 
First, India is a liberal democracy that shares the same goals as NATO in the region, 
namely stabilizing and democratizing Afghanistan and combating terrorism. Even without 
the mission in Afghanistan, democratic and rising India would be of growing importance as 
NATO is increasingly facing threats on a global level.1063 In 2007, the US ambassador to 
NATO, Victoria Nuland stressed that the "post-Cold War honeymoon" is over and NATO 
needs to develop capabilities "wherever and whenever they may arise".1064 The US 
government is therefore keen to institutionalize a NATO-India partnership, which would 
complement the strategic partnership established in 2005 after the US-Indian nuclear 
deal.1065While most of NATO’s partners in the Middle East are autocratic regimes, creating 
stronger bonds with India would strengthen NATO’s claim that it seeks to align with 
countries with “common values.” 
In the light of these developments, several leading strategic thinkers have called for 
India’s inclusion in NATO. Ivo Daalder, now US ambassador to NATO, has argued prior to 
taking office that NATO should open membership to “any democratic state in the world that 
is willing and able to contribute to the fulfillment of NATO’s new responsibilities.” They 
argue that members such as India would turn NATO into a “legitimate and capable adjunct 
to the UN by helping to implement and enforce its decisions.”1066 Although European and 
American officials have not openly backed such a claim, Washington genuinely seeks a 
NATO-India partnership which would involve increased coordination of security matters.1067 
Rasmussen argues that NATO should become "the hub of a network of security partnerships 
and a center for consultation on international security issues" with countries such as India.1068 
  Others reject NATO’s institutional globalization. German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel, for instance, argued that the inclusion of members outside of its core area was 
impossible.1069 Particularly countries that depend on NATO’s protection are unlikely to 
support its radical expansion as that could undermine Article 5, under which an attack on 
one member is considered an attack on all members. The more members are accepted, the 
more likely it is that the alliance would be pushed into wars it does not consider to be crucial 
for its strategic interests. 
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Yet, despite a potential partnership, India is unlikely to officially align with NATO, 
or become a NATO member. The Indian public, used to Non-Alignment, does not support 
any type of unconditional alignment, and signing up to NATO would be like giving up 
sovereignty. Any type of NATO-India consultation was therefore held without making any 
public announcements.1070 The political risk of approaching the established powers is so high 
that Manmohan Singh’s government almost collapsed after signing the nuclear agreement 
with the United States in 2005. No government will therefore take the risk of applying for 
NATO membership (an application NATO could accept).1071 In any case, it seems 
improbable for India to engage militarily in Afghanistan, fearing that its reputation would 
suffer among the Afghan population.1072 In addition, India seeks to avoid antagonizing 
Pakistan, which may feel encircled by an Indian military deployment in Afghanistan. Still, 
India is bound to become one of NATO’s key allies in the region. 
Strategic considerations with regard to Afghanistan overlook that India is still 
fundamentally opposed to outside military intervention, explained by its fear of the 
internationalization of the conflict with Pakistan over Kashmir. When, on the third day, the 
UNSC refused to condemn the NATO bombings in Yugoslavia, the trio Belarus, India and 
Russia offered a draft resolution charging that the bombings violated several articles of the 
UN Charter.1073 Criticism of the NATO campaign within India was widespread and 
characterized NATO largely as a US tool to dominate the world.1074 This shows that, 
particularly in the context of India’s alignment with the G77 and the group’s opposition to 
interference that violates sovereignty, India has historically been opposed to India’s NATO-
led interventions. 
Still, as India’s policy is becoming more assertive, we can best describe its strategy 
towards NATO as alignment. Despite the historical opposition to outside interventions, 
India’s values and interests are strongly aligned with those of NATO. India and NATO 
collaborate in Afghanistan, the most important mission in NATO’s history, so we can 
describe India’s policy towards NATO as alignment.  
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2.3. Evaluation and Interpretation 
 
Section 2.1. and 2.2. have given a brief overview over Brazil’s and India’s strategy towards the 
Western World Order. The table below summarizes the findings. 
 
Institution (Principles, Rules and 
Norms, Decision-making procedures) 
Brazil India 
UN Security Council: Principles:  
Maintaining peace and security 
Rules and norms:  
Majority-based decision-making, 
binding enforceable resolutions  
Decision-making procedures:  
Exclusive membership, five 
permanent veto-holding members 
Revisionist integration 
Fundamental agreement 
with principles, rules and 
norms.  
Seeks to amend decision-
making procedures 
through expansion of 
permanent membership  
Revisionist integration  
Fundamental agreement with 
principles, rules and norms.  
Seeks to amend decision-
making procedures through 
expansion of permanent 
membership 
UN General Assembly:  
Principles:  
Promote peace, economic 
development and global progress, 
provide international platform for all 
national actors  
Rules and norms:  
Equal membership 
Decision-making procedures:  
Majority-based decision-making, 
binding enforceable resolutions 
System-strengthening 
integration  
Agrees with and fully 
supports principles, 
rules, norms and 
decision-making 
procedures. Leadership 
in G77, Observer Status 
in Non-Aligned 
Movement  
System-strengthening 
integration  
Agrees with and fully 
supports principles, rules, 
norms and decision-making 
procedures. Leadership in 
G77, Leader and Co-founder 
of Non-Aligned Movement  
UN Peacekeeping:  
Principles:  
Keep or enforce peace agreements, 
protect persecuted groups, maintain 
political stability  
Rules and norms:  
Voluntary troop contributions and 
military leadership of missions 
Decision-making procedures:  
Missions need to be supported by 
UNSC 
System-strengthening 
integration 
Agrees with and fully 
supports principles, 
rules, norms and 
decision-making 
procedures. Significant 
troop contributions and 
leadership of 
MINUSTAH since 2004  
System-strengthening 
integration 
Agrees with and fully 
supports principles, rules, 
norms and decision-making 
procedures. Historically one 
of the principal troop 
contributors  
World Trade Organization: 
Principles:  
Reduce trade barriers, promote free 
trade, enhance welfare  
Rules and norms:  
Dispute settlements, multilateral trade 
System-strengthening 
behavior  
Agrees with principles, 
norms, rules and 
decision-making 
procedures.  
System-strengthening 
behavior  
Agrees with principles, 
norms, rules and decision-
making procedures.  
Frequent user of dispute 
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negotiations, summits  
Decision-making procedures:  
One vote per country, necessity to 
obtain consensus to achieve new trade 
deal 
Frequent user of dispute 
mechanism and leader of 
G20 development 
countries during Doha 
Round   
mechanism and leader of 
G20 development countries 
during Doha Round   
Non-Proliferation Treaty:  
Principles:  
Nuclear disarmament, non-
proliferation, promotion of peaceful 
use of nuclear energy for civilian 
purposes 
Rules and norms:  
Two-tiered system, all states that 
went nuclear before January 1967 are 
NWS, all other NNWS, non-nuclear 
powers need to open nuclear facilities 
for IAEA inspectors 
Decision-making procedures:  
Negotiations about additional 
inspection regimes, five-yearly 
meeting to discuss progress on 
disarmament and non-proliferation  
Systemic confrontation 
Agrees with overarching 
principle of NPT 
Agreed to rules and 
norms but vague 
disagreement with 
‘nuclear apartheid’. 
(“signing the NPT was a 
mistake”), violates 
fundamental norm of 
IAEA inspectors  
Not cooperative with 
regard to additional 
inspection regimes to 
strengthen non-
proliferation regime 
  
Passive confrontation  
(amounts to systemic 
confrontation due to NPT’s 
structure) 
Agrees with overarching 
principle of NPT 
Has refused to sign NPT as 
non-nuclear power, tested 
nuclear weapons in 1974 and 
1998. 
Objects to two-tiered 
‘nuclear apartheid’ and does 
not open all nuclear facilities 
to IAEA inspectors 
Part of Nuclear Suppliers 
Group (NSG), has 
traditionally acted 
responsibly with its own 
nuclear material.  
 
IMF/ World Bank:  
Principles:  
Strengthen global financial stability 
Rules and norms:  
Lending upon conditionalities, 
intervention in recipient countries  
Decision-making procedures: 
Quotas and voting shares, developed 
countries overrepresented  
Revisionist integration 
Agrees with overall 
principle, supports 
‘spirit’ of organization, 
gives great importance to 
‘lender status’ Agrees 
with most rules and 
norms, although some 
reservations about the 
type of intervention and 
conditionalities  
Disagrees with decision-
making procedures, 
seeks change of quota 
and voting structures, 
more weight for 
developing countries   
Revisionist integration 
Agrees with overall 
principle, supports ‘spirit’ of 
organization, gives great 
importance to ‘lender status’ 
Agrees with most rules and 
norms, although some 
reservations about the type 
of intervention and 
conditionalities  
Disagrees with decision-
making procedures, seeks 
change of quota and voting 
structures, more weight for 
developing countries   
G8 / G20:  Revisionist integration Revisionist integration 
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Principles:  
Address global challenges in informal 
meeting without procedural 
constraints  
Rules and norms:  
Summit-based communication, 
exclusive invitation-based 
participation 
Decision-making procedures:  
Exclusive creation of joint statement 
Agrees with principles 
and seeks participation 
Agrees with rules and 
norms of informal, 
summit-based 
communication 
Disagrees with extreme 
exclusivity, seeks 
replacement of G8 by 
G20, which better 
reflects developing 
countries 
At G20, seeks presence of 
G24 representative  
Agrees with principles and 
seeks participation Agrees 
with rules and norms of 
informal, summit-based 
communication 
Disagrees with extreme 
exclusivity, seeks 
replacement of G8 by G20, 
which better reflects 
developing countries 
At G20, seeks presence of 
G24 representative 
Regional organizations Alignment  
Strong supporter of Inter 
American Development 
Bank and Mercosur, 
which are both 
organized around 
democratic, fair and 
open principles  
Alignment  
Strong supporter of Asian 
Development Bank, which is 
organized around 
democratic, fair and open 
principles 
NATO Alignment  
Member of Rio Treaty, 
which is based on similar 
principal as NATO  
Criticized NATO 
campaign in Yugoslavia 
but agrees with ISAF 
mission in Afghanistan  
Alignment  
Criticized NATO campaign 
in Yugoslavia but agrees 
with ISAF mission in 
Afghanistan 
Key donor for Afghan 
reconstruction due to 
strategic importance of 
Central Asia 
Fully aligned with NATO on 
issues of terrorism   
 
This shows that both Brazil’s and India’s behavior can be described as overwhelmingly 
integrative, considering that all strategies except systemic confrontation are, in fact, 
integrative strategies. This analysis in section 2.1. shows that Brazil’s behavior towards the 
Western World Order is a mix of system-strengthening integration, revisionist integration, 
issue-based confrontation, alignment and systemic confrontation. Brazil’s behavior is 
therefore overwhelmingly integrative. Except for the NPT, Brazil does not engage in any 
instant in systemic or passive confrontation (which, given Brazil’s size, would amount to 
systemic confrontation). The results obtained in section 2.2. are slightly different. India’s 
strategy is a mix of all categories ranging from system-strengthening behavior to passive 
confrontation. While India’s overall strategy can be characterized as overwhelmingly 
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integrative, there are instances of confrontation, most prominently regarding the Non-
Proliferation Treaty. 
What do these results tell us? The results obtained in both section 2.1. and 2.2. 
therefore prove the hypothesis developed that rising fringe nations will join the Western 
World Order, creating not a ‘Post-Western World’, but a ‘Greater West’. Brazil and India 
engage in what Celso Lafer, Brazil’s former Foreign Minister, calls “moderated 
constructiveness”, characterized by the systemic use of both diplomacy and international 
law.1075 The case of the NPT, however, requires further analysis. 
The hypothesis about the attractiveness and durability of the international 
institutions that make up the Western World Order is therefore largely proven, but it 
becomes obvious that the hypothesis does not hold in some instances. Under what 
circumstances does a democratic nation such as India decide to confront the system? We need 
to develop additional hypotheses that explain when fringe nations engage in systemic 
confrontation. We will then seek to prove this second set of hypotheses in Part 3, which will 
analyze three specific cases in detail. 
The first hypothesis is that fringe nations confront a particular institution 
systemically if they face an acute security threat that can only be addressed employing 
systemic confrontation. In this case, nations may still approve of Ikenberry’s claim about the 
openness and fairness of the Western World Order. The security they face, however, 
supplants the Western World Order’s benefits given the security restraints. This hypothesis 
has a certain appeal to realists, who argue that institutions are mere strategic alliances which 
are discarded once they no longer serve a particular short-term interest. As soon as a member 
country believes that its security is at stake if it is part of a specific institution, it will retreat 
or oppose the institution.1076 
 
In accordance with this hypothesis, Rahul Sagar argues that  
 
…India will, if by default, pursue prosperity and peace, a strategy that promises to transform 
it into a great commercial power. Such a development would have positive implications for 
India and the international system. It would satisfy India’s desire for recognition and create 
new constituencies for peace and stability in Asia and beyond, founded on the prospect of 
mutually beneficial trade and investment. However, if this quest is thwarted by external 
threats it is likely that a contrary dynamic will be set in motion, as calls to enhance India’s 
military power grow louder—and are heeded more closely.1077 
 
The second hypothesis, involving constructivist approaches, is that nations engage in 
systemic confrontation if the principals and the ‘spirit’ of the institutions run counter to 
Ikenberry’s description of international institutions  (just, democratic, open), if the institution 
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offers no ‘intra-institutional mobility’, and if states perceive the institution in question as 
highly unjust and impossible to fix. 
This hypothesis is not directly tied to the questions of costs vs. benefits, nor is it 
about the discussion of relative gains vs. absolute gains between realists and liberals. Rather, 
it is a question of how fringe countries perceive the spirit of the institutions. During the 
interviews for this study, all Indian diplomats have consistently characterized the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as “unjust”. If fringe countries perceive the institution to be 
unjust and void of social mobility, Ikenberry’s claim about institution’s attractiveness (due to 
openness and fairness) is no longer valid for potential entrants. Their most likely strategy is 
therefore no longer unconditional integration. Ruzicka and Wheeler voice a similar argument 
when they argue that “the lack of trust could potentially be overcome in a trust-building 
process, [but] no amount of trust-building could address the conviction that the bargain 
incorporated in [a] treaty threatens the state’s security and is inherently unjust and 
discriminatory.”1078 
The more unjust fringe nations consider an institution, and the smaller the 
probability to solve this issue, the less likely they are to integrate. If they consider the system 
to be somewhat unjust but worth preserving, they will engage in revisionist integration or 
alignment. This is arguably the case with the UN Security Council, the G8 and Bretton 
Woods. If fringe countries consider the system to be unjust and impossible to fix, they will 
engage in systemic integration. There is some evidence that fringe countries’ strategy towards 
international relations is correlated to their view on how just that particular international 
regime is. 
 In the same vein, Henry Kissinger argues that any system produces winners and 
losers, and that losers will seek to confront the system if they believe the gap between them 
and the winners becomes too great.1079 He adds that leading actors have to assure that all 
participants feel they are on the winning side in order to maintain stability. 
 We will seek to prove or disprove the hypothesis in Part 3, particularly in Case Study 
3, which deals with the UN Security Council. 
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3. Case studies 
 
CRITERIA FOR THE CASE SELECTION 
 
First, and most importantly, the following three case studies seek to prove or disprove our 
research hypothesis that liberal theory can adequately explain Brazil’s and India’s behavior 
towards the Western World Order. They should also clarify our additional set of hypotheses 
developed at the end of Part 2 to explain why, in some instances, liberal theory fails to 
explain their behavior. Most importantly, we have argued that countries may chose to 
confront the Western World Order if doing so helps them reduce an acute security threat. 
The second hypothesis is that rising fringe nations will confront regimes that they consider to 
be unjust. 
Secondly, the three case studies that were chosen are of particular interest due to their 
strategic significance. The United Nations Security Council, the Bretton Woods institutions 
and the Non-Proliferation Treaty cover an important part of the Western World Order and 
range across different issue-areas. The Security Council is considered to be the most powerful 
part of the UN, as it deals with security issues and has enforcement capability. It is true that 
the Council was largely paralyzed and unable to function properly during the Cold War. Yet 
contrary to what its critics claim, the UN Security Council’s performance has improved with 
each passing decade.1080 The IMF and the World Bank are the most important aspect of 
global financial governance, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is crucial because 
nuclear weapons are the gravest threat to global peace. While it is difficult to predict how 
international institutions will evolve, we can expect the three institutions covered in Part 3 to 
play a major role in international politics in the coming years. 
 The lack of strategic significance is the main reason why alternative institutions such 
the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) or the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) have not been selected for the case studies. While likely to be of great 
importance in the future, the institutions are too recent, so their analysis is unlikely to 
provide meaningful conclusions. This is particularly true for the UNCFFF. However, there is 
a lack of institutional maturity, as too many countries still doubt whether the United Nations 
is the best institution to deal with climate change.1081 As a consequence, we can argue that the 
UNFCCC is not yet part of the established institutions that make up the Western World 
Order. 
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3.1. Case study I: Brazil, India and the UN Security Council 
 
HISTORIC BACKGROUND: THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 
 
As arguably the most important international institution of all, the UN Security Council 
(hereafter UNSC) remains the symbol of global governance and the only judge of what 
amounts to a threat to international peace.1082 Despite its importance, remarkably little has 
been written about the Council, as Edward Luck points out.1083 
The Security Council is built on the experiences of the League of Nations. In order to 
strengthen the new institution’s ability, the Council’s creators made three fundamental 
changes. First, they gave the organ enforcement capabilities. Second, they discarded the 
unanimity role, which was seen as one of the major reasons for the League’s failure1084, and 
gave veto power to a small number of powerful states.1085 Its enforcement authority is unique 
in the history of international institutions.1086 To compensate the smaller nations, the UN 
General Assembly (hereafter UNGA) was given the right to discuss security matters under 
article 10 and give recommendations to the UNSC. The voting procedures in the UNSC were 
agreed upon during the Yalta Conference by Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill in February 
1945, and adopted in June of the same year at the UN conference in San Francisco.1087 
The Security Council held its first session in 1946 in London. Since then, the Council 
has existed in continuous session in New York City. The Council consists of 15 members (5 
veto-wielding permanent members (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and United 
States, called the ‘P 5’1088) and 10 elected non-permanent members with two-year terms. In 
order to respond quickly to crisis situations, representatives of the countries occupying the 
Council must always be present. Few rules have changed since the Council’s inception in 
1945. Articles 23 and 27 of the UN Charter were amended in 1965, increasing the Council’s 
membership from eleven to fifteen, increasing the necessary votes for the adoption of 
resolutions from seven to nine.1089 
The Cold War largely immobilized the UNSC1090, but even after a brief moment of 
hope at the Cold War, criticism persisted.1091 In 1990, the UNSC authorized the use of force 
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for the second time in history, and a large coalition force under US leadership defeated 
Iraq.1092 In 1992, John Major captured the spirit of the time when he argued that at last the 
UNSC was fulfilling the role envisioned by the UN’s founders in 1945.1093 Since then, 
however, the Council proved to be a largely ineffective instrument in the context of collective 
security, failing to take action in the face of horrific human suffering in Rwanda and former 
Yugoslavia, and making serious mistakes with regard to the Somalia mission, which ended in 
1995.1094 “The veto”, John English and Andrew Cooper argued in 2009, “plays havoc with the 
United Nations.”1095 “The Security Council failed”, John Glennon announced in a similar 
vein in 2003, after US President Bush had decided to invade Iraq. He predicted that the UNSC 
would go the same way the League of Nations did sixty-five years before.1096 One of the 
major criticisms voiced is the lack of representativeness.1097 A New York Times editorial from 
2004 reflected a common opinion when it argued that “the Security Council [’s] 
membership…. reflects the power relations of 1945, not 2004.”1098 Reform efforts largely 
focused on the following categories: the size of an enlarged Security Council, the categories of 
membership, the question of regional representation, the question of the veto, the working 
methods of the Security Council and the relationship between the Security Council and the 
General Assembly.1099 
Yet the UNSC proved resilient, adapting to some changing realities.1100 In 1965, over 
initial Soviet opposition due to continued Taiwanese occupation of the permanent seat, the 
Security Council underwent reform and increased the number of members from eleven to 
fifteen.1101 Now, nine instead of seven votes were needed to pass a resolution.1102 This was 
largely done to reflect the new realities after the wave of decolonization in the 1960s which 
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had caused the number of UN members to increase from 51 to 114.1103 In 1971, mainland 
China was handed the seat until then occupied by the government in Taipeh. In 1991, Russia 
was allowed to hold on to the seat until then assigned to the Soviet Union.1104 Despite 
frequent criticism, there has been no military conflict between members of the UNSC since its 
inception. Jochen Prantl argues that the Security Council is largely functional, and that 
conclusions of failure premature.1105  
In other instances, the UNSC has been slow to change.1106 Some years after the 
expansion in 1965, reform pressure resumed due to the growing number of underrepresented 
African countries. Efforts for reform reached another high when Razali Ismael, a Malaysian 
diplomat, submitted to the working group a carefully crafted reform proposal in 1997. Yet 
too few members were willing to openly support the plan to create the necessary political 
momentum, and the plan was not put to the vote in the General Assembly.1107 
In 2002, Kofi Annan made the rare move for a Secretary General to get personally 
involved in the reform efforts, pursuing the “most ambitious overhaul of the United Nations 
since its inception”.1108 The pressure to reform had been particularly high since the 1990s, 
which can paradoxically be explained by the relative successes of the Council after the end of 
the Cold War- as seen by the example of the liberation of Kuwait1109 He presented the report 
produced by the high-level commission he had appointed to make proposals about how to 
deal with “threats, challenges and change” confronting the United Nations. While the panel 
specifically warned about solely focusing on the recommendations on how to reform the 
UNSC, just this happened.1110 The report proposed two reform options both of which 
recommended an expansion from fifteen to twenty-four members. One proposal includes 
Brazil and India as permanent members, the other one offers a rotation principle which 
would give the two countries semi-permanent status.1111 
As a response to Annan’s efforts, reform efforts came relatively close to success in 
2005, when the General Assembly could not agree on a reform proposal by the G4.1112 This 
specific proposal would have included Germany, Brazil, Japan, India and two African 
countries as permanent members without veto power. Too many key decision makers, 
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however, opposed at least one of the G4 members. Particularly the United States only viewed 
Japan’s bid favorably.1113 In addition, 43 African countries, submitted their own proposal 
which included veto power for two African nations, because non-permanent members 
without a veto have significantly less power than veto-wielding members.1114 None of the 
plans received enough endorsement to be put to the vote in the General Assembly. Other, less 
realistic reform proposals are to give the International Court of Justice (ICJ) the power to 
“judicially review” decisions by the UNSC to hold it more accountable.1115 
After the failure in 2005, other proposals surge occasionally, but there is overall 
fatigue with regard to reform. In 2006, the ‘Small 5’ (‘S-5’) launched a more modest reform 
proposal that merely included procedural reforms but no expansion, and Panama later 
launched a “transitional proposal” which foresaw five-year terms for non-permanent 
members with the possibility of becoming permanent members without veto power after four 
reelections.1116 Yet, despite numerous efforts within the General Assembly’s Working Group 
on the subject (established in 1993), successful reform seems unlikely at this point.1117 
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3.1.1. Brazil and the UN Security Council  
 
Brazil considers the UN as the most legitimate international institution, and the UN Security 
Council as the only organ with a legitimate enforcement capacity. This became obvious in 
2002 and 2003, when both President Cardoso (1995-2002) and President Lula (2003-2010) 
argued that war against Iraq would only be justifiable if authorized by the UN Security 
Council.1118  
Brazil attempted, with the support of the United States, to be included as a permanent 
member of the UNSC at its inception, but its efforts were thwarted by the United Kingdom 
and the Soviet Union during the Yalta Conference.1119 As a consolation prize, Brazil was 
elected as a non-permanent member during the first selection process. In addition, Brazil was 
granted the right to speak first at General Assembly meetings. Since then, Brazil has been a 
non-permanent member nine times, currently serving for the tenth time.1120  Yehuda Blum 
argues that Brazil has become a de facto “semi-permanent” member of the UNSC.1121  
A permanent seat on the UN Security Council has been, at varying degrees of 
intensity, the objective of Brazil’s foreign policy over the past decades.1122 There are two types 
of reform Brazil has sought in the past. First, and most importantly, it has argued for 
membership expansion. Secondly, it has at times lobbied for an alteration of the P5’s veto 
rights. Using Krasner’s definition1123 of an international institution, we can therefore see that 
Brazil has always fundamentally agreed with the UNSC’s principles and norms, yet sought to 
modify some of its rules and decision-making procedures. President Itamar Franco (1992-
1995) articulated this goal more clearly than his predecessors. President Cardoso (1995-2002) 
mentioned it more often still, but continued to show restraint out of respect for Brazil’s 
faltering neighbor, Argentina.1124 In addition, Cardoso argued that UNSC reform was 
unlikely, and that Brazil should focus on G8 reform instead.1125 President Lula (2003-2010) 
was more vocal still and made a permanent seat for the UN Security Council a key goal of 
Brazil’s foreign policy strategy.1126  
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Since its earliest efforts to join the Council, Brazil has argued along similar lines, stressing 
that its inclusion would increase the Council’s legitimacy. As President Lula argued in 2008 in 
the UN General Assembly, “today’s structure has been frozen for six decades and does not 
relate to the challenges of today’s world. Its distorted form of representation stands between 
us and the multilateral world to which we aspire.”1127   
But not all agree with this rationale. Critics argue that an expanded UNSC could very 
well paralyze the process.1128 Using the same rationale, the G7 long resisted reform to 
maintain effectiveness. Finally, there is a more fundamental argument against the value of 
inclusiveness in the context of the UNSC. No matter how much the UNSC will expand, it will 
never be as representative as the UN General Assembly, which represents all countries. While 
the UN’s creators attempted to make the UNSC as inclusive as possible, it was specifically 
not supposed to be inclusive, but functional. The UN General Assembly, on the other hand, 
satisfied the need for inclusiveness. In this context, it seems questionable whether increasing 
the inclusiveness to some degree is a worthwhile exercise if it implies a strong reduction of 
effectiveness. Finally, the argument that Brazil can represent Latin America in the world’s 
most important international institution is strongly contested outside of Brazil. In fact, 
Argentina, Mexico and Colombia all joined coalitions (first the “Coffee Club”1129, then 
“Uniting for Consensus” after 2005) created to frustrate Brazil’s attempts to gain entry as a 
permanent member.1130 In a survey in 2005, all Latin American countries except Honduras 
and Venezuela said they opposed Brazil’s permanent membership.1131 These smaller countries 
agree in principal that the ‘global South’ needs better representation, but there is no 
consensus about which country should be in the Council permanently. Finally, Weiss points 
out that the key problem of the Council is not a lack of legitimacy (quite to the contrary, he 
says), but its strong dependence on US military power to enforce its decisions.1132 
In addition, permanent membership is crucial to defend Brazil’s ever more global 
interests. As Weiss points out, states use whatever institution is available to serve their 
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national interests.1133 Lacking significant military power, Brazil is forced to find other ways in 
order to make its mark. Multilateralism has been identified as the best tool to do so early 
on.1134 Assessing Brazil’s strategy with regard to UNSC has been widely popular among 
Brazilian scholars, while few have analyzed reform proposals of the UN’s other entities,1135 
and at times it seemed as though this particular topic eclipsed all other matters related to 
Brazil and the United Nations.1136 While some conservative voices have denounced the quest 
for UNSC as an “unnecessary adventure”, there is now a solid consensus that Brazil deserves 
a permanent seat.1137 For Brazil, a reformed Security Council reflects on the legitimacy and 
thus on the effectiveness of the entire UN organization, and no UN reform is thus complete 
without a reform of the UN Security Council.1138  
Specifically, Brazil seeks to expand the Council with several permanent and non-
permanent members. The G4’s proposal envisions six new permanent seats (two for Africa, 
two for Asia (India and Japan), one for Latin America (Brazil) and the Caribbean and one for 
Western Europe and Others (German); and four new non-permanent members (one from 
Africa, one from Asia, one from Eastern Europe, and one from Latin America and the 
Caribbean).1139 Since expansion and its own inclusion is the fundamental objective, Brazil 
does not favor rotation of a new permanent seat to be filled by a country from the Latin 
American and Caribbean region.1140 
While Brazil would certainly prefer to enter the Council as a permanent member with 
veto power, pragmatic considerations have led the Brazilian government to seek inclusion 
without veto power.1141 This is widely believed to increase the chances for reform. Stressing 
the need to avoid conditions that led to the downfall of the League of Nations, the P-5 
insisted on having individual veto rights over UN Charter amendments.1142 
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In 2004, Brazil joined the G4 in an attempt to realize UN Security Council Reform 
and to obtain a permanent seat.1143 The G4 largely formed to use the “window of 
opportunity” that Kofi Annan’s push for an intensive UN soul searching and reform project 
had opened.1144 In 2005, the UN Assembly discussed a reform proposal which included the 
addition of the G4 and two African nations, as permanent non-veto wielding members.1145 
The proposal failed to be submitted to a vote in the General Assembly, largely because 
African countries were unable to agree who would occupy the two permanent seats.1146 In 
addition, several countries such as Italy, Argentina, Pakistan and Mexico opposed the 
inclusion of the G4, which led Brazilian policy makers to doubt whether an alliance with 
India would be the most prominent strategy.1147  However, even if the Assembly had agreed to 
the proposal, the United States would have most likely vetoed it.1148 While the G4 has, for 
now, ceased to exist as a vehicle for achieving Security Council Reform, Brazil continues to 
press for expansion and a permanent seat. 
More recent reform proposals do not look promising, but the “Open-ended Working 
Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of 
the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council” (more simply known 
as the Working Group), set up by the General Assembly in 1993, continues to gather and 
discuss possibilities. Brazil still pushes for UNSC expansion. The Brazilian government has 
continuously rejected any more modest proposals that divert attention from UNSC 
expansion.1149 
How has the objective of UN Security Council Reform influenced President Lula’s 
foreign policy since 2003? Brazil’s strategy towards UNSC reform has been a complex mix of 
multilateral engagement (positioning itself as a ‘responsible stakeholder’), global outreach 
(diversifying its strategic partnerships), assuming regional leadership, and becoming the 
leader of the South (by strengthening South-South partnerships and distancing itself from the 
developed world to some degree. While obtaining a seat on the UNSC may have been the 
greatest foreign policy goal of the Lula administration, these strategies certainly constitute 
policy goals in themselves as well. During interviews for this study, most diplomats named 1. 
A seat on the UNSC, 2. A global trade deal and 3. South American unity under Brazilian 
leadership as the Lula administration’s three main foreign policy deals.1150 
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Since 2003, Brazil’s commitment to multilateral institutions has continued to be one 
of its principal policy paradigms.1151 For example, Brazil has successfully led the UN mission 
in Haiti. Secondly, one of President Lula’s major foreign policy innovations after President 
Cardoso (1995-2002) was to diversify Brazil’s strategic partnerships. One of the major tools 
to do so was through trade. This goal was largely achieved, as trade and other ties in Africa 
and Asia have indeed been strengthened. Brazil’s engagement in the Middle East and 
strengthening ties with Russia symbolize this move. In addition, Brazil has attempted to turn 
into a “Leader of the South” by drastically increasing aid flows to poorer countries.1152 
Thirdly, it has been one of the major goals of the Brazilian government since 2003 to assume 
regional leadership and help the process of regional integration. Results of this third strategy, 
however, have been poor. Progress with regard to Mercosur has largely stalled, and 
UNASUL, a recently created body, is unlikely to strengthen integration. 
This analysis has shown that Brazil’s behavior towards the UN Security Council is a 
classic example of revisionist integration. This becomes clear when we apply Krasner’s 
definition1153 of an institution to the UNSC and assess Brazil’s stance. Brazil fully agrees with 
the UN Security Council’s principles (its ‘spirit’) and the fundamental norms and rules that 
undergird this particular institution. Quite to the contrary, by seeking to join it, it implicitly 
strengthens the importance of the Council. Yet, Brazil does seek to change the decision-
making procedures by changing the membership rules. As the UN Security Council is an 
exclusive institution with restricted access, any member’s wish to join it constitutes revisionist 
integration.1154 While Brazil seeks changes, it is far from pursuing systemic confrontation as 
some governments who have called for the abolition of the UN Security Council. 
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3.1.2. India and the UN Security Council  
 
India was an avid supporter of the United Nations, and the UNSC, since the body’s inception. 
India, which had been a member of the League of Nations1155, actively campaigned for a 
permanent seat on the UN Security Council during the San Francisco Conference in 1945, but 
ultimately failed, like Brazil, partly because it was not an independent country yet.1156 This 
can mostly be explained by India’s leaders’ refusal to suspend its independence struggle, 
which caused Roosevelt to stop pressuring Great Britain to grant independence, driving a 
wedge between the US and India during the War.1157 It then changed its approach and lobbied 
towards making population a crucial indicator for the selection of the non-permanent 
members to assure its frequent presence on the Council.1158 It has been on the Council as a 
non-permanent member six times1159, making it one of the most frequent non-permanent 
members. As Blum points out, India has obtained “quasi semi-permanent” status, although it 
has not been able to participate in the Council as often as Brazil due to its regional rivalry 
with Pakistan.1160 In 2010, after Kazakhstan decided to give up a campaign it had been waging 
for years to obtain the Asian seat in the UNSC, India will once more occupy the non-
permanent seat starting in January 2011.1161 
India has regularly pushed for UNSC Reform, and it remains one of the principal 
foreign policy objectives.1162 In 1979, a series of NAM countries, including India, submitted a 
draft resolution to the General Assembly proposing an increase of the non-permanent 
members from 10 to 14. They argued that UN membership had increased since 1963, from 
136 to 152, and that the last 1965’s benefits had already been nullified.1163 The 1990s saw 
India strengthen its campaign for reform and a permanent seat on the UNSC.1164 Finally, in 
2005, India was once more, as part of the ‘G4’, one of the driving forces behind a reform 
effort which almost led to a second fundamental reform.  
India’s major argument is that its inclusion would increase the UNSC’s legitimacy by 
making it more representative of UN membership.1165 In 2004, for example, India argued that 
it deserved the seat because it was the world’s second largest country in terms of population, 
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with a large economy and the third largest contributor of troops to UN peace-keeping 
missions.1166 In addition, it has always been India’s proclaimed goal to increase the 
representation of the ‘global South’ and limit the influence of the established powers. The 
government argues that an “adequate presence” of developing countries is needed in the 
Security Council. Nations of the world must feel that their stakes in global peace and 
prosperity are factored into the UN's decision making. Any expansion of the permanent 
members' category must be based on agreed criteria, rather than be a pre-determined 
selection. There must be an inclusive approach based on transparent consultations. India 
supports expansion of both the permanent and non-permanent members' category. The latter 
is the only avenue for the vast majority of Member States to serve on the Security Council. 
Reform and expansion must be an integral part of a common package.”1167 With regard to 
these principled motivations, India’s rhetoric has been and remains remarkably similar to that 
of Brazil, another G77 member.  
But permanent membership would also help India defend its ever more global 
interests. According to Kulwant Rai Gupta, there is a sense in India that regarding security 
matters, the role of the UNSC is increasing while that of the UN General Assembly is 
diminishing. Development issues are more and more handled by the IMF and the World 
Bank, while the UN turns into an institution dealing mostly with security issues. This 
interpretation is thus yet another reason why India should seek to gain admission as a 
permanent member to an ever more important organ.1168 Finally, India is said to eye a 
permanent seat to assure that the United Nations does not get involved in the conflict in 
Kashmir, which would, Indians fear, lead to a partition or independence of Kashmir.1169 
Specifically, India seeks to expand the UNSC by four permanent and six non-
permanent members. The G4’s proposal envisions the six new permanent seats to be occupied 
by two African nations, two for Asia (India and Japan), one for Latin America (Brazil) and 
the Caribbean and one for Western Europe and others (Germany); and four new non-
permanent members (one from Africa, one from Asia, one from Eastern Europe, and one 
from Latin America and the Caribbean).1170 
While a majority of states within the General Assembly want to abolish or curtail the 
right of the veto1171, India is more pragmatic and seeks no veto rights for new permanent 
members. It thus proves much more realistic, given the fact that the current permanent 
members with veto power are unlikely to grant it to any newcomers.1172 
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Similar to Brazil, UN Security Council Reform has been one of India’s key objectives 
over the past decade, influencing its policies to some degree. Given its prominence, UN 
Security Council Reform has traditionally been regarded as a crucial part of any wider UN 
reform by the Indian government. 1173 Several of India’s strategies can be better understood in 
the context of the UN Security Council. 
India’s UNSC reform strategy has two main components: Garnering support in the 
UN General Assembly and reducing resistance in the UN Security Council. Through India’s 
continued leadership in the G77, India hopes to assure widespread support in the UN General 
Assembly. India’s strong stance on defending sovereignty and criticizing “the responsibility to 
protect” can be understood in this context. At the same time, India’s recent rapprochement 
with China, its historic deal with the United States, and its continued historic friendship with 
Russia are all meant to assure that none of the permanent members would block India’s 
entry. 
India’s decision to openly vie for a seat as part of the ‘G4’ was the most recent 
attempt, which garnered considerable support but failed to materialize due to African 
disunity. Specifically, the G4’s proposal envisions six new permanent seats (two for Africa, 
two for Asia, one for Latin America and the Caribbean and one for Western Europe and 
Others); and four new non-permanent members (one from Africa, one from Asia, one from 
Eastern Europe, and one from Latin America and the Caribbean).1174 Even South Africa 
supported the proposal.1175 
Since the G4’s failure in 2005, India has continued to focus on UNSC expansion. 
When the so-called “Small 5” or “S5”, a group made up of Switzerland, Singapore, Jordan, 
Costa Rica and Liechtenstein, submitted a proposal that sought not to expand the UNSC but 
change its procedures to some degree, India rejected it as it would shift focus away from 
expansion.1176 India has, together with Brazil and South Africa, created an IBSA faction 
within the Working Group set up by the General Assembly (called “Open-ended Working 
Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of 
the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council”), but its impact has 
not been substantial.1177 
India seeks to alter some of the UNSC’s rules and decision-making procedures, but 
adheres to its principles, ultimately strengthening the UNSC. Its strategy is therefore not 
merely “revisionist”, as is often claimed1178, but it constitutes revisionist integration. The fact 
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that India is one of the few member states that has been elected six times to the body 
underlines the importance of the entity for the Indian government.1179 The Indian government 
bemoans that governance structures, particularly in the UNSC, had not been able to keep up 
with contemporary realities. Indian politicians believe that India should have been granted a 
permanent seat on the UNSC in 1945.1180 After failing to obtain a seat in 2005, when India 
was part of the G-4 (together with Germany, Japan and Brazil), the Indian government is 
determined to continuously push for expanding the Council, even though short-term success 
is unlikely. China is seen as a crucial gate keeper in India’s attempt to advance in the UN 
Security Council, and this—together with an appreciation of China’s growing economic 
importance—is one of the reasons that India aims to improve relations with China, despite an 
ongoing border dispute in Arunchal Pradesh. In the future, India is more likely to team up 
with Brazil in its attempt to obtain a seat, as Germany and Japan weaken India’s claim that 
developing countries need to be better represented. 
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3.2. Case study II: Brazil, India and Bretton Woods   
 
3.2.1. The Bretton Woods institutions 
 
The IMF and the World Bank, jointly often referred to as the “Bretton Woods institutions” 
named after the town of their founding conference, were created in 1945 in order to help 
poorer countries stabilize financially and avoid debt crises and to facilitate development 
through the implementation of economic reform. Having started out with only 44 members, 
this number quadrupled in the process of decolonization. Today, all UN members except 
Cuba, North Korea and a series of city states are members of the IMF. As of 2010, Hungary 
($11.6 billion), Romania ($12.5 billion) and Ukraine ($16.4 billion) were the largest 
borrowers from the fund. 
 
3.2.1. Brazil and Bretton Woods 
 
Brazil’s economic growth story is not yet as impressive as that of its fellow emerging powers, 
China and India1181, but President Lula has tried to make up for it by being the most vocal 
player of the group, tirelessly pressing for more weight for emerging countries in both the 
IMF and the World Bank since he took office in 2003.  
President Lula identified the financial crisis as a unique chance to make a compelling 
case for the democratization of global governance, pointing out that the established powers 
could no longer fix the world on their own.1182 Eager to stress that the crisis originated in the 
developed world, Lula repeatedly claimed that emerging powers’ participation was necessary 
to build a more robust system. Brazil, as he often and proudly pointed out, had been “the last 
country to enter the crisis and the first to leave it.”1183 While this claim was false - the 
Brazilian economy was in recession for a short period of time, yet India and China did not 
enter recession at all1184 - his point was clear. Lula sees Brazil on the way to “decoupling” 
from the rich world, and hopes that this will soon allow Brazil to no longer depend on 
consumption in Europe and the United States. As Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, one of Brazil’s 
leading diplomats, has noted, Brazil is aiming to create a multipolar world system with a 
Brazil-led South America as one of the poles.1185  
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What lies behind the bold rhetoric? Lula’s occasional outburst against “Western-
dominated” international institutions and evil “blond and blue-eyed bankers” must be seen in 
the domestic context.1186 This confrontational rhetoric is a concession for the left-leaning 
factions of Lula’s government who feel betrayed by Lula’s conservative economic policy at 
home. In addition, Brazil’s international actions often do not match Lula’s verbosity. 
Brazil, above all, seeks to increase its visibility and influence. Brazil’s goal to 
strengthen its voice in the international institutions can be seen as a consequence of that 
strategy. It also shows Brazil’s willingness to engage in and strengthen existing multilateral 
development regimes, although most of Brazil’s aid expenditures are still disbursed 
bilaterally. This is mostly because Brazilian aid is given for economic and political reasons, 
and the political and economic impact of bilateral aid (international political gain and 
economic gain for Brazilian economic interests) is considered larger and more direct than 
multilateral aid. 
Judging from the statements made during the G20-summit in Pittsburgh in late 
September and the Annual IMF and World Bank Meeting in Istanbul early October 2009, 
Brazil’s and the other emerging powers’ arguments about reform are unlikely to go 
unheard.1187 While the changes will not take effect before 2011, developing countries’ voting 
share in both institutions is set to increase, promising Brazil’s more active engagement in both 
the IMF and the World Bank.   
 
3.2.1.1. BRAZIL AND THE IMF 
 
This section will give a brief overview of Brazil’s stance towards the IMF. This concerns 
Brazil’s views on the distribution of power and the way the fund operates. 
  Today’s International Monetary Fund is very different from the organization its 
founders envisioned in 1944. It was conceived as an institution to monitor exchange rates and 
provide currency to support states through balance-of-payments difficulties.1188 Yet, as 
Barnett and Finnemore point out, the IMF’s failure to help states adequately paradoxically 
justified its expansion, culminating in sweeping structural interventions. Through technical 
advice and conditionalities tied to loans, the IMF has become deeply involved in members’ 
domestic affairs in a way specifically rejected by its founders.1189 
 In late 2007, prior to the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, analysts 
across the world openly asked whether the IMF was a superfluous organization.1190 In a 
world where IMF lending seemed to be largely unnecessary due to large amounts of private 
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capital, ever fewer governments paid attention to its advice.1191 Another problem was that the 
IMF’s reputation remained tarnished from botched attempts to stabilize several developing 
countries, such as Argentina, Zambia and Pakistan1192, and the IMF was criticized for 
“overdoing it” by imposing too many major structural and institutional reforms.1193 Still 
today, the IMF’s image in Argentina is tainted, and populist politicians across Latin America 
(including Brazil) frequently speak out against it to shore up support, as many citizens 
associate the IMF’s involvement with the financial collapse in 2001.1194 As an official at 
Brazil’s Finance Ministry pointed out, there still is a stigma attached to IMF loans 1195- and, as 
a consequence, to the institution itself. In this regard, Brazil has been very much aligned with 
the rest of the region.1196 
 The crisis has brought radical change. Under the leadership of Dominique Strauss-
Kahn, the IMF came “back from the dead”, having increased lending considerably, and 
planning to increase the fund’s size even more, to around 2 trillion dollars, to become a 
credible lender of last resort.1197 
 Understanding how the Brazilian government thinks of the IMF helps us put Brazil’s 
behavior into context. President Lula’s Workers Party (PT) has traditionally seen the IMF as 
a tool used by “Western imperialists” to control developing countries. This opinion is not 
restricted to the left-leaning parties, and a negative view of the IMF has been historically 
endemic among Brazil’s political elites.1198 Lula has strong negative memories of Brazil’s 
experience as an IMF lender, calling it “traumatic to see, for almost two decades, IMF 
bureaucrats telling us what we should do”1199 This fuelled fear in a country that is historically 
concerned about attacks on its sovereignty - be it in the form of internationalizing the 
Amazon forest, or in the form of strings attached to IMF loans.1200 
 The old rhetoric remains, at least among PT politicians, but today, Brazil regards the 
IMF as an important and necessary tool to stabilize the world economy. This 
acknowledgement can best be explained by Brazil’s strong insertion in the world economy, 
and a resulting interest in global financial stability. As recently as March 1999, Michael Reid, 
wrote that 
                                                 
1191 Ambrose, S. (2010). IMF Confidence Crisis, Foreign Policy in Focus, Institute of Policy Studies, 
April 12, 2007; http://www.fpif.org/articles/imf_confidence_crisis (accessed July 19, 2010)  
1192 Khan, S.R. (2002). IMF Conditions Stunt Growth, Economic and Political Weekly, Volume 37, 
November 29, 2002 
1193 Feldstein, M. (1998). Refocusing the IMF, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, pp. 20-33, March/April 1998 
1194 Llana, Sara Miller and Matthew Clark (2007). Latin America's answer to the World Bank and IMF 
. Christian Science Monitor, July 12, 2007 
1195 Interview, Brazilian Finance Ministry, March 26, 2010. See also Zaidi, S. A. (1999). IMF Package: 
Nothing to celebrate, Economic and Political Weekly, Volume 34, Number 8 February 20, 1999 
1196 Brazil’s changed relationship to the IMF is certainly not representative of the region. In Argentina, 
the IMF continues to be fiercely criticized, despite an emerging global consensus that a credible lender 
of last resort is necessary.  
1197 Economist Correspondent (2009). Back from the dead, The Economist, September 17, 2009  
1198 In 1986, for example, Brazil’s President Sarney laid out his strategic plan and described under how 
much pressure he was due to the IMF’. (Sarney, José. Brazil: A President’s Story. Vol. 65, No. 1, 
Foreign Affairs, 1986) 
1199 Junior, C. (2009). Lula diz que FMI não deve mais ditar regras a países devedores, Folha de São 
Paulo, April 15, 2009; http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/dinheiro/ult91u550953.shtml (accessed Dec 
30, 2009) 
1200 Busch, Alexander (2009). Wirtschaftsmacht Brasilien, München: Hanser Verlag, 2009  
OLIVER STUENKEL – DOCTORAL THESIS 211 
 
[Brazil’s] currency has lost about 35% against the dollar, and nobody knows yet whether 
that is the end of the slide. A recession that was already under way has deepened, and 
inflation is rising once again. Although the government has reached a new agreement 
with the IMF, it faces a battle to regain the confidence of the financial markets. Fears that 
private companies, or even the government, might default on debts have receded but not 
disappeared.1201 
 
After the turn of the century, Brazil obtained a credit line of over 30 billion dollars, the 
biggest in IMF history1202, to avoid a looming default on its debt.1203 Furthermore, its very 
interest in IMF reform and more voting shares is a strong signal that Brazil acknowledges the 
IMF’s relevance as a credible lender of last resort in the future.1204 Considering Krasner’s 
definition of international institutions (principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures), it becomes obvious that Brazil agrees with the IMF’s fundamental principles. 
Brazil’s policy is thus by no means aligned with that of Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, who aims 
to replace the fund with a home-grown model, the Bank of the South. 1205 
 In Istanbul, during the yearly IMF gathering in October 2009, Brazil’s finance 
minister Guido Mantega announced that Brazil would spend $10 billion dollars (€6.8 billion) 
to buy International Monetary Fund bonds to boost the fund’s resources. Ahead of the 
meeting in Istanbul, Mantega underlined the importance of this decision for Brazil, noting it 
was a “historic moment for us. It is the first time in history that Brazil is lending resources to 
the IMF and therefore to the international community", stressing that Brazil’s contribution 
"is an expression of Brazil's willingness to play a greater role in the fund and support the 
institution and its objectives."1206 Brazil’s commitment is likely to alter the way the world 
perceives Brazil, and the way Brazil perceives itself. For example, it may accelerate the 
reduction of aid given by rich countries to Brazil, as they will increasingly regard Brazil as a 
“donor country”. In Germany, for example, some policy makers have questioned the need to 
provide development aid to emerging powers such as Brazil, India and China.1207 
                                                 
1201 Reid, Michael (1999). The devaluing of a Presidency. The Economist. March 25, 1999 
1202 Hakim, Peter (2004). The reluctant partner. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 1, January/February 2004 
1203 Brazil repaid 15.57 billion dollars in December 2005 to settle its debt two years ahead of schedule 
1204 During the IMF meeting in Istanbul in early October, the Group of 24, which includes Brazil, said 
that the IMF should assume a stronger role and make more use of the SDRs (Special Drawing Rights). 
(Wall Street Journal Correspondent (2009). G-24: Supports Greater Role For IMF And Its SDRs. Wall 
Street Journal, October 3, 2009)  
1205 The Bank of the South (Banco del Sur in Spanish) is a monetary fund and lending organization first 
proposed by Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, which aims to focus on poverty reduction. Lula has 
frequently supported the idea of the Bank of the South, which is ideologically opposed to the Bretton 
Woods institutions, yet this support is likely to remain rhetorical, and Lula does not consider the Bank 
of the South to be of major strategic importance similar to the IMF.  
1206 Rodriguez, A. (2009). Brazil joins emerging-nation boost to IMF funds, Agence France Presse, 
October 5, 2009; 
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hQ8r19HEHMHVd2zurIgbcCuZhvqQ 
(accessed Dec 30, 2009) 
1207 For example, Wolff, P. (2009). Traditionelle Entwicklungshilfe ist nicht mehr zeitgemäß, Die Zeit, 
http://www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/2010-05/entwicklungshilfe-modern (accessed May 15, 2009), 
Handelsbatt Correspondent (2009). Fricke: Keine Entwicklungshilfe für China, 
http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/fricke-keine-entwicklungshilfe-fuer-china;2119466 
(accessed May 15, 2010) 
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 At the same time, the Brazilian government claims it is determined to alter the way 
the fund operates in the future (Krasner’s decision-making procedures), and it has tied its 
promise to become a lender to the rapid implementation of reform. Brazil demands change in 
two areas. First, Brazil believes it is necessary to enhance emerging powers’ weight in the 
decision making process, and to reduce richer countries’ influence. Brazil consequently 
presses for a change of the IMF quotas.1208 Quotas determine voting shares in the fund, and 
the contributions countries make to it. Brazil wants power to be taken away from European 
countries, increasing emerging powers’ weight.1209 The fact that Belgium has more votes than 
Brazil1210 is an oft-cited fact in the Brazilian media that symbolizes Brazil’s discontent with 
the current modus operandi. In Istanbul, developed nations proposed to increase developing 
countries’ voting share in the IMF by 5%, which would bring the developing countries’ total 
share to 48%.1211 It is unclear at this point whether this increase will be sufficient for Brazil 
and the other developing nations. It would mean an increase of Brazil’s share from 1.38% to 
1.72%. The United States’ share would decrease from 16.77% to 16.73%, yet the US’ ability 
to block proposals would be maintained. Prior to the meeting, the G24, which includes 
emerging and developing countries from Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and Asia, 
called for a commitment to shift 7 percent of quota shares from rich to developing countries, 
which would give them an equal say with the industrialized world.1212 
 During the G20 summit in South Korea in October 2010, IMF head Dominique 
Strauss-Kahn announced that European countries would give up two of their eight seats to 
                                                 
1208 In his speech, Mantega stressed that the next quota review should at least double the overall size of 
quotas. Quotas, not borrowing arrangements, should be the main source of funding for the IMF. 
Mantega, Guido (2009). Statement of Mr. Guido Mantega, Finance Minister of Brazil. International 
and Financial Committee, Istanbul, October 4, 2009 
 http://www.fazenda.gov.br/portugues/releases/2009/outubro/Guido-Mantega-Statement-IMFC-04-
10.pdf (accessed December 24, 2009) 
1209 Quota subscriptions generate most of the IMF’s financial resources. Each member country of the 
IMF is assigned a quota, based broadly on its relative size in the world economy. A member’s quota 
determines its maximum financial commitment to the IMF and its voting power, and has a bearing on 
its access to IMF financing. The IMF's Board of Governors conducts general quota reviews at regular 
intervals (usually every five years). Any changes in quotas must be approved by an 85 percent majority. 
There are two main issues addressed in a general quota review: the size of an overall increase and the 
distribution of the increase among the members. First, a general quota review allows the IMF to assess 
the adequacy of quotas both in terms of members’ balance of payments financing needs and in terms of 
its own ability to help meet those needs. Second, a general review allows for increases in members’ 
quotas to reflect changes in their relative positions in the world economy. The Thirteenth General 
Review was concluded on January 28, 2008 with no proposal by the Board of Governors to increase 
quotas. (www.imf.org) See also: Barnett, Michael and Martha Finnemore (2004). Rules for the World. 
International Organizations in Global Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004 
1210 Barnett, Michael and Martha Finnemore (2004). Rules for the World. International Organizations 
in Global Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004 
1211 Cermak, C. (2009). “G-innovations": Major powers jockey for influence, Earth Times, October 4, 
2009; http://www.earthtimes.org/articles/show/288641,g-innovations-major-powers-jockey-for-
influence--feature.html (accessed Dec 30, 2009) 
1212 The Executive Board (the Board) is responsible for conducting the day-to-day business of the IMF. 
It is composed of 24 Directors, who are appointed or elected by member countries or by groups of 
countries, and the Managing Director, who serves as its Chairman. The United States, Japan, 
Germany, France and the United Kingdom appoint their directors, the other directors are elected and 
usually represent several countries, such as Adarsh Kishore from India, who represents Bangladesh, 
Bhutan, Sri Lanka and India. (www.imf.org) 
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better reflect the newfound power of emerging powers. These measures are likely to be 
ratified by the IMF by late 2011.1213 
 In addition, the Brazilian government aims to reduce the percentage of votes needed 
to ratify the IMF’s most important decisions. Currently, 85% are needed. The goal is to break 
the United States’ ability to veto any crucial vote with its 17% share. Breaking the US veto 
power would be an additional step to reduce the established powers’ grip on the fund.1214 
 In this context, Brazil largely agrees with the IMF-appointment committee headed by 
South Africa’s then Finance Minister, Trevor Manuel, who reported to the fund on March 
24th, 2009 on how to enhance the Fund’s capacity.1215 The Brazilian government has also 
repeatedly criticized the unwritten rule that a European and an American head the IMF and 
the World Bank, respectively. When rumors emerged in July 2009 that the Obama 
administration had informally asked President Lula to head the World Bank, Brazil’s leader 
stated that he would be honored to take on the post. He is since said to have changed his 
mind, hoping to succeed Ban Ki-moon as United Nations Secretary General. No matter what 
Lula’s personal ambitions are, Brazil will continue to press for a selection process that 
chooses the IMF leadership irrespective of nationality. 
 The second area where Brazil sees the need for reform is the lending procedure.  
Brazil believes in a more “recipient-friendly” lending process, envisioning a less intrusive 
process with fewer “strings attached”, i.e., fewer policy conditionalities.1216 However, the 
Brazilian government has been rather vague about how exactly things should be changed.1217 
In this regard, Brazil remains a developing country in spirit, even though it has pledged to 
give the fund 10 billion dollars, thus becoming - for the first time in history - a lender to the 
IMF. Commenting on Brazil’s new role in the IMF, President Lula stressed that “as we turned 
from debtors into international creditors… we decided to contribute resources for the IMF to 
loan money to poor countries, free of unacceptable conditionalities imposed in the past.”1218 
Such demands are not new. In fact, the IMF has already modified the way it imposes 
conditions on its borrowers. In the 1990s, the fund was known to micromanage economic 
policy in debtor countries and to impose reform in areas that were not directly related to 
economic growth. In 2002, under Horst Köhler’s leadership, new guidelines were published to 
operate in a less invasive manner. While loans will always have to be attached to conditions, 
the involvement of Brazil and other emerging markets may further dilute conditionalities, in 
                                                 
1213 Song Jung-a (2010). G20 agrees historic reform of IMF, Financial Times, October 23, 2010  
1214 Aside from a country’s votes, the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) are important because the 
represent a potential claim on other countries’ freely usable currency reserves, for which they can be 
exchanged. Alternatively, countries with robust finances can buy SDRs from countries which are in 
need of hard currency. If the IMF issues new SDRs, it increases countries’ foreign reserves without 
needing to be lent. (www.imf.org)  
1215 Manuel, Trevor (2009). Cover letter to Mr. Dominique Strauss-Kahn. 24.3.2009; 
www.imf.org/external/np/omd/2009/govref/032409n.pdf (accessed July 19 2010) 
1216 Rowlands, Dane (2008). Emerging Donors in International Development Assistance: A Synthesis 
Report, Partnership and Business Development Division, IDRC, January 2008 
1217 It must be noted here that there have been no specific proposals put forward by the Brazilian 
government in this regard. Evidence for this policy position is based on two conversations with 
Brazilian diplomats and on declarations by politicians.  
1218 da Silva, Luiz Inácio (2009). Address to the United Nations General Assembly, 23.9.2009;  
http://www.un.org/ga/64/generaldebate/pdf/BR_en.pdf (accessed July 19, 2010) 
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the hope of making them more effective. Brazil called the FCL (Flexible Credit Line), a tool 
recently created by the IMF with few strings attached, a “breakthrough”.1219  
 Brazil’s motivations to increase developing countries’ weight in the IMF and 
insistence on reducing the amount of conditionalities attached to IMF loans are based on 
power politics, its own experience as an IMF recipient, and the genuine belief that emerging 
countries can help the Fund increase its legitimacy. Despite continuing former President 
Cardoso’s conservative economic policies, the Lula administration has introduced a leftist 
ideology in its foreign policy outlook. In order to gain more leeway with regard to 
(conservative) internal policies, Lula has made significant concessions in the area of foreign 
policy, allowing left-leaning perspectives to dominate Itamaraty, the foreign ministry. 
While rhetoric is usually more radical than actual policy, the result has been a marked 
shift. Under Cardoso, Brazil’s major allies were, aside from Argentina, the United States and 
the European Union. While Lula never openly broke with the richer countries, his 
government has changed focus and sought to align with other developing countries. The 
objective to increase Brazil’s weight on the international stage remained unchanged, but the 
strategy employed to achieve this goal changed radically. Rather than seeking rapprochement 
to the United States and Europe, Lula attempted to maximize benefits by positioning Brazil as 
the “leader of the South”1220, aligning with other developing countries. Lula’s travels have 
been indicative of this shift of focus. Lula has travelled to Africa and Asia more frequently 
than any other President in history.  
This change towards the left has been criticized by foreign policy advisors of the 
Cardoso administration and by Mr. Cardoso himself. Their major criticism is that Lula’s 
foreign policy, which resulted in the establishment of the “South-South diplomacy”, is based 
on a somewhat ideologized and antiquated dichotomy of “first world vs. third world”, or “us 
vs. them”. Several analysts1221 have therefore described Lula’s foreign policy outlook as “third 
worldish”, showing that while the Workers’ Party modernized its views in several areas such 
as economic management, its foreign policy outlook remains that of the 1960s and 70s, when 
the term “third world” was still in use. Lula’s opponents, furthermore, ascribe his apparent 
foreign policy successes as a result not of his strategy, but of Brazil’s economic growth, the 
result of Cardoso’s clever policies in the 1990s.1222 
 Brazilian policy makers are right to believe that the IMF can be strengthened and 
made more effective if developing countries were to participate more in decision making. 
This position is tied to a general interest in the democratization of global governance and the 
                                                 
1219 Mantega, Guido (2009). Statement, International and Financial Committee, Istanbul, October 4, 
2009; http://www.fazenda.gov.br/portugues/releases/2009/outubro/Guido-Mantega-Statement-IMFC-
04-10.pdf (accessed July 19, 2010)  
1220 Vigevani, Tullo and Gabriel Cepaluni (2010). Brazil’s Foreign Policy in Changing Times, Lanham 
(MD): Lexington Books 
1221 Hurrell, Andrew and Narlikar, Amrita (2006). A New Politics of Confrontation? Brazil and India in 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Global Society, Volume 20 (4), 2006, pp. 415-433 
1222 The opposition is certainly right to point out that the economic rationale for Lula’s alignment with 
the South is questionable, as economic relations with developing countries are, with the exception of 
China, still far below those with the United States and Europe. Lula’s “South-South diplomacy” 
explains why Brazil not only fought for its own better representation, but also that of other developing 
nations. But from a realist perspective, aligning with other emerging countries such as India increases 
Brazil’s clout during negotiations. 
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belief that a more balanced global leadership is more successful at tackling the world’s most 
pressing issues.1223 Brazil has long argued that developing countries’ contributions, such as 
from Brazil, Russia, India and China, will boost the fund’s legitimacy and its ability to 
convince countries in trouble to adopt its recommendations.1224 Brazil has been pushing for 
reform for several years.1225 In 2006, the Medium Term Strategy was passed, which includes 
changes in IMF governance to enhance the role of developing countries in the institution's 
decision-making process - yet Brazil did not receive a higher share of votes. While Brazil feels 
well protected from financial disaster at this moment, its recent memory of the rescue by the 
IMF certainly added to the conviction that a strong lender of last resort can provide a useful 
safety net in rough times. As the Brazilian economy is more and more open and intertwined 
with the global economy, and as more Brazilian multinationals venture out into the world, 
Brazil has an increasingly strong interest in global financial stability, something the IMF 
contributes to.1226  
 In conclusion, the Brazilian government strongly believes in the future of the IMF, 
and in its ability to help prevent further financial crises. The Brazilian government’s strategy 
is a clear case of revisionist integration as it accepts the IMF’s principles, but seeks to change 
its rules and decision-making procedures. The Brazilian government wants the IMF to 
become a credible lender of last resort, a role the IMF had temporarily lost prior to the 
economic crisis in 2008. The IMF emerged from the meetings in Istanbul with a promised 
increase of its capital, also thanks to developing countries such as Brazil. At the same time, 
the Brazilian government is committed to increasing its own role and that of other developing 
countries in the IMF decision making process. European countries are likely to be most 
affected by Brazil’s growing role in these institutions. Proposals by Brazil carry with them a 
loss of power for European nations because changing voting rights is, by definition, a zero-
sum game. If the Brazilian economy continues to grow, so will Brazil’s demands for more 
weight in the IMF. 
 Brazil also claims it wants the IMF to operate less invasively. Rather than insisting on 
fundamental changes in economic and institutional structures, Brazil envisions credits to be 
more flexible, with fewer conditions attached. One possibility is to tie loans to 
macroeconomic goals only, and leave it to the recipient to design the necessary changes. 
Brazil’s proposition remains vague, however, and it is unclear whether Brazil will bring 
forward any specific proposals. In this context, when analyzing Brazil’s reform proposals, 
one must carefully assess how much Brazil is really interested in actual change in procedure, 
and in how far Brazil pushes for reform in order to make a broader argument about an unjust 
distribution of power in today’s international institutions.1227 While Brazil may be genuinely 
                                                 
1223 During the meeting in Istanbul, Finance Minister Mantega stressed that the fund was “ill-prepared 
to face the challenges of the current economic crisis.” (Mantega 2009) 
1224 Mantega, Guido (2009). Statement, International and Financial Committee, Istanbul, October 4, 
2009; http://www.fazenda.gov.br/portugues/releases/2009/outubro/Guido-Mantega-Statement-IMFC-
04-10.pdf (accessed July 19, 2010)  
1225 Overseas Development Institute (ODI), (2007): Closing the deal: IMF Reform in 2007, Briefing 
Paper, http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/388.pdf (accessed May 15, 2010) 
1226Busch, Alexander (2009). Wirtschaftsmacht Brasilien. München: Hanser Verlag, 2009 
1227 Spektor, Matias (2010). How to read Brazil’s Stance on Iran?, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), 
2010 http://www.cfr.org/publication/21576/how_to_read_brazils_stance_on_iran.html (accessed May 
15, 2010)  
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interested in improving the IMF’s work, Brazil has identified the IMF as a medium of power 
and influence, and its principal goal is therefore better representation. 
 
2.3.1.2. BRAZIL AND THE WORLD BANK 
 
As this section will show, there are similarities between Brazil’s strategy towards the IMF and 
the World Bank- Brazil seeks changes in both the internal distribution of power in the 
organization and the way the World Bank operates. The International Monetary Fund has 
received widespread attention over the past year due to its role as a financial fire fighter in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis. The World Bank finances more tangible projects which are 
usually less politicized.1228  
Brazil and the World Bank have a long history of collaboration until this day. The 
World Bank started to finance public sector projects in Brazil in the late 1940s, soon after the 
institution’s creation. In the 1970s, the Bank turned into one of the largest funding sources of 
social projects in Brazil.1229 The Bank continues to play an important role in Brazil today. For 
example, the Bank will help Brazil accelerate $11.1 billion in mostly infrastructure 
investments needed to host the Olympic Games (World Bank 2009). In addition, the World 
Bank will lend the state of Rio de Janeiro $212 million to help the state government purchase 
30 trains for its rail network, and $480 million to improve public administration of the health 
and education systems.1230 
Similar to its sister organization, the IMF, the World Bank has been slow to adapt to 
changing global economic realities by changing its decision-making structures. It remains 
dominated by rich and established countries.1231 The United States is the Bank’s principal 
paymaster, and there is an unwritten rule that the White House can appoint the World Bank’s 
President. Critics claim Europe is overrepresented: Eight to nine members of the 24-member 
executive board are Europeans. 60% of the executive directors are from the world’s 
industrialized countries, and the US government, with close to 20% of the vote, can veto 
important decisions, which require an 85% majority. The 46 Sub-Saharan African members 
together control only 8% of the board’s total voting power, with two seats. 
In yet another parallel to the IMF, where South Africa’s former Finance Minister 
Trevor Manuel headed an independent commission to propose reforms, World Bank 
President Robert Zoellick appointed a high-level commission to improve the Bank’s 
performance. The commission was headed by Mexico’s former President Zedillo, and it 
included, among others, Brazil’s former Central Bank Chief Armínio Fraga, one of Brazil’s 
most influential economists.1232 Similar to the Manuel Report, the Zedillo Commission called 
for sweeping changes to reflect the world’s new economic order. Presenting the proposal to 
                                                 
1228 Both in Brazil and in the world.  
1229 Fonseca, M. (1998) O Banco Mundial como referência para a justiça social no terceiro mundo: 
evidências do caso brasileiro, Revista da Faculdade de Educação, Rev. Fac. Educ. vol.24 n.1 São 
Paulo Jan./Jun. 1998 
1230 Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Brief, 2009;  
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/LACEXT/0,,contentMDK:20340156~
menuPK:258561~pagePK:146736~piPK:146830~theSitePK:258554,00.html (accessed July 19, 2010) 
1231 Einhorn, J. (2006). Reforming the World Bank. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No.1, January/ February 
2006 
1232 Busch, Alexander (2009). Wirtschaftsmacht Brasilien. München: Hanser Verlag, 2009 
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Zoellick, Zedillo said that the decision-making process was too exclusive, and that European 
countries’ influence in the executive board needed to be reduced- to four or five seats. The 
report also recommends replacing the Executive Board with a “World Bank Board”, whose 
members should hold ministerial or vice-ministerial rank.1233 The report further suggests 
lowering the majority needed on major decisions to end America’s ability to veto decisions. 
Finally, it argues that the selection process for the World Bank’s leadership position should 
not be based on nationality, but on merit.1234 While there has been no explicit endorsement of 
the entire report, Brazil’s rhetoric indicates that the Brazilian government’s position on World 
Bank reform is largely in line with that of the Zedillo Report, supporting all the items listed 
in the Zedillo Report.1235  
 During the recent G20 Summit in Pittsburgh, heads of governments agreed to shift 
voting power within the World Bank, increasing developing countries’ weight by 3%. The 
Brazilian government does not regard this as sufficient, but rather as a first step towards a 
long term reform process. Prior to the summit, Brazil had asked for a bigger increase.1236 
 While Lula frequently berates the World Bank1237, he also seeks to strengthen it. This 
strategy points to a struggle within the ruling Workers’ Party (PT), which the pragmatists are 
winning. The party’s base adheres to traditional leftist views and often strongly disagrees 
with Lula’s conservative economic policies, yet Lula is pragmatist enough to understand that 
Brazil is better served by continuing former Presidents Cardoso’s economic policies. Several 
analysts argue that Lula attempts to compensate and satisfy his left-leaning party members by 
using a foreign policy rhetoric reminiscent of the “good old days” when the PT was still 
genuinely fighting for socialism similar to that in Cuba.1238 President Lula frequently uses 
harsh rhetoric against the World Bank, sometimes calling it an “evil western institution”. For 
example, in a typical speech in early 2009, Lula criticized the World Bank for the way it was 
handling the crisis: “It seems like those institutions, which knew everything when we had a 
crisis, don’t know anything when the crisis is happening there (in the rich world). Or, at least 
it is not permitted to give their advice; with the arrogance they do it here.”1239Yet, in such 
                                                 
1233 Zedillo, E. (2009). Repowering the World Bank for the 21st Century. Yale Center for the Study of 
Globalization, 2009  
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/NEWS/Resources/WBGovernanceCOMMISSIONREPORT.pdf 
(accessed July 19, 2010)  
1234 Linn, J. (2009). World Bank Reform: Proposals for the next G20-summit, Brookings, 2009 
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n.ashx (accessed May 15, 2010)  
1235 Several Brazilian diplomats have confirmed this assumption during interviews for this paper. 
(Phone interviews, July 1, July 1,4 2010, and Interviews, May 22, 2010, Brazilian Foreign Ministry) 
1236 Mantega, Guido (2009). Statement, International and Financial Committee, Istanbul, October 4, 
2009; http://www.fazenda.gov.br/portugues/releases/2009/outubro/Guido-Mantega-Statement-IMFC-
04-10.pdf (accessed July 19, 2010)  
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the Bank after leaving it. (Wolf, Martin (2004). Why globalization works. New Haven, NJ: Yale 
University Press, 2004); Easterly, William (2007). The White Man’s Burden. New York: Penguin Book, 
2007; Stiglitz, M. (1998). Globalization and its Discontents, New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 1998 
1238 Interview with Rogério Schmitt, Political Analyst, Center for Public Leadership, São Paulo, 
November 11, 2009 
1239 Aquino, Y. (2009). Lula critica FMI e Bird por não interferirem em países desenvolvidos durante 
crise, Agência Brasil, January 12, 2009; http://www.sintectrj.org.br/carrega_PDF//janeiro2009.pdf 
(accessed Dec 30, 2009) 
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cases, he is pandering to leftist or anti-Western factions in his government and the 
population. In reality, Brazil pursued conservative economic policies (de Onis 2008), and its 
interest in the World Bank’s reform process underlines its belief in the usefulness and future 
of the organization to maintain financial stability, help transition countries join the 
international economy, and fight poverty. The US and European governments are therefore 
right not to take Lula’s at times anti-Western comments too seriously, as they are clearly 
directed towards certain domestic groups. 
 Brazilian policy makers believe that the developing countries’ lack of participation in 
the decision-making process reduces the World Bank’s legitimacy. However, that does not 
mean that Brazil is on a confrontational course against the World Bank - quite the opposite. 
Rather than avoiding contact with the Bank, Brazil is keen to assume more responsibility. 
Brazil’s position thus strongly differs from that of Venezuela and Ecuador, which have 
attempted to take concerted action against the World Bank. In April 2007, Ecuador’s 
President Rafael Correa expelled the World Bank representative from the country. In the 
same month, Venezuela’s President Chavez announced his country’s withdrawal from both 
the IMF and the World Bank.1240 Venezuela was later forced to reverse its decision to prevent 
default clauses in the country’s sovereign bonds. 
 Brazil’s proposals of how to reform the World Bank have been largely focused on 
issues related to the organization’s decision making procedure. Its strategy therefore 
constitutes revisionist integration. Yet, judging from the comments made by Brazilian 
policymakers about pushing for IMF loans with fewer strings attached, it is likely that this 
policy also affects Brazil’s views on how the World Bank should operate: less invasive and 
“less arrogant”1241 although it is somewhat unclear what exactly that means, and there have 
been no specific World Bank proposals put forward by the Brazilian government in this 
regard. There is thus some gap between Brazil’s rhetoric and its actual behavior with regard 
to World Bank Reform. Brazilian officials, however, have pointed out that they prefer to 
exert pressure together with other countries, rather than assume responsibility and stick out 
as the leader, to not undermine the overall effort to improve developing countries’ weight. 
Brazil’s view on the World Bank is therefore aligned with that of the IMF. It regard the 
World Bank as a crucial institution with an important role in the context of facing global 
development challenges. Yet, in order for the Bank to assume that role, Brazil thinks it should 
give developing nations a greater say. Brazil’s behavior towards the Bank is thus a classic 
example of revisionist integration. 
                                                 
1240 Buncombe, A. (2009). Chavez pulls out of IMF and World Bank, The Independent, May 2, 2007; 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/chavez-pulls-out-of-imf-and-world-bank-
447087.html (accessed Dec 30, 2009) 
1241 For example, see Folha de São Paulo Correspondent (2009). Lula pede reforma internacional em 
discurso à ONU. Folha de São Paulo, October 23, 2009. Contrary to recipients of private creditors, 
those who make use of World Bank loans must usually be careful not to destroy the environment, or 
uproot indigenous peoples unfairly. 
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3.2.2. India and Bretton Woods  
 
3.2.2.1. INDIA AND THE IMF 
 
India’s noteworthy transition from IMF recipient to IMF lender has important implications 
for India’s international role, which will be studied in this section. 
Similar to Brazil, India has been quite outspoken about its desire to reform the 
Bretton Woods Institutions. During the annual IMF and World Bank meeting in Istanbul in 
early October 2009, the Indian press cheered on as Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee made 
his case for “far-reaching changes” in the governance structure of financial institutions such 
as the IMF and the World Bank, to “reflect the changing dynamics of the world economy.”1242 
India has called for the quota shares of developing countries to be raised since 2003. To 
strengthen its claim, India wrote off Rs1 billion ($24 million) owed to it by seven Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries (Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Guyana, Nicaragua, Ghana and 
Uganda).1243 
According to the World Bank, even before the crisis, nearly three-fifths of the growth 
in global GDP was created in India and China alone. In 2009, most of the global growth has 
occurred in emerging economies.1244 While the case for reform seemed evident to Indian 
policy makers all along, they have identified the crisis as an opportunity to strengthen their 
argument. The statements made by several officials from developed countries, such as US 
Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, about the need for reform have been interpreted in 
India as a sign that change is underway. With 1.89% of total voting rights at the IMF, India 
feels its newly found economic strength is not adequately reflected. As in Brazil, the fact that 
small countries such as the Netherlands or Belgium have more votes than India is an often 
used argument to symbolize the inequality and of the Bretton Woods institutions.1245 Indian 
newspapers often write that “the rich countries” or simply “the West” are not ready to accept 
the fact that they are losing power.1246 
The Indian government has proposed a quota shift of 7% towards the developing 
countries during the recent IMF meeting in Istanbul motivated by national interest and a 
genuine belief that greater legitimacy and credibility will increase the IMF’s effectiveness.1247 
                                                 
1242 For example, see: The Hindu Correspondent (2009). India pitches for governance reforms in IMF, 
World Bank. The Hindu, October 7, 2009  
1243 Price, G. (2005). Diversity in donorship: the changing landscape of official humanitarian aid, 
Humanitarian Policy Group at ODI, September 2005  
1244 International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2010): IMF Data Mapper;  
http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php, (accessed July 19, 2010) 
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2009) 
1246 Nayar, Baldev Raj and T.V. Paul (2003). India in the World Order. Searching for Major-Power 
Status. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003 
1247 Mukherjee, P. (2009). Statement by the Governor of the Bank and the Fund for India, at the Joint 
Annual Discussion, Board of Governors, 2009 Annual Meetings, Istanbul; 
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Yet, it has also conceded that this goal could be achieved over several years, which indicates 
that India will be content with the promised 5% increase for now.1248  
Over the past decades, the IMF has played an important and often controversial role 
in Indian politics. The IMF loan agreement and the World Bank Structural Adjustment Loan 
(SAL) signed in December 1991 had severe social consequences. It forced India to cut social 
programs (including food subsidies) and scrap infrastructure projects.1249 Its economic impact 
was contentious, especially for the poor, as food prices temporarily spiked, and wages 
decreased. The IMF’s influence in the early nineties was so palpable that one economist 
claimed that “while the rajputs and princely states had a fair degree of autonomy in relation 
to the British colonial government (…), under IMF-Worldbank tutelage, the union minister 
of finance reports directly to 1818 H Street NW, Washington, D.C., bypassing the parliament 
and the democratic process”.1250 In a similar fashion, Joseph Stiglitz compared India’s 
agreement to the IMF with the “surrender of Mahrajadas to the British”.1251 The IMF’s 
intervention created political tension, as several ministers of the Congress party spoke out 
against the IMF’s austerity measures, which eroded their political support among the rural 
poor. 
Despite these at times traumatic experiences, Manmohan Singh has achieved the 
improbable in more than a decade - first as Finance Minister and then as Prime Minister- and 
stabilized the economy and convinced the political establishment and the voters that the IMF 
is a functional organization, and that India can use the IMF as a vehicle to increase its power 
in the international arena. Rather than marking a stark turnaround, India’s engagement with 
the IMF as a lender marks the culmination of Manmohan Singh’s long and arduous travails, 
which includes offering painful truths and questioning long-held convictions. Admitting that 
both the socialist-leaning Nehruvian economic model and Gandhi’s belief that small-unit 
rural production were the key to development have ultimately failed has been difficult in a 
country where the two are revered father figures.1252 Today the Indian government now 
strongly believes in the future of the IMF and wants to be a credible lender of last resort. The 
Singh government supports the recommendation brought forth by the commission headed by 
Trevor Manuel in March 2009. The commission, which included the Indian intellectual 
Amartya Sen, among other things recommended an adjustment of the fund’s power structures 
to today’s economic realities and the end of the United States’ ability to veto important 
decisions.1253 The commission recommended a reform of voice and vote share: The five 
biggest financial contributors should no longer have the right to appoint a Director to the 
                                                 
1248 Similar to Brazil, India is willing to increase its financial contributions, but it insists that these 
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March 6, 1993 
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Executive Board (Voice reform), and the Directors representing the developing nations should 
have more weight (Vote reform). 
 As India’s Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee laid out during the IMF meeting in 
Istanbul, India wants to ratify the April 2008 package of quota reforms early, calling it an 
“urgent requirement”, and stating that the next quota review should be completed no later 
than January 2011.1254 Finally, India is intent on preserving the Fund as a quota-based 
institution, pushing for a doubling of quotas. This position very much reflects the Indian 
government’s conviction that it will grow significantly in the future, and that it believes in the 
possibility to assume an every greater role in the IMF.1255 
 One of India’s principal goals was already achieved during the G20 meeting in 
November 2008. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had repeatedly called for a more inclusive 
Financial Stability Forum (FSF), which until recently consisted of the finance ministers and 
central bankers of the rich world. The FSF has since been replaced by the Financial Stability 
Board (FSB), which includes members from all the G20 members.  
  Yet, India’s push for reform, which constitutes revisionist integration is set to 
continue. India’s view on how to reform the IMF is, overall, good news for the fund. Rather 
than calling for other institutions to regulate the world economy, Indian policy makers do not 
tire to point out the importance of the IMF as a credible last lender. Manmohan Singh’s 
recent experience as Finance Minister under IMF tutelage can only be helpful for an 
institution that seeks to reproduce India’s economic success - which includes the move of 
millions from the lower to the middle classes - story all over the world. 
 
3.2.2.2. INDIA AND THE WORLD BANK 
 
When, in October 2009, India’s External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna invited Chinese 
Foreign Minister Yan Jiechi and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to Bangalore to 
speak about the future of the international architecture, the joint communiqué issued after 
the meeting emphasized that future global economic governance should ensure the “voice and 
representation of emerging market and developing countries”.1256 Among reforms of the IMF 
voting structure and question of who may host G20 summits, the ministers called for a 3% 
voting share increase for developing nations in the World Bank. This would elevate the 
developing nations share to 47%.1257 “The ultimate goal” of governance structure reform of 
international institutions, including the World Bank, is the equitable distribution of voting 
power between developed countries and developing ones. This could only be achieved by 
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increasing the developing nations’ share by 6%, but even India’s Finance Minister Mukherjee 
acknowledges that while this move would be transformational, it could take place in stages. 
Yet, patience can be expected to be limited because emerging countries are expected to grow 
faster than rich countries for the years to come, and small steps are unlikely to halt India’s 
drive for significant reform. In 2008, the World Bank agreed to give sub-Saharan countries a 
greater share. Mr. Mukherjee says he was dismayed to see the shift to be of only 1.4 percent, 
too small to have an impact.1258 Indian officials keep pointing out that they regard a country’s 
GDP (using purchasing power parity) as a “main” reference point. In this dimension, India is 
already the fourth largest nation.1259 
 Interestingly, this puts India in a difficult position, as it puts the country slightly at 
odds with the G77, a group of developing countries that requests a more fundamental change 
instead of seeing India become part of the powerful. While India has repeatedly assured that 
it will defend developing countries’ views, it cannot hide the fact that it now requests the 
same privileges other rich countries such as the United States have secured for itself. India’s 
developmentalist rhetoric is thus possibly aimed to appease other developing countries. 
 India’s position reflects some discontent with the World Bank’s governance structure, 
but it also makes clear that India sees the World Bank as a key institution to confront today’s 
global development challenges. It is a classic case of revisionist integration. According to 
India’s Finance Minister Mukherjee, the goal to achieve the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) suffered a setback during the financial crisis, and the demand for help from the 
World Bank was set to increase. A well-capitalized Bank is therefore necessary.1260 India’s 
view on how to reform the World Bank was strengthened by the Zedillo Commission, which 
presented its findings to World Bank President Zoellick in October 2009. The Commission, 
which included Montek Singh Ahluwalia, deputy chairman of India's planning commission, 
criticized the rich countries’ grip on the organization’s governance structure and 
recommended more power for the world’s developing nations such as India. Among other 
issues, the final report called for the abolition of the United States’ veto power and the 
American right to appoint the World Bank President. 
Yet, India’s claim to better representation is contrasted by its reluctance to use multilateral 
channels as a donor more fully. Most Indian assistance is bilateral, and while India prefers to 
receive aid to multilateral institutions, as a donor it prefers bilateral aid to increase political 
impact.1261 This represents an unresolved dilemma. 
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 Despite its economic growth, India still takes loans from the World Bank, and it is 
expected to do so over the next decades. The World Bank strategy envisages total proposed 
lending to India of $14 billion for 2009 - 2012. Due to the financial crisis, the Bank has agreed 
to provide an additional $3 billion as part of the total financing envelope of $14 billion to 
India.1262 In late September 2009, the World Bank signed a $4.3 billion loan for the 
capitalization of public sector banks in India, the India Infrastructure Company Ltd and debt 
support for the Power Grid Corporation of India.1263 India remains one of the principal 
recipients of World Bank loans.1264  
 World Bank involvement in India is controversial and hotly debated in the Indian 
media. After the announcement of the new loans in September, several op-eds in leading 
newspapers denounced the World Bank loan as unnecessary.1265 As The Hindu argued, the 
new World Bank loans were too expensive, they did not meet genuine requirements, and its 
conditionalities were unacceptable.1266 This criticism is different from the latent howling of 
anti-capitalists such as Arundhati Roy, who accuses the World Bank of infiltrating into the 
Indian government, and of killing the poor through neo-imperialist policies. 1267 
 Rather, it may reflect a clash between two identities - that of a developing nation and 
that of a great power.1268 Massive World Bank loans and the intervention that comes with it 
may be a normal phenomenon for a developing nation. India undoubtedly possesses the 
characteristics of a developing nation, such as extreme poverty, a high percentage of the 
population in rural areas, and low literacy rates. At the same time, it possesses several 
characteristics of a great power. India is a recognized nuclear power, it is one of the fastest 
growing markets in the world, and India’s voice is increasingly recognized in international 
institutions. For a great power, meddling in internal matters by the World Bank seems wholly 
inadequate. This reflects India’s engagement with the donor community in general - India 
regards intrusive development aid tied to conditions as humiliating. As a consequence, its 
bilateral aid programs tend to be based on more balanced donor-recipient relationships- 
although it must be noted that a higher percentage of Indian bilateral aid is tied to projects 
than aid from established donors. Rowland argues that “the poorer the donor, the less 
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intrusive its assistance programs.”1269 This may explain India’s call for the World Bank to act 
less invasively.  
 The clash of identities points to a more fundamental struggle between the “two 
Indias” that have different interests. Within India, there are interest coalitions that are 
concerned primarily with addressing economic problems (e.g. low caste parties representing 
the poorest) and interest coalitions that support the promotion of India as a great power. One 
of the major issues here is the presence of an extremely large group of poor peasant farmers 
(approx. 300 million), who have limited empathy with promoting India as a big power given 
their still appalling economic circumstances. Poor Indians are still likely to vote on local 
issues, and often feel regional caste-based parties best represent their interests. These regional 
parties distinguish themselves by having no foreign policy position at all1270, and they reflect 
the fact that poor Indians have different priorities than the country’s educated elites. While 
the elites would very much like to present themselves as a powerful country that needs no 
World Bank loans, ending the Bank’s involvement in India would not be politically feasible 
due to the interests of the poor and their political representatives. The Indian government is 
thus forced to attempt to position itself as a key player in the World Bank while still being 
one of the Bank’s principal clients for years to come. Yet, India’s two sides may be 
complementary to some degree as they strengthen India’s argument that developing countries 
need a better representation in the Bank’s decision-making bodies. India’s claim that it can 
offer a different perspective on the issue of poverty is real, and India has a point that the 
World Bank is likely to gain from a greater Indian representation. Out of necessity, this 
constellation has shaped India’s policy approach towards the World Bank. In the next years, 
the Indian government under Manmohan Singh is likely to attempt to balance these two sets 
of interests by showing how India’s greater insertion and international engagement helps even 
the poorest. The key takeaway is that India regards a reformed World Bank as a crucial 
institution to deal with today’s global development challenges. 
 This analysis shows that, similar to Brazil, India’s strategy towards the Bretton 
Woods organizations can be best described as revisionist integration. Despite the reforms 
India calls for, its behavior clearly strengthens both the World Bank and the IMF. There is 
thus fundamental agreement with principles and norms, but a desire to change some specific 
rules and decision-making procedures still exists, especially regarding quota shares and the 
distribution of votes between developed and developing countries.  
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3.3. Case study III: Brazil, India and the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
 
INTRODUCTION: THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY 
 
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (hereafter NPT), which came into force in 1970, seeks 
to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons, promote disarmament, and enhance the 
peaceful use of nuclear energy. Currently there are 189 states that have signed the treaty. The 
five permanent members of the UN Security Council are recognized Nuclear Weapon States 
(hereafter NWS), the other 184 states are Non-Nuclear Weapon States (hereafter NNWS).1271 
To put the principle of non-proliferation into practice, the Treaty consists of three pillars 
(non-proliferation, disarmament, and right to peaceful use). All three pillars of the NPT are 
fraught with problems, and the treaty is facing growing pressures that may be eroding what 
used to be an effective barrier to nuclear arms proliferation.1272 
The first is non-proliferation, which bars NWS from transferring nuclear weapons or 
material to NNWS, and NNWS from receiving it, is becoming ever harder to implement in a 
world where several nuclear powers – India, Pakistan, Israel and soon North Korea – have 
not signed the treaty. The ease with which A.Q. Khan, a Pakistani nuclear scientist, was able 
to operate his illicit global nuclear market-place further points to the dangerously porous 
NPT. 
The second pillar, disarmament, is an equally important bone of contention. It asks 
NWS to negotiate in good faith and move towards disarmament. Its ambiguous wording, 
however, has given NWS enough wriggle room to disarm very slowly, much to the criticism 
of the NNWS. From the very start, critics called the NPT unjust as it created two classes of 
states, the ‘haves’ and the have nots’.1273 Jaswant Singh, former Minister for External Affairs 
of India, famously called the system established by the NPT “nuclear apartheid.”1274 This has 
reduced the NWS’ legitimacy to assume leadership in matters of non-proliferation.1275 The 
problem of disarmament is arguably most prominent in relation to the question that has 
divided the signatories from the outset: whether the NPT’s ultimate goal is nuclear 
disarmament, or whether NWS merely seek to reduce their stockpiles without ever engaging 
in the difficult process of absolute disarmament.1276 There is thus a fundamental uncertainty 
with regard to one of principles of the treaty.  
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The third pillar, peaceful use, is the most contentious. Peaceful use allows and 
regulates the transfer of nuclear technology to NNWS to develop strictly civilian nuclear 
energy programs. As the commercially popular light water reactor nuclear power station uses 
enriched uranium fuel, states must be able to either enrich uranium themselves or purchase it 
on the international market. This makes it relatively easy to build a nuclear bomb. As the 
global thirst for energy explodes, and environmental concerns about fossil fuels increase, the 
number of states to establish their own fuel cycle is set to increase, making nuclear material 
essentially available to everyone. The International Atomic Energy Agency (hereafter IAEA) 
has the leading role in the verification process and thus a crucial executive branch of the 
NPT.1277 Established in 1957 as an independent organization, the IAEA reports back to the 
United Nations and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The IAEA engages in many 
activities such as cooperation on nuclear safety mechanism, but its most visible function is 
that of assessing whether member states properly comply with the rules stipulated by the 
NPT.  
Despite its flaws, the treaty has had a very good record of attracting states over the 
past forty years, as attested by the low number of non- signatories today.1278 Aside from the 
five nuclear weapon states when the Treaty was signed in 1970, Israel, India and Pakistan 
developed nuclear weapons. In the late 1970s, South Africa developed nuclear bombs but 
discarded them in the 1990s. The most recent nuclear power is North Korea, which developed 
nuclear arms after it left the NPT in 2002. Yet, as Charles Ferguson argues, the situation 
could have been much worse. 1279 In 1963 President Kennedy envisaged a world in the 1970s 
with 15 to 25 nuclear weapon states.1280 In 1976, US President Ford’s report to Congress 
estimated that by 1985 40 countries would have the capacity to produce nuclear weapons.1281 
Dozens of countries, including Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, South Korea, and 
Switzerland, have explored nuclear weapons programs, but ultimately decided not to pursue 
such aims. Thanks to the non-proliferation regime most countries that have the technical 
ability to build nuclear arsenals have renounced nuclear weapons. And, most importantly, for 
more than 60 years, no nuclear weapons have been used in an attack.1282 
Still, the future of the NPT is uncertain. Experts frequently question whether the NPT 
is still relevant, predict that it will collapse, or wonder if it is “worth saving.”1283 
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3.3.1. Brazil and the NPT 
 
3.3.1.1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: BRAZIL AND NUCLEAR ENERGY 
 
Brazil has a long-standing interest in nuclear energy. “It was inevitable that Brazil would turn 
to nuclear power”, William Lowrance wrote in a commentary in 1975, after Brazil had signed 
the largest nuclear deal in history with West Germany1284, which provided Brazil with an 
autonomous nuclear industry, justified by a strongly growing population and too little energy 
sources to sustain them.1285 
Prior to the historic deal, however, Brazil had historically played a leading role in 
nuclear disarmament. This was particularly the case in the early 1960s, when Brazil became a 
member of the UN Disarmament Committee.1286 During the Goulart Presidency from 1961 to 
1964, Brazil promoted the idea that rich countries should use the money not spent on arms to 
help developing countries fight poverty. The “3 Ds” (disarmament, development, de-
colonization) represented the cornerstones of Brazilian foreign policy.1287 It signed the Treaty 
for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, commonly 
referred to as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, in 1967.1288 This had significance because the NPT was 
still in the making, and the Tlatelolco Treaty obliged Brazil, as Redick points out, to adhere 
to non-proliferation.1289 The Treaty largely came into being for two reasons: The tenacity of 
Mexico’s Under-Secretary García Robles, and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 had alarmed 
heads of state sufficiently to convince them to ban nuclear weapons.1290 
Brazil was an early skeptic of the NPT. In the UN debate about the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty in 1968, Brazil refused to sign the NPT, characterizing it as an attempt to "freeze" the 
international power structure to contain emergent powers such as Brazil.1291 Brazil’s refusal to 
sign the NPT had mostly psychological reasons; emotional nationalists pointed out that 
signing the treaty posed a ‘colonialist threat’.1292 More moderate voices argued that Brazil 
should retain the ability to use nuclear energy for the purpose of economic development. 
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Furthermore, it was often argued that Brazil should be able to have its own nuclear deterrent, 
or at least be able to develop one, rather than depending on the established nuclear powers. 
A consequence of this conviction was the nuclear agreement between Brazil and 
Germany in 1975, in which Germany would sell nuclear technology to Brazil.1293 It was 
triggered after India exploded nuclear bombs in 1974, an event that had a palpable impact on 
developing countries across the world. An additional reason was the high oil price, which had 
quadrupled in 1973-74, making nuclear energy more attractive.1294 India and Brazil had been 
observing each other with suspicion prior to 1974, and India’s nuclear tests seemed to 
strengthen Brazil’s determination to obtain nuclear arms as well. As Norman Gall pointed 
out in 1976, several developing countries were attempting to acquire nuclear technology, but 
Brazil and India were the most serious ones. They were also the only ones carrying out space 
programs with their own launching facilities.1295 
In the 1980s, Brazil tried to develop nuclear bombs and hid its efforts from the 
IAEA.1296 During that time, Brazilian policy makers frequently argued that the NPT does not 
provide a balance between duties and obligations. It lacked, according to diplomats, the spirit 
of reciprocity that characterizes most institutions. During the time, Brazil insisted on the 
dubious distinction between ‘peaceful nuclear explosives’ and nuclear bombs.1297 
During the time between 1975 and 1990, each branch of Brazil’s armed forces pursued its own 
route towards nuclear weapons status. The navy was most successful, and it managed to 
operate small reactors for submarines. Under President João Figuereido (1979-1985), the 
government was preparing to conduct a "peaceful nuclear explosion," based on the Indian 
example. The 300-meter shaft for the test had already been drilled.1298 
In 1990, the nuclear program was officially repudiated by President Fernando Collor, 
Brazil joined the NPT and international inspection became the norm. This helped reintegrate 
Brazil into the international community, after it had been somewhat ostracized under the 
military dictatorship, which had ended in 1985. The international press famously depicted the 
President who took a shovel and began to close the nuclear shaft built by the military regimes 
for nuclear weapons testing.  
Brazil turned into a responsible actor. Five years later, in 1995, the NPT was extended 
indefinitely, at US President Clinton’s behest. This was part of an agreement that extracted 
other commitments from the five official nuclear powers at that conference and the next one 
in 2000. To this day, virtually none of these agreements, like faster disarmament, have been 
met. As a consequence of a proliferation regime that seemed ever more stable, the Brazilian 
government signed the NPT in 1998 under President Cardoso. In 1996, he had signed the 
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Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which Brazil’s Congress ratified in 1998. These 
moves were interpreted as Brazil’s growing commitment to the regime. 1299 
 
3.3.1.2. BRAZIL’S POLICY SINCE 2003 
 
Under Lula da Silva, however, Brazil seems to have become less hesitant about toying with 
the nuclear option. Only a few months after Lula's inauguration in 2003, the country 
officially resumed the development of a nuclear-powered submarine, for which it is, under 
the NPT, allowed to enrich uranium.1300 
Even during his election campaign, Lula criticized the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 
(NPT), calling it unfair and obsolete, arguing that it failed to grant Brazil the status he felt it 
deserved. 
In 2004, Brazil took the unusual step of barring its nuclear plant’s doors to IAEA’s 
inspectors, violating its obligations under the NPT. As Palmer and Milhollin point out, at its 
announced capacity, Brazil could, in theory, produce five to six implosion-type war heads. 
While Roberto Abdenur, then Brazil’s ambassador to the United States,1301 vigorously denied 
that Brazil was violating the NPT, the consequences were felt around the globe. Brazil’s 
behavior allowed Iran, another NPT signatory, to ask for similar treatment. 1302 In 2008, 
Brazil unveiled its new National Defense Strategy, which, in addition to the mastery of the 
complete nuclear fuel cycle - since been achieved - called for the building of more nuclear-
powered submarines.1303 The rhetoric has taken a sharp turn, and Brazilian politicians now 
frequently lambast the non-proliferation regime. Similar to India’s stance, Brazil’s Secretary 
General of the Foreign Ministry pointed out that the “established nuclear powers sought to 
fortify their oligopoly of power,“ and that signing the NPT “had been a mistake.”1304 
There is now widespread apprehension about Brazil’s intentions, and several experts 
such as Sam Nunn and Graham Allison predict that Brazil will obtain nuclear bombs.1305 In 
addition, several high-ranking members of Brazil’s government frequently insinuate that 
Brazil should develop nuclear weapons. In 2009, during a meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group, a group of nuclear supplier countries that works toward non-proliferation by 
controlling exports of nuclear materials, the Brazilian representative did his utmost to fight 
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requirements that would have made the nuclear submarine program transparent.1306 During 
the 2010 NPT Conference, Brazil was one of the least constructive members when discussing 
issues such as improving monitoring by IAEA’s inspectors. It continues to refuse to let IAEA 
inspectors take a full look at its uranium-enrichment machines at Resende, and will not sign 
the additional protocol that would oblige it to do so.1307 
The Brazilian government, however, denies such claims and argues that it has no 
intention to develop nuclear weapons. It points out that Brazil merely enriches uranium to 
3,5%, and “occasionally to 19%”1308, while 90% is necessary to build bombs.1309 At the same 
time, Brazil would break three treaties if it decided to build nuclear bombs: The Tlatelolco 
Treaty, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and its own Constitution, adopted in 1988.1310 Yet, 
Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, in charge of foreign policy strategy, also denies that Brazil 
sought nuclear weapons in the 1970s and 1980s, a highly dubious claim given the copious 
historical evidence.1311 
In a highly controversial move, the Brazilian government has also sought to 
strengthen ties with Iran, attempted to act as a mediator between Iran and the established 
powers, and opposed sanctions against Iran in the UNSC in June 2010. The controversy 
ensued because Iran had continued to defy the IAEA’s inspectors, blocking entrance to several 
nuclear facilities and raising doubts about Iran’s intentions. After a tentative agreement in the 
fall of 2009 between Iran and the ‘G6’ (consisting of the US, Russia, Great Britain, France and 
Germany), which included a fuel swap to prevent Iran from enriching uranium fuel 
domestically, Iran had reneged, fuelling suspicions that Iran was seeking to develop nuclear 
weapons.  
This behavior, combined with the numerous missed opportunities to come to an 
agreement, caused the United States to call for a new round of sanctions in the UNSC, an 
effort that received widespread international support. In May 2010, Turkey’s Prime Minister 
Erdogan and Brazil’s President Lula traveled to Iran and signed an agreement with Iran’s 
Ahmadinejad which included enriching uranium in Turkey and shipping it back to Iran.1312 
This agreement failed to convince the established powers, who suspected another Iranian 
ploy, and the United States presented a sanction package only days later.1313 Although Brazil 
has been a member of the UNSC for almost twenty years in total (on ten separate occasions 
since 1946), it was the first time it voted against a majority-backed resolution. Only Turkey 
joined it in its opposition, while Lebanon abstained, and all permanent members backed the 
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resolution. According to Matias Spektor, Brazil’s behavior cannot be explained by a specific 
interest in Iran or nuclear weapons, but by Brazil’s discontent with the lack of justice, fairness 
and openness in the structure of the NPT.1314 
In conclusion, we can argue that Brazil’s behavior constitutes systemic confrontation. 
There may be agreement with the spirit and the principles of the NPT (a world free of nuclear 
weapons and with nuclear energy for peaceful purposes for all), but disagreement about the 
two-tiered structure of nuclear and non-nuclear states and inspections (norms and rules). 
Brazil violates the NPT as it does not allow IAEA’s inspectors to view its centrifuges. The 
argument that Brazil seeks to protect commercial secrets is spurious as inspectors have an 
excellent record of keeping such secrets. There is therefore considerable reason to believe that 
Brazil seeks either to build nuclear weapons, or it seeks to develop the ability to do so. 
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3.3.2. India and the NPT 
 
3.3.2.1. HISTORICAL CONTEXT: INDIA AND NUCLEAR ENERGY 
 
India has been skeptical of the NPT since the treaty’s inception, and it has always refused to 
consider signing it. India has continuously argued that the NPT was unjust and cemented 
‘nuclear colonialism.’1315 India tested a nuclear device in 1974, which it described as a 
"peaceful nuclear explosive." India conducted further nuclear tests in 1998, which raised 
widespread international condemnation. India’s role in the context of nuclear proliferation is 
therefore complex. Supporters of the NPT, most prominently the United States, called India 
one of the most recalcitrant countries that contribute to the destruction of the global non-
proliferation regime.1316 Indians disagree, call the regime flawed, and point to India’s 
continuous leadership in calling for bans on nuclear testing, for the establishment for a non-
discriminatory treaty on non-proliferation, and complete elimination in 1988.1317 
How did such confrontational behavior emerge? India was arguably the country most 
affected by the NPT because it was the only large country that had no nuclear power-ally to 
provide it with a nuclear security umbrella. Indians were, Nayar and Paul write, “simply left 
to fend for themselves.”1318 First opinion polls after the creation of the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT) conducted in 1972 showed that the majority of India’s elites was against the 
development of the bomb. The pro-bomb faction was small, but their support for the bomb 
was stronger than the skeptic’s rejection. While rightist parties were more in favor of the 
bomb, socialists, communists and the Congress Party were split on the issue. However, 82% 
of respondents of the study opposed the NPT, as it would severely limit India’s options to 
develop a bomb if the necessity arose, an important topic after the war against China in 1962 
and against Pakistan in 1965.1319 In addition, rejecting the treaty would allow Indians to keep 
foreign inspectors out of its nuclear sites, important for a country that despises foreign 
meddling after centuries of foreign occupation. Thirdly, the rejection can be explained by the 
“discriminatory conditions favoring the nuclear powers”, which have failed to honor their 
promise and disarm.1320 
These fundamental arguments - the security problem of not possessing nuclear 
weapons, the rejection of foreign inspections, and the inherent injustice of the NPT as it 
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could not ascribe great power status to India - have remained the same over the past forty 
decades. The latter problem, the NPT’s inequality and injustice, has probably been the most 
often-used argument by those defending India’s position.1321 In 1998, for example, Jaswant 
Singh, former Minister of External Affairs, argued that the NPT perpetuated “the existence 
of nuclear weapons in the hands of five countries busily modernizing their nuclear arsenals”, 
and that India would stick to the principle that “the country's national security in a world of 
nuclear proliferation lies either in global disarmament or in exercise of the principle of equal 
and legitimate security for all.”1322 In a similar fashion, Baldev and Paul argue that “the aim 
of [the NPT] has been to bar new nuclear weapons states (NWS) from emerging in order to 
preserve indefinitely the powers’ position of the existing nuclear powers in the international 
system.”1323 
 
Summarizing the argument, Singh argued that 
 
The first 50 years of Indian independence reveal that the country's moralistic nuclear 
policy and restraint paid no measurable dividends, except resentment that India was 
being discriminated against. Disarmament seemed increasingly unrealistic politics. If 
the permanent five's possession of nuclear weapons increases security, why would 
India's possession of nuclear weapons be dangerous? If the permanent five continue to 
employ nuclear weapons as an international currency of force and power, why should 
India voluntarily devalue its own state power and national security? Why admonish 
India after the fact for not falling in line behind a new international agenda of 
discriminatory nonproliferation pursued largely due to the internal agendas or political 
debates of the nuclear club? If deterrence works in the West as it so obviously appears 
to, since Western nations insist on continuing to possess nuclear weapons - by what 
reasoning will it not work in India?  Nuclear weapons powers continue to have, but 
preach to the have-nots to have even less. India counters by suggesting either universal, 
nondiscriminatory disarmament or equal security for the entire world.1324 
 
Joseph Nye disagrees. He admits that the NPT is inherently unequal. But he argues that the 
strategic characteristics of nuclear weapons are such that equality is difficult to obtain. He 
points out that equality only existed if every single government had nuclear weapons or if 
none had them. Since a couple of countries already have them and immediate disarmament is 
not feasible, the choice lies between universal proliferation to assure equality and a non-
proliferation regime, which inevitably creates inequality. The vast majority of nations, Nye 
points out, is pragmatic and prudent, and prefers inequality over “anarchic equality”.1325  
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 Indian scholars retort that the concern for world order and international stability is a 
weak pretext to deny or deprive rising powers nuclear weapons they consider necessary to 
turn into major powers.1326 
India’s intransigence is fundamentally tied to the conviction that the acquisition of 
nuclear weapons is the key to major power status, and that India wants to be a major power. 
Baldev Raj Nayar and T.V. Paul recognize this when they argue that although the 
“immediate origins” of the decision to test nuclear weapons were security concerns, the “key 
underlying reason” is, often unstated, India’s deep-rooted aspiration to assume the role of a 
major power.1327 These two aspects are, naturally, somewhat connected. Part of what makes 
a power great is its invulnerability, which is, most argue, enhanced through the acquisition of 
nuclear weapons.  
After having failed to obtain serious disarmament guarantees, India conducted its 
first nuclear test, Pokhran I, in 1974 under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.1328 As Chopra 
writes, the rationale was no different from other countries who had decided to go nuclear. 
Russia went nuclear because America did, China went nuclear because Russia did, and India 
went nuclear because China did - and because it suspected Pakistan was about to go nuclear 
as well, which would make India the only country “sandwiched” between two nuclear 
powers.1329 Asia thus became, with three nuclear powers with neighboring borders to the 
other two, the highest concentration of nuclear arms and thus the highest risk of nuclear war. 
India’s test would have probably taken place much earlier had India’s chief scientist, Homi 
Bhabha, not died in 1966, significantly delaying the project.1330 The government’s insistence 
that, despite the tests, called “peaceful explosions”, India had no intention of producing 
nuclear arms, caused confusion and uncertainty whether India had joined the nuclear club.1331 
Only when Rajiv Gandhi, initially opposed to nuclear weapons, obtained evidence that 
Pakistan was acquiring nuclear weapons in 1987, he ordered India’s nuclear weapons 
program to proceed in 1988. 
In the 1990s, pressure increased on India to join the NPT. In 1992, the UN Security 
Council passed a resolution declaring that the proliferation of nuclear weapons was a threat 
to international peace and security. This resolution, passed in the presence of India’s Prime 
Minister Rao, was directly aimed at India and significantly increased political pressure.1332 
The 1995 indefinite extension of the NPT legitimized and perpetuated, in India’s eyes, an 
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unequal nuclear regime.1333 It constituted a turning point for India as it viewed the extension 
as a US attempt to foreclose India’s rise for good and “defang it in the nuclear arena”.1334 
Later in the same year India came tantalizingly close to testing nuclear weapons openly, but 
the government pulled back in the last minute due to mounting international pressure. 
Despite the pressure, India tested nuclear weapons for a second time (Pokhran II) in 
1998, this time “crossing the nuclear Rubicon”1335 and fully assuming its nuclear weapons 
status, causing international condemnation and sanctions.1336 Criticism was not only 
widespread abroad, but also at home, where several commentators argued that India had 
“lost moral statue and courage.”1337 This points to an internal struggle between two lines of 
thought. Indian idealists seek to bring peace to the world and abhor the thought of India 
developing weapons of mass destruction. On the other hand, realists argue that the world is 
such that without those weapons, great power status cannot be attained. Many prominent 
Indian analysts, among them Raja Mohan, hailed the deal as a breakthrough and argued that 
“thanks to the nuclear tests, India’s relationship with the United States stood transformed by 
the turn of the century. Although the United Stats did impose sanctions, it also began to treat 
India more seriously than ever before.”1338 India correctly argued that it had not broken 
international law (pointing to a clause in the CBTB that allows countries to withdraw in the 
face of acute security threats). Rather, the Indian government said it was forced to openly 
turn into a nuclear power since the Sino-Pakistani nuclear weapons collaboration (what India 
saw as a violation of the treaty) was proof for India that the NPT regime had collapsed in 
India's neighborhood.1339 
 
3.3.2.2. INDIA’S POLICY SINCE 2003 
 
Since the tests in 1998, however, India has acted responsibly, having refrained from testing or 
deploying nuclear weapons or passing technologies on to other states. As Nayar and Paul 
point out, the end of India’s isolation became evident with the visits from heads of state or 
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foreign ministers of all major powers within two years of the tests.1340 Furthermore, India has 
not supplied nuclear material to NNWS, as China is thought to have done with Pakistan.1341 
While India remained obstinate about the NPT, this responsible behavior certainly helped 
improve ties between India and the United States.1342 After the tests, India even considered 
signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), but in the end decided not to when Bill 
Clinton failed to convince US Congress to ratify the treaty. India had assumed leadership in 
initiating the negotiations that led to the CTBT, but later refused to sign because the treaty 
was de-linked from the issue of non-proliferation.1343 
This caused the Indian government to characterize the treaty as another way the 
United States sought to implement an unjust system. Most analysts argued that the CTBT 
had turned into yet another imperialist tool that sought to foreclose India’s nuclear option, 
given that India had not yet tested sufficiently to have a credible deterrent. Against this, 
several Indian experts called on the Indian government to sign the CTBT, stressing that 
signing it would have prevented the international isolation that ensued the tests in 1998.1344 
Since the IAEA meeting in 2004, India began to join the United States and Europe in arguing 
that Iran had violated NPT obligations, helping refer the matter to the UN Security 
Council.1345 
In a highly controversial move, the United States and India signed a bilateral nuclear 
agreement in 2005 in which the United States recognized India as a nuclear power. Aiding 
India's nuclear weapons program violated the NPT, which bans such help to any country not 
recognized as a nuclear power by the treaty. President George W. Bush’s move constituted a 
break with long-standing U.S. policy as he openly acknowledged India as a legitimate nuclear 
power.1346 In a highly asymmetrical deal regarded by many as an attempt by the United States 
to find an ally both to balance China and to fight (nuclear) terrorism, India emerged with an 
impressive diplomatic victory as it obtained many concessions and gave away little.1347 India 
did not make any commitment to limit the growth of its nuclear arsenal and merely needs to 
allow inspectors into its civilian nuclear plants (not its military plants). One the other hand, 
the deal included significant economic cooperation and the United States subsequently 
pushed the members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), a group of countries allowed to 
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trade nuclear technologies, to accept India’s membership.1348 Since 2005, four of its 17 nuclear 
reactors are subject to IAEA safeguards.  
This move drew criticism particularly from countries like Brazil that had signed the 
treaty and refrained from developing nuclear weapons. India, they claimed, had disregarded 
the rules and was rewarded for it.1349 Worse, India continued to refuse to sign the NPT 
(although accepting India to the NPT as an NWS would have been unlikely anyway since this 
would require approval from all its 189 members). Yet the worst consequence of the treaty 
was probably of systemic nature. The deal, critics argued, would undermine the rules of non-
proliferation and disarmament. Despite being accepted as a nuclear power, India did not 
agree in any way to reducing its nuclear stockpile. It did not even agree to stop nuclear 
testing.1350 
Supporters of the deal answered that India’s nuclear status was an irreversible fact, 
that India was a responsible and democratic power, and that the damage to the NPT would 
be insignificant.1351 
The agreement was, if anything, concrete proof that India is considered a future 
world power. The United States’ concessions were not based on current strategic weight, but 
on the expectation of future power. In 2000 already, future Secretary of State Condoleezza 
Rice identified India as a ‘strategic partner’ (and China as a ‘strategic competitor’)1352 
After signing the deal, India continued to pursue an independent foreign policy. As 
Ashton Carter pointed out, there was little evidence that India’s overall policies would align 
with those of the United States. Fresh from signing the deal with America, Singh joined 
Cuba’s Fidel Castro and Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for the Non-Aligned Meeting.1353 
Americans, furthermore, showed surprise at the “lack of gratitude” shown by Indian policy 
makers, who rather contended that India had been entitled to nuclear weapon status.  
This analysis shows that India’s behavior constitutes passive confrontation, which, 
given the structure of the non-proliferation regime, amounts to systemic confrontation. While 
India may agree on the principles and the spirit of the NPT in principle (a world free of 
nuclear weapons and nuclear energy for all), it disagrees once these principles are made more 
specific and turn into norms and rules (most importantly, the cutoff date of January 1967). It 
significantly destabilizes the non-proliferation regime. Ashton Carter, former US 
undersecretary of defense, argued that the US-India nuclear deal would not damage the NPT, 
pointing out that North Korea and Iran were already breaking the rules, no matter what 
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India did.1354 Yet, Carter overlooks how other emerging democracies such as Brazil and 
Turkey would interpret the deal. If states remain outside the NPT, the pay-offs from the 
treaty for the signatories will change and influence their cost-benefit calculations about their 
participation in it. This is the classic problem of free-riding.1355 Contrary to what official 
government sources indicate, there is a vibrant internal discussion inside the Brazilian 
government about the merits of obtaining nuclear arms.1356 Due to India’s decision to build 
them, Brazil remains as the only non-nuclear BRIC. The fact that a rising power can “get 
away” with systemic confrontation and maintain and strengthen crucial partnerships may 
cause others to behave in a similar way. There is an additional aspect that explains why 
India’s behavior is so serious. The world can only make significant progress towards non-
proliferation if all countries join and obey the treaty. A single country is, in theory, enough to 
undo the benefits. As long as at least one state stays outside the treaty, the trusting 
relationships that are embodied in the NPT will be diminished and may even be fatally 
undermined.1357 While India is not the only country to remain outside of the treaty (Israel, 
Pakistan, North Korea are the others), its integrative behavior could fundamentally 
strengthen the non-proliferation regime. During interviews for this study, Indian diplomats 
have unanimously contested the claim that India’s nuclear policy is confrontational. They are 
right to claim that since they have not signed the NPT, they have not violated it. But the 
structure of the NPT is so universal  that it virtually turned into compulsory jurisdiction in 
international proliferation law, so India confronts even without having signed the treaty. 
India’s confrontational strategy is unlikely to change in the short-term. In 2009, the 
UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1887 which called on states outside of the NPT to 
join the treaty. India immediately rejected the resolution, repeated the argument heard so 
many times that the treaty is discriminatory and strengthened the Indian prime minister’s 
statement earlier that year that there ‘is no question of India joining the NPT as a non-
nuclear weapon state’.1358 But even if India wanted to join the treaty as a nuclear weapons 
state, it would not be able to do so. In order to add India as a nuclear weapons state, all 189 
members would have to agree, something which is virtually impossible at this point. As 
Wheeler points out, even if all 189 states were to agree, it would fundamentally contradict the 
normative underpinning and principles of the NPT and the commitment of the NNWS to 
nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.1359 India is therefore certain to remain outside of 
the NPT. 
India’s behavior points to two important issues. First, India’s (and Brazil’s) critique of 
the NPT is not only about content, but also about procedure. India repeatedly points out that 
the NPT is inherently unjust and fails to award India with ‘big power status’. Second, India’s 
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behavior reveals the tensions that exist between two fundamentally different organizing 
principles of the international system: Balance of power and constitutional order. In this 
context, it seems useful to recall Ikenberry’s distinction between three different types of 
international order. The hegemonic type of order is hierarchical and possesses no restraints 
on concentrated power. Balance of power, on the other hand, is an anarchic order, made up 
of counterbalancing coalitions, and its source of stability is the equilibrium of power. Finally, 
the constitutional order’s organizing principle is the rule of law. Its binding institutions pose 
severe restraints on concentrated power, and it achieves stability by limiting the returns to 
power.  
As pointed out in section 1.2.3., today’s international order is of constitutional, rule-
based nature. The return to power is therefore limited. Yet the case of India and the NPT 
clearly show that the rule of law is not always compelling enough. India believes the rules are 
not entirely just, which reduces the incentives to engage. India has, as Part 2 has shown, 
decided to engage with and integrate in the vast majority of institutions, strengthening the 
argument that today’s constitutional world order is very attractive and bound to persist even 
as the distribution of power changes. While the case of the NPT cannot undo this argument, 
it does show that balance of power remains a reality in our constitutional system, and India is 
convinced that power still matters.  
 The tensions between the concept of balance of power and constitutional order are 
therefore one of the defining characteristics of today’s system. Fundamentally, the question is 
how valid Ikenberry’s claim about the reduced importance of power really is, and in how far 
countries agree with him. It must be pointed out in this context that emerging powers are by 
no means the only actors to engage in balancing behavior. The United States’ decision to sign 
a nuclear deal with India in 2005 was interpreted, by most analysts, as an attempt to balance 
China by strengthening a US-ally in China’s neighborhood. It thus indirectly accepted Indian 
claims that balance of power remains, despite the global constitutional system, a relevant 
paradigm in Asia.  
 Given the contrary principles that undergird balance of power and constitutionalism, 
how do the two interact? Today’s institutions and rules are complex and of multidimensional 
nature- they are generally organized according to issue area (such as in the case of the WTO), 
but at times also according to region (such as in the case of NATO). This leads to a scenario 
in which the rule of law is the dominant organizing principle, but in which there remain 
pockets where actors revert to balance of power. Security in South and East Asia is a classic 
example of how balancing continues to be the norm, defying the global trend towards 
constitutionalism. India’s refusal to integrate into the NPT is thus a consequence of this 
peculiar regional situation. Yet the Indian government’s stance affects not only the region, 
but weakens the attractiveness and effectiveness of the entire constitutional order. To keep 
the pockets of balancing behavior from enlarging, the most powerful actor in the Western 
World Order, the United States, needs to show that the return to its power is limited by the 
rule of law, and that balancing needs to take place within the institutions, rather than outside 
of them. 
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4. Conclusion: Towards the Greater West or a 
Post-Western World?  
 
What have we learned? This study has sought to show that our traditional paradigms of 
understanding and interpreting world politics are coming under strain due to fundamental 
power shifts towards non-established actors. The question of how these rising powers behave 
towards the West is difficult to answer unless we properly define the West. 
As we have shown in Section 1.1., traditional definitions of the West - using history, 
religion, culture, values, policy, and geography - are insufficient and do not stand up to 
rigorous analysis.  
Section 1.2. argued that rather than defining what the West is, we need to observe its 
practical consequences. Therefore, the best way to capture the West and understand how 
nations make use of it is by looking at international institutions. Given the West’s 
fundamental role in their creation, we can call the order they establish the ‘Western World 
Order’. This concept is post-ideological and transcends cultural, civilizational and historic 
dimensions. But more fundamentally it is the Western procedures - constitutionalism, 
representation, rules, membership, social mobility, fairness, democracy and economic 
interdependence - that undergird these institutions. 
Since the Western World Order is fundamentally about procedures, a country does 
not need to ‘westernize’ culturally in order to become part of the West. Japan is well-
integrated into the Western system, while being culturally non-Western. In the same way, 
countries do not need to democratize to integrate.1360 The Western World Order can thus 
even continue its existence under Chinese dominance as long as China chooses to rise within 
the system.1361 An expansion of the Western World Order thus cannot be confused with 
neoliberal concepts of democracy and capitalism, such as those presented in Francis 
Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man, which is a radical restatement of the 
liberalization theme.1362 For example, Indonesia can become a full member of the Western 
World Order by integrating in its institutions, irrespective of its domestic political system or 
cultural norms. 
By uniquely focusing on the procedures we gain clarity about the concept of the West, 
but we must acknowledge that there is also a content-related dimension to it, and there is a 
certain tension between these two dimensions. From the procedural point of view, the West is 
stable and survives even the rise of China. Yet could there be substantive changes within the 
established structures? 
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The claim that the democratic character of international institutions directly 
promotes ‘Western values’ such as democracy in autocratic regimes, a notion common among 
American policy makers1363, seems somewhat far-fetched. Throughout the Cold War, the 
representatives of autocratic regimes have actively participated in democratic institutions 
such as the UN General Assembly without worrying that this would somehow bring 
democracy to their countries. In addition, our previous analysis has shown that the concept 
of ‘Western values’ does not stand up to rigorous analysis.  
Still, a rule-based and democratic constitutional global order is likely to indirectly 
promote rule-based governance on the domestic level. Mandatory norms by institutions such 
as the NPT force closed regimes to open their doors to foreign inspectors, thereby fostering 
the application of international standards. The web of treaties and commitments is set to 
increase, including with regard to pervasive aspects such as climate change. In addition, 
through global norms, for example regarding human rights, today’s rule-based order affects 
governments to some degree by establishing the meaning of specific issues, such as genocide, 
and the adequate way to respond to them.1364 
We can therefore identify some relation between procedure and content, and the 
spread of the Western World Order may have a domestic impact on countries that integrate 
into today’s global order. Yet it is important to point out that issues such as human rights 
and democracy do not belong uniquely to the West. Rather, the Western World Order will 
put those concepts at an advantage that are deemed the most attractive and modern, 
irrespective of whether they are ‘Western’ or not. Once emerging powers such as China and 
India are able to define modernity and articulate the ‘best practice’ in areas such as poverty-
reduction or climate change, the rule-based Western World Order will invariably promote 
their concepts, so today’s order is not a one-way street. Thus, rather than promoting 
‘Western values’ (a concept difficult to sustain analytically) as if in a one-way street, the 
Western World Order helps spread best practices. 
The system’s supporters argue that the Western World Order is unique as it is rule-
based, open and democratic. Moderate critics mostly agree but point to problems with regard 
to distribution, and more radical opponents disagree entirely and describe it as hegemonic 
and exploitative, just like all the other previous global systems. Moderate critics are certainly 
right to point out that the system has weaknesses. Established powers seek to avoid truly 
democratic institutions such as UNCTAD and the General Assembly, and take important 
decisions in less open, more exclusive decision-making bodies such as the World Bank or the 
G20. 
However, the supporters are right. The fact that non-established countries have 
joined today’s institutions in large numbers, and their ability to rise within and thanks to the 
Western World Order, proves Ikenberry’s claim that the system is easy to join and hard to 
overturn. On needs to admit that “not all is well with the institution the world currently 
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has,”1365 and that several institutions that make up the Western World Order are not as open 
and democratic as Ikenberry claims. Yet, the fundamental argument is not that the 
institutions themselves have triumphed; rather, it is the institutions’ underlying procedures 
that have triumphed. Inconsistencies in the Western World Order exist, but they fail to 
disprove the argument about the gist of today’s institutions. 
Today’s order is of a constitutional nature, which means that its organizing principle 
is the rule of law, its binding institutions are a restraint on power, and the source of stability 
is the limits on the return to power. The major tensions will arise not between the 
constitutional nature and hegemonic elements, but between constitutionalism and balance of 
power behavior. Balancing behavior may occur within the system (“soft balancing”)1366, seen 
during trade negotiations, in which case it strengthens the institutions.1367 Balancing outside 
of the institutions, however, threatens to weaken the constitutional character of today’s 
order. Given its attractiveness and the benefits the rule-based system provides to all 
participants, rising powers will not challenge the system. Rather, they will seek to maintain 
its rule-based character. Still, even though the returns to power are much lower than in an 
anarchic system, power still matters, and the tensions between balancing behavior and the 
rules and procedures that define the constitutional order are bound to define the future of 
today’s rule-based system. 
Using this procedure- and rule-based definition of the West, we can identify a group 
of ‘fringe’ countries that is either not fully integrated into the institutions, or that seems to 
confront them frequently. The “fringe” is a problematic term, and it is merely used in this 
context to describe a group with regard to their relationship with the Western World Order. 
Other terms such as “second world”, specify a group of countries without characterizing or 
predicting any specific features. Brazil’s and India’s strategy towards institutions shows that 
the two countries belong in this “fringe category.” 
Liberal theory fundamentally supports the claim that it will be in the interest of non-
established democratic members to join the institutions. The creation of international 
institutions harks back to Kantian ideas formulated in his work Eternal Peace about the 
Pacific Union. Kantian liberal theory supports this claim and says that there is an incentive to 
collaborate internationally. One of the factors that lend strength to today’s system - 
compared to institutions before WWII - is that they are virtually all-encompassing, and they 
enjoy the support of many powerful nations. Liberal theory explains democracies’ strong 
interest in joining international institutions and predicts that Brazil and India will seek 
collaboration. Liberal theory would therefore account for India’s and Brazil’s integrative 
behavior. 
It becomes clear that we cannot make progress on either adequately explaining the 
past or predicting the future with realist or liberal theories until we have a better way of 
defining the terms for the options rising powers have. Before we turn to the case studies, we 
need to properly understand the terms such as integration, alignment, and confrontation, 
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which are not sufficiently defined to describe rising powers’ strategy. We can differentiate 
between seven types of strategies. Unconditional integration, revisionist integration, 
strengthening integration, alignment, passive confrontation, systemic confrontation and 
issue-based confrontation. Five of these options strengthen the system, two options (passive 
confrontation and systemic confrontation) weaken the system. All the other ones strengthen 
the Western World Order and contribute to the emergence of what we shall call ‘The Greater 
West’. Issue-based confrontation, often wrongly interpreted as systemic confrontation, is 
probably the most common. It has become the norm and the trademark of the Western 
World Order - for example, by denying the UN stamp of approval on U.S.-led interventions. 
Liberal theory would expect fringe nations to strengthen the system and, through their 
behavior, create a Greater West, and not a ‘Post-Western World.’ 
Part 2 shows that India and Brazil do, in fact, overwhelmingly integrate. While 
traditional foreign policy analysis deals more with a nation’s ties to other governments, this 
part analyzes Brazil’s and India’s behavior towards the major international institutions. 
Applying the categories developed in section 1.5., we can observe that Brazil’s behavior is a 
mix of mostly revisionist integration and issue-based confrontation, but with one case of 
systemic confrontation. India’s strategy consists of a combination of revisionist integration, 
issue-based confrontation and a prominent case of systemic confrontation. Both countries 
engage in systemic confrontation regarding the non-proliferation regime. 
How can we explain the exceptions? While both Brazil’s and India’s strategy is 
overwhelmingly system-strengthening, as predicted by liberal theory, we can hypothesize 
about why countries confront at times, proving the theory wrong. One hypothesis would be 
that fringe countries always engage except when they face acute security threats, such as India 
does with regard to Pakistan, and, as some argue, China. The second hypothesis would be 
that fringe countries always integrate except when they consider a particular institution, such 
as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, extremely unjust and impossible to fix through revisionist 
integration. This would also explain why Brazil has engaged in confrontational behavior in 
the absence of a security threat. 
Part 3 analyzed three case studies in detail to prove or disprove the hypotheses 
developed at the end of Part 2. The three issue-areas analyzed - the UN Security Council, 
Bretton Woods and the Non-Proliferation Treaty - are among the most important regimes of 
the Western World Order. 
The analysis of the UN Security Council shows that both Brazil and India engage in 
revisionist integration. While Brazil and India frequently criticize the Council and describe it 
as an instrument established powers use to defend their interests, they fundamentally accept 
the principles that undergird the institution and believe its problems can, albeit serious, be 
solved through reform. 
The analysis of the World Bank and IMF shows that both Brazil and India engage in 
revisionist integration. Similar to the UN Security Council, both India and Brazil feel 
established countries use the IMF and the World Bank to exploit others. But, as they play a 
more important international role and have to defend their economic interests globally, both 
Brazil and India have realized that both the IMF and the World Bank are necessary- they 
agree with the principles that undergird these institutions. Their confrontational behavior is 
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limited to the institution’s decision-making procedures, which shows that they engage in 
revisionist integration. 
The analysis of the Non-Proliferation Treaty shows that Brazil engages in systemic 
confrontation, India engages in passive confrontation. Both countries have historically had 
profound reservations about the fundamental principles of the NPT. Brazil and India initially 
refused to sign the NPT when it was drafted in 1970. Both countries antagonized early on. 
India conducted nuclear tests in 1974, Brazil secretly tried to develop nuclear weapons in the 
1970s and 1980s before officially ending its program in the 1990s. In 1998, India became more 
confrontational by conducting a second nuclear explosion while Brazil signed the NPT as a 
non-nuclear power. In 2004, however, Brazil violated the NPT by not allowing IAEA 
inspectors view its nuclear facilities. India signed a historic nuclear deal with the United 
States in 2005, which gave it de facto recognition, but it continues to refuse IAEA inspectors 
access to most of its military nuclear facilities. Both countries’ behavior undermined the 
system. Their strategy can therefore be characterized as systemic confrontation. 
It must be noted in this context that confrontational behavior with regard to the NPT 
is highly unusual. There are only six countries in the world that engage in confrontational 
behavior: Brazil, India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea and Iran. Pakistan is often 
characterized as a failed state1368, and North Korea is one of the most isolated regimes in the 
world. Iran remains, despite basic democratic structures, a theocratic dictatorship. Brazil and 
India therefore are, along with Israel, the only fully democratic countries that decide to 
engage in confrontational behavior with regard to the NPT. 
Confrontational behavior in the context of the non-proliferation regime also has 
serious consequences for global security. This does not mean that Brazil and India are wrong 
to engage in this particular strategy. Yet they cannot deny that their behavior significantly 
reduces the stability of the proliferation regime, which directly increases the risk of 
proliferation and, indirectly, nuclear terrorism. Iran does not allow IAEA inspectors see its 
nuclear facilities because it points to Brazil’s behavior. Brazil closes the doors of its nuclear 
facilities and asks why it has to obey rules that India does not need to obey. In addition, 
Brazil has continuously opposed the adoption of more stringent inspection rules, thus 
undermining more effective non-proliferation mechanism. 
Brazil’s and India’s confrontational behavior towards the NPT can be explained not 
by costs that outweigh the benefits, but by Brazil’s and India’s belief that this particular 
institution is highly unjust and its problems impossible to fix. The NPT does not provide 
them with the intra-institutional mobility they require as emerging powers who seek to rise in 
the system. India’s confrontational behavior with regard to the NPT is often justified by the 
high cost it entails in the context of to security concerns, and the few benefits it provides. 
This may certainly influence India’s behavior to some degree, in the same way that security 
issues partially explain Israel’s decision to confront the NPT and develop nuclear weapons. 
But a careful analysis shows that nuclear weapons have done little to improve India’s 
security. As Stephen Cohen argues, “India’s security [after the 1998 test] stands in more - not 
less - jeopardy”, given that India’s conventional weapons’ superiority over Pakistan is now 
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worthless.1369 One year after openly assuming nuclear status, the so-called Kargil War broke 
out between India and Pakistan.1370 Nuclear weapons are unlikely to ever be used in a 
conflict, so their practical use is limited. Several diplomats have conceded during interviews 
that India’s and China’s nuclear status is unlikely to render a convential war between the two 
impossible. In addition, they affirm that India would prefer a world without nuclear 
weapons, and that it would be no obstacle once all nuclear powers would begin do destroy 
their stockpiles.1371 India’s violation of the NPT can best be explained by India’s frustration 
that the NPT is unjust, undemocratic, and unable to provide India with ‘first-class’ status it 
feels it deserves. Precisely this possibility is, even if at times remotely, a key characteristic of 
all the other institutions of the Western World Order. Even institutions as inflexible as the 
UN Security Council and the IMF provide emerging powers with some perspective that they 
may eventually be granted the great power status. The possibility that the NPT will grant this 
possibility is too small for India to take the chance. The key moment came in 1995, when the 
Clinton administration succeeded in extending the NPT indefinitely, perpetuating, in India’s 
eyes, an unequal nuclear regime.1372 As Nayar and Paul point out, it constituted a “turning 
point” for India as it viewed the extension as a US attempt to foreclose India’s rise for 
good.1373 
The case is even more pronounced regarding Brazil. The first hypothesis cannot 
explain Brazil’s systemic confrontation, given that it does not face any acute security threat. 
Quite to the contrary, Brazil’s foreign policy strategy can be characterized by the complete 
lack thereof.1374 As Matias Spektor points out, Brazil does not engage in systemic 
confrontation because such behavior would not provide it with any tangible benefits. Rather, 
Lula seeks to make a broader argument that parts of the international system, such as the 
NPT, are fundamentally unjust.1375 He uses the same line of argument to explain Brazil’s 
unprecedented involvement in the dispute between Iran and the developed world.1376 Brazil 
believes the NPT is unjust and that the treaty does not grant Brazil the status it requires as an 
aspiring power. This is a striking finding because it clearly contradicts realists’ predictions. 
Opposing the NPT with its decision to close the doors of its nuclear facilities to the IAEA’s 
inspectors, Brazil gains nothing tangible. But even if Brazil sought to develop nuclear 
weapons, its strategic gains would be negative: With no security threat in the region and no 
declared enemy, Brazil has no need for a deterrent. Obtaining nuclear weapons could cause 
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Argentina and Venezuela to pursue nuclear weapons and cause a Latin American arms race 
reminiscent of the 1970s. 
Seen from a systemic perspective, India’s behavior reveals the tension that exists 
between a fundamentally constitutionalist international system and pockets where balancing 
behavior is still the norm. Balancing is not limited to emerging powers, and the United States’ 
decision to elevate India’s status to recognized nuclear power has rightly been interpreted as 
balancing behavior. The institutional cobweb that enmeshes all actors is particularly weak in 
South and East Asia. There is no “Asian NATO”, and the source of stability in the region is 
not the limits on the return to power, but the equilibrium of power. The consequences extend 
beyond Asia and affect the entire nuclear proliferation regime, and with it the whole 
constitutionalist international order. This tension exists because nations such as India are not 
fully convinced that power no longer matters as much as it used to. Incentives to engage in 
balancing behavior need to be dealt with in two ways. 
First, the ‘justice deficit’ needs to be reduced and intra-institutional mobility needs to 
increased, especially with regard to the non-proliferation regime. The NPT constitutes a 
fundamental exception to Ikenberry’s claim about the Western World Order. As section 3.3. 
shows, the NPT is not as attractive as all the other institutions analyzed in this study. In the 
interviews conducted, no diplomat agreed that the NPT was “democratic, open and just.” 
Guimarães, one of the most powerful individuals in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, called 
President Cardoso’s decision to sign the NPT a “mistake”.1377 This is particularly surprising 
in the Brazilian case, as Brazil signed the NPT in 1998, and the government argues that it does 
not violate the NPT. This is not merely rhetoric. President Lula is known to disparage many 
institutions, including the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO and the UN Security Council.1378 
But, differently to the NPT, Brazilian diplomats and policy makers agree that the 
fundamentals of the WTO, the UNSC and Bretton Woods are sound. The only way to 
address these problems is for nuclear weapons states to take more visible steps towards 
disarmament. Only then will powers such as India and Brazil regard the NPT as a genuine 
element of the constitutional order, and not an attempt to “freeze” current international 
power structures. Increased intra-institutional mobility will therefore increase an institutions’ 
attractiveness, its membership, and thus, its legitimacy. This may temporarily make 
negotiations more difficult, just as politics in democratic India is often slower and more 
cumbersome than in autocratic China, were fewer parties take part in the decision-making 
process. Long and at times frustrating negotiations, such as those on global trade and those 
on climate change, are thus unlikely to become less intricate.  
Secondly, the most powerful nation in today’s constitutional order, the United States, 
must show that the limits on the return to power apply to all actors, including itself. 
Emerging powers only resort to balancing behavior if they believe that power, not rules, 
remains the ultimate arbiter in international politics. The United States must therefore use its 
position to exercise leadership by adhering to the rules it wants rising actors to respect now, 
and also once America no longer plays the dominant position it plays today. 
                                                 
1377 Glüsing, Jens (2010). Der Spiegel. Baut Brasilien eine Atombombe, Herr Minister? May 10, 2010 
1378 See, for example: Nossa, Leonencio (2009). Lula diz que crise é causada por 'gente branca de olhos 
azuis', Estado de São Paulo, March 26, 2009, http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/economia,crise-foi-
causada-por-gente-branca-e-de-olhos-azuis-diz-lula,345255,0.htm (accessed Dec 30, 2009) 
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What do the results of this analysis mean for the Western World Order? The analysis 
shows that in the vast majority of cases, Ikenberry’s claim that the system is open, 
democratic, rule-based and therefore easy to join and hard to overturn is correct. The 
Western World Order is indeed unique and historically unprecedented, and there is a strong 
likelihood that the Western World Order will persist - a scenario we have termed the ‘Greater 
West’.1379 
Non-established powers agree with the claim and join today’s institutions because 
they consider them as fundamentally just and mutually beneficial. The argument that 
countries join the Western World Order out of coercion is unconvincing. For example, 
neither Brazil nor India were forced to become IMF lenders. Quite to the contrary, their move 
was highly surprising and historic, given that they had been IMF recipients until very 
recently. This is good news for the supporters of today’s Western World Order. Brazil’s and 
India’s engagement will significantly strengthen the existing institutions and increase their 
legitimacy further. The IMF is a good example for an institution that has successfully turned 
former recipients into donors. While both still receive loans from the World Bank, they have 
already begun to assume leadership in this organization, strengthening its legitimacy and 
effectiveness. The same logic applies to other organizations such as the WTO, which has been 
fiercely criticized by Brazil and India, but which succeeded in creating a stable framework 
that helped countries “agree how to disagree” on matters of trade. Furthermore, non-
established countries are able to prosper within and thanks to the system. It is particularly 
this detail that makes the Western World Order stronger than any previous system. It allows 
new entrants to rise, which in turn increases their interests in engaging more profoundly in 
the system due to their ever more global interests. There is a “virtuous circle” at work which 
makes the current order stronger through every new entrant. Few aspects epitomize the 
strength of the Western World Order better than Brazil’s and India’s strategy vis-à-vis today’s 
international institutions. 
                                                 
1379 Robert Gilpin rightly points out that there has been some social mobility in earlier system. During 
the Pax Britannica, for example, countries other than the hegemon grew, at times faster than the 
hegemon itself. Gilpin, Robert (1975). US Power and the Multinational Corporation. New York: Basic 
Books, 1975 
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EPILOGUE 
 
“The next morning, as the sun was rising, the animals were still gathered with the heads of 
state around the negotiation table. (…) Oscar, the elephant, said: If you don’t sign the treaty 
in two minutes, (…), I will talk to the people who have gathered outside, and you will not 
govern for much longer. Then, finally, the men pulled their pencils and signed the document. 
The animals had won! 
 The treaty the heads of state had signed, said: We, the responsible representatives of 
all nations on earth, oblige ourselves with our life and our property to implement the 
following policies: 1. All border posts and border guards will be removed. 2. The army and 
all fire weapons and bombs will be destroyed. There will be no more wars. 3. The police 
responsible for maintaining order will be equipped with bows and arrows. It needs to assure 
that science and technology are used for peaceful purposes (…) 4. The number of offices, 
public employees and filing cabinets will be reduced to the absolute minimum. Offices are for 
people, not vice versa. 5. The public employees with the highest salaries will be the teachers. 
The task to educate the children to become real human beings is the most important and 
most difficult task. The goal of education shall be that our hearts can no longer be idle!” 
 
- Erich Kaestner, The Animals’ Conference (1988) 
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